Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
9-17-2021 10:30 AM

The Problems Facing the International Criminal Court: African
Perspectives
Sarah Nimigan, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Quinn, Joanna R., The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Political Science
© Sarah Nimigan 2021

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nimigan, Sarah, "The Problems Facing the International Criminal Court: African Perspectives" (2021).
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 8186.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/8186

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
Since the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has faced serious
problems and has been subject to criticism, particularly from African states. More
specifically, some African states have argued that the operation of the Court has produced
outcomes that are vastly different from what was imagined and hoped for at the time the
Court was negotiated in 1998. The dissertation answers four interrelated research questions:
(1) What kind of International Criminal Court (ICC) did African states want prior to and
during the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998? (2) Why did African states ratify the Rome
Statute more than any other region even though they did not get the kind of Court that they
wanted? (3) What are the origins of the criticisms levied by African states against the ICC?
(4) Why, despite the compromises reached in Rome, and the significant criticism levied
against the resultant ICC since, would African states commit and/or stay committed to the
Court by signing, ratifying, and implementing the Rome Statute into domestic law more than
any other region? The dissertation employs constructivist international relations theory and
makes the overall argument that the active and meaningful engagement on the part of African
governments and African individuals in the Rome Statute/ICC project from its earliest stages
of development has created a deep normative commitment to the resultant Court, which, at
times, overrides rationality and self-interest explanations of state behaviour.

Keywords
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute, international criminal law, international
diplomacy, African Union, Africa, multilateralism.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This dissertation offers insight into the problems facing the International Criminal Court
(ICC or Court) from African perspectives. The analytical focus is on the ICC’s interactions in
Africa since the only completed cases at the Court have involved African situations and
African suspects at the time of writing. The dissertation considers how the ICC was designed
and constructed as a result of the multilateral negotiations at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference in 1998. It then evaluates how the compromises reached in Rome have or have
not affected the resultant Court’s work, especially on the African continent. With this in
mind, the dissertation provides answers to the following four questions: (1) What kind of
ICC did African states want prior to and during the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998?
(2) Why did African states ratify the Rome Statute more than any other region even though
they did not get the kind of Court that they wanted? (3) What are the origins of the criticisms
levied by African states against the ICC? and (4) Why, despite the compromises reached in
Rome, and the significant criticism levied against the resultant ICC since, would African
states commit and/or stay committed to the Court by signing, ratifying, and implementing the
Rome Statute into domestic law, more than any other region? The overall argument is that
the active role that African states and African individuals occupied with respect to the ICC
project from its earliest stages of institutional development provides an answer to all four
questions. The dissertation provides a thorough account of African involvement in the ICC
project, including the preferences of African governments at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference using a constructivist international relations theoretical approach. Such an
understanding provides the necessary backdrop to evaluate the problems facing the ICC in its
current institutional form, from the perspective of some African states and/or the African
Union based on both rational and normative factors.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

The formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC or ‘Court’) was agreed to with
the successful conclusion of the Rome Diplomatic Conference (Rome Conference) on 17
July 1998. The Rome Conference was attended by representatives from 160 states;
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs); intergovernmental organizations; and
other specialized agencies. The successful adoption of the Rome Statute of the
International Court (Rome Statute) signalled a collective commitment to the creation of a
permanent international criminal court, which would function as a court of last resort to
ensure criminal accountability for the most serious violations of international law (i.e.
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression) if domestic justice
mechanisms prove unable or unwilling to do so. The ICC entered into force on 1 July
2002, after the Rome Statute received the required sixty ratifications to become operable.
The Court has undergone growing pains in the time since. But in particular, some of the
African states have voiced their displeasure in what has been framed as the Court’s bias
against or targeting of them. In the popular press and in some emerging scholarship, there
has been much discussion about whether the African states understood that they might be
treated as unequal partners when they signed on to the Court. And whether they would,
indeed, remain a part of the Rome Statute System by remaining States Parties to the ICC.
This dissertation measures the seriousness of the compromises made at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court from the
perspective of African states and explores the explanatory value of those compromises in
the context of contemporary criticism of the resultant Court. It is well understood that
African states took a particularly active role in the negotiation of the Rome Statute at
various junctures. This engagement offers a means to establish what kind of court African
states really wanted, as well as the ability to measure the correlative disparities that
emerged in the final negotiated text of the Rome Statute. This approach contributes to the
growing discourse on the relationship between the negotiated text of the Rome Statute
and the well-documented operational weaknesses of the resultant ICC, which have
revealed themselves largely through the Court’s behaviour in African situations and
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contexts. The reasons for the Court’s hyper-focused engagement in African situations and
contexts are manifold and justifiable in many respects. Nevertheless, the willingness of
African states to remain committed to the ICC more than any other region, coupled with
longstanding normative investment in the ICC project, fosters a sense that the criticisms
raised by African governments and the African Union against the Court ought to be taken
seriously and given due consideration.1 This is important for the holism of the ICC as an
institution within the international political landscape that represents the values and
norms surrounding principles of human rights, human security, and justice (broadly
considered), and as a last chance judicial mechanism that ensures accountability for the
most serious violations of international criminal law when all else has failed in the
interest of achieving long-term peace, stability, and transitional justice objectives in the
aftermath of serious conflict and violence.2
This research situates itself within the context of the Africa-ICC relationship,
which can be understood and conceptualized differently throughout the Court’s history.
Early development of the Rome Statute and the idea of an ICC was largely supported by
African states. This support continued when the Rome Statute was adopted, most
demonstrably evidenced by the fact that African states have signed, ratified, and
implemented the Rome Statute more than any other region in the world. Notwithstanding
this, African support for the ICC began to wane following the Court’s indictment of
African leaders, particularly Omar al-Bashir of Sudan in 2009 and others such as Uhuru
Kenyatta of Kenya in 2011, and to a lesser extent, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011.
These indictments created a serious conflict of interest for African governments, which
were forced to choose whether to continue diplomatic relations with government leaders

1

It is important to highlight that the use of the phrase ‘more than any other region’ refers to the level of
support and commitment to the ICC based on the geographic regions established by the United Nations and
employed by the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC. It is important to note that 34 out of 54 African
States have ratified the Rome Statute (63 per cent). While it may be possible to base comparative support
for the ICC on the percentage of states that have ratified the Rome Statute within each region, it is well
established that African States comprise the largest regional bloc of signatories and this is what is being
referred to throughout this dissertation.

2

It is acknowledged and understood that the aims and objectives of the ICC are understood and
conceptualized differently within the literature and is the subject of wide debate. See, for example
Catherine Gegout, “The International Criminal Court: limits, potential and conditions for the promotion of
justice and peace,” Third World Quarterly 34.5 (2013): 800-818.
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that were also indicted suspects at the ICC, or else to cooperate with the Court by
arresting and surrendering those same indicted suspects. The unanimous decision by
African governments not to arrest and surrender indicted heads of state was justified by
them on claims of double standards, unfair targeting, and neocolonialism, since the ICC
was failing to pursue perpetrators of serious international crimes from any region other
than Africa.
This conflict came to a head in 2016, when several African states voiced their
intent to withdraw from the Rome Statute. Often couched in rhetoric surrounding an
‘Africa-ICC crisis,’ attempts by the African Union to incite a continent-wide mass
withdrawal movement, supported in large part by a handful of vocal governments,
seriously threatened the trajectory of the ICC’s role in the African region. The Gambia
and South Africa filed formal notices of withdrawal in 2016 but reversed those decisions.
Burundi did formally withdraw from the ICC in 2017. Yet, some of the most vocal
opponents of the Court such as Kenya and Uganda have remained States Parties to the
Rome Statute despite threats of withdrawal. This peculiar inconsistency between policy
and rhetoric offers a nuanced lens through which to analyze the intricacies of the ICC’s
involvement on the African continent, approaches to institutional reform or alternative
mechanisms of justice on the continent, and the state of the international criminal justice
norm in Africa, more generally.

1.1 Research Questions and Explanation of the Research Project
The dissertation answers four interrelated research questions: (1) What kind of ICC did
African states want prior to and during the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998? (2)
Why did African states ratify the Rome Statute more than any other region even though
they did not get the kind of Court that they wanted? (3) What are the origins of the
criticisms levied by African states against the ICC? and (4) Why, despite the
compromises reached in Rome, and the significant criticism levied against the resultant
ICC since, would African states commit and/or stay committed to the Court by signing,
ratifying, and implementing the Rome Statute into domestic law, more than any other
region? Africa is conceptualized as a ‘region’ throughout the dissertation as opposed to a
continent, to provide consistency both within the existing discourse and the ICC’s use of
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the five geographic regions of the world as established by the United Nations, i.e.,
African States, Asia-Pacific States, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States,
Eastern European States, and Western Europe and Other States. The dissertation employs
constructivist theory and makes the overall argument that active and meaningful
engagement on the part of African governments and African individuals in the Rome
Statute project from its earliest stages has enmeshed a deep normative commitment to the
ICC that at times, overrides rationality and self-interest in tangible ways.
The dissertation also places a special focus on the conceptualization of the ICC
project as a vehicle to reorder the global hierarchy. Thus, the most significant
compromises throughout the Rome Statute negotiations for many African governments
involved the role of the United Nations Security Council to refer cases to the ICC, or
defer ongoing ICC cases, and the decision to exclude nuclear weapons from the
prohibited list–both of which involved, insulated, and further protected only the smallest
group of most powerful states. The dissertation emphasizes that African states were
averse to the enmeshment of politics within the architecture of a prospective ICC and
many of the issues raised by some African states and the African Union with the resultant
Court’s operationalization can readily be traced back to concerns illuminated by African
delegates and governments from as early as 1994 with respect to politicization and Court
independence. Notwithstanding this, the longstanding historical involvement and
ownership of the ICC project has created an environment where most African
governments continue to support the ICC and governments that have openly criticized the
Court have decided to express opposition from within the Rome Statute System.3 This is
evidenced not only by sustained African membership to the Court compromising the
largest regional bloc of States Parties, but also with active involvement within procedural
processes, such as the comparatively high number of judicial nominations from the
African region to fill vacancies on the ICC bench, for example.

3

The Rome Statute System refers to the obligation placed upon States Parties to include the contents of the
Rome Statute into domestic law, which is referred to as implementation. It also refers to the obligation of
States Parties to cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of crimes under its
jurisdiction. It also touches on the principle of complementarity, which says that the jurisdiction of the ICC
is only triggered if national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate and/or prosecute international
crimes.
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In the context of the African Union (AU), it emphasizes pan-Africanism under the
auspice of ‘African solutions to African problems,’ which includes efforts to regionalize
international criminal justice through the expansion of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights to cover the same types of crimes as those enumerated in the Rome Statute
in relation to the ‘Malabo Protocol.’ Interestingly, African governments have been slow
to ratify the Malabo Protocol and have remained strongly committed to the Rome Statute.
The dissertation argues that the expression of a pan-Africanist vision of an international
criminal justice mechanism offers another layer of information about what kind of
international criminal court African states want and the ways in which the ICC fails to
satisfy those wants. While the AU efforts to regionalize international criminal law vis-àvis the Malabo Protocol can be framed either positively or negatively, the substance of
this effort is revealed by digging deeper into the historical trajectory on the continent with
respect to what an ICC was hoped to be and how the resultant court has manifestly failed
to achieve those ideals in some significant respects. In many ways, attempts to
regionalize international criminal law can be framed as a response to the aversion to
disproportionate paternalism and subjugation by the international community–Europe in
particular–especially if (more) local responses might be possible. Yet, the dissertation
highlights that the African governments that have sought to include regional mechanisms
within the Rome Statute System under the auspice of complementarity have sought to do
so under a cooperative and integrative guise. This approach yields far more productive
possibilities for the development and strengthening of the international criminal justice
norm altogether and ought to be considered as an avenue for the continued development
of the ICC’s jurisdiction regime.

1.2

Overall Importance of the Research Project

The research project’s greatest value is its contribution to a better understanding,
contextualization, and situation of African concerns and criticisms with the institutional
behavior of the International Criminal Court. Since at the time of writing the ICC has
only completed cases that are located on the African continent, it is fundamentally
important to take stock of the institutional shortcomings and problems that have become
apparent through its engagement in those situations and contexts. This can only be
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possible with genuine engagement with the issues raised by those most affected by the
Court, coupled with ongoing communicative strategies whether in the academy or in
practice under the auspice of remedy or else reform. While the argument that the ICC is
still a ‘young’ institution is losing rigor, the problems that have been observed throughout
its operationalization have persisted in many respects.
Plainly, an evaluation of the ICC’s performance cannot be measured outside of
the African contexts in which it has disproportionately operated. Since the ICC depends
on membership from states, and African states comprise the largest regional bloc of
States Parties to the Rome Statute, it makes good sense to take African concerns
seriously. This is in the broad interest of institutional self-reflexivity, including potential
avenues for reform, but is also necessary for the long-term sustainability and holism of
the ICC altogether. This is especially the case since the choice to be bound by the Rome
Statute System is entirely voluntary and can be revoked at any time. While the ICC has
become a permanent fixture in the global political and legal landscape, its ability to
operate effectively is facilitated by an expansive membership that is committed to the
shared normative values that undergird the Court through a cooperative arrangement
between a broad membership of states and the ICC.
This dissertation is important because it offers a more inclusive and complete
historical narrative about the significant role that African states and Africans played in
the negotiation of the Rome Statute from the earliest stages of its ideational development
and African preferences expressed during the Rome Diplomatic Conference. In many
respects, the existing literature acknowledges the engagement on the part of ‘Africa’ in
the negotiation of the Rome Statute, though with limited detail and explanation. The
account provided herein is in-depth and illuminates the substantive agency that African
governments and African delegates exercised throughout the Rome Statute negotiation
processes, which gives African concerns a considerable amount of normative weight.
This level of engagement is important to document because it yields explanatory value in
terms of sustained African commitment to the ICC, even among African states and the
AU that have openly criticized the Court. A better understanding of the ways in which
‘Africa’ authored the ICC project allows for a more accurate situating of the fluidity
between the subject-agent relationship experienced by ‘Africa’ through its complex and
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intersubjective engagement with the ICC. Notwithstanding this, the dissertation also
bears in mind the political hierarchy of the international political system, which is
acknowledged as a structurally limiting factor in any international negotiation or
institutional apparatus created by states. Thus, it is even more crucial to acknowledge the
ways in which traditionally weak states such as those in Africa influenced the Rome
Statute negotiations, while simultaneously acknowledging the limitations of such
influence with respect to the final outcome.
In terms of the Rome Statute negotiations, the preferences expressed by African
states are synthesized in this dissertation and provide a novel understanding of how
African states imagined the design of the ICC in its ideal form. This is central to an
understanding of how the final text of the Rome Statute either satisfied or failed to reflect
the desired outcome as expressed by African states throughout the negotiations. The
knowledge generated from this research provides a lens through which to evaluate the
significance of the compromises reached in Rome, which has explanatory potential for
making better sense of the observed problems with the resultant ICC’s operationalization
in African contexts as well as African responses to those problems–i.e. the
regionalization of the international criminal law at the AU Court in an effort to provide
an alternative or extrajudicial mechanism to the ICC. In short, the dissertation offers a
more complete account of African involvement in the ICC project, which provides a
framework that generates more nuanced understandings of the origins of the
contemporary criticisms of the ICC. The dissertation repositions African concerns with
the ICC in their appropriate historical context, which reveals far more deep-seated
political problems and manifestations of those problems that are worthy of
acknowledgement and inclusion in any analysis that examines how African states engage
with the Rome Statute and/or the ICC.

1.3

Chapter Outline

The remainder of the dissertation is organized into eleven substantive chapters. Chapter
two outlines the methodology employed by this research project. The chapter provides a
formulation of the proposed research questions, relevant hypotheses, and research tools
employed throughout. It offers an overview and justification for the use of process
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tracing as its chosen methodology; it explores the value of elite interviewing and content
analysis as invaluable tools of process tracing research, both of which are employed
throughout this dissertation.
Chapter three provides a review of the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations,
as well as the substantive aspects of the ‘Africa-ICC’ relationship, and generally
observed problems with the ICC throughout the course of its operationalization. The
literature has identified the role of African states throughout the negotiation of the Rome
Statute, but has manifestly failed to provide a conceptualization of an ICC from an
African perspective in substantive detail. Some research has begun to interrogate whether
the compromises reached in Rome were too material but very few have situated this
question within the Africa-ICC contention. This dissertation revisits the compromises
reached in Rome and places them within the context of the more contemporary problems
that some African states and the AU have cited with respect to the operation of the ICC.
In this respect, the compromises reached at the Rome Diplomatic Conference are used as
explanatory factors that have had long-lasting effects on the Court’s efficacy and
legitimacy.
Chapter four provides background on the Rome Statute negotiation processes in
the time period leading up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference. The chapter maps the
historical development of the idea of a permanent international criminal court apropos the
United Nations and the International Law Commission. The chapter places a special
emphasis on the role of African states and African delegates within the United Nations
processes to develop such a court. Chapter four provides the necessary context and
background to better understand the political climate within which the idea of an ICC
gained traction, its historical underpinnings and trajectory, as well as the relevant place
that African states and African politicians occupied within the conceptualization and
development of a permanent ICC.
Chapter five considers African preferences on the Court’s jurisdiction, with a
special emphasis on the potential role of the United Nations Security Council, as well as
the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation on his or her own volition, i.e.
proprio motu. Chapter six is closely related to chapter five and considers African
positions on key issues at the Rome Diplomatic Conference with respect to crimes,
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including the inclusion of internal armed conflicts; the prohibition of terrorism and drug
trafficking; and the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the prohibited list. In combination,
the fifth and sixth chapters provide the foundation for the remainder of the dissertation,
since it is the preferences expressed by African delegates in the plenary meetings at the
Rome Diplomatic Conference on the most contentious issues of the Rome Statute that
provide the means to construct an idealized ‘African’ construction of an ICC. This
provides a basis to better make sense of the serious of the compromises reached in Rome
from an African perspective and consider those compromises as explanatory of the
subsequent operational deficiencies cited by some African states and the AU with respect
to the Court.
Chapter seven provides an analysis of why African states have chosen to commit
to the Rome Statute despite the substantive compromises reached at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference, more than any other region. It considers African commitment to the Rome
Statute using constructivist and rational choice models of international relations theory
and provides an explanatory analysis of ICC commitment using Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya
as its case studies using two-level game theory. The chapter places an emphasis on
domestic and international political contexts as factors that explain the choice to commit
to the Rome Statute and stay committed to it, even if it runs contrary to traditional
notions of self-interest to do so.
Chapter eight explores the emergence of the deterioration of the relationship
between Africa and the ICC, using the indictment of former Sudanese President Omar alBashir as the primary catalyst for this deterioration. The problems that some African
states, and the AU in particular, have had with the ICC as a result of the indictment of a
then sitting head of state are considered in normative (and to a lesser degree) legal terms.
The important contribution of this chapter is that it links the compromise reached in
Rome to give the United Nations Security Council the ability to refer situations to the
ICC, including those in non-states parties (as Sudan was at the time it was referred), as
explanatory of the criticisms subsequently launched from an African perspective. The
chapter highlights African aversion to the politicization of the ICC from the earliest
stages of its institutional development. The integration of deep politics, especially with
respect to the Security Council’s ability to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction, was a

10

significant compromise for many African states. The chapter does not dispute the
justifications for the ICC’s intervention in the situation in Darfur, but instead places an
emphasis on the interrelated political consequences of the Security Councils’ decision to
do so in that situation but not others of comparable gravity. Even if the ICC had good
reason to be involved in Darfur, the uneven application of the same norms in all
situations triggered sensitivities and subjected the ICC regime to serious scrutiny.
Coupled with the Court’s decision to indict a sitting head of state, concern that the Court
could be used to incite regime change in Africa whether a state consented to its authority
or not, with all of the correlative destabilizing effects associated by the creation of an
internationally (politically) imposed power vacuum, were very real. This was the fear that
African states clearly expressed as early as 1994, which in many ways has contributed to
a pan-Africanist pushback against the ICC and attempts to establish alternative judicial
mechanisms as a response to similar crimes.
Chapter nine evaluates AU efforts to regionalize international criminal law
through the expansion of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights with reference
to the Malabo Protocol, which includes many of the same crimes that are covered by the
Rome Statute. This chapter interrogates whether regional mechanisms could or ought to
fit within the Rome Statutes’ conceptualization of complementarity which, as written,
only enumerates a relationship between the ICC and domestic courts. This chapter argues
that the embodiment of international criminal law enumerated in the Malabo Protocol is
inherently useful for an understanding of what African states want and need out of an
international criminal justice judicial mechanism that is apparently lacking at the ICC.
The chapter argues that the Malabo Protocol offers an opportunity to prosecute far more
crimes than the ICC can, crimes that are most relevant to the continent and may actually
undergird and/or finance the perpetration of the perhaps more serious crimes covered by
the Rome Statute. Thus, it argues that the integration of regional mechanisms such as the
Malabo Protocol within the international criminal justice schema offers an opportunity to
contribute to the evolution of a robust system of justice.
Chapter ten explores the ways in which African states remain engaged and
committed to the ICC by exploring the disproportionately high number of judicial
nominations to the ICC bench from African states. This chapter maps African
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representation on the ICC bench, as well as the number of nominations from the region.
The chapter considers the reasons for African engagement in judicial nomination
processes, and also considers what types of candidates are most likely to be successfully
elected. The chapter provides a means to contextualize sustained commitment to the
Rome Statute System, and an ability to further recast Africans as important authors of
justice at the ICC.
Chapter eleven, the final chapter, concludes the dissertation. It maps the
importance and significance of the research and summarizes its primary arguments with
respect to the proposed research questions. The conclusion reemphasizes the role that
African states and Africans played in the negotiation of the Rome Statute and highlights
the importance of the fact that many African states and politicians viewed the ICC as a
vehicle to restructure the global hierarchy. The ways in which the final text of the Rome
Statute reflected the interests of the most powerful states represented the most substantive
compromises required of African states when deciding to voluntarily sign, ratify, and
implement the Rome Statute. Though African states have raised substantive problems
with the ICC throughout the course of its operationalization, almost all have continued to
remain States Parties, and many have sought to insight change from within the Rome
Statute System. As such, the ways in which African concerns can be meaningfully
considered and responded to remain a vitally important imperative for the long-term
success of the Court, since Africa has been the disproportionate subject of the ICC’s
intervention. If the ICC is to continue to evolve in terms of its institutional robustness, it
ought to take African concerns seriously in order to avoid repeating mistakes in future
situations and contexts. The tenth chapter resituates the dissertation within the literature
on the Rome Statute negotiations and the Africa-ICC relationship. Areas for future
research are considered as part of a broader research agenda.
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Chapter 2

2

Methodology

This dissertation interrogates whether the compromises made by states in the 1998 Rome
Statute negotiations can help explain the problems with the International Criminal Court
(ICC), which have been most notably illuminated through the Court’s interaction with
(and in) African states from 2003 to the time of writing. Process tracing has been
employed as its methodology. This is an inductive qualitative study ultimately intended
to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of the underlying complexities and the
dynamism of concerns that are at the heart of the at-times strained Africa-ICC
relationship.1Process tracing allows for an interrogation of necessary and sufficient
conditions, as well as the sequence of the breakdown in the Africa-ICC relationship that
precedes the purview of observable contemporary phenomena.2 The guiding hypothesis
of the project was that the compromises made when drafting the Rome Statute in 1998
could help to explain and better understand the identifiable problems that many African
states have had with the operationalization of the ICC. The fact that African states had
taken such an active role in the establishment of the ICC and have committed more to the
Rome Statute than any other region, makes the breakdown of the relationship even more
curious and significant. The dissertation uses Africa as a ‘region’ instead of a continent in
keeping with the ICC’s use of the United Nations five geographic regions of the world
(African States, Asia-Pacific States, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States,
Eastern European States, and Western Europe and Other States Group). This provides
consistency and continuity in the discourse. The dissertation chooses to look at the group
of African States because many of the criticisms levied against the ICC from the African
continent have originated from a pan-Africanist purview – i.e., the African Union.
Moreover, the group of African States had signed and ratified the Rome Statute more
than any other geographic region at the time of writing and had also been subjected to the
behaviour of the ICC comparatively more than any other region.

1

Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013): 11-12.
2
David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44.4 (2011): 823-30.
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The guiding questions of the dissertation were the following: (1) What did
African states want out of a permanent international criminal court? (2) Why did African
states ratify the Rome Statute even though they did not get what they wanted? (3) What
are the origins of African criticisms towards the ICC? and (4) Why, despite the
compromises reached in Rome, would African states commit and stay committed to the
ICC by signing, ratifying, and implementing the treaty into domestic law, more than any
other region? I hypothesized that the answer to the fourth question was related to the
ownership, activism, and agency that many African states exercised in the establishment
of the ICC from the earliest stages of its development (both ideationally and
operationally). This history translated into a primordial normative commitment to
international criminal justice and accountability that informed the identity and interests of
many African states, over and above self-interest.

2.1

Process Tracing

According to Collier, process tracing is defined as the “systematic examination of
diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses
posed by the researcher.”3 In order to answer the first question, i.e. What did African
states want out of a permanent international criminal court?, I began by conducting a
content analysis of relevant United Nations documents. Specifically, I analyzed the
following documents: the statements of African delegates as well as their publications
and reports that were presented at the six Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) sessions
before the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1994-1998); the statements of African
delegates in plenary at the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1998); and statements made by
delegates post-Rome at the Preparatory Commission and at the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute. The research design relied on the selection of particular
variables, for example, the independence of the Court from political influence, the
automatic jurisdiction mechanism, the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor, and state
cooperation obligations. While some depth may have been lost through the selection of

3

Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” 823.
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these variables, doing so did not undermine the greater value of the project, but instead
provided the appropriate scope to begin to answer the proposed research questions.
James Mahoney explains that “process tracing tests can be used to help establish
that (1) an initial event or process took place, (2) a subsequent outcome also occurred,
and (3) the former was a cause of the latter.”4 This is quite plainly what this research
project is seeking to establish. That is, (1) there were substantive compromises made in
Rome in order to ensure that the Diplomatic Conference was a success; (2) African states
were once active supporters of the Rome Statute and the ICC, but that relationship was
severely strained after the ICC began its operationalization; (3) and the compromises
made in Rome caused, at least in part, the deficiencies in the ICC’s operationalization
which have strained the relationship between some African states and the Court. Thus,
process tracing is a logical methodological choice and is particularly well suited to the
theoretical aims of this dissertation. As Mahoney explains, process tracing “is arguably
the most important tool of causal inference in qualitative and case study research.5” On
this basis, the hypothesis is evaluated to determine if there is a causal connection between
two or more events or processes. This is achieved by applying rigorous research
standards relying on what Collier, Brady, and Seawright refer to as causal-process
observations (diagnostic pieces of evidence), which may or may not be used in
combination with generalizations relevant to the analysis.6 While the research suggests
that a causal connection might exist between two or more events or processes, the
dissertation is not meant as a causal explanation, as such. Instead, it seeks to provide a
richer explanation and understanding of those processes, which is valuable independently
or combined with other analytical approaches.
It is not the aim of this project to prove or argue that the ICC is ineffective or
deficient. Rather, the project takes the existing literature and works backwards to better

4

James Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,” Sociological Methods and
Research (2012), 2.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid. See also David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, “Sources of Leverage in Causal
Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools,
Shared Standards, 2nd edition, eds. Hendry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
2010): 161-199.
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understand the troubled relationship between Africa and the ICC, based on the
institutional deficiencies cited in the literature. This could only be done with an effective
data collection method. To this end, I gathered as much information as possible from
primary and secondary literature and combined these findings with the content analyses
mentioned hereto.

2.2

Analysis

As described, the research process began with primary and secondary document sources.
I began with a review of the Rome Statute negotiation plenary transcripts, demarcating
the participation (and influence) of various African states throughout the diplomatic
process. While the task was largely one of ‘counting’ and in a basic way coding the
preferences of African states, it provided a framework to situate my research question
with respect to African preferences and agency with respect to the ICC. This content
analysis also provided a lens to ascertain nuance among the preferences of African States,
since there is not a monolithic ‘African’ vision of the ICC. However, the position of the
African Union in the post-Rome period is weighed against the preferences of African
states (as expressed in Rome and afterward), to elicit a broader picture of the complexity
of the regional issue(s) with the resultant ICC. Thus, I triangulated the elite interviews I
conducted by combining interviews with my content analysis/document review to
balance any inaccuracies or bias.7

2.2.1

Interviews

After this work was completed and a satisfactory cursory understanding was established,
I supplemented my research with fifteen semi-structured elite interviews carried out
between 2018 to 2019, in order to make up for gaps in the data and to enrich my overall
understanding of the Rome Statute negotiations, African involvement in the negotiations,
and/or African concerns with the ICC. Most of the interviews ranged from one to two
hours in length, over one to two-day time periods.

7

See Rebecca S. Natow, “The use of triangulation in qualitative studies employing elite interviews,”
Qualitative Research 20.2 (2019): 160-173.
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The semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with those with the most
relevant, first-hand experience. I asked each person about their recollections of the Rome
Statute negotiation process and how it engaged with and involved African states in
particular. I interviewed former state delegates, observers, academics, and NGO
personnel who were directly involved in the Rome Statute negotiation processes. I
interviewed ICC employees, including employees of the Office of the Prosecutor and
ICC Judges. I conducted semi-structured interviews to elicit insight into any relationship
between the outcome of the Rome Statute negotiations and the contemporary ICC-Africa
problem(s). I also asked probing questions about the soundness of the African discontent
with the ICC and proposed solutions thereto (i.e. a regional African court to prosecute the
same crimes as those contained in the Rome Statute).

2.3

Recruitment Methods

I relied on targeted sampling to identify key actors with the most involvement in the
negotiation process. I recruited key experts with relevant knowledge or insight to enrich
my initial content analysis. As such, in-depth elite interviews were used to obtain
information and to, as Tansey described, “probe beyond official accounts and narratives
and ask theoretically-guided questions about issues that are highly specific to the research
objectives.”8 The research project was approved and guided by the rules provided by The
University of Western Ontario’s Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (NMREB) to
protect the participants involved in my study.9 As such, I took care to avoid coercion,
pressure, and obligation.
The pre-interview stage was vital to the success of my interviews. I had to know
exactly who I was interviewing with respect to their individual history and background.
According to Mikecz, this enhances an understanding of the researcher’s own
positionality and decreases the status imbalance between the interviewer and
respondent.10 I was cognizant and limited by the practical barriers that slowed down the

8

Oisín Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,” Political
Science and Politics (October 2007): 7.
9
The project was approved as Western University NMREB protocol #107906.
10
Robert Mikecz, “Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues,” Qualitative Inquiry 18.6
(2012): 482.
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progress of my study significantly. Specifically, I experienced difficulties with respect to
accessing elites, acquiring their trust, and establishing rapport.11 In this respect,
anonymizing the responses of some interviewees was determined to be a useful strategic
tool, and was often paramount to the success of the interview. This bears particular
relevance among those who are currently employed by government or the Court.
Adequate preparation for the interviews mitigated the challenges that act as a barrier to
trust and rapport. I was able to determine the willingness of particular individuals to
assist with my academic research, which informed who and how I asked my questions
from the outset. The aim of this project was to obtain more than just ‘official’ account of
the process–i.e. what can be delineated from the statements of delegates at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference or the Assembly of States Parties. This required careful and
strategic planning and a paramount respect for the stakes involved for the respondent. It
is important to note that any interviews that were conducted under the promise of
anonymity (i.e. the so-called “Chatham House” rules where ideas may be used but the
identity of the speaker is not disclosed) did not compromise the overall value or weight of
the answers given, but instead increased an understanding of mutual respect and trust.12
Indeed, I attempted to adopt what Saunders et al. described as “context-sensitive
strategies to preserve the richness of the interview material wherever possible while also
protecting participants.”13 Anonymity provided a degree of protection so that elites could
be more open and honest about their own opinions and points of view without disrupting
their employment obligations or reputation within their professional capacities.
The risk and potential bias associated with simply parroting official or ‘public
relations’ answers with respect to the research question was a known concern that was
taken into consideration throughout the course of the interviews. A well-informed semistructured interview guide allowed for the flexibility and precision to avoid this concern,
as it was clear when ‘official’ accounts emerged throughout the course of the

11

Ibid.
See William S. Harvey, “Strategies for conducting elite interviews,” Qualitative Research 11.4 (2011):
431-441.
13
Benjamin Saunders, Jenny Kitzinger, and Celia Kitzinger, “Anonymising interview data: challenges and
compromise in practice,” Qualitative Research 15.5 (2015): 616.
12
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interview(s). Being aware of official government or Court positions on particular issues
made me aware of such responses and provided me with an opportunity to probe the
respondent beyond these often superficial, politicized accounts. This was only possible
with adequate preparation and background knowledge of both the institution/government
and respondent. While it was not always possible to move beyond an official explanation
or account, knowledge that the response was generated to promote a particular point of
view allowed for a greater contextualization of the responses given.
In-depth interviews were an appropriate choice for the study because the focus of
the inquiry was relatively narrow, and the respondents were/are directly involved in the
processes under investigation. Moreover, the goal of the project was to acquire a better
understanding of a particular phenomenon, and even more so to generate a narrative
about the process in an interactive and relational way, based largely on the perceptions
and experiences of those who were/are directly involved. My evolving status between
insider/outsider throughout the course of the study permitted necessary objectivity; selfreflection was frequently used to account for biases and/or expectations that emerged
throughout the course of the study, which were acknowledged, evaluated, and mitigated
throughout the course of the project.
Travel was required to conduct the necessary interviews for this study. I attended
the 17th Assembly of States Parties (ASP) meeting as part of the Canadian Partnership for
International Justice delegation from 3 December to 13 December 2018 in The Hague.
My attendance at the ASP was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada. Once in The Hague, I took the opportunity to access elites
and coordinate interviews with several Court employees. I also travelled to Pretoria,
South Africa from 15 February to 20 February 2019, where I was able to interview
several current and past government employees, particularly those from South Africa
who played an active role in the Rome Statute negotiation efforts within the South
African Development Community and the government of South Africa as an entity. I was
also able to access those with first-hand knowledge about the contemporary problems that
African states have with the ICC, and government responses to those problems.
I exhausted all domestic resources first and foremost with respect to data
collection. Since Canada was so actively involved in the negotiation for an ICC well
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before the Rome Conference, I started by talking to those with relevant insight and
information with respect to the intricacies of the negotiations the compromises made by
various states and the reasons for making those compromises. Similarly, several African
delegations were provided with diplomats and lawyers from the United States and
Canada, which provided an opportunity to access those who were involved in that
capacity. I used these interviews, as well as my own independent research, to ascertain
whom I needed contact next, provided that the interviewee had adequate experience to
instruct me on the points of interest. I contacted various elites by telephone and/or e-mail
and determined whether or not in-person interviews were required. In accordance with
the guidelines provided by the NMREB, I did not incentivize any participant in my study,
nor did I use language that gave the impression that I was incentivizing them in any way.
I obtained full informed consent and had participants contact me directly to participate in
my study. The nature of my study was considered to be of low risk to the participants by
the NMREB and as a result, was not reviewed by the full board when it was granted
approval. This was likely because I relied heavily on documents. The interviews I did
conduct were with elites, as opposed to members of vulnerable populations.
Nevertheless, I took caution to ensure that ethical standards were upheld, including the
confidentiality of participants, if requested, and the proper storage of interview transcripts
and project materials to ensure that the identity of any and all respondents are protected at
all times. I greatly appreciated the time and participation of each of the individuals that I
interviewed. Their insight was invaluable and imperative to the success of my study.

2.4

Conclusion

In summary, this dissertation examines whether the compromises made by states in the
1998 Rome Statute negotiations can help explain the problems with the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which have been most notably illuminated through the Court’s
interaction with (and in) African states from 2003 to the time of writing. Process tracing
is employed as its methodology and it is an inductive qualitative study ultimately
intended to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of the underlying
complexities and the dynamism of concerns that are at the heart of the at-times strained
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Africa-ICC relationship. The dissertation relies on primary and secondary documents, as
well as elite interviews to answer the proposed research questions.
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Chapter 3

3

Literature Review

This dissertation takes a collaborative and interdisciplinary approach and can generally
be situated within the growing scholarship on Africa and the International Criminal Court
(ICC or Court). It relies and builds upon key theoretical frameworks provided by
international relations (IR) and, to some extent, international law (IL) literatures. This
chapter reviews the most salient themes in the Africa-ICC discourse. Whereas most of the
existing scholarship tends to focus on the operational problems that have plagued the
Africa-ICC relationship from the Court’s establishment in 2002 onwards, this dissertation
examines that literature but also focuses on the time that precedes the establishment of
the Court. In doing so, this chapter also highlights literatures of institutional design,
specifically in the context of the Rome Statute negotiations, to theoretically ground the
design and architecture of the resultant ICC. The existing literatures on the Rome Statute
negotiations and the Africa-ICC relationship illuminate the compromises that African
States made in and after Rome when signing, ratifying, and implementing the Rome
Statute into domestic legislation, and also frame the most prevalent debates concerning
the problems with the ICC’s operationalization in African contexts and African responses
to those problems. In short, the literatures of the Rome Statute negotiations; African
commitment to the Rome Statute/ICC; African problems with the ICC; and African
responses to the problems with the ICC each provide a theoretical framework through
which to situate this dissertation’s contribution to the literature.

3.1

Rome Statute Negotiations

Much of the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations is descriptive in nature, as
opposed to theoretical or argumentative.1 Some literatures focus on the development of

1

See generally Fanny Benedetti, Karine Bonneau, and John L. Washburn, Negotiating the International
Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014); Otto
Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes,
Article by Article, 2nd ed. (C.H. Beck, Hart, and Nomos, 2008); Roy S.K. Lee, ed., The International
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, and Results (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1999); William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court 2nd ed.: A Commentary
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the idea of an international criminal court from the pre-Rome period and/or trace the
emergence of the developing international criminal justice and accountability norm
within the international political landscape, particularly at the United Nations (UN) and
through the early work of the International Law Commission (ILC) in creating a draft
statute for an international criminal court.2 With respect to pre- and post- Rome UN
developments, Christopher Keith Hall carefully documented the meetings of the
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court and the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court.3 While Hall

on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.
W. D. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume 1 and
Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); William Schabas, Introduction to the International
Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998); Mauro
Politi and Giuseppe Nesi, eds., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity
(Ashgate, 2001); Leila Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International
Law: Justice for the New Millennium (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002); Herman A.M. von
Hebel, Johan G. Lammers, and Jolien Schukking, Reflections on the International Criminal Court–Essays
in Honour of Adriaan Bos (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999). Note that some scholars do offer more a
more analytical approach to the study of the Rome Statute negotiations. See for example Frédéric Mégret,
“The Rome Conference: institutional design and the constraints of diplomacy,” in The Elgar Companion to
the International Criminal Court, eds. Margaret deGuzman and Valerie Oosterveld (Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd., 2020), 20-47.
2
See for example Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court; see
also John Washburn, “The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and
International Lawmaking in the 21st Century,” Pace International Law Review 11.2 (1999): 361-377.
Washburn explained that many of the diplomats involved in the negotiation of the Rome Statute were
involved from the earliest stages (1995) through the post-Rome period. This shared experience and
commitment fostered a sense of trust among delegates. He also attributes the mutually shared experience
within the United Nations system in the 1990s as a contributing factor for the successful negotiation of the
Rome Statute, since many delegates felt an ideological and normative attachment to the project. See also
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 32.3 (1999): 443-469. See also Antonio Cassese, “From
Nuremburg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal Court,” in The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, eds. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and
John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 3-22. See also Adriaan Bos, “From the
International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994-1998),” in The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, eds. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D.
Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 35-66.
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Christopher Keith Hall, “The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 91.1 (1997): 177-187;
Christopher Keith Hall, “The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 92.1 (1998):
124-133; Christopher Keith Hall, “The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 92.2 (1998):
331-339; Christopher Keith Hall, “The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 92.3 (1998):
548-556; Christopher Keith Hall, “The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the
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primarily focused on the issues dealt with by the PrepCom, other scholars such as Fanny
Benedetti and John Washburn described the practices undertaken by officers,
governments, NGO representatives, and UN officials at the PrepCom meetings, which the
authors argue, was a “high act of international creativity.”4
Indeed, the Rome Statute negotiations have been rightly situated in the literatures
concerning the new wave of multilateral diplomacy and treaty making of the 1990s. The
approach taken in Rome has been described as akin to the strategy undertaken with
respect to the Landmines Convention (i.e. the role of NGO campaigning and the
formation of strategic negotiation blocs as an effective opposition to traditionally
powerful states). In the context of landmines, Axworthy and Taylor explained that
“governments and civil society worked directly together as members of a team.”5
According to the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations, given the success of this socalled ‘Ottawa Process’ approach in 1997, William Pace of the Coalition for the
International Criminal Court contacted former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Lloyd Axworthy, to reproduce this coordinated civil society-governmental approach in
Rome.6 In a similar vein, Marlies Glasius highlighted the important role of the LikeMinded Group (LMG) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the proliferation
and diffusion of the idea of an ICC.7 NGO involvement was a keystone of the Rome
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Statute negotiations and thus the merger of civil society and governments in Rome has
occupied an important place in the literature.
However, it is important to note that the influence of civil society and NGOs in
multilateral treaty making is not always viewed positively. For example, Shirley V. Scott
has argued that:
The very openness of the system of international law that enables both democratic
and authoritarian regimes to promote norms reflective of their policy preferences
has also enabled civil society to advance norms, processes, and institutional
structures that go beyond the policy preferences of dominant states. In doing so,
civil society–a hallmark of what we might refer to as the ‘pseudo-democratic’
international legal system–has challenged the delicate balance between power
politics and the realization of a pure international rule of law. The consequences
appear serious.8
Scott points out important difficulties with multilateral treaty making processes, notably
that in trying to solve collective action problems, the text of the treaty could reflect the
opposition calls from the staunchest resisters.9 However, she also identifies that
international law is only capable of offering normative standards to create a better world
if the gap between the substance of the law and what is agreeable to the most powerful
states is not “too stretched.”10 She explained, “[i]f there is no gap, then law simply
reflects policy preferences, but if the gap is too big, international law will be unlikely to
exert any pull over the behavior of the most powerful.”11 She contended that middle
powers and NGOs have stretched international law beyond what is acceptable to the most
powerful states. In the context of the ICC, that overstretch is evidenced in the fact that the
United States, China, and Russia have not ratified the Rome Statute at the time of writing.
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Thus, Scott said that “[t]he ICC is perhaps the classic example of over-reach within the
empire of international law,” and the overall claim is that it is civil society and not the
hegemon (the United States) that has acted as “the imperial power within international
law.”12 It is thus argued by Scott that the ICC lacks an inbuilt design feature to balance
legalism with realpolitik, which is an inherently limiting factor in terms of its institutional
effectiveness.
Despite these political limitations, it is important to make sense of how the Rome
Statute negotiations unfolded in 1998. To this end, Roy S. Lee explained that most of the
Rome Statute negotiations were conducted in informal meetings from the preparatory
stage to the Rome Diplomatic Conference and “no official records were kept at those
meetings.”13 As such, there is no other option than to rely on individual accounts of all
stages of the negotiations to ascertain the most important controversies and themes
concerning the institutional design of the ICC. Yet as Cherif Bassiouni pointed out in the
context of observers of the Rome Conference, “personal views stem from the perspective
of how they [experts or those who were involved in the drafting of specific provisions of
the Rome Statute] perceived the intended purpose of each specific provision and its
contextual relationship to related provisions.”14 This is a point that bears repeating since
the literatures on the Rome Statute negotiations fundamentally depend on the
intersubjective perspectives of particular individuals, rather than objective facts.
Several works have documented the complex process of the Rome Statute
negotiations in 1998. For example, Philippe Kirsch and John Holmes provided an account
of how the negotiations unfolded in Rome.15 Philippe Kirsch was a member of the
Canadian delegation and served as Chair of the Conference. Holmes was also a part of
the Canadian delegation and took a leading role with respect to the provisions regarding
complementarity. Kirsch and Holmes focused on the most controversial aspects of the
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Statute as being most important to the success of the Rome Diplomatic Conference–that
is, the political issues: the role of the Security Council in relation to the Court; the
inclusion of aggression among the core crimes covered by the statute; how the
jurisdiction of the Court could be triggered; the power of the Prosecutor to initiate
proceedings proprio motu; the inclusion of terrorism and drug trafficking; and the
inclusion of nuclear weapons among the list of weapons prohibited by the statute.16 Based
on this list of controversial statutory elements, it is apparent that the influence of
realpolitik heavily affected the institutional design of the ICC, since almost all of these
components involved the United Nations Security Council (especially the permanent five
members, or ‘P5’) directly or indirectly–a point that is highlighted by most scholars
seeking to explain the outcome of the Rome Statute negotiations.17 To this point, Louise
Arbour described the history of the ICC negotiations by article, with a particular
emphasis on the inclusion of Security Council powers–i.e. to refer and defer cases at the
ICC. She explained, “Many of the concerns surrounding the nature and parameters of the
Security Council’s relationship to the ICC were raised at the negotiating stage of the
Rome Statute… many delegates expressed concern that, should the two bodies be too
closely linked, the ICC could become subject to political maneuvering that would
undermine its independence and credibility.”18
Philippe Kirsch explained that groups of states–particularly the Like-Minded
Group (i.e. the sixty plus states that wanted an independent and effective ICC) and its
engagement with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the permanent members of
the Security Council, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)–largely structured the
controversies and ideological conflicts at the Rome Diplomatic Conference. He said that
“[t]he interaction of these groups and their competing views shaped the resulting
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Statute.”19 Observers most often credit the role of the Like-Minded Group, largely
consisting of middle power and weaker states, as an effective counter to the political
power wielded by the P5.
The literature has made clear that several delegations in Rome were forced to
make compromises with respect to the final version of the Statute. As Rome Statute
observer Otto Triffterer explained,
the only alternative to the establishment of a permanent ICC by the Rome Statute
would have been the failure of the Conference, in spite of decades of
comprehensive preparations, endeavours and various proposals. A compromise
therefore, was required in many cases… Closing the Conference without the
adoption of a Statute for the ICC would have delayed the whole idea for decades,
if not destroyed it altogether. Nobody dared to carry the responsibility for thus
refusing the mandate conferred to the Conference by the General Assembly.20
This observation serves as an analytical basis to question ‘how much compromise
is too much compromise.’ The institutional design of the Rome Statute reflects
quintessentially important design features, particularly as a consequence of balancing the
interests of powerful states with smaller coalitions or blocs of states that wanted a strong,
independent ICC. Other Rome Statute participants such as Kirsch have similarly
explained that “[t]he Statute is not a perfect instrument; it is the product of international
negotiations on a sensitive subject between diverse groups. It includes uneasy technical
solutions, awkward formulations and difficult compromises. But it is a balanced
instrument, strong enough to ensure the effective functioning of the Court and with
sufficient safeguards to foster broad support among States.”21 Other participants and
observers have made similar claims. For example, the Canadian Minister of Foreign
Affairs at the time of the Rome Statute negotiations, Lloyd Axworthy, said that “The
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Rome Statute is by no means a perfect document and it will need a great deal of refining
in the years ahead.”22 It is these imperfections that guide the research project herein.
One form of compromise in the Rome Statute was to make use of ambiguous
language to satisfy opposing factions during the negotiations. This strategy has been
referred to in the literature as ‘constructive’ or ‘creative’ ambiguity.23 To be sure, early
commentators on the Rome Diplomatic Conference tend to credit the diplomatic
solutions and compromises made as fundamental to the successful negotiation of the
Rome Statute and ultimately conceptualize the approach taken by the drafters as both
effective and necessary for the success of the final package presented to governments for
up and down vote in Rome.24 As observers Kirsch and Robinson pointed out, if the
strongest possible statute was put forward, it would have received very little political or
financial support, and would have received significant opposition from states.25 As such,
it appears that the drafters of the Rome Statute were aware that the final document did not
facilitate the strongest possible ICC, but this was indeed a strategic and diplomatic
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decision.26 As Adriaan Bos explained, “the Rome Statute, as negotiated between the
participating States, reflects the current political forces in the international community. A
statute that would run counter to what States view as their fundamental common interests
is a non-starter.”27 The observers of the negotiations have made clear that the Rome
Statute’s fundamentally political foundation affected its construction in discernable ways.
This is consistent with the literature surrounding institutionalism, global governance, and
institutional design, which overwhelmingly points out that the challenge in creating
international institutions is to “provide adequate assurance to nation-states that their
interests will not be abused, while at the same time vesting the institutions with the
independence needed for them to be effective in promoting global well-being.”28 The
reality that the Rome Statute succeeded without the support of the most powerful states,
especially the United States, and how that has affected the institutional effectiveness of
the Court has been a focal preoccupation for many researchers.29 Others have considered
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how this observed inequality between states has in turn affected the equality of
individuals, especially those before the ICC.30
With the benefit of hindsight, some scholars have questioned the compromises
made and the architecture of the Rome Statute as explanatory of the ICC’s institutional
weaknesses. For example, William Schabas opined that “[t]here is as yet not much soulsearching about the role of that the Rome Conference, for all of its glory, may have
played in the creation of an institution whose achievements remain a disappointment.
Perhaps the architecture of the Court has some serious flaws. Possibly some of the
compromises were not as brilliant as was once thought.”31 This is precisely the
intellectual space that this dissertation occupies–linking the compromises made at the
Rome Diplomatic Conference to the problems that some African states have identified
with the ICC throughout the course of its operationalization. In many respects, one of the
motivating questions that guides this research project can be reduced to ‘how much
compromise is too much compromise?’
Some works have considered similar questions in the African context. For
example, Lucrecia García Iommi posited that “the absence of meaningful engagement
with issues germane to some ICC stakeholders before and during the Rome Conference

a comparative analysis, see Martijn Groenleer, “The United States, the European Union, and the
International Criminal Court: Similar values, different interests?” International Journal of Constitutional
Law 13.4 (2015): 923-944. See also Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2013): “The tragedy of the ICC is its incapacity to exercise political jurisdiction
over great powers, thus, creating a permanent two-tier justice system in which strong states use global
institutions to discipline the weak.” See also Caroline Fehl, “Explaining the International Criminal Court: A
‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches,” European Journal of International
Relations 10.3 (2004): 357-394, at 357: “Regarding institutional design, rationalist theory helps identify a
tradeoff between a weak court backed by the US and a strong court without US support; a complementary
constructivist approach can explain why states opted for the latter.” See also Steven C. Roach, Governance,
Order, and the International Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009); Caroline Fehl, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European
Responses to US Unilateralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Part II: Case Studies (5), The
International Criminal Court; Stephen C. Roach, Politicizing the International Criminal Court: The
Convergence of Politics, Ethics, and Law (Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006).
30
Sarah M.H. Nouwen, “Legal Equality on Trial: Sovereigns and Individuals Before the International
Criminal Court,” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 43 (December 2012): 151-181.
31

William Schabas, “The dynamics of the Rome Conference,” in The Elgar Companion to the
International Criminal Court, eds. Margaret deGuzman and Valerie Oosterveld (Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd., 2020), 19. See also Mégret, “The Rome Conference,” 22: “the adoption of the Statute was not the
victory that it is sometimes described as being, as much as a complex compromise that contained what have
turned out to be many potentialities as well as some severe limitations.”

31

facilitated the adoption of the Rome Statute, but also plausibly created difficulties for the
Court in the long run… it postponed unavoidable conflict over contentious issues and
undermined the likelihood that specific stakeholders would develop a sense of ownership
over the Statute.”32 From a different point of view, Line Engbo Gissel conducted a study
looking at the preferences of African states towards the ICC as expressed in the
statements of diplomats made to the United Nations General Assembly from 19932003.33 She concluded that African states wanted a very different kind of Court than the
one that was ultimately established. She focused on key areas of departure, namely:
understandings of universality, participation, complementarity, court independence and
sovereign equality. Max du Plessis and Christopher Gevers have similarly focused on
what they refer to as Africa’s ‘four fears’–that is, the understandings upon which African
states supported the establishment of the ICC in Rome, which they reduced to the
following: (1) the Prosecutor should be able to initiate investigations without interference
from States or the Security Council; (2) the Court should contribute to furthering the
equality of States; (3) the Court should be an effective complement to national criminal
justice systems and respect the complementary nature of its relationship with such
national systems; and (4) the Court should contribute to the attainment of international
peace.34 Thus, some scholars have considered how the outcomes in Rome have affected
African perceptions of the ICC and the general conclusions hint at the role of sovereignty
and the hierarchy of states as both a statutory and operational weakness of the Court.
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3.2

African Involvement in the Rome Statute
Negotiations

Some literatures offer a more nuanced and/or personalized perspective of the direct
involvement of particular participants and/or groups of participants in the Rome Statute
negotiation processes.35 Most relevant for the purposes of this research project, Sivu
Maqungo and Phakiso Mochochoko have each provided an account of the important role
taken by African states, African groups of states, particularly the South African
Development Community, and African delegates within the Rome Statute negotiations
from the earliest stages of its ideational development, based on their own personal
involvement and experience in the processes.36 Indeed, most detailed commentaries of
the Rome Statute negotiations have acknowledged the fundamentally important role
taken by African states and Africans in the negotiation processes, with a primary
acknowledgement of the important role taken on by the South African Development
Community (SADC), as well as the regional meeting that resulted in the passing of the
Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998–
though with mixed degrees of detail and explanatory depth.37
In the context of NGO involvement in Africa throughout the Rome Statute
negotiations, Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn explained that the NGO Human Rights
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Watch played a particularly supportive role and helped SADC states organize its
Regional Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Pretoria
in September 1997; the government of Senegal and the NGO No Peace Without Justice
convened an ‘African Conference on the International Criminal Court’ in Dakar in
February 1998.38 The authors also explained that Human Rights Watch and other NGOs
“provided funds for developing countries’ legal advisers to attend the intersessional
meeting in Syracuse. This allowed for some African delegates to participate more
effectively in the negotiations and to associate themselves with the results of the Syracuse
meetings.”39 For context, the Syracuse meeting was sponsored by Cherif Bassiouni and
was intended to continue the advancement of the draft statute between formal
negotiations and facilitate engagement between NGOs and state delegates in the interim
period. It is important to note that this literature establishes that NGOs played a
significant role in supporting and coordinating African engagement in the Rome Statute
negotiations throughout much of the diplomatic processes in the pre-Rome period. It has
also been pointed out that “Some 90 African organisations joined the NGO Coalition for
an International Criminal Court (CICC). They lobbied in their respective countries for the
early establishment of an independent and effective international criminal court.”40
Some literatures acknowledge African participation in the Rome Conference but
fail to provide the amount of depth necessary for any substantive analysis of that
participation. To illustrate this point, former ICC Judge Geoffrey Henderson said that “A
careful historical review of the negotiations at Rome must acknowledge the strong and
active participation of African States in the drafting and adoption of the Rome Statute…
African states actively participated in the debates and did so with high level participants
as their delegations were led by Attorney Generals, Ministers of Justice and Ministers of
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Foreign Affairs.”41 ICC Judge Kimberly Prost similarly highlighted what she identified as
“the important role that African States and Africans played in the adoption of the ICC
Statute.”42 Max du Plessis opined that “The high ideals and hard work that marked
African states’ participation in bringing the ICC to life in Rome should not too easily be
forgotten.”43 Others have pointed out that forty-seven of the fifty-four African states
attended the Rome Diplomatic Conference.44
Notwithstanding this, other literatures have viewed African participation in the
Rome Statute negotiations through a much more critical lens. For example, other
literatures contend that “it cannot be overlooked that many African states and NGOs
actively participated in the development of the Rome Statute. However, cloaked in the
universalist language of the ICC, relations of dominance have privileged particular norms
of ‘juridical justice’ over others. The reality is that during the negotiations on the Rome
Statute, politically ‘weak’ states were rarely in positions to overpower ‘stronger’ ones.”45
In order to fill in the necessary gaps and inconsistencies in the narrative, others
have outlined why and how Africans were interested and involved in the creation of an
ICC. In this vein, Phakiso Mochochoko, the Head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity
and Cooperation Division at the ICC at the time of writing, and a former diplomat from
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Lesotho at the time of the Rome Statute negotiations, has explained that African support
for an ICC was rooted in a desire to combat gross violations of human rights, which was
understood to be inextricably linked to the goal of proliferating regional peace and
security, including socioeconomic and political security–what he referred to as the
‘rebirth of Africa’ in the new millennium.46 In this sense, African support for an ICC was
linked to the primary objective of regional economic development, which Mochochoko
argues can be eroded by political instability, violence, and civil war. Thus, he argued that
“[i]nvestigating and prosecuting those responsible for serious crimes was amongst the
measures that could be taken if Africans were to succeed in making Africa a safe haven
for foreign investment and greater economic prosperity.”47 This account hints that
African interest in the ICC project was rooted in the self-interest of states. With this
historical context in mind, Mochochoko detailed the involvement of ‘Africa’ throughout
the Rome Statute negotiation processes through several lenses. First, he described the role
of African NGOs. Second, he highlighted the importance of SADC, particularly its
formulation of ten basic negotiating principles for the establishment of an ICC in 1997.
Third, he drew attention to the significance of the African Conference on the ICC, which
resulted in the Dakar Declaration in 1998. Last, he explained how the then-Organization
of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers directed its Member States to support the
creation of the ICC.48
In the context of the Rome Conference itself, it was explained that African
delegates had the SADC Principles and the Dakar Declaration at their disposal, both of
which were compatible with the principles of the Like-Minded Group. As such, it was
explained that “African delegates thus joined the so-called ‘like minded group’ whose
diverse nature made it clear that support for and opposition to an effective Court was not
a North South dispute.”49 Like former Judge Henderson, Mochochoko pointed out that
Africans took leading roles throughout the negotiations by either chairing or coordinating
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various issues. For example, Egypt chaired the Drafting Committee, South Africa chaired
the working group on the Composition of the Court, Malawi coordinated articles on
cooperation, Tanzania coordinated discussions on the crime of aggression, and Lesotho
chaired the Committee of the Whole and chaired the working group on international
cooperation and judicial assistance.50 This account provided the necessary context to
grasp how and why the level of engagement on the part of African governments and
African delegates was so high throughout the Rome Diplomatic Conference. This account
similarly explains the significance of that engagement for ‘Africa’ and the Rome
Conference more generally.
Other literatures focus on more particular African entities and efforts throughout
the negotiation processes. For example, former South African delegate Sivu Maqungo
provided a specific and detailed account of SADC’s engagement in the negotiation
processes by explaining the role and participation of SADC in the Rome Statute
negotiations before, during, and after Rome.51 Writing in 2000, Maqungo interrogated
why, despite longstanding commitment to the Rome Statute during and pre-Rome, no
SADC state had yet ratified the statute. Tracing SADC participation in the establishment
of an ICC, Maqungo detailed that SADC states initially chose to negotiate in Rome as a
bloc because “[i]t had been quite clear that, in order to make an impact on these
multilateral negotiations, SADC states had to speak with one voice and thus negotiate as
a bloc rather than as ‘small’ individual states.”52 This decision resulted in the
development of SADC’s ten negotiating principles for the establishment of an ICC,
which Maqungo described as an “instruction manual for SADC’s negotiations.”53 In
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order to implement SADC’s principles to the greatest extent possible, SADC delegates
sought to occupy “strategic positions within the political structures in the conference.”54
Linking this account back to the list of positions occupied by African delegates provided
by Mochochoko, the fact that each of the listed delegations except Egypt belonged to
SADC can be rightly contextualized and better understood. Importantly, however,
Maqungo further enriched an account of African involvement throughout the negotiation
process by explaining how SADC mobilized its influence over other groupings within
Africa, specifically the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, and other
African states generally.55 Adding to the initial list of important positions enumerated by
Mochochoko, Maqungo added that Namibia was the coordinator of African states with
the Non-Aligned Movement group, and Zambia was a member of the Credentials
Committee of the conference.56 This account planted the seed to better understand how
African states intended to shift the balance of the hierarchy of states throughout the
negotiation process, which was clearly described as intentional.
Indeed, scholars such as Christopher Rudolph have emphasized that a state’s
acceptance of its place in the “hierarchy of international society” was a relevant factor for
understanding national preferences and interests throughout the Rome Statute
negotiations, since the ICC’s “design had such potentially dramatic implications for
international order.”57 This assertion is firmly linked to the conclusion made by Gissel
that “the creation of the ICC was never solely about justice; it was also about sovereign
inequality and global order.”58 Jalloh and Bantekas similarly opined that “in
decolonization, the claim of post-colonial governments was not confined merely to the
establishment of independent states but invoked also the ability to formulate rules of
international law, whether or regional or universal value, as well as to partake in global
decision-making; the same is true today in respect of African states in their power
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struggle with Western superpowers.”59 In this sense, the literature has situated the ICC
negotiations (and the resultant Court) within the broader political context that shaped
African diplomacy towards the establishment of the ICC in the 1990s and beyond.
In seeking to explain why SADC states had not yet ratified the Statute, Maqungo
highlighted the most contentious elements and their compatibility with the SADC
principles. Based on this account, the biggest compromises for SADC states were about
the ICC’s jurisdiction (SADC states preferred universal jurisdiction) and the role of the
Security Council (SADC states preferred that the only role for the Security Council was
to refer matters to the prosecutor–deferral capabilities were thus a compromise position).
It was explained that “the draft Statute was not the best result that SADC would have
hoped for,” but nevertheless, SADC states accepted it at the end of the conference as a
package deal.60 The way SADC states worked to convince other African states to accept
the package deal was further explained by Maqungo in a subsequent article.61 Indeed, the
decision to accept the final version of the statute is compatible with the account provided
by Kirsch, since he explained that no state or groups of states were wholly satisfied with
the final text, yet most accepted it anyway. However, Maqungo’s account of SADC’s
regional mobilization to accept the final package enriches the explanation as to why
states did ultimately accept the final text, especially African states.
In looking to explain why SADC states did not readily ratify the Rome Statute,
Maqungo opined that SADC states had not yet done so in 2000 because they took the
obligation to implement and enforce the treaty seriously and needed to continue to
formulate a strategy to this end. This was supported by the fact that SADC held a oneweek conference in July 1999 to develop a model for how to implement the Rome Statute
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into domestic law.62 In a related vein, Max du Plessis described that SADC state South
Africa was the first African state to implement the Rome Statute into domestic legislation
and sought to provide a regional model to this end.63 Taken together, this history provides
a more holistic view as to why South Africa took a leading role in this regard.

3.2.1

African Commitment to the Rome Statute

There is a growing literature that seeks to answer why states choose to become
States Parties to the Rome Statute/ICC, since doing so imposes tremendous
sovereignty costs onto states.64 This bears particular relevance in the African
context, since African states comprise the largest regional bloc of members to the
Court. As du Plessis has pointed out, the ICC is “a court which counts amongst its
members such a significant coterie of African nations that Africa today is the
largest regional bloc represented at the ICC. After the statute was completed, in
February 1999 Senegal become [sic] the first state party to ratify the Rome
Statute. Steadily following suit were a host of African states parties so that today
the court enjoys–at least on paper–significant support in the region.”65 Similar to
the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations, many works acknowledge the
comparatively high levels of commitment to the Rome Statute among African
states, but few substantively analyze or else seek to explain this commitment.66
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Scholars such as Vilmer claim that African commitment to the Rome
Statute “can be traced to the end of the Cold War, when newly independent
African countries sought to demonstrate a commitment to good governance and
membership of the ‘new world order’ by signing international treaties.”67 While
this offers some explanatory value, it fails to adequately interrogate why newly
independent states might be willing to give up any amount of sovereignty.
Referring to the explanation provided by Mochochoko, it might be for reasons of
self-interest; that is, to promote socioeconomic development and regional
stability.68 Other reasons might include an aim to achieve “the goal of ridding the
continent of its deserved reputation as a collage of despots, crackpots and hotspots
where impunity for too long has followed serious human rights violations.”69 Yet,
it is important to consider the hypothesis presented by Maqungo that “[i]t is
expected that SADC states, due to the contribution they made in the process to
establish the ICC, will be among the first sixty states to ratify the Statute of the
Court.”70 This explanation links political and normative commitment–at least on
the part of SADC states–to explain the potential reason(s) for ratification.
Relying on the human rights literature, scholars such as Goldsmith and
Posner have argued that most states ratify multilateral treaties because of a
‘coincidence of interest’–in other words, ratifying human rights treaties “often
requires many of the parties to do nothing different from what they have done in
the past.”71 Oona Hathaway has posited that treaty ratification can best be
explained by considering the domestic constraints it places on states. She argued
that “states with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to commit to
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human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records because there is little
prospect that the treaties will be enforced. Conversely, states with more
democratic institutions will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties if
they have poor human rights records–precisely because treaties are likely to lead
to changes in behavior.”72
Others point out that the ICC operates under the principle of
complementarity: i.e. that it is complementary to national justice systems and can
only intervene if a state is unwilling or unable to prosecute international crimes.
Therefore, the intent is to bolster national criminal justice responses, ultimately
reducing overall sovereignty costs. As John Holmes has explained, “ironically,
the provisions of the Rome Statute itself contemplate an institution that may never
be employed.”73 In a similar vein, Anne-Marie Slaughter said that:
One of the most powerful arguments for the ICC is not that it will be a
global instrument of justice itself–arresting and trying tyrants and torturers
worldwide–but that it will be a backstop and trigger domestic forces for
justice and democracy. By posing a choice–either a nation tries its own or
they will be tried in The Hague–it strengthens the hand of domestic parties
seeking such trials, allowing them to wrap themselves in a nationalist
mantle.74
Former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo similarly explained that “as a
consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should
not measure its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court,
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as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a
major success.”75 On this basis, the literature on complementarity mitigates
sovereignty concerns to a sizable degree.
However, in the context of the Rome Statute and African states, there
were/are reasonable concerns about the capacity of national legal institutions to
adequately respond to international criminal law violations and ratification often
required/requires significant change in behavior. It is perhaps even more
important to note, as scholars have, that domestic institutional failure/collapse
would actually increase the chances of the treaty being enforced–that is, for the
ICC to intervene due to the national states’ inability to respond to violations of
international criminal law therefore increasing the associated sovereignty costs.76
Some have proposed that weak states ratified the Rome Statute to increase
development aid and/or assistance because “[p]oorer states might have seen the
Rome Statute as a key to unlock greater flows of official development assistance
(ODA), even while intellectuals and government advisers in the Global South
might have seen the ICC’s mandate as an extension of the West’s neocolonial
projects.”77
Such claims have been discredited in the human rights literature, which
could have analogous application in the international criminal law discourse.78
This is supported by Mochochoko who explained that:
Contrary to the view that the ICC was shoved through the throats of
unwilling Africans who were dragged screaming and shouting to Rome
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and who had no alternative but to follow their Western Masters under the
threat of withholding of economic aid if they did not follow, the historical
developments leading up to the establishment of the Court portray an
international will of which Africa was a part, to enforce humanitarian
norms and to bring to justice those responsible for the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community.79
On this basis, it becomes clear that the Africans who participated and published
about their experience in the establishment of the ICC (i.e. Mochochoko and
Maqungo) emphasize the authenticity of African involvement in the enterprise
and the normative valuation of the project that undergirds and helps to explain the
comparatively high levels of commitment on the part of ‘Africa.’ However, both
of these accounts emanate from experience within SADC (Mochochoko
represented Lesotho; Maqungo, South Africa) and this could be viewed as
problematic for the formation of a regional explanatory account. Indeed, there is
no monolithic ‘African’ experience or position and the lack of literature from
outside of SADC can be reasonably framed as a significant gap that is at least
worth pointing out.
Other scholars have provided more ‘generalizable’ theories about why
states (including African states) ratify the Rome Statute. For example, Simmons
and Danner have explained Rome Statute ratification in terms of “credible
commitments theory.” The authors argued that states that are the most and least
likely to experience ICC intervention have most readily committed to the Court.
Conversely, states with credible means to conduct international criminal law trials
have not. The authors argue that “ratification of the ICC is associated with
tentative steps towards violence reduction and peace in those countries precisely
least likely to be able to commit credibly to foreswear atrocities.”80
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Chapman and Chaudoin reach a different conclusion and argue that
“countries for whom compliance is likely to be easiest–democracies with little
internal violence–are the most likely countries to join the ICC. On the other hand,
countries with the most to fear from ICC prosecution, nondemocracies with weak
legal systems and a history of domestic political violence, tend to avoid
ratification.”81 This argument falls in line with the coincidence of interest
argument promoted by Goldsmith and Posner, but does not do a sufficient job of
explaining why African states comprise the largest regional bloc of States Parties
to the Rome Statute. The authors acknowledge and accept this theoretical
incompatibility and term it the “Sub-Saharan Africa Exception.”82 What Chapman
and Chaudoin do provide, however, is a theoretical explanation for this exception
through an examination of domestic political factors or motivations for Rome
Statute ratification in African contexts. The authors raise the important point that
African leaders may commit to the Rome Statute for their own political interests
and purposes, that is that they “are trying to make a strong commitment to
prosecute, without necessarily committing to being prosecuted.”83 This has
particular application in African states that have instrumentalized the ICC to
prosecute rebels or warlords while simultaneously insulating the sitting
government. Indeed, the political instrumentalization of the ICC by African
leaders has started to occupy an important space in the literature that seeks to
explain ongoing African commitment to the Rome Statute, despite widespread
criticism and opposition from the African Union (AU) and some African states.84
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3.3

The Decline of the Africa-ICC Relationship: head of
state immunity, selectivity, bias, and double-standards

A proliferation of literature on the relationship between Africa and the ICC started to
emerge following the ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and the
African Union’s direct opposition to those indictments. Al-Bashir was a sitting head of
state of a non-States Party (Sudan) at the time that the arrest warrant was issued by way
of referral by the United Nations Security Council. The African Union strongly opposed
the ICC’s indictment of a sitting head of state for legal reasons, claiming that it is a
violation of customary international law, and also for political reasons, claiming that the
decision to indict al-Bashir disrupted sensitive peace processes that were underway in
Darfur.85 Thus, the AU adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the ICC for the arrest
and surrender of al-Bashir and obliged its member states to allow indicted leaders onto
their territory in order to facilitate regional peace and security goals. The literature can be
largely parsed into works that consider the following issues: (a) the legality of ICC
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indictments against sitting heads of state;86 (b) evaluations of the political
appropriateness of such indictments as they relate to peace and justice objectives;87 (c)
normative evaluations about the AU’s response to such indictments with respect to claims
of selectivity, bias, and double-standards;88 (d) analyses seeking to explain why some
African states chose to prioritize their obligations to the AU over the ICC by refusing to
arrest and surrender indicted suspects (particularly Omar al-Bashir, former President of
Sudan) to the Court and the related nexus of competing obligations and duties.89
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Others have focused on explaining the reasons why the relationship between the
AU, some African states, and the ICC began to decline.90 In making sense of African
discontent towards the ICC, scholars have identified the significance of “Africa’s tortured
place in geopolitics.”91 It has been pointed out that “[e]qually important is the need for
sensitivity to the history of Africa’s troubled relationship with international law and how
the impact of the power structure of the international system on the ICC shapes how the
ICC is perceived in Africa.”92 In this vein, Mutua argued that “[i]n my view, the ICC will
not be able to blunt the charges of a racist agenda if it cannot produce indictments of
senior officials from continents other than Africa.”93 Such a view is not wholly
sympathetic with the AU position, but also acknowledges the reality of the ICC’s
behaviour that validates regional criticisms and tugs at historical and emotional
sensitivities in many respects.
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Aside from these more political considerations, it is also worth noting that some
scholars have agreed with the AU position regarding al-Bashir’s immunity under
customary international law,94 while others have provided legal pathways intended to
strip al-Bashir’s alleged immunity. For example, some have argued that the Security
Council referral made Sudan a de facto States Party to the ICC.95 Others say that under
customary international law, immunities do not apply to core international crimes such as
those covered by the Rome Statute, regardless of jurisdiction.96 A survey of the literature
indicates that the immunities issue has been vexing, contentious, and variously
understood by international legal experts and the ICC as an institution, which has
exacerbated tensions with the AU and some African states. The formulation of a modality
to resolve the immunities issue remains a vital priority for the legitimacy of the Court and
international law (including criminal and customary legal standards).

3.4

The African Union (AU) and the Malabo Protocol:
‘African Solutions to African Problems’

There is a growing literature that evaluates the African Union’s steps to
regionalize international criminal law in Africa through the expansion of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) vis-à-vis the adoption of the
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of

94

See Gaeta, “Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?”; Gaeta and Labuda, “Trying Sitting
Heads of State,”; Kiyani, “Al-Bashir and the ICC”; and Tladi, “Of Heroes and Villains, Angels and
Demons,” 67: “As long as supporters of the ICC’s claim to legal neutrality are willing to turn a blind eye to
the ICC’s baseless interpretation of international law in order to catch one man [al-Bashir] (who may, by
the way, catch a bad cold and die tomorrow), and as long as supporters of the AU’s objective of
independence and non-colonialism continue to turn a blind eye to the AU’s apparent insistence on
protecting heads of State, the AU and the ICC will continue to play hero and villain games at the expense
of the African continent.” Tladi argues that the AU’s legal arguments with respect to al-Bashir’s immunity
were sound, but similar arguments launched against the ICC’s indictment of Uhuro Kenyatta (leader of a
States Party to the ICC) were unjustifiable.
95
See generally Dapo Akande, “The Legal Nature of the Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its
Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunity,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7 (2009): 333. See also: Samar
El-Masri, “The legality of the International Criminal Court’s decision against Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan,”
International Journal 66.2 (2011): 371-390.
96
See Guénaël Mettraux, John Dugard, and Max du Plessis, “Heads of State Immunities, International
Crimes and President Bashir’s Visit to South Africa,” International Criminal Law Review 18.4 (2018):
577-622.

49

Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol). The proposed Malabo Protocol
grants the regional court jurisdiction over international crimes, including those
covered in the Rome Statute. This institutional overlap has led some to frame the
Malabo Protocol in the context of regime complexes, that is, “the way in which
two or more institutions intersect in terms of their scope and purpose.”97 Scholars
such as Sirleaf have explained that the ICC’s “institutional crisis created a space
for regional innovation.”98 Others including Jackson say that the likelihood of the
creation of regional tribunals with overlapping subject matter jurisdiction with the
ICC should be expected over time whether regional, multilateral, or bilateral.99
Some scholars have attempted to explain why the AU would want to regionalize
international criminal justice in the first place. For example, Tim Murithi opined that “the
key issue is that the continental body views its relationship with the International
Criminal Court as having deteriorated to such a point that it is exploring actively how to
make the Court’s presence in Africa an irrelevancy in the future.”100 In a similar vein,
Gaeta and Labuda couched the Malabo Protocol as reactive to the Court and more
particularly as “[o]ne of the surprising consequences of the AU’s conflict with the
ICC.”101 Few scholars have considered potentiality for the coexistence of the ICC and the
AU Court.102 Rather, most works have focused on the merits and acceptability of the
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proposal without considering how regional courts such as the ACJHR could fit within the
Rome Statute System under the auspices of the complementarity principle.
To illustrate this point, some scholars have challenged the Malabo Protocol on the
grounds that it is merely a response to the ICC’s prosecution of African presidents and is
an attempt to insulate African leaders, since the Malabo Protocol provides immunity for
sitting heads of state, which is not afforded under the Rome Statute.103 For example, Fred
Aja Agwu opined that “the African leaders’ decision to imbue the African Court with a
criminal jurisdiction and ensure a soft landing for those of them that committed heinous
crimes against their populations raises a red flag for Africa on the standards of
complementarity in the international criminal justice system, especially as anticipated by
the Rome Statute that created the ICC.”104 Other scholars have argued that the Malabo
Protocol’s immunity clause is ‘self-defeating’ because “[i]t calls into question seemingly
settled norms of customary international law… Moreover, the immunities clause
contravenes the law of some African countries… which have adapted their internal
legislation to the Rome Statute. Most seriously, giving immunity to African leaders
undercuts the AU’s criticisms of the ICC’s system of ‘selective justice’ and suggests that
the proposed African Court is little more than a thinly veiled attempt to challenge the
ICC’s authority over high-ranking African politicians.”105 Thus, there is a real concern
raised in the literature about the intent of the Malabo Protocol and how it relates to
political insulation for African leaders.
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On the other hand, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder argued that, “[i]n
response to opponents of the AU’s initiative to endow the African Court with criminal
jurisdiction, we argue that the concerns that have been voiced about the intentions of
African leaders and about possible jurisdictional battles with the ICC are exaggerated…
the Protocol has express value… even if the Protocol will not enter into force… its
adoption matters, because it articulates a regional vision on the future of international
criminal justice.”106 This is consistent with the ‘official AU position,’ which is that “the
African Court’s wider jurisdictional mandate is not a challenge to the ICC’s authority but
rather an ‘African solution to African problems.’”107 Kamari Maxine Clarke also drew
attention to the importance of the Pan-Africanism that undergirds the Malabo Protocol.
Her study explained “how the drafters of the Malabo Protocol for the ACJHR sought to
gain authority over the sequencing of peace and justice interventions by discursively
recalling the deep inequalities in Africa’s histories and infrastructures, while innovating
new ways for political actors to navigate judicial contexts.”108 As such, Clarke uses the
immunity provision in Malabo to spin the argument of political insulation on its head by
emphasizing that such an approach allows for the prioritization of justice responses
outside of retributive or court-based mechanisms, while simultaneously addressing the
crimes that are a direct biproduct of the structural inequality that stems from colonialism.
Thus, scholars have acknowledged that “the postcolonial condition is the one in which
the globally disenfranchised navigate the international justice system, which still
consecrates the West as incapable of committing criminal acts.”109 This
acknowledgement is part of the discourse that surrounds calls for African solutions to
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African problems and recontextualizes African discontent with the behaviour of the ICC
and the desire to pursue Afro-centric alternatives.

3.5

Part II. Theoretical Approach

As determined from the summary of the literature above, much of the discourse
surrounding the Rome Statute negotiations is descriptive as opposed to theoretical and/or
explanatory. In the context of the Africa-ICC relationship, the theoretical literatures tend
to focus on African criticisms of the Court as such, with little consideration of their
origins. On this pattern, analyses that consider similar questions to those of the
dissertation tend to focus on the years after the ICC’s establishment, rather than the preRome or Rome Conference time period. When works do consider the pre-Rome time
period, they have failed to consider African positions at the Rome Conference itself, or
else fail to consider how African conceptualizations of an ideal ICC can be used to
explain the origins of the criticisms towards the resultant Court. As such, consideration of
African engagement in the Rome Statute negotiation processes increases the explanatory
depth and facilitates a better understanding of the criticisms expressed by some African
states and the African Union towards the Court. It also fosters a greater appreciation of
the empirical significance of the normative commitment that African states have towards
the ICC, which at times has superseded rational self-interest and directly informed
African state behaviour and policy preferences with respect to sustained commitment to
the Rome Statute.
It is argued here that the behaviour of African states in relation to the ICC can only
be sufficiently explained through the use of a constructivist theoretical approach. The
remainder of this section will unpack why constructivism is the preferred lens though
which to answer each of the four guiding research questions of the dissertation, over and
above other less suitable theories of international relations, which have narrowed to
include realism/rational choice; postcolonialism; and liberal institutionalism/institutional
design. It is argued that constructivism offers a theoretical basis to both predict and
explain the behaviour of African states in relation to the ICC based on its inclusion of the
empirical value of rational, normative, and ideational factors. To frame the remainder of
the chapter, each of the theoretical approaches that were considered for the purposes of
the dissertation are outlined below, followed by an explanation as to why constructivism
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provides a preferable theoretical framework through which to answer the research
questions herein.

3.5.1

Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal institutionalists posit that the international political world is ordered by rules and
is less anarchic and chaotic than realists suggest. Within international relations theory,
liberal institutionalists such as Alexrod and Keohane assert that institutions can strongly
influence cooperation between states.110 International institutions are defined as
“recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge.”111 While other
definitions may be possible, the common theme is that institutions determine expectations
of behaviour. As such, institutions “facilitate significant amounts of cooperation for a
period of time” and can change the incentives for countries, as well as the strategic
choices available to states in their own self-interest.112 Quite plainly, liberal
institutionalism has deep roots in game theory–i.e. the measure of strategic opportunities
and constraints in decision making. Similar to realists, liberal institutionalists are
concerned with states as unitary actors. For liberal institutionalists, states make strategic
choices based on self-interest in terms of material security and/or wealth as a primary
goal. Thus, liberal institutionalism is closely associated with neoliberal, rational-choice
models.
The relationship between liberal institutionalism and international law rests on the
fact that “fully legalized institutions bind states through law: their behavior is subject to
scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law and,
often, domestic law.”113 Thus, if a state is willing to make a legal commitment, it is
because it coalesces with its national self-interest even when levied against the relative
sovereignty costs associated with doing so. International institutions, it is argued, reduce
transaction costs. As such, the ICC would be beneficial because creating a permanent
court would eliminate the need to establish ad hoc tribunals in the future. On this basis,
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scholars such as Goldsmith and Posner staunchly assert that states only obey international
law when it is in the self-interest of the state to do so.114 They further argue that when
international law is instrumentalized in this way, it does not indicate that it is an effective
legal system.
In this vein, law and institutions such as the ICC are designed, created, and
maintained for reasons of strategic self-interest. Liberal institutionalism provides a
theoretical framework to understand why states choose to legalize arrangements, and to
better understand the spectrum of soft and hard law approaches to solving collective
problems. The process of legalization, as defined by Abbott et al., is a “particular form of
institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and
delegation.”115 Institutions may or may not possess each of these characteristics; they
each operate independently of the other and can exist at different levels along a
continuum. The greatest utility of liberal institutionalism for the purposes of this study is
its ability to provide a theoretical lens through which to explain elements of the ICC’s
institutional design. However, while liberal institutionalism provides a lens to theorize
about how and why the ICC was established through the course of its negotiation process,
it also provides a more general theoretical framework to analyze why states choose to
commit to it.116

3.5.2

Institutional Design

This dissertation engages with works concerning the ICC’s institutional design, that is the
“specific provisions in the Rome Statute governing the ICC’s operation.”117 As
Christopher Rudolph has explained, “[w]here a state stands regarding joining the court is
a direct function of its process of institutional design, for that determines what exactly it
is supporting or opposing. Thus, theorizing interests regarding the court must begin by
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considering them in the context of preferences in institutional design.”118 Rudolph also
importantly points out that “beneath the surface of the Rome Statute negotiations, a battle
was also waged between states seeking to maintain their relative position in the global
hierarchy and those who sought to restructure that hierarchy in part by creating a specific
type of international criminal court.”119 This point is linked back to the Court’s
relationship to the United Nations Security Council as the ‘crucial political fault line’ in
the institutional design of the court.120 Rudolph identifies three ‘phases of the process of
institutional design’: (1) Preparatory Committee meetings (1996-1998); (2) the Rome
Conference (1998); and (3) the Kampala Review Conference (2010).121 Relying on these
phases of the ICC’s institutional design offers a lens to better theorize about the kind of
Court that African states ‘wanted’ and how that might explain state support or opposition
to the Rome Statute. Similarly, theorizing in terms of the ICC’s institutional design
allows for an integration of the effects of power politics within the architecture of the
Rome Statute. The following section will examine how various theoretical approaches
might answer the research questions and will explain why constructivism provides the
greatest overall explanatory and predictive value for the purposes of the dissertation.

3.5.3

Rational Choice

Duncan Snidal defines rational choice as a “methodological approach that explains both
individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under
constraints.”122 Thus, rational choice says that explanation can be found by determining
the “relevant actors, the goals they seek, and their ability to do so. The approach also
requires some specification of constraints–which may be technological, institutional, or
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arise from interdependencies among actors’ choices.”123 It is important to note that the
goals under consideration could include material interests but also “normative or
ideational ‘goals.’”124
Rational choice, at least in the context of this dissertation, can be closely
associated with realist principles that suggest that states are the primary actors, have
sufficient information, and have the capability to make rational calculations in order to
maximize power and self-interest. It is important to acknowledge that any explanation of
state behaviour ought to consider that states typically engage in international politics both
strategically and rationally. Under a rational choice model, goal seeking is its primary
explanatory factor. In the context of the Rome Statute negotiations, rational choice
provides a theoretical model to consider why states chose to design the ICC the way that
they did, but it substantively fails to explain what kind of Court states ought to have
designed. Therefore, rational choice tends to generally overlook broader normative
concerns. Snidal says that “by showing that good institutional design must be consistent
with interests to be effective, rational choice can help normative analysis avoid
foundering on naïve idealism.”125 Yet, such an approach does not account for the
inequality of interests in international politics. In other words, the interests of dominant
states tend to overshadow those of traditionally weak or less powerful states, particularly
in the context of multilateral negotiations pertaining to questions of institutional design.
Thus, rational choice is limited in that it takes for granted who the key actors are
(identity); what their interests are; and how that affects the creation of international
institutions, all of which are fundamentally important for the purposes of this dissertation.
Moreover, it fails to consider how interests or preferences can change. Thus, rational
choice explanations are partially helpful, but need to be combined with other
(constructivist) theoretical approaches to be more fully instructive.

123

Ibid.
Ibid.
125
Ibid., 103.
124

57

3.5.4

Postcolonialism

Postcolonialism emphasizes the importance of power relations stemming from
decolonization and anticolonial struggles. It looks not only at the formal end of
colonialism following the Second World War, but also the imperial and colonial
experiences that continue to affect contemporary politics. This suggests that there are
lingering consequences to colonialism that persist, based on the relations between ‘the
West’ – i.e. the dominant political powers in international relations, and the ‘other’–i.e.
the ‘Third World,’ developing world, or ‘Global South.’ For postcolonial theorists, the
starting place is one which assumes that ‘Western’ power and influence before and
during decolonization still exists and informs political strategies that seek to retain that
power and influence, at the subjugation of developing states, including those in Africa.
The utility of employing a postcolonial lens is in its ability to think critically about an
often ‘taken for granted’ Eurocentric and/or North American point of view and to begin
to deconstruct the ways in which the global order is both shaped and maintained by
dominant and subjugated states.126
Scholars such as Epstein argue that postcolonialism provides a different lens through
which to consider the nature of norms in the context of international relations. She says
that “the postcolonial perspective is thus deeply… genealogical, in its dual concerns with,
first, the genesis of norms, or the processes by which particular behaviours come to be
taken to be ‘normal.’ Second, it is centrally concerned with the power relations
implicated in the (re)drawing of boundaries between the normal and the strange or the
unacceptable.”127 In this light, postcolonialism offers a lens through which to reframe
norms as a mechanism or process of control and/or domination created by the existing
power relations in international politics. It also provides a means to consider ‘alternate’
behaviours as potentially legitimate, or least of all, it provides a theoretical method to
situate difference within the overarching power structures that shape and are shaped by
dominant powers in the global order.
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In the context of the research questions that guide this dissertation, postcolonialism
can help to theoretically reposition and partially explain all four. Since postcolonialism is
not a grand theory of international relations, but rather a situational lens through which to
view phenomena, it offers an alternative standpoint from which to examine each of the
research questions employed throughout the dissertation, but it can neither fully explain
nor predict. It does, however, provide a means to deconstruct the Eurocentric
undercurrents of international law, human rights, and liberal cosmopolitism rooted in the
United Nations System that greatly influenced the Rome Statute negotiations and the
establishment of the ICC. Postcolonialism has often been used as a theoretical approach
to explain the operationalization of the ICC, especially with respect to its hyper-focus in
African situations and contexts, which is highly important for the purposes of the
dissertation.128

3.5.5

Constructivism

Constructivism provides the means to examine the identities and interests of relevant
actors within the international system, but also allows for rational considerations, such as
the strategic pursuit of interests. As Reus-Smit explained, constructivism “is
characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material
structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually
constitute relationship between agents and structures.”129 Early constructivists such as
Wendt and Ruggie challenged the epistemological foundations of dominant rationalist
theories of international relations (i.e. realism and liberalism) by emphasizing the
importance of ideational and identity factors in generating understandings and
explanations of global phenomena.130 Constructivism is fundamentally what Wendt et al.
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described as a “social theory of international politics.”131 Indeed, the foundation of
constructivism rests on the notion that the international system is ‘socially constructed’
and reflects the identity and practices of actors, as opposed to a fixed approach to
identities and interests, as is the case with rational approaches stemming from realist and
liberal schools. Constructivists do not deny that the international political system is
largely anarchical but instead challenge the significance anarchy.
According to Wendt, “anarchy is what states make of it.”132 In the case of the
ICC, states have elected to create an institution to preserve order, based on a collective
and intersubjective understanding of appropriate behaviour, i.e. norms. As such,
constructivism makes sense of international relations by understanding it as inherently
social. Constructivists argue that states create–and are created by–shared norms and
values. Thus, some scholars argue that the guiding theoretical objective for international
relations constructivists is to establish that norms matter.133 In this respect, constructivism
is an inherently useful theoretical framework for this study because it allows
consideration for how the international criminal justice norm as exemplified by the
creation and enmeshment of the International Criminal Court is related to identity and
interests. Such an approach can be used to help explain commitment, avoidance, or
reversion to the ICC at various junctures of its lifecycle.
From an ontological perspective, constructivism allows for consideration of social
facts, that is facts that “depend on human agreement that they exist and typically require
human institutions for their existence.”134 On this basis, constructivism is influenced by
critical international theory in its broad ontology but differs with respect to its emphasis
on empirical analysis. According to Adler, constructivism “occupies the middle ground
between rationalist approaches (whether realist or liberal) and interpretive approaches
(mainly postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical), and creates new areas for theoretic
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and empirical investigation.”135 Since the Rome Statute and the ICC only exist because a
group of states collectively decided that they ought to, constructivism is a particularly
well-suited lens through which to view both the Statute and the Court’s normative and
institutional evolution.
Foundationally, constructivism gained traction in the 1990s as an alternative
theory to explain international relations, since rationalist theories failed to predict the end
of the Cold War. Allowing scholars of international relations to consider ideational
factors in their analyses provided an opportunity for an increased and richer
understanding of global politics. The depth afforded by a constructivist approach is
preferable for the purposes of this study, since its intent is to generate deeper and richer
understanding of the evolution of international criminal justice, the ICC, and its
relationship to African states. While realist accounts can more readily explain the
preferences of powerful states, especially members of the permanent five of the United
Nations Security Council in opposing the Court, the behaviour and interest formation of
the coalition of middle and weak power states (i.e. the Like-Minded Group) that pushed
for the success of the Rome Statute and the Court cannot be explained by similar
theoretical approaches. Thus, Nicole Deitelhoff argued that the ICC was created because
of persuasion and discourse within the negotiations, in other words, “a shift in states’
interests.”136 This, she argued, was heavily influenced by the ability of weak states and
non-governmental actors to influence the normative and institutional settings of the Rome
Statute negotiations altogether, which contributed to persuasion and discourse.137
The compatibility of constructivism with the study of international law has been
established in the literature. For example, Brunnée and Toope suggest that constructivism
is compatible with the study of international law because of the attention it gives to the
role of norms in international politics, which is ‘stock-in-trade’ for international law
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scholars.138 Brunnée and Toope further explain that it is “norm creation, evolution, and
destruction that has proven to be the strongest bridging point between some IL theorists
and the constructivists.”139 Slaughter et al. pointed out that international relations
constructivists and international law scholars start with the same proposition that “actors,
identities, interests and social structures are culturally and historically contingent
products of interaction on the basis of shared norms.”140 Slaughter had previously written
that constructivist international relations theories expanded the prospects for
interdisciplinary collaboration because of its emphasis on international legal norms in
shaping state behaviour; institutions have the capacity to transform the identity of actors,
and thus reshape calculations of interests.141 Similarly, Anthony Arend said that
constructivism is useful to the study of international law because international legal rules
contribute to the creation of state identity and interest.142 In a similar vein, Harold Koh
posited that states obey international law because interpreting global norms and
internalizing them into domestic law leads to the “reconstruction of national interests and
eventually national identities.”143 On this basis, constructivism departs from realism by
broadening the spectrum of factors that might shape and inform conceptions of a states’
self-interest. Interdisciplinarity in the fields of international relations and international
law has been a focal advocacy point for scholars on both sides of the disciplinary divide,
with constructivism featuring strongly on the international relations side of the
discussion.
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3.5.6

Norm Theory

A key component of constructivism depends on the emergence and valuation of norms in
the formation of a states’ identity and interests. Norms are defined as a standard of
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.144 The constructivist undercurrent
of norm theory stresses the significance of socialization by both international institutions
and norms, which inform identity and interests. However, liberal institutionalist scholars
have argued that norms are not causally linked to behaviour or phenomena. As Ruggie
explained:
Norms may ‘guide’ behavior, they may ‘inspire’ behavior, they may ‘rationalize’
or ‘justify’ behavior, they may express ‘mutual expectations’ about behavior, or
they may be ignored. But they do not effect cause in the sense that a bullet
through the heart causes death… The impact of norms within international
regimes is not a passive process… because state behavior within regimes is
interpreted by other states, the rationales and justifications for behavior that are
proffered, together with pleas for understanding or admissions of guilt, as well as
the responsiveness of such reasoning on the part of other states, all are absolutely
critical component parts of any explanation involving the efficacy of norms.145
On this basis, it is important to measure the efficacy of the international criminal justice
norm not in terms of its causal effect on ‘compliance,’ ‘deterrence’ or similar behaviours
in the narrow sense. Alternatively, the discourse among states offers a better opportunity
to take stock of the norm’s overall significance in international relations.
Other scholars such as Risse and Ropp have considered how international human
rights norms influence domestic politics and the behaviour of states.146 Karen Engle
mapped the evolution of the anti-impunity norm and its synonymity with international
criminal law as a response to human rights violations, including the relevant history that
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paved the way for the establishment of the ICC.147 Theorizing about how norms diffuse
and the contexts in which they influence international politics encompasses a wide
research agenda with particular applicability to the study of the diffusion of the
international criminal justice norm.
The theory of norm diffusion was laid out most cohesively by Martha Finnemore
and Kathryn Sikkink in their article, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change.148 Employing a largely constructivist international relations theoretical
framework (with consideration to rational strategic factors), Finnemore and Sikkink
explained how new norms are created and diffuse, which may take the form of law over
time. Indeed, in the context of the ICC, international criminal justice and accountability
for grave violations of human rights serve as bedrock norms that undergird the entire
institutional enterprise of the Court. It is therefore impossible to make sense of how and
why the ICC came to be without tracing the evolution of the international criminal justice
norm in international political and legal life. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms
evolve in a patterned three-step ‘life cycle:’ (1) ‘norm emergence,’ which occurs as a
result of persuasion by norm entrepreneurs who convince states to embrace new norms; if
a critical mass of states support the norm it reaches a ‘tipping point,’ leading to; (2) broad
norm acceptance, otherwise referred to as a ‘norm cascade’ where states attempt to
‘socialize’ other states to follow the norm; (3) internalization, where norms assume a
‘taken-for-granted quality.’149
In the context of the ICC, some scholars point out that the academic debate is
saturated with normative discussions, which largely pivot around empirical findings
about the Court’s effectiveness at holding perpetrators accountable, and its corresponding
deterrent capabilities.150 Indeed, scholars such as Sikkink have posited that the ICC does
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have a deterrent effect, largely expanding upon her work regarding the deterrent effect of
human rights trials.151 Jo and Simmons reach a similar conclusion based on their
systematic assessment of the ICC’s deterrent effects for state and nonstate actors.152
Catherine Gegout reaches the opposite conclusion, that ICC intervention has not
prevented the emergence of new conflicts, but argues that it could have a deterrent effect,
though this is not guaranteed.153 Nevertheless, this approach to the study of international
law falls under what Shaffer and Ginsburg have referred to as “a new empirical turn in
international legal scholarship.”154 The authors contend that “[t]he theoretical debate over
whether international law matters is a stale one. What matters now is the study of the
conditions under which international law is formed and has effects.” While speaking
from an international legal theoretical perspective, the same applies for the study of
international legal institutions within the study of international relations. The
interdisciplinary nature of international courts and institutions is inherent and ought to be
incorporated into any empirical inquiry.
On this basis, other literatures have focused on measures of normative
commitment and/or compliance in the context of the ICC as a modicum for norm
efficacy. However, as Howse and Teitel point out, “the concept of compliance (especially
viewed as rule observance) is inadequate for understanding how international law has
normative effects.”155 This is especially because a strict interpretation of state compliance
or noncompliance, which is common in international law scholarship, ignores the broader
effects that international legal norms might have at multiple levels of political
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engagement. This theoretical framework offers a means to evaluate norm diffusion at the
domestic, regional, and/or international level(s), which is a primary objective of this
dissertation.
In addition to norm evolution and diffusion, scholars have also focused on norm
contestation and erosion.156 Falling somewhere in the middle of those discourses,
scholars have similarly considered the role of norm contestation as it relates to concepts
of political backlash.157 For example, Dietelhoff examined the impact of norm
contestation in the context of Africa and the ICC and determined that “the spread and
intensification of this contestation, or backlash movement, has weakened the court and
the norm it embodies: Non-compliance with the court has increased on the African
continent… Hence, contestation even was consequential.”158 On the other hand,
Dietelhoff also acknowledged that ICC activity in some African states sparked efforts to
bolster domestic legal institutions so as to avoid Court intervention, and the African
Union has made efforts to regionalize international criminal justice as a response.159 This
is especially important to acknowledge, since not all forms of norm contestation are de
facto regressive. This provides a framework to consider the unintended normative
consequences for African states engaged in pushback or backlash towards the ICC.

3.5.7

Hybrid Theoretical Approaches

In the context of the ICC, scholars have attempted to explain the successful negotiation of
the Rome Statute in both rationalist and constructivist terms. For example, David
Whippman has explained that the Rome Statute negotiations can best be understood by
considering three factors: (1) the ‘reasons for action’ of the actors involved–i.e. states and
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non-governmental organizations; (2) how actors’ interests and identities produced
positions on particular elements of the statute; and (3) the context of the negotiations,
since actors were required to situate their positions in the framework of a legal
institution.160 The overall conclusion made by Whippman is that “politics is driven by
normative as well as material concerns, and that law is both a product of– and constituted
of– this multifaceted politics. In the context of the ICC, the arguments of both supporters
and critics of the proposed new court evidenced a combination of normative, material,
and identity-based concerns.”161 While this study situates the negotiation of the ICC in
terms of United States opposition to the Rome Statute and the Court, questions about
interest formation on the part of weak states can be interrogated through similar
frameworks. Thus, the positions of African delegations can also be understood in light of
material and normative factors that influenced identity and interests which were
ultimately reflected in support or opposition to the ICC.
Relying on the work of Abbott and Snidal, both rationalist and constructivist
international relations analyses can be combined with international law in order to
explain particular phenomena and make sense of legal institutional design. It is argued
that “law and legalization involve values and interests; they operate through instrumental
and normative channels; they involve power as well as rational design; they are shaped
by and shape the behavior of private actors as well as states.”162 Finnemore and Sikkink
similarly posit that “rationality cannot be separated from any politically significant
episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative context
conditions any episode of rational choice.”163 This bears particular relevance to the ICC,
since as Nicole Deitelhoff has explained, “the ICC entails enormous sovereignty costs for
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states but only uncertain benefits.”164 Political scientist Judith Kelley similarly concluded
that “[i]t is not very clear what concrete gains any one state can anticipate from
supporting the ICC.”165 Thus, there is a basis to employ both constructivist and rationalist
approaches together to better understand questions of why the ICC was created why
states choose to commit to it.

3.6

Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the most salient themes in the Africa-ICC discourse and has
surveyed works that evaluate aspects of the ICC’s institutional design as reflected by the
Rome Statute negotiations in particular. In doing so, this chapter provided a framework to
theoretically ground the design and architecture of the resultant ICC and evaluate the
compromises reached in Rome from an African perspective. This chapter provided a
sketch of the literatures on the Rome Statute negotiations and the Africa-ICC relationship
to illuminate the compromises that African States made in and after Rome when signing,
ratifying, and implementing the Rome Statute into domestic legislation. This framing also
emphasized the most prevalent debates concerning the problems with the ICC’s
operationalization in African contexts and African responses to those problems. In short,
the literatures of the Rome Statute negotiations, African commitment to the Rome
Statute/ICC, African problems with the ICC, and African responses to the problems with
the ICC have each provided a theoretical lens through which to situate this dissertation’s
contribution to the literature. This chapter also provided an overview of the theoretical
approaches with the greatest utility throughout the dissertation and has explained why
constructivism/norm theory has been selected as its theoretical lens. It is important to
note that the point is not that the existing literatures are inherently flawed or wrong.
Rather, this dissertation seeks to complement the existing literature by providing another
layer of nuance and analysis.

164

Nicole Deithelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting the Islands of Persuasion in the
ICC Case,” International Organization 63.1 (2009): 33.
165
Judith Kelley, “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and
Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements,” American Political Science Review 101.3 (2007): 577.

68

Chapter 4

4

Historical Background

It is necessary to situate African support and activism for an International Criminal Court
(ICC or ‘Court’) within its broader historical context. The ICC initiative began at the
United Nations (UN), and more particularly within the UN General Assembly’s Sixth
Committee after the Second World War. This chapter maps African interest and
involvement in the ICC project, and considers how this interest translated into direct
participation and influence throughout the pre-Rome Conference period. The process of
establishing the ICC in its broad sense has been well-documented by scholars of
international relations and international law.1 Tangible developments began in 1994 when
the International Law Commission (ILC) presented the first draft statute for an ICC to the
United Nations General Assembly. This draft was the necessary springboard for the work
that followed, which was completed within four negotiation forums set up by the UN
Secretariat: the Ad Hoc Committee (1995); the Preparatory Committee or ‘PrepCom’
(1996-1998); the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1998); and the Preparatory Commission
(1999-2004) under the Sixth Committee’s agenda item, ‘The Establishment of the
International Criminal Court.’
This chapter focuses on the specific role of Africa and Africans in the formation
and establishment of the ICC within and outside of UN processes from 1993 to the Rome
Diplomatic Conference in 1998, i.e. at the Ad Hoc Committee, the Preparatory
Committee, in regional meetings, and through engagement with civil society most
particularly the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC), Human Rights
Watch, and No Peace Without Justice. These contributions were the culmination of (in
many cases) years of negotiation and diplomacy at the local, regional, and international
level(s).
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The aim of this chapter is to systematically map African engagement in the
development of the Rome Statute from its earliest stages in order to dispel the myth that
Africans were coerced into joining the ICC by Western states (and other neocolonial
assertions about the Africa-ICC relationship). This is historical analysis is based on
research findings which effectively demonstrate high levels of (organic) participation,
agency, and influence in the creation and use of the Court through diplomatic, political,
and legal channels leading up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference. The primary
conclusion is that (neo)colonial arguments are not only inaccurate but deny an important
historical moment for Africa and the Africans who worked tirelessly to establish the ICC.
Mutually constituted skepticism on the part of ‘Africa’ and ‘the West’ reinforce ideas of
mistrust. This is a mistake; if couched differently, the insights generated from the ICC’s
disproportionate involvement in African situations could provide a reasonable basis to
consider avenues for constructive reform, used to strengthen the institution and
international criminal law, more generally. This will require a genuine dialectical process
rooted in equality and respect, which is imperative given Africa’s disproportionate and
long-lasting support for the Court and the normative and tangible development of
international criminal law, more broadly. Alternatively, acknowledging the longstanding
African commitment to the development of the international criminal justice norm
provides the space to meaningfully consider the merits of establishing regional
mechanisms to address similar crimes.

4.1

Drafting the Rome Statute: Tracing UN Processes

The idea of establishing an ICC originated within the General Assembly of the United
Nations and the International Law Commission, as early as 1948. See Table 4-1 for a
timeline of the early stages and legwork involved in establishing an ICC. Table 4-2
details the processes from the establishment of the ad hoc committee to Rome. Note that
relevant African contributions or roles are referenced throughout Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
Several key political events reinforced the notion that a permanent court was needed to
address the most heinous violations of human rights. Yet it is essential to highlight the
political factors that both hindered and facilitated the establishment of an ICC from its
earliest moments to the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.
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For example, the Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials following the Second World War
established the idea of holding individuals criminally responsible for atrocity crimes.
Without dwelling on the overwhelming criticism surrounding these trials and the
associated complaints of ‘victors justice’–the idea of criminalizing international crimes
was born as a result of these trials.2 While the General Assembly had asked the
International Law Commission to examine the establishment of an ICC and a draft statute
was presented, the effective prioritization of human rights was not a strong or primary
focus during the Cold War. However, the conflicts in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda and subsequent ad hoc tribunals established by the United Nations Security
Council, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, reiterated the need for a permanent judicial
institution to respond to mass atrocity crimes. Historical events, coupled with changing
political trends in the 1990s (which focused less on the primacy of sovereignty and more
so on ideas of human security and human rights), presented an opportune political
environment in which to establish an ICC.
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Table 4-1: Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty, Key United Nations
General Assembly and International Law Commission Efforts (1948-1994)
1948
General Assembly Resolution 260 invited the International Law Commission (ILC),
“to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ
for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction
will be conferred.”
Note: This was a response to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials (1945-1948), which established a system
of international criminal justice based upon holding individuals criminally responsible for the most
serious international crimes: war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity by (fair)
trial.

1951
ILC presented a draft statute to the General Assembly to be submitted to governments
for comment and observation titled, ‘Code of Offences against the Peace and Security
of Mankind.’
Discussion about the possibility and desirability of defining ‘aggression’ was
undertaken.
1954
The ILC prepared a revised draft based on the observations received from
governments.
The General Assembly postponed considering the draft until aggression was defined.
(Note: The Cold War limited the progress of the ICC project during this time period. Political will was
insufficient to push the ICC initiative forward.)

1989
Trinidad and Tobago asked the General Assembly to create an international criminal
court with jurisdiction over drug trafficking.
The General Assembly asked the ILC to revive the ICC project and work on a new
draft statute.
1991
9 December: ILC completes provisional draft articles on the draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
1992
25 November: ILC requested to continue its work on a draft statute for an ICC as a
matter of priority. The report of the Working Group, views expressed during debate in
the Sixth Committee, and written comments from states were to be considered.
1993
9 December: ILC asked to continue its work as a matter of priority with the goal to
establish a draft statute by the forty-sixth session in 1994.
The ILC decided that the draft articles proposed by the Working Group on a draft
statute for an ICC be transmitted to governments to formulate observations and submit
comments to the Secretary-General.
(Note: the conflict and ad hoc tribunal set up by the UN Security Council on 25 May for the former
Yugoslavia put pressure on the UN to create a more permanent solution.)
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South African Development Community (SADC) countries Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland,
Tanzania, and South Africa begin to meet and discuss the ICC project with the aim to
meaningfully participate in its establishment.
African membership in the ILC Working Group on the ICC: Sierra Leone (chair),
Madagascar, Senegal (Special Rapporteur).

1994
ILC forty-sixth session: ILC completed a draft statute based on government feedback
and recommended that the General Assembly convene an international conference of
plenipotentiaries to adopt a treaty on the establishment of an ICC.
9 December: General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee to consider
the
substantive and administrative issues in the draft statute and consider arrangements for
convening an international conference of plenipotentiaries.
(Note: The ad hoc tribunal set up by the UN Security Council on 8 November for Rwanda put continued
pressure on the UN to create a more permanent solution.)
(Note also: In South Africa, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated signaling a definitive transition from
apartheid. This created additional momentum in international politics to prioritize norms such as
international human rights and post-conflict/violence reconciliation. )

The ILC appointed Senegalese lawyer and former Minister Doudou Thiam as Special
Rapporteur on the Draft Code of ‘Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Humanity’ from
1982 until the ILC completed its draft statute in 1994.
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Table 4-2: The Ad Hoc Committee, Preparatory Committee, and Rome Conference
1995
The ad hoc committee meets twice and submits a report to the General Assembly.
The General Assembly creates the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) to prepare the
draft text for submission to a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries.
African membership in the ad hoc committee 3-13 April: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt
(Vice-Chairman), Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
African membership in the ad hoc committee 14-25 August: Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Gabon,
Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Sudan, Tunisia.

1996
25 March – 12 April: First session of the PrepCom takes place.
12 August – 30 August: Second session of the PrepCom takes place.
17 December: General Assembly adopts a resolution and sets the dates for subsequent
PrepCom sessions.
Italy offers to host the treaty conference in 1998.
(Note: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended the PrepComs, particularly under the
‘Coalition for the International Criminal Court’ (CICC) umbrella.)

7 August: South Africa and Lesotho submit a working paper on international cooperation and
judicial [mutual] assistance.

1997
10 February – 21 February: Third session of the PrepCom takes place.
4 August – 15 August: Fourth session of the PrepCom takes place.
1 December – 12 December: Fifth session of the PrepCom takes place.
14 September: SADC states meet and establish ‘ten basic principles’ for negotiating an
independent and effective ICC.

1998
16 March – 3 April: Sixth session of the PrepCom takes place.
15 June – 17 July: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court takes place in Rome, Italy.
5 February – 6 February: twenty-five African governments meet in Dakar, Senegal and adopt
the ‘Dakar Declaration,’ calling for an independent and effective ICC.
February 1998: Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers adopts the Dakar
Declaration
June 1998: Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity
adopts the Dakar Declaration
31 October 1998: Organization of African Unity adopts ‘Resolution on the Ratification of the
Treaty on the International Criminal Court
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4.2
4.2.1

African Support within the General Assembly Processes
The Ad Hoc Committee

Africans and African governments took a particularly keen interest in the development of
the throughout its trajectory through the UN system. Former South African diplomat
Pieter Kruger, who participated in the discussions that led to the establishment of the Ad
Hoc Committee in 1994, explained that his own personal position, in consultation with
the (then) Foreign Affairs and Legal Section, “at the time was cautious support for the
ICC, but no input had yet been received from other Departments such as Justice, Police,
and Defence.”3 Kruger explained that he was the only representative of South Africa who
attended the Ad Hoc Committee meetings in 1995 and “had a general mandate to take a
positive position to the establishment of an ICC.”4 At least for South Africa, he
explained, the aftermath of the Cold War made the idea of an ICC viable and possible,
although it needed a lot of negotiation.5 Referring to Table 4-2, it is apparent that several
African governments were involved at this stage of the Court’s development and
contributed to its evolution.
Kruger explained that during the second week of the Ad Hoc Committee
meetings, he was invited by the representatives of Australia and New Zealand to
participate in an early meeting, which he said was the beginnings of the ‘Like-Minded
Group’ (LMG). The LMG was a formidable negotiating bloc for the remainder of the
process, including at the Rome Diplomatic Conference. According to Kruger, African
membership in the LMG grew to include “at least Lesotho, Botswana, and Malawi.”6
Also highly influential, Egyptian Cherif Bassiouni assembled interim workshops to work
on ICC issues at the Siracusa Institute in Sicily. This is particularly important to
highlight, since Cherif Bassiouni was able to fundamentally influence the development of
the ICC project and take a leading role in its success, even though his government did not
fully support the idea (Egypt has neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute at the time
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Pieter Kruger, former South African diplomat, Foreign Affairs, interview by author, 28 September 2018,
by telephone.
4
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5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.

75

of writing).7 Once the Ad Hoc Committee had done all it could, the Preparatory
Committee for the Establishment of the ICC was established, in order to work out the
more complex issues surrounding the text of the draft statute.

4.2.2

The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) Meetings

With respect to the Preparatory Committee, Pieter Kruger described that in the context of
South Africa, Foreign Affairs could not take a position on any issue without the
participation of the Justice Department. As such, he campaigned to put a Justice official
on the delegation. It is incredibly interesting to note that South Africa’s Department of
Justice was not initially eager to participate in the Rome Statute negotiation process.
Kruger explained that “the main reason for the initial recalcitrance was a concern that the
ICC could have retrospective jurisdiction, which could be problematic during South
Africa’s ongoing transition period. Once informed that the Statute would not provide for
retrospective jurisdiction, Justice considered my request.”8 This is significant because it
demonstrates that South Africa was thinking about the consequences of establishing an
ICC and its potential effects in domestic contexts. This is a high level of engagement, and
one that is worth pointing out.
South Africa took a leading role at the PrepCom meetings. Kruger explained that
after the first PrepCom that he “started to seriously engage SADC representatives to get
them to participate actively in the ICC process.”9 This is important to note, since SADC
had been engaging in its own meetings and establishing its own principles in this respect
for some time. He explained that Phakiso Mochochoko from Lesotho, who was then part
of Lesotho’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations, was the only other participant
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Note: Cherif Bassiouni has been called the ‘Father of International Criminal Law’ for the leading role he
took in the development of the International Criminal Court. See Mohamed Helal, “In Celebratus: M.
Cherif Bassiouni (1937-2017)” OpinioJuris (26 September 2017) available at
https://opiniojuris.org/2017/09/26/in-celebratus-m-cherif-bassiouni-1937-2017/; accessed 1 January 2021:
“He is essentially the father of International Criminal Law as we know it today; he is the authority on
extradition law and practice; he has made immense contributions to international human rights law; he has
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the International Criminal Court.”
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who took an active interest in the ICC and was soon brought into the LMG meetings.10
This provided the foundation for Kruger and Mochochoko to work on issues together,
particularly the working paper that they co-authored on International Cooperation and
Judicial Assistance.11 This demonstrates a degree of regional cooperation and
coalescence on the most important issues for the development of the ICC project at its
critical stages of development at the UN.

4.2.3

The Second PrepCom Meeting and Increased African
Participation

The second PrepCom meeting saw the expansion of the South African delegation to
include two Justice officials and Sivu Maqungo from Foreign Affairs; Kruger served as
the Head of Delegation at this meeting. At this meeting, Kruger explained that the coauthored paper with Mochochoko served as the basis for the working group discussion on
international cooperation and judicial assistance. This similarly demonstrates the high
level of engagement that African governments and Africans exercised throughout the
development of the ICC through the UN process. Other African participation “remained
very low key due to limited resources and expertise. At least the representative of Malawi
was there, and more visible as a result of his participation in earlier workshops.”12 Kruger
recalled having numerous discussions with non-governmental organizations about ways
to increase African participation in the process, since “it was not apathy, but a genuine
lack of resources at that stage.”13 Thus, while South Africa was in a position to take a
leading role in the process, other avenues were required and pursued for a great deal of
the region. Kruger said that “most African representatives that I spoke to during that time
were pretty much in favour of the ICC. They were all aware of the Rwanda tribunal and
viewed it in a positive light. At that stage there was no real talk of this being imposed on
Africa by the West, and that the ICC would only exercise its jurisdiction in Africa–those
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arguments only came later.”14 In this respect, African engagement at the earliest stages
was genuine, as was support for the ICC initiative. This is important because it makes
clear that such support did not come from a place of manipulation or coercion either
directly or indirectly on the part of the ‘West.’

4.2.4

The Third Preparatory Committee Meeting

Kruger explained that he had left the Civil Service at the end of September 1997.
However, Chairman of the PrepCom Meetings, Adrian Bos of the Netherlands requested
that South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Department include him on the South African
delegation so that he could chair the Working Group on International Cooperation and
Judicial Assistance again.15 The government of South Africa did not compensate him
financially for his attendance, instead Cherif Bassiouni facilitated the sponsorship of his
participation and he chaired the meeting. This is important because it demonstrates the
lengths that individual Africans were willing to go to ensure that the ICC project ended in
a successful outcome, above and beyond what the dominant historical narrative might
suggest.
Following Kruger’s departure from the South African delegation, he explained
that he was replaced by Professor Medard Rwelamira who “was aware of the efforts to
involve SADC states and other African states.”16 Other members of the delegation
included John Makhubele, Gen De Klerk, and Sivu Maqungo. With respect to the
Working Group at the final PrepCom and the Rome Conference on International
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, Phakiso Mochochoko took over that role, further
demonstrating regional collaboration and engagement in the process. Kruger explained
that the LMG began to expand its membership, which he said made it “a little less
effective because the interests were becoming a bit more diverse the close it came to the
Rome Conference.”17 This is an important point, since it offers some explanation as to
why governments often chose to negotiate as regional blocs instead of under the umbrella
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of the LMG. It raises questions about how close interests need to be in order to provide
an effective negotiation strategy for blocs of states. South African participation in the
final PrepCom meeting remained high, with positive and active participation by Medard
Rwelamira and Sivu Maqungo. This was the final meeting heading into the Rome
Conference.

4.3

Outside of the United Nations: SADC’s early interest in
the establishment of an ICC

African support for the idea of an international criminal court began as early as 1993
through the work of the South African Development Community (SADC), which
spearheaded coordinated regional activism. Sivu Maqungo, the former Principal State
Law Advisor to South Africa, explained that “Delegations from Lesotho, Malawi,
Swaziland, Tanzania and South Africa had participated in the effort to establish the ICC
as early as 1993 when the International Law Commission (ILC) presented a draft statute
to the General Assembly Sixth Committee for consideration.”18 This cursory involvement
evolved into a robust consultative approach by SADC, “with the view to develop a
strategy aimed at making a meaningful impact on the negotiations on the establishment of
the ICC.”19 This is significant inasmuch as it illustrates that African states not only
supported the idea of an ICC, but sought to impact its institutional design from the
earliest stages. African interest in establishing a permanent ICC was directly related to
the regional experience with widespread and systematic grave human rights abuses,
particularly apartheid in South Africa and genocide in Rwanda.20
To this end, according to Maqungo, delegates of fourteen African states,21 “had
met for the first time on the topic of an International Criminal Court on the 11 to 14
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September 1994 and discussed a joint uniform approach to negotiating the draft Statute of
the International Criminal Court.”22 The SADC-led discussions aimed to establish a
unified position, which was a strategic approach to make a meaningful impact on the
multilateral negotiations as the ICC initiative continued to move forward. In the
intervening years, African states worked together in close consultation to shape and
support the ICC project locally, regionally, and internationally, particularly within the
United Nations.
In this vein, legal experts from SADC states met in Pretoria, South Africa on 14
September 1997, “and adopted principles of consensus which were transmitted for review
to SADC ministers of Justice and attorneys-general.”23 These principles of consensus
provided the basis for the issuance of a Common Statement, “which became the
instruction manual for SADC’s negotiations.”24 This streamlined approach provided a
strong basis for African activism and involvement in negotiating the ICC from the outset.
The 14 September 1997 meeting and subsequent principles of consensus are
referred to as ‘SADC’s ten negotiating principles for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court.’ The ten negotiating principles were enumerated as follows:
(1) Support for an early Establishment of an International Criminal Court;
(2) The ICC should be effective, independent and impartial and operating within
the highest standards of international criminal justice;
(3) The ICC should decide whether it has jurisdiction in circumstances where the
national judicial system is not available, fails to prosecute or investigate or is
ineffective;
(4) The ICC should be complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases
where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective;
(5) The ICC should be responsive and give consideration to plights of victims
especially women and children;
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(6) The ICC should be unfettered by veto of the Security Council;
(7) Independence of the Prosecutor should be guaranteed and he/she must have ex
officio powers to initiate investigations;
(8) The ICC should enjoy maximum cooperation of States;
(9) The ICC ought to have inherent jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, serious violations of the principles applicable in armed
conflicts and if consensus is reached in respect of the crime of aggression it
should also fall under inherent jurisdiction of the ICC. Opt in or prior consent
should be in respect of treaty-based crimes;
10 Human Rights must be respected in all aspects of the ICC Statute, especially
rights of the accused to a fair trial.25
These negotiating principles reflect an Afro-centric vision of what would be required to
establish an effective ICC. Interestingly, these principles reflect a desire for a much
stronger statute than the one that was ultimately negotiated in 1998, especially regarding
the role of the Security Council, for example. The efforts on the part of SADC triggered
other regional dialogue about the want and need for the ICC Statute to succeed and the
importance of establishing an effective negotiation strategy to this end.

4.4

The Dakar Declaration

On 5-6 February 1998, the government of Senegal hosted an ‘African Conference on the
International Criminal Court’ (African Conference). Twenty-five states attended this
conference and the ‘Dakar Declaration on the Establishment of the International Criminal
Court’ (Dakar Declaration) was adopted.26 The attendees of the African Conference were
aware of the upcoming diplomatic conference for the adoption of the ICC treaty, which
was only four months away in Rome, Italy. African interest in the ICC project had been
well-established and the Dakar Declaration may be framed as reactionary to SADC’s
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vigilance, best expressed by the ten negotiating principles for the establishment of an
ICC. Of importance, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union
(AU), adopted the Dakar Declaration at the 67th ordinary session of the OAU Council of
Ministers in Addis Ababa (February 1998) and at the 34th Assembly of Heads of State
and Government of the OAU in Ouagadougou (June 1998). Since all African nations are
members of the African Union (which was then the OAU), this demonstrates strong
regional support for an ICC.
The Dakar Declaration makes several similar affirmations to those in the SADC
principles. For example, the Dakar Declaration affirms “that the Court shall be
independent, permanent, impartial, just and effective.”27 Other parallel components
include the affirmation that the ICC statute be adopted at the diplomatic conference, in
other words, there was a shared regional commitment to the early establishment of an
ICC. An important affirmation that “the International Criminal Court shall operate
without being prejudiced by actions of the Security Council”28 demonstrates a uniform
regional importance placed on this particular point. Both SADC and the Dakar
Declaration identify the importance of complementarity between the ICC and national
tribunals. Other similar points address the importance of state cooperation, respect for
human rights in all phases of the procedure, the independence of the Prosecutor, and a
financing scheme that does not impede the ICC’s independence and impartiality.29
Additionally, both documents say that the ICC can determine its own jurisdiction when
national systems fail to punish those most responsible for committing genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.
The Dakar Declaration largely mirrored SADC’s ten negotiating principles, with
some interesting points of departure. For example, while SADC only references national
justice systems in its conception of complementarity, the Dakar Declaration says, “That a
complementarity exists between the International Court and national and regional
tribunals, when these are ineffective and where political will is manifestly absent.”30 This
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approach signals a focus on (more) local forms of justice, and further entrenches the
notion of complementarity by framing the ICC as a court of last resort. The second key
difference is with respect to the question of providing compensation for victims. The
Dakar Declaration says “that the Statute of the Court must ensure respect for Human
Rights in all phases of the procedure, namely the rights of the suspects, the accused, the
victims and the witnesses, and consequently that the Preparatory Committee should
intensify its efforts to establish a consensus on the question of victim compensation.”31
These differences may be a reflection of the expansion of states involved in the process,
which represent different legal systems and/or valuations of particular aspects or ideas of
justice, i.e. compensation.

4.5

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined African participation in the establishment an ICC, particularly
from 1993 to 1998. It is clear that African governments and individuals engaged in very
high levels of engagement with the issues both inside and outside of the United Nations
processes. The role of civil society to increase broader regional involvement in the
development of the ICC project is especially important to note. Ultimately, however, this
chapter has outlined that African delegations were invested in the successful negotiation
of the Rome Statute, and many governments had established positions and preferences on
what kind of Court the ICC ought to be. This engagement offers a basis to seriously
consider the interventions of African governments throughout the Rome Diplomatic
Conference to better understand how the region conceptualized international criminal
justice at the ICC.
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Chapter 5

5

African Participation at the Rome Diplomatic Conference

This chapter deconstructs the preferences of African states at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference with respect to the role of the Security Council, the trigger mechanism for the
Court’s jurisdiction, and the power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio
motu. While there is no one monolith, there are some general regional consistencies in the
construction of preferences on these three provisions. This chapter synthesizes the
positions of African governments with respect to these issues, based upon the plenary
meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference.
Generally, the states that preferred to construct the Court in the ways reflected in the
final text displayed a strong commitment to the Statute in the form of treaty ratification. It
is important to note that these trends are general, since not every African state spoke to
every issue. However, the information provided by the summary records of the plenary
meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole indicates that there is a general
correlation between how much of the final text of the Statute reflected the preferences of
various African delegations and that states’ willingness to be bound by it.

5.1 Key Issues
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court (The Rome Diplomatic Conference, Rome Conference or
Conference) took place from 15 June to 17 July 1998 in Rome, Italy. From an
organizational (United Nations) perspective, it was the culmination of years of work on
the part of the International Law Commission (ILC), the Ad Hoc Committee (which was
tasked with reviewing the draft statute provided by the ILC in 1995),1 and the Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom), which continued to iron out the contentious components of the
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draft statute leading up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998.2 These efforts were
supplemented by the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments,
intergovernmental (regional) organizations, and committed delegates and activists. The
draft statute contained 13 parts and 116 articles.
Heading into the diplomatic conference in Rome, the successful negotiation of the
treaty to establish an International Criminal Court (ICC) was uncertain. Conference
Chairman Philippe Kirsch and his colleague, Canadian delegate John Holmes, explained,
“[d]espite the work accomplished by the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), the draft
statute that ultimately emerged from the PrepCom was riddled with some fourteen
hundred square brackets, i.e. points of disagreement, surrounding partial and complete
provisions, with any number of alternative texts.”3 This resulted in the need to organize
the Conference strategically. Coordinators were appointed to a specific area of
responsibility: “the chairman requested all coordinators at the outset to take the lead in
drafting provisions in their area of responsibility and to refer only unbracketed texts to
the CW [Committee of the Whole] so as to avoid miring it in negotiations on the
multitude of square brackets.”4 This division of labour was a managerial choice to
maximize time and consolidate the text.
On this basis, it is important to highlight the most controversial or contentious
parts of the treaty– that is, those aspects that could have resulted in the failure of the
Conference. Heading into Rome, according to the UN Press Release of 8 June 1998:
Most of the draft’s unresolved issues, however, are political in nature. Key issues
still outstanding include whether or not State consent would apply within inherent
jurisdiction of the court; whether the prosecutor would be able to initiate criminal
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action independently of the Security Council or the complaint of any State;
whether the Security Council could stop the course of investigation or prosecution
if it considered it a matter of international peace and security; the definition of
war crimes; and whether or not to include the crime of aggression under the
jurisdiction of the court.5
Naturally, as the Conference evolved, the questions of contention became more
concentrated. Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn broke the issues into two ‘sets of
questions.’ The first concerned questions “about the exact categories of crimes the Court
would try, and the second would be directed at the Court’s jurisdiction, how to determine
a case’s admissibility, and the type of law the Court would apply… The meeting and
Conference as a whole recognized that these questions of jurisdiction and admissibility
were the intensely political issues that could no longer be postponed.”6 A key example of
this was the crime of aggression and its fundamental ties to the United Nations Security
Council (Security Council or UNSC). While a definition of aggression was not
established in the context of the ICC by the PrepCom before the Rome Conference, the
basic and general understanding was that aggressive acts breached the peace.7 Such
breaches are fundamentally linked to the Security Council, the primary responsibility of
which is to maintain international peace and security, under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.8 The nature of the relationship between the proposed Court and the Security
Council was unclear leading up to and at the Rome Conference, especially when handling
the same situation(s). Questions about institutional sequencing and concurrent
involvement remained largely unanswered leading up to and during the negotiations.
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Nevertheless, Kirsch and Holmes explained that “the most controversial elements
of the statute–those that could make or break the conference–were largely contained in
Part 2, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law, which includes the list and
definition of crimes. For that reason… the negotiating efforts of the chairman and the
Bureau of the Committee of the Whole were mainly directed at resolving problems in
part 2.”9 Kirsch and Holmes highlighted some key areas of contention: the role of the
Security Council in respect of the Court; the inclusion of aggression among the core
crimes covered by the statute; how the jurisdiction of the Court could be triggered
(automatic jurisdiction upon ratification, case-by-case consent, universal jurisdiction); the
power of the Prosecutor to initiate proceedings proprio motu; the inclusion of terrorism
and regional drug trafficking; and the inclusion of nuclear weapons among the list of
weapons prohibited by the statute.10 The jurisdiction question was the most problematic:
“It is on this issue that the differences proved irreconcilable and consensus eventually
broke down, leading to a vote at the end of the conference.”11 Indeed, the Rome Statute
was not borne out of consensus. Instead, the final text was a reflection of measured
compromise, designed to generate broad acceptance in the form of a ‘final package’ that
states would be forced to accept in its entirety, or not at all, by an unrecorded yes-or-no
vote. This was an effective strategy: 120 countries voted in favour of the Statute; seven
countries, China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the United States, and Yemen, voted against
it; 21 countries abstained.
Within that framework, this chapter focuses on the positions of African
delegations on the controversial elements contained in Part 2 in an effort to better
understand the African ‘vision’ of the Statute and has been broken into two parts. The
first considers African positions on the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the Security
Council, ‘trigger mechanisms,’ and the powers of the Prosecutor to initiate an
investigation on his or her own volition (i.e. proprio motu). The second part considers
African positions on key issues with respect to crimes. This includes the inclusion of
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internal armed conflicts, the prohibition of terrorism and drug trafficking, and the
prohibition of nuclear weapons. For clarity, the inclusion of aggression as a core crime is
fundamentally interlinked with the role of the Security Council and is considered as such,
in part one.
This builds on the work of others by further enriching understandings of African
activism and support for the establishment of an ICC by putting a special analytical focus
on the Rome Diplomatic Conference negotiations.12 This content analysis primarily relies
upon the summary records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of
the Whole, the main working body of the Conference. Unpacking Afro-specific
contributions at the Rome Conference provides important insight into the ‘African vision’
of the ICC in its key ideational moment. A review of the contributions in Rome is used to
better understand what kind of Court African states and coalitions of states wanted and
whether or not such preferences ultimately affected treaty ratification in the region.
Understanding these preferences provides a basis to better understand the areas of
compromise which were required to ensure the success of the Conference and the
establishment of the Court. It is argued that these compromises in many respects troubled
the Court’s institutional design as a corollary of political posturing. This has permeated
its operationalization, most focally in African situations.

5.2

Regional and Other Group Affiliations

African preferences in Rome were formed by states, and in many cases, within coalitions
of states. Such coalitions took the form of intergovernmental negotiation blocs or
regional organizations, namely: the South African Development Community (SADC), the
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Group of Arab States, the Group of African States, the Like-Minded Group (LMG),
and/or the Nonaligned Movement (NAM); intersectional membership was commonplace
for many African delegations, as shown in Table 5-1. It is also important to acknowledge
the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in supporting and driving
commitment to the establishment of an ICC, most notably through the work of the
umbrella NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC).
Table 5-1: African Coalition Membership at the Rome Diplomatic Conference
(1998)
Negotiating Bloc
SADC

African Member States
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Group of Arab States

Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia.

Group of African States

Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Lesotho, Mali, Tunisia.

Like-Minded Group

Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Egypt,
Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia.

Nonaligned Movement

Algeria, Ghana, Egypt, Mozambique, Sudan.

It is important to understand that many African delegations had multiple affiliations at the
Rome Conference, which often shaped the preferences of individual states throughout the
negotiations. This frames a conceptualization of African diplomacy in Rome as complex
and interdependent in many respects. The decision to join a negotiation bloc or coalition
is a strategic choice for less powerful states to wield greater influence over the outcome
of the negotiations.13 For context, it is important to note that SADC took a leading role

13

See Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo, “The African Contribution Towards the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court,” in African Yearbook of International Law, ed. A.A. Yusef (African Association of
International Law: 2001), 333-350; Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott, “Beyond soft balancing: small
states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations,” Cambridge Review of International
Affairs 25.3 (2012): 345-366.
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regionally. As South African delegate Sivu Maqungo explained, “SADC also sought to
maintain control of the regional groups, particularly the African group. To this end a
successful concerted lobby effort was undertaken by SADC to have Lesotho co-ordinate,
on a permanent basis, the Africa group’s effort within the process to establish an ICC.”14
It is also important to highlight that “The Arab States formed one of the most active
informal groups; they met frequently and adopted common positions that were not
necessarily supportive of the ICC, although some states (such as Egypt and Jordan) were
part of the ‘like-minded states.’”15 This is indicative of the difficulty stemming from
membership in multiple groups. Nevertheless, while regional or group affiliations may
explain preferential patterns among some African states, the analytical starting point is at
the level of the state. More specifically, 48 African states attended the Rome Statute
negotiations and expressed a range of national preferences.16 On this basis, African
positions on the most controversial elements and key issues relating to elements of the
Court’s jurisdiction are summarized in Table 5-2, below.

14

Manqungo, “The African Contribution Towards the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,”
339.
15
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 32.3, Article 3 (1999): 449, note 25.
16
These states included Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

90

Table 5-2: African Positions on Controversial Elements and Key Issues on
Jurisdiction at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 1998
Controversial element and/or
key issue
The role of the Security
Council

No role for UNSC

Number of African
states that expressed
a preference for the
stated element/issue
4

No veto to block cases

7

Independence from

16

Cooperative relationship

4

Referral powers

18

Deferral powers

17
31

Clear definition needed

15

No inclusion

4

Automatic

30

Case-by-case consent

7

Universal

10

Proprio motu

28

No power to initiate
proceedings

7

Inclusion of aggression as a
core crime

‘Trigger mechanism’

Powers of the Prosecutor

5.3

The role of the Security Council

Many African delegations engaged in dialogue surrounding the proposed relationship
between the ICC and the Security Council. The range of positions on this issue was
broad. Five delegations expressly felt that the Council should have no involvement in the
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operation or function of the Court.17 Others took a softer position, suggesting that the
Council and the Court would need to have clearly defined roles and boundaries in order
for both to work effectively– a cooperative arrangement.18 It is helpful to evaluate the
positions of African delegations in further detail on this point, to better understand the
imagined working relationship between the Council and the proposed Court.

5.3.1

The Security Council and the crime of aggression

Many states understood that the Security Council was bound to the crime of aggression,
however defined, given its responsibility to maintain international peace and security
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Some African states wanted to give the Council
inherent power in this respect. Cameroon, for one, was particularly involved in this
discussion and submitted a proposal on the crime of aggression and the relationship
between the Security Council and the Court. The most relevant points of the
Cameroonian proposal are contained in its proposed Article 10: Relationship between the
Security Council and the Court, which stated:
1. The Security Council shall determine the existence of aggression in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
before any proceedings take place in the Court in regard to a crime of
aggression.
2. The Security Council may determine the existence of aggression in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this article:
(a) On its own initiative;
(b) At the request of a State which considers itself the victim of aggression;
(c) At the request of the Court when a complaint relating to a crime of
aggression has been submitted to it.19

17

These states included Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia.
These states included Cameroon, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique.
19
Proposal Submitted by Cameroon to the Committee of the Whole, United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (2 July 1998)
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.39.
18
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This approach suggests that the Security Council would have primary and sole authority
to determine whether the crime of aggression had been committed.
Other African delegations strongly disagreed with this idea. For example, the
Nigerian delegate stated that:
He had a reservation about the proposed role of the Security Council. While there
should be a relationship between the United Nations and the Court under an
agreement, he was opposed to conferring on the Council the exclusive right to
determine when aggression was committed and to refer such cases to the Court.
The Court should not be encumbered at the outset by avoidable political
influences. The power of the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations should not extend to the Court.20
These concerns were further highlighted when he asked, “Moreover, how could
aggression on the part of one of the permanent members of the Security Council be
referred to the Court if that member could veto such a referral?”21 These sentiments were
echoed by the Kenyan delegate who said that “he shared the view concerning the
potential for conflict of jurisdiction, given the pre-existing powers of the Security
Council. Its competence to determine the existence of acts of aggression could seriously
affect the integrity of the Court as an independent body free from political influence.”22
The delegate from Libya provided an experience-based opinion and posited that:

20

Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 7th plenary meeting (18
June 1998) A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 and Corr.1, 111, para. 87. See also 8th plenary meeting (18 June 1998)
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 and Cor. 1, 118, para. 69: This opinion was mirrored by the Ugandan delegate who
said, “The role of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should not
be allowed to influence the acceptability and independence of the Court.” 31st meeting (9 July 1998)
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 and Corr. 1, 314, para. 6: The Tunisian delegate took a balanced position and said,
“The Court should not be prevented by the Security Council from exercising jurisdiction over situations
involving the crime of aggression. Nevertheless, due weight must be accorded to the Council’s role in the
maintenance of international peace and security.”
21
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June 1998)
A/CONF./183/Add.1 and Corr.1, 209, para. 83.
22
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 7th meeting (19 June 1998)
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.7, 181, para. 15. See also the statement of the delegate from Ghana: “The Court
should have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but not, at the current
juncture, over aggression, as that would inevitably cause conflict with the Security Council.” Summary
records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 26th meeting (8 July 1998) A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53,
278, para.61.
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She did not consider that the Security Council should refer cases. The Security
Council had failed to deal with many cases of flagrant aggression–for instance,
the attack on her country in 1986… The Security Council and its decisions were
influenced by the interests and positions of certain permanent members, so that its
resolutions were selective and followed a double standard. Her delegation would
object to the Court’s being paralysed if the Security Council could not decide
whether or not there was aggression.23
These examples demonstrate the range of opinion about the Security Council’s power to
determine acts of aggression among various African delegations. Importantly, the
politicization of the Council was acknowledged by several states that were less than
enthusiastic about incorporating an unchecked United Nations Security Council into the
framework of the ICC to solely determine acts of aggression.
It is important to note that there was a high level of consensus among African
delegations in Rome to include the crime of aggression in the Statute (65 per cent of the
total number of African delegations in Rome).24 Only four states posited that aggression
should not be included in the Statute, namely Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and Rwanda. Ghana
appeared to change its position as the Conference evolved.25 Despite the overall

23

Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 6th meeting (18 June 1998),
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.6, 174, paras. 79-80.
24
These included Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Tunisia.
25
See Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 25th meeting (8 July 1998), 278,
para. 61. Ghana had said that “The Court should have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes, but not, at the current juncture, over aggression, as that would inevitably cause conflict
with the Security Council.” Later, at the 33rd meeting (13 July 1998), 325, para. 63, the delegate from
Ghana, “said that aggression was the mother of war crimes and it was absolutely essential that the Statute
should reflect that fact.” At the 6th plenary meeting (17 June 1998), 103, para. 106, Morocco “agreed that
the Court’s jurisdiction should be confined to war crimes, crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.
To include the crime of aggression would be premature.” Ibid., at 174, para. 53: “Given the difficulty of
finding a precise definition of the crime of aggression and the role of the Security Council, he thought that
aggression should be excluded from the list of crimes falling within the competence of the Court. At the
29th meeting (9 July 1998), 298, para. 53, Morocco said, “Aggression was political in nature and had not
been clearly defined. It should therefore be excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction, and the same applied to
other crimes which were not of the same gravity.” At the 26th meeting (8 July 1998), 278, para. 65, Mali
said, “Aggression should not be included at that stage because it was an act for which no generally
acceptable definition had yet been found.” Rwanda’s preference to exclude aggression is derived from its
statement at the 6th plenary meeting, 103, para. 11: “His delegation believed that the crimes falling within
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court should be confined to genocide, war crimes and crimes
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consensus that aggression ought to be included in the Statute, opinion diverged on two
distinct and important points: (1) its definition and (2) whether the Security Council
would be necessarily and/or solely responsible for determining whether aggression had
occurred as a precursor to Court intervention. This divergence is important because it
hints at the willingness of African governments to accept the status quo–that is, the
integration of the power of the Security Council within the Court’s institutional
architecture. To this point, there was some disagreement as to whether or not the Court
would be able to make its own determination about acts of aggression independent of the
Security Council, or if there might be a role for the United Nations General Assembly in
determining aggressive acts. Nevertheless, enumerating aggression within the Rome
Statute required an acknowledged degree of coalescence between the Court and the
Security Council, given the Security Council’s primary duty to maintain international
peace and security; at the most basic level, acts of aggression disrupt international order.
However, embedding realpolitik within the structure of an international judicial
institution vis-à-vis the Security Council raised concerns for many African states in (and
before) the negotiations at Rome. Since consensus broke down on this issue, aggression
was included as an undefined core crime in the Statute in 1998. However, it did not come
into force until it was: (a) defined in 2010 at a review conference in Kampala; (b)
activated through the adoption of a resolution on 15 December 2017; and (c) entered into
force on 17 July 2018.26 It is also important to note that the ICC only has jurisdiction over
aggression with respect to States Parties which have ratified the Rome Statute and the

against humanity, to the exclusion of other crimes already covered by national, regional or international
conventions.” While aggression may be conceptualized as a war crime, it was generally compartmentalized
as a separate and distinct ‘core crime’ alongside those cited by the Rwandan delegate and it is inferred that
aggression was deliberately omitted from its preferred list of crimes. Note, also: the Angolan delegate took
a mixed position, first supporting the inclusion of aggression at the 8th plenary meeting (18 June 1998),
118, para. 56: “He supported the inclusion of aggression within the Court’s jurisdiction.” This was
reinforced at the 9th meeting (19 June 1998),180, para. 8: “aggression was a very serious crime which
caused a great deal of suffering and damage to the victim State. It must therefore be covered in the Statute.”
Later at the 27th meeting (8 July 1998), 285, para. 42, the delegate stated that “he was not yet decided
whether aggression should be included. A clear definition was needed so as to take account of General
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) and, particularly, the role of the Security Council.”
26
See generally “The Crime of Aggression,” Coalition for the International Criminal Court, (no date),
available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/icc-crimes/crime-aggression; accessed 25 February
2020.
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amendments on the crime of aggression (unless referred to the ICC by the Security
Council, which has no jurisdictional limits).

5.3.2

Veto Powers

Before the Rome Conference, SADC states had considered the role of the Security
Council and the Court. Specifically, the SADC Principles enumerate that “The ICC
should be unfettered by the veto of the Security Council.”27 More general language was
expressed by African states in the Dakar Declaration, which states “that the International
Criminal Court shall operate without being prejudiced by actions of the Security
Council.”28 While SADC’s position focused squarely on the use of the UNSC veto, the
Dakar Declaration reads more generally, with reference to ‘actions’ of the Security
Council, which may include referral and deferral powers, for example. The consistency
between the two expressions is in an overall emphasis on the Court’s independence from
the Security Council, which was the primary point articulated by African delegates in the
plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole.
It is significant that 33 per cent of African states that attended the Rome
Conference expressed general statements about the importance of the Court’s
independence from the Security Council. For example, the Tanzanian delegate said that
“The International Criminal Court had to be truly independent, effective, impartial and
permanent. It must not become a tool for the political convenience of states.”29 Similar
claims were made by Senegal, which noted that “referring to the role of the Security
Council in respect of the International Criminal Court… no political structure should
hamper the Court’s action. The Court should be independent of the Council and any other
political body.”30 General expressions about the Court’s independence from political
bodies, and particularly the Security Council permeate the summary records and
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SADC Negotiating Principles for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (11-14 September
1997, Pretoria, South Africa).
28
Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (6 February 1998,
Dakar, Senegal).
29
Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 3rd plenary meeting (16
June 1998), 74, para. 29.
30
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 11th meeting (22 June 1998), 211,
para. 1.
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thematically characterize an African vision of a depoliticized Court rooted in the ideals of
judicial independence. These two examples are relatively unsurprising, since Tanzania
belongs to SADC and the Dakar Declaration took place in Senegal and both states had
advocated the need for an independent ICC well before the Conference. Nevertheless, it
is constructive to evaluate how the SADC Principles and Dakar Declaration shaped state
positions at the Rome Conference with respect to the role of the Security Council in
greater detail.
Preference for the Court’s independence from the use of the Security Council veto
was clearly reflected in the positions of seven African delegations in Rome.31 To
highlight this point, the Gabonese delegate stated that:
His delegation also considered that the Council should be given the possibility of
bringing certain cases before the Court. It was, however, opposed to the principle
that the Court could not prosecute persons who had committed crimes in a
situation being taken up by the Council by virtue of its powers under the Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, unless the Council explicitly authorized
it to do so. The exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction must therefore not depend on
prior decisions by the Council, a highly politicized body. Any machinery that
might allow the permanent members of the Council to use their veto to protect
potential accused persons when the interests of their countries were at stake
would severely damage the independence and credibility of the Court.32
Gabon was a member of the Like-Minded Group (LMG), of which many African
countries were also a part.33 This may explain why the Gabonese delegate took a strong
position on this particular issue. Most important, it illustrates that the delegate had
meaningfully considered the significance of the relationship between the Security
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These were Angola, Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Senegal, Sierra Leone.
Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 6th plenary meeting (17
June 1998), 102-103, para. 96 [emphasis added].
33
The Like-Minded Group consisted of 55 states. African countries included: Algeria, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia. See Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling, Song Tianying and Yi Ping,
eds.Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 4, (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublisher, 2015), 732, note 8.
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97

Council and the Court and chose to emphasize judicial independence to enhance
institutional credibility.
This might be compared to the contributions of the Botswanan delegate (and
SADC member), who said, “some questions remained, for instance, regarding the role of
the Security Council. The Council was the first port of call in international crises and
should be allowed to refer cases to the Court. Any State or member of the Council should
also be able to refer cases before it to the Court, and the veto should not be applicable.”34
Comparing the statements of these two delegations indicates diversity with respect to the
overall willingness to involve the Security Council within the structure and function of
the Court. Both Botswana and Gabon reach the same conclusion (i.e. that the UNSC can
refer cases to the Court, but the veto should not be used), yet the language indicates a
greater willingness on the part of Botswana to work within the existing political structure
by incorporating and trusting the Security Council to fulfill its mandate and the mandate
of the Court. These are important distinctions which demonstrate that consensus is often
reached with complex and principled difference(s), even in cases of surface-level
(general) agreement.
A different concern regarding the role of the Security Council and the use of the
veto with respect to the Court was raised by the Libyan delegate, who said that “the Court
should not be prevented from exercising its jurisdiction in the event of a Security Council
veto.”35 This was reinforced when she said that “her delegation could not agree to any
role for the Security Council. The Court would be paralysed if the Council could impede
its investigations because of the veto power of individual States.”36 This position
demonstrates a strong aversion to the Security Council altogether. Curiously, this
indicates a desire for a strong and independent Court, but only if the case was not referred
by the Security Council. Such a position is consistent with placing an ideological
superiority on state sovereignty and ultimately reflects a desire to establish new power
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Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 8th plenary meeting (18
June 1998), 118, para. 66.
35
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998), 293-294,
para 102.
36
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 36th meeting (13 July 1998), 344,
para. 6.
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structures in international politics concerning the design of international criminal law and
its judicial institutions.37 This illustrates that there was not one monolithic ‘African’
position with respect to the ICC and its intended relationship with international political
structures such as the Security Council. Nevertheless, similar fears were identified by
Gabon and Libya with respect to the possibility of the Council abusing its power by using
the veto and obfuscating the independence of the Court. Despite nuanced differences,
expressions of Court independence remained generally consistent among African states in
Rome.
In contrast, Cameroon took a unique approach to constructing the relationship
between the Court and the Council based on ideas of ‘cooperation and complementarity.’
Specifically, the Cameroonian delegate said that “the relationship between the Security
Council and the Court should be a matter of cooperation and complementarity. The
Council needed the Court to help maintain global peace and the Court needed the
Council, in particular, to help enforce its decisions.”38 This suggests that Cameroon’s
vision of the Court was based more so on including it within the existing political
landscape, rather than seeking complete independence from it. This also indicates a belief
that the Council and the Court could work together to achieve mutually shared goals.
Similar themes were addressed by Mozambique when it outlined the importance of
establishing a coordinated and cooperative relationship between the Security Council and
the Court. In a similar vein, the Central African Republic emphasized the need for
harmonization, not obstruction between the Court and the Security Council.
Perhaps the most significant underlying concern raised by Cameroon and others
was the idea that the Court would need assistance with enforcement, based on complex
political realities, which the Security Council could help facilitate. To elaborate,
Madagascar suggested that the Security Council would be needed to compel States
Parties to enforce the Court’s sentences. However, underlying these advances of
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See generally 28th meeting, 294, para. 104 when the delegate from Libya said that “she was ready to
consider guarantees that would secure the integrity and sovereignty of States;” see, also: 6th plenary
meeting (17 June 1998), 102, para. 81: Libya similarly said that “It was essential to respect the sovereignty,
equality and independence of States and to prevent political organs from controlling international life.”
38
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 310, para.
81.
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institutional cooperation is the assumption that the Council would place the moral
imperatives or normative ideologies of the Court above the political interests of Council
members, either individually or collectively. Although relatively unpopular with other
African delegations, this position presents a degree of pragmatism with respect to
enforcement challenges that could not go unacknowledged. This is important because it
demonstrates the high level of engagement exercised by African delegates, who engaged
with the difficult and contentious issues directly relating to power politics and the
limitations of realpolitik.
Nevertheless, a different understanding was described by the delegate from
Lesotho, who said that “the relationship between the Security Council and the Court
raised difficult questions. Although, in theory, no conflict should exist, the Council’s
maintenance of peace and security might either complement or frustrate the work of the
Court in bringing war criminals to justice and advancing the international rule of law. He
opposed any political interference by the Council or States in the affairs of the Court.”39
Lesotho took a leading role within the SADC on the ICC issue and was heavily involved
in the negotiations leading up to Rome. This statement suggests a fundamental concern
with trusting the Security Council to strengthen, rather than weaken, the Court. This
appears to be a chance that Lesotho was unwilling to take, opting instead for an
independent and depoliticized ICC, much like the majority of African delegations that
spoke to this issue in plenary. This is important because it demonstrates that the majority
of African states viewed the ICC as an institution that ought to reflect a new world order,
or at least not integrate the existing power structures within its institutional design.

5.3.3

Referral powers

Other expressions of Security Council powers outside of the veto include its capacity to
refer situations to the Court and to defer proceedings in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The majority of
African delegations that addressed the powers of the Security Council in the plenary
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Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 2nd plenary meeting (15
June 1998), 69, para. 72.
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meetings were willing to grant referral powers with relatively little contestation. This
willingness may be linked to thematic ideals of universality and the desire to establish a
Court with broad jurisdictional reach.40 Further, the Security Council has historical ties to
international criminal justice, since it established the ad hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Granting the Security Council referral powers would supplant the need to
establish ad hoc tribunals, should the need arise in future contexts.
Nonetheless, there was variation in opinion on how to establish Security Council
referral powers in the context of an ICC during the negotiations. Specifically, 15 African
states expressly agreed to give the Security Council referral powers. This represented the
position of 31 per cent of the African delegations in attendance in Rome and more
pointedly, 75 per cent of African delegations that addressed this particular issue in the
plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole.41 Ethiopia, Morocco, and
Zimbabwe preferred that the referral powers of the Security Council be limited only to
acts of aggression. Nigeria and Libya were expressly opposed to giving referral powers in
any capacity.42 To demonstrate this point, the Nigerian delegate said that the Council
should have “no role whatsoever with regard to referral of matters to the Court.”43
Generally, this indicates broad(er) regional support for granting the Security
Council referral powers, though 28 African states did not address this issue in the plenary
meetings. Tacit approval and/or consent may be inferred by the states that did not speak
to this issue but either signed, or more demonstrably, signed and ratified the final version
of the Statute.44 Of the 18 African delegations that preferred to grant the UNSC referral
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See generally Line Engbo Gissel, “A Different Kind of Court: Africa’s Support for the International
Criminal Court, 1993-2003,” The European Journal of International Law 29.3 (2018), 735.
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This included the following states: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.
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See generally Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June
1998), 209, para. 77. Libya said that “To give the Security Council, which was a political body, the right to
trigger action would destroy confidence in the impartiality and independence of the Court, and thus detract
from its credibility.”
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Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 198, para.
76. See 28th meeting, 293-294, para. 102: Libya expressed a similar position when its delegate said that “the
right of members of the Council to refer cases to the Court was an entrenchment of domination.”
44
Note that Angola, Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sudan did not speak
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the issue of Security Council referral powers but signed and ratified the Rome Statute include: Cape Verde,
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar,
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powers (limited or general), 13 went on to ratify the Statute, constituting the majority of
the group with this shared preference.45 Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Zimbabwe signed
the Rome Statute, but did not ratify it, which demonstrates a degree of low-level
commitment. Ethiopia neither signed nor ratified the Statute.
Indeed, the final text of the Statute grants the Security Council referral powers
under Article 13 (b)– Exercise of jurisdiction:
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if…
b. A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.46
Providing referral powers for the Security Council is generally in line with the
predominant ‘African’ vision of the Court. Only two African states specifically expressed
a preference for no referral powers: Nigeria and Libya. Nigeria eventually signed and
ratified the Rome Statute. Libya neither signed nor ratified. The significance of the
Security Council’s referral power is that it can expand the Court’s jurisdiction to
situations involving non-State Parties. This is a privilege not afforded to the Prosecutor or
to States Parties when triggering the Court’s jurisdiction and can be used in lieu of the
establishment of ad hoc tribunals.

5.3.4

Deferral powers

All the African states that accepted conferring deferral powers on the UNSC opposed
prolonged involvement or interference with the Court and sought to limit this power as a
result. This is consistent with the regional thematic aspiration of Court independence
from political bodies, especially the Security Council. Specifically, 17 African
delegations accepted giving the Security Council the ability to defer proceedings at the

Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia. The states that did
not speak to the issue of Security Council referral powers and did not sign or ratify the Rome Statute
include Mauritania, Rwanda, and Swaziland.
45
This included the following states: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo,
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone.
46
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) A/CONF.183/9.
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Court, though with varying levels of overall approval and endorsement.47 African
delegations sought to restrict UNSC deferral powers in two primary ways: (1) temporal
restrictions with respect to the duration of the deferral and the duration and number of
possible renewal(s); (2) the caveat that evidence and witnesses be protected during the
deferment process.48 To be sure, these restrictions were important for many African
states. Consider that Congo and Senegal preferred not to give the UNSC deferral powers
but were willing to compromise if limits were placed on those powers. It is instructive to
evaluate the positions of various African delegations to better understand the ideological
spectrum on this particular issue.
First, Libya recommended giving no deferral powers to the Security Council. The
Libyan delegate said, “[t]he Security Council should not have powers over the Court or
be able to suspend proceedings for 12 months. Both article 10 [Security Council deferral]
and article 6(b) [Exercise of jurisdiction: Security Council referral] should be deleted.”49
This position is consistent with Libya’s view of a depoliticized Court, particularly
regarding its quintessential independence from the Security Council. Speaking from a
similar perspective, the delegate from Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed that
“the Court should be able to function without interference from any other organ,
especially the Security Council.”50 However, it is necessary to identify that the majority
of African states that addressed this issue expressed a desire to limit the deferral powers
of the Security Council, rather than deny this power altogether.
In this frame, the majority of African states that considered this issue took a
(more) moderate position on UNSC deferral powers in Rome. Delegations such as Congo
submitted that its preference was not to grant the Security Council deferral powers.
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These included Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and
Sudan.
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Note that the states that preferred placing limits on the duration of the deferral included Angola, Benin,
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Sudan. States that preferred to incorporate
protections for witnesses and evidence included Benin, Burundi, Congo, Gabon, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.
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Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 307, para.
35.
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Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 7th plenary meeting (18
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However, “it could, as a compromise, agree to a suspension for a maximum, nonrenewable period of six months.”51 The Burundian delegation also took a compromise
position, expressing that “it would have liked the suspension period to be shorter, but
could accept the provision… provided that the need for preservation of evidence was
addressed.”52 This position indicates an acceptance of limited deferral powers, so long as
evidence is preserved while proceedings are suspended. In other words, the deferral
cannot prejudice any future investigations or proceedings.
The preservation of evidence and the protection of witnesses in the event of a deferral
was a priority for Benin, Burundi, Congo, Gabon, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Like
Burundi, each of these delegations also preferred to place temporal restrictions on the
duration of the deferral and/or the possibility for renewal. To illustrate this point, the
Senegalese delegate presented a compromise position by placing temporal and
evidentiary restrictions on UNSC deferrals when he said “the Security Council should be
able to refer matters to the Court, but it would be preferable for it not to have the power
to suspend proceedings. However, he would be prepared to accept option 2 for article 10,
paragraph 2, [Security Council deferral] if the period involved did not exceed three or
perhaps six months and if the suspension was not renewable. Strong provisions should be
included for the protection of witnesses and the preservation of evidence.”53 This position
reflects a preference for the Council not to have deferral powers, but a willingness to
compromise if powers were limited in terms of duration and if protections were afforded
to the evidence and associated witnesses/victims. Other states made more general
assertions. For example, the delegate from Gabon said that “the Council should not have
the power to defer consideration of a case by the Court for more than six months.”54
African delegations had competing ideas about the appropriate length of time that the
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Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 315, para.
17.
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Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), 336,
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Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 307, para.
29.
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103. In a similar vein, Ethiopia supported the view that deferral powers should not exceed six months and
could not be renewed for more than six months, see 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 315, para. 29.
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UNSC could defer a situation from the Court. This provides additional evidence with
respect to how African governments viewed the UNSC, and more specifically, the
relative willingness of particular African governments to provide the UNSC with more or
less integrative powers within the institutional framework of the Court.
Some African states had less hesitation about incorporating Security Council
deferral powers within the Statute, albeit with similar temporal limits. Egypt, for
example, submitted that while the Security Council “should have the right to deal initially
with some matters, it should be empowered to prevent the Court from dealing with them
only for a limited, non-renewable period.”55 Similarly, but more specifically, Kenya
acknowledged the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international
peace and security, yet suggested that a twelve-month deferral period should be reduced
to six, with the possibility of one six-month extension.56 Mozambique dealt specifically
with the question of renewal and was willing to accept UNSC deferral powers “on the
understanding that the request of the Security Council could be renewed for no longer
than six months, and once only.”57 Notably, some African delegations were concerned
with the possibility that the Security Council could defer a situation indefinitely. For
example, the delegate from Central African Republic said that “granting the Council
power to suspend proceedings reflected a commendable desire to harmonize the actions
of those two bodies; however, harmonization did not mean obstruction… his delegation
felt that… the Council’s right of suspension could not be renewed indefinitely.”58 Such
positions acknowledge that the Security Council may have a need to defer Court action in
the interest of maintaining international peace and security, but only temporarily.
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Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June 1998), 209,
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33.
57
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), 341,
para. 71.
58
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 11th meeting (22 June 1998), 212,
para. 12.

105

5.4

The final text

The final version of the Statute under Article 16 that deals with the deferral of
investigation or prosecution says:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that
effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.59
Ultimately, the negotiated Statute does not reflect the ‘African vision’ of Security
Council deferral powers. Indeed, all of the African states that addressed this issue in the
plenary meetings preferred to grant limited deferral powers to the Council in terms of
duration and/or evidence and witness protections. This required compromise on the part
of Senegal and Congo, as both countries ideally preferred to grant no deferral powers to
the Council.60 However, since deferrals are enacted by Security Council Resolution, it
requires a relatively unified Council decision-making process; abstention rather than the
use of the veto may suggest disapproval without impacting the outcome of the resolution.
However, the use of the veto on a deferral resolution could be used. Nonetheless, the
Rome Statute does not reflect the ideal ‘African vision’ of Security Council deferral
powers as described at the Rome Conference. It is important to note that non-States
Parties of the ICC which are permanent members of the Security Council have built-in
insulation from the Court (i.e. Russia, China, United States) as a consequence of its
collective deferral (and referral) powers. Of the 17 African states that were willing to
grant the UNSC deferral powers, 11 went on to ratify the Statute, constituting 65 per cent
of this group of states.61 Angola, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sudan signed
the Rome Statute, but did not ratify it, demonstrating a minimal level of approval and
commitment. Ethiopia neither signed nor ratified.
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 16.
It could be viewed as problematic that the final text does not enumerate the need to protect evidence or
witnesses in the event of a deferral. It similarly places no restriction on renewals, meaning that the Security
Council could infinitely defer situations from Court action.
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These states included: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Africa.
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5.5

Implications of key positions on the role of the Security
Council

The broad spectrum of African positions ranged from rejection, cautious acceptance, tacit
approval, and overall acceptance of the UNSC as it relates to, and operates alongside, the
ICC. This highlights the difficulty in constructing an institution from scratch and
incorporating it within an existing global structure (and order), which has been designed
to deal with similar and related issues in international political life. Nevertheless, it is
fundamentally important to acknowledge that the diffusion of politics and law is in
keeping with the most basic rule-of-law principles–embedding an imbalanced and
hierarchical political body within the foundation and structure of a (purportedly
objective) judicial institution is perplexing at the very least. This is even more so the case
because the use of the Security Council veto presents the opportunity to insulate the
national interest(s) of states, even with respect to the most serious crimes. In a similar
vein, relying solely on the Security Council to determine acts of aggression presents
another opportunity for politicized lawlessness.
Given that African states stressed the importance of the Court’s independence
from the ICC in Rome, the final Statute reflects a compromise outcome–one that iterates
the fears expressly stated by African states that saw Security Council involvement as an
opportunity for the enmeshment of power politics in international law. Many delegates in
Rome had the foresight to predict that the Council would interject in the Court’s
proceedings in subjective and unfair (i.e. political) ways. Since then, the Security Council
can and has used the veto to block referrals to the Court, particularly as it relates to
jurisdictional matters concerning non-states parties (e.g. the resolution on the referral of
the situation in Syria to the ICC, which was blocked by China and Russia) even with
respect to the most serious international crimes.62 On the other hand, it can and has
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United Nations, Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, “Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court
Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution,” (22 May 2014)
SC/11407, available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm; accessed 11 March 2020. Note
that even the representative of the United States supported the draft resolution and said it “was about
accountability for crimes so extensive and deadly that they had few equals in modern history. It was also
about accountability on the [Security] Council’s part. Recalling that the International Criminal Court had
been able to act when extraordinary crimes had been committed in the past, she asked why the Syrian
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referred situations to the ICC, even with respect to non-states parties (e.g. the resolution
referring the situation in [Darfur] Sudan–a non-states party, to the ICC and the
subsequent referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC, also a non-states party).63 This
uneven application of the Court’s only mechanism of ‘universal’ jurisdiction damages not
only the ICC’s institutional reputation, but perhaps more importantly, international
criminal justice norms altogether.
The fact that the UNSC referred the African situations but not others of equal
gravity is less significant than the point that African delegates were very aware of this
possibility, well before the Rome Statute entered into force and the ICC came to be. In
other words, this was a known risk associated with signing and ratifying the treaty. While
Sudan and Libya did not become States Parties, the majority of African nations that did,
did so with an awareness that this type of politicization was not only possible, but likely.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is relatively uncontroversial to contend that the powers
given to the Security Council constituted the biggest compromise of the Conference. This
is iterated by reference to Security Council referrals as a ‘poisoned chalice.’64 This is not
just because such referrals enmesh justice and politics, but also because UNSC referrals
have had no substantive political support or backing and completely debilitate the Court
as a result. In this view, the ideal construction of the relationship between the UNSC and
the Court by the majority of African delegations in Rome was not reflected in the final
text of the Rome Statute. Problematically, the Court is not solely independent nor is it
coalescent with the Security Council in many respects, which troubles the effective
political and legal operationalization of both.

people did not equally deserve justice.” The French representative also said that the resolution “appealed to
the human conscience and was not a political gesture… stressing that failure to adopt it was an insult to
humanity.” Note also: justice was extremely slow for the Rohingya in Myanmar – mass violence began in
2017 during a military campaign and has continued since. The Prosecutor of the ICC was only authorized
to open an investigation by the Pre-Trial Chamber in November 2019 based on neighbouring Bangladesh’s
membership. It is argued that the UNSC could and should have referred this situation to the ICC much
earlier.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), S/RES/1593; United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1970 (2011), S/RES/1970.
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Mark Kersten, “The UN Security Council and the ICC: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” Justice in
Conflict (6 May 2011), blogpost available online at https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/05/06/the-un-securitycouncil-and-the-icc-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/; accessed 7 April 2020.
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5.6

Jurisdiction: ‘Trigger mechanism’

Establishing the trigger mechanism for the Court’s jurisdiction was a particularly high
priority at the Rome Diplomatic Conference and is a key institutional feature of the
Court. Consensus broke down on this issue and African delegations were similarly
divided. Importantly, 77 per cent of African delegates in attendance in Rome took an
express position on the Court’s jurisdiction regime, providing ample insight into regional
preference(s) on this issue. Specifically, modes of jurisdiction were broken down and
compartmentalized within three ideological frames: automatic, universal, and case-bycase consent/opt-in. Automatic jurisdiction upon ratification of the Statute was the most
widely shared preference for the Court’s jurisdiction regime by African delegations in
Rome, which compromised the majority and 63 per cent of the total number of African
delegations in attendance at the Conference; 81 per cent of African delegations that spoke
to the jurisdiction regime issue during the negotiations.65 Universal jurisdiction was
supported by 10 African delegations, which constituted 21 per cent of total African
delegations and 28 per cent of the African delegations that spoke to the jurisdiction
regime issue. Importantly, all of the African delegations that wanted universal
jurisdiction were willing to compromise and settle for automatic jurisdiction. For this
reason, these states are identified and dually listed in both universal and automatic
jurisdiction categories for the purpose of this analysis. Case-by-case consent was
endorsed by eight African delegations, which compromised 17 per cent of the total
African delegations in attendance at the Conference and 22 per cent of African
delegations that spoke to the jurisdiction regime issue in the plenary meetings and
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These states included Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Côte
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali,
Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note that Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe preferred universal jurisdiction, but accepted automatic jurisdiction as a
compromise. Note also: Tunisia preferred the Court have automatic jurisdiction over some crimes, while
others would require explicit consent. Consider also that delegations such as Ghana explicitly opposed a
consent-based system but did not expressly take a position on automatic or universal jurisdiction. Such
ambiguous positions have been omitted from this analysis. For context, the Republic of Korea proposed
‘automatic jurisdiction’ at the outset of the Conference. Under this framework, jurisdiction would be
triggered when any of the states involved (territorial, national [of accused or victims], or custodial) had
consented to the Court’s jurisdiction either by ratifying the Rome Statute or ad hoc and this position was
supported by the majority of African states in the negotiations.
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meetings of the Committee of the Whole.66 These positions will be considered in greater
detail in order to generate a more nuanced understanding of the ‘African vision’ of the
ICC as it was negotiated in Rome. The jurisdiction issue might be understood on an
ideational spectrum of desired institutional strength/robustness, illustrated by Figure 5-1.
This is significant because this spectrum reflects the relative willingness of states to be
subject to infringement on sovereignty, evidenced by preferences in the ICC’s
institutional design, particularly with respect to its jurisdiction regime.
Figure 5-1: Institutional robustness based on jurisdiction regime or ‘trigger
mechanism’

Universal
Jurisdiction
• Most Robust:
all states
subject to the
Court's
jursidction
over the core
crimes, even
non-States
Parties

5.6.1

Automatic
Jurisdiction
• Moderately
Robust: states
that ratify the
Statute
automatically
accept the
Court's
jurisdiction

Case-by-case
Consent
• Least Robust:
state must
consent to the
jurisdiction of
the Court,
even if it has
ratified the
Rome Statute

Case-by-case Consent/Opt-in Jurisdiction

Case-by-case or opt-in approaches to the jurisdiction of the Court would require the
explicit agreement on the part of states over and above ratification of the Statute to
trigger Court action. This conception of the Court’s jurisdiction is strongly rooted in
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These states included Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Tunisia. Note that
Algeria, Rwanda, and Sudan preferred for states to be able to issue reservations. Tunisia preferred mixed
jurisdiction: automatic for some crimes and opt-in for others. It is cross-listed on both automatic and
consent-based preferences.
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traditional understandings of state sovereignty and the primacy of states in international
law.67 The interjection of international law in domestic contexts is only permissible if the
state allows it. This was an especially common understanding of international law in the
mid to late 1990s, which explains why consent was advocated or presumed as an
essential feature of the Court’s jurisdiction regime by some African states.
Specifically, Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Nigeria
expressly endorsed a case-by-case consent jurisdiction in Rome. Algeria took the position
that “State consent was fundamental. The consent of at least two States should be
required: the State of nationality [of the suspect/accused] and the State of custody [of the
suspect/accused].68 The Algerian delegate clarified his position in later meetings and said
that his country, “was not in favour of automatic jurisdiction of the Court over all the
crimes covered by the Statute. When ratifying the Statute, States should indicate the
crimes for which they accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. For the exercise of jurisdiction,
the consent of the following States would be necessary: the State of which the victim was
a national, the State where the act had been committed and the State of which the accused
was a national.”69 This raises fundamental questions about the nature of consent and
which States might be required to agree to Court action and whether a lack of consensus
could render the Court ineffective. This particular interpretation of state consent is
exhaustive and presents the greatest likelihood of restricting the Court’s jurisdictional
reach.
In a similar vein, the Nigerian delegate highlighted the importance of the
relationship between sovereignty and state consent. In particular, the Nigerian delegate
said that he “reiterated his full support for the collective African position set out in the
declaration on the establishment of an international criminal court adopted by the
Organization of African Unity at Ouagadougou in June 1998. That declaration stressed,
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inter alia, that the cardinal principle of the sovereignty of States should be preserved in
the Statute of the Court and that the Court should be complementary to national criminal
justice systems and be based on the consent of the States concerned.”70 Similarly, the
Libyan delegate opined “that the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction should be based on
State consent” and moreover that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court could not be split in the
sense of having an inherent jurisdiction for some crimes such as genocide and an optional
jurisdiction for other crimes. Her delegation supported the principle of acceptance of
jurisdiction, rather than that of inherent jurisdiction.”71 This position similarly places an
emphasis on state sovereignty and consent. With respect to ‘split jurisdiction,’ Tunisia
proposed a mixed approach–some crimes should have automatic jurisdiction and others
should require the consent of States. In rejecting this approach, it is clear that Libya
endorsed consent-based jurisdiction, emphasizing the primacy of state sovereignty and
the principle of non-interference with respect to internal (domestic) matters.
In this vein, Algeria, Rwanda, Sudan, and, to some degree, Egypt posited that
states should be able to issue reservations on particular aspects of the Statute, thus
reflecting a degree of opt-in jurisdiction, since it would allow States to choose the laws it
is subject to on an ad hoc or piecemeal basis. According to the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties, Article 2(1)(a):
“reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State, when ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.72
In the context of the Rome Conference, it was well-established that Rwanda preferred the
inclusion of the death penalty. At the negotiations, the Rwandan delegate expressed that
“the exclusion of the death penalty could not affect the right of sovereign States to apply
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it in aggravated circumstances, particularly in situations involving great loss of life.”73
This may explain why Rwanda took the position that states should be able to express
reservations. Particularly, its delegate said, “Rwanda supported the right of a State to
express reservations with respect to certain provisions of the Statute. It hoped that the
establishment of an international criminal court would allow prosecution of the planners
of genocide who had sought refuge in other States.”74 This position is interesting
inasmuch as on one hand, it promotes the ‘right’ of a State to express reservations while
advocating for the extrajudicial prosecution for perpetrators of genocide on the other.
This appears to combine a consent-based regime with universal jurisdiction.
Sudan also expressed a preference for reservations in Rome, but couched its
justification in the idea of universality. Specifically, the Sudanese delegate, speaking on
behalf of the Group of Arab States, said that, “[w]hile the Arab States would not stand in
the way of the adoption of the Statute of the Court, he felt bound to place on record that
they were not convinced by what had been agreed upon… The right to express
reservations should also have been granted. The removal of that right by article 109
would be an obstacle to accession.”75 Egypt also touched on this point when its delegate
said that “he attached great importance to the universality of the Convention to be
adopted. The possibility of entering reservations might encourage many countries to
accede to the Convention.”76 Indeed, the final version of the Rome Statute does not allow
reservations of any kind.77 As such, States Parties must accept the treaty in its entirety. It
appears as though Sudan and Egypt (and the Group of Arab States, by extension) were
willing to construct a weaker Statute in exchange for increased ratification (i.e.
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universality). This is important because it demarcates a division in regional preferences
and priorities. Indeed, a trade-off in the interest of universality was not prioritized by the
majority of African delegations at the Conference, but it provides interesting insight as to
how African states conceptualized or ranked features of institutional effectiveness.
A related concern was raised about the potential for conflict between domestic
law and the proposed Rome Statute with respect to the surrender of nationals under the
International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance heading. In three African cases, the
extradition of nationals was an express contradiction with domestic law. It was explained
by the Sudanese delegate that “the constitutions of a number of countries, including his
own, prohibited the surrender of nationals. His delegation hoped that the International
Criminal Court, once established, would take that difficulty into account.”78 The delegate
from Libya similarly identified this competing obligation. She explained that “the
prohibition of the surrender of nationals was one of the most important provisions in her
country’s legislation.”79 Likewise, the delegate from Algeria said that “[h]is country’s
Constitution and legislation prohibited the extradition of nationals. Algeria therefore
wished to record its reservation… pending a final decision as to the issue of reservations
in general.”80 Libya and Sudan made clear the incompatibility between domestic law and
the proposed Rome Statute on the issue of extradition. This may offer explanation
regarding the preference for reservations in the negotiation process, emphasized by
Algeria. This is particularly insightful when coupled with national preference for the use
of the death penalty, as expressed by states like Rwanda and Ethiopia. Such a position
suggests that a ‘weaker’ Court would be more agreeable to a greater number of states;
this would result in increased membership and work towards the broadly stated goal of
universality. This reflects a view that institutional and normative weakness is generally
more acceptable to states and the Court’s relative effectiveness would be correlated with
its number of States Parties.
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It is worth noting that Sudan also expressed other reasons for opposing automatic
jurisdiction for Court. Specifically, the Sudanese delegate said, “to give the Court
inherent [automatic] jurisdiction would favour a State that was not a party to the Statute,
because in their case the consent of the custodial State or the territorial State or both
would be required before the Court could exercise its jurisdiction, whereas in the case of
States parties the Court would automatically exercise jurisdiction. That would discourage
accession to the Statute.”81
This demonstrates an emphasis on protective measures–that States should be
insulated from the Court’s jurisdiction. This position privileges consent and principles of
state sovereignty and non-intervention. In this respect, an emphasis on the principle of
complementarity is relevant since the Court can only intervene as a last resort when
domestic institutions manifestly fail to act. This bedrock principle is fundamentally
important when conceptualizing the role and function of the Court in domestic contexts
and responding to concerns like those expressed by Sudan. Ultimately, a normative
commitment to international criminal justice demands that states surrender some amount
of sovereignty.
This isolationist approach was countered by several African delegations, most
strongly by Botswana. Specifically, the delegate from Botswana “rejected the opt-in/optout approach: in his delegation’s view, States ratifying the Statute must accept the
Court’s automatic jurisdiction in respect of all the core crimes. That did not mean he did
not want to see a universally accepted court. However, the ideal of universality should
not be achieved at the expense of effectiveness.”82 This demonstrates broad ideological
diversity with respect to the Court’s jurisdiction regime or trigger mechanism. It is clear
that there was not one monolithic ‘African’ position, though the majority of delegates that
addressed the options for triggering the Court’s jurisdiction in the plenaries and the
Committee of the Whole preferred to establish an effective Court that could operate
beyond the limits of state consent. The strongest articulation of this position came from
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the states that pushed for a Court with universal jurisdiction over the core crimes–that is,
a view that the Statute should apply to every relevant situation regardless of consent or
accession by the national, territorial, or custodial state(s) involved.83

5.6.2

Universal Jurisdiction

Ten African delegations at the Rome Conference supported a universal approach to the
Court’s jurisdiction: Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Mali, Senegal,84
Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Universal jurisdiction would have expanded the
Court’s reach, making it more effective and a comparatively stronger institution than the
other jurisdiction regimes allow. In normative terms, universal jurisdiction offers an
opportunity to expand the salience of international criminal justice, regardless of a state’s
willingness to submit to it. The reality of international relations is such that the
willingness on the part of states to realize the ideals of international criminal law is not
uniform; compromise positions are not only necessary, they were (and are) required. This
offers explanation as to why all of the African delegations that preferred universal
jurisdiction were willing to accept automatic jurisdiction as a compromise. Yet it is useful
to evaluate the statements made on behalf of the African states that were willing to grant
the Court universal jurisdiction, mitigating state sovereignty and maximizing institutional
power and scope.
In this respect, Tanzania’s contributions were particularly instructive.
Specifically, early in the Conference, the Tanzanian delegate said that “[t]he regime of
human rights derived its legitimacy from the universality of those rights, and the same
would apply to the Court. Some aspects of the idea of sovereignty were a potential bar to
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the common will to punish heinous crimes, but the Court must ensure that State
sovereignty became a concept of responsibility and international cooperation rather than
an obstacle to the enjoyment of universal human rights.”85
Such an approach is rooted in ideas of human rights, human security, and the
interrelated consequence of placing conditional limits on sovereignty if gross human
rights violations are largely ignored by the state in which they occur.86 Tanzania framed
sovereignty in a very different way than the states that promoted a consent-based
jurisdiction regime. This demonstrates a significant difference in ideological perspective.
With specific attention to jurisdiction, the Tanzanian delegate stated that “her delegation
supported universal jurisdiction for all the core crimes but as a compromise could accept
automatic jurisdiction. It considered that an opt-in/opt-out regime would undermine the
Court’s effectiveness.”87 Similar statements were made by other states, such as Congo.
For example, the Congolese delegate explained that
the Statute should provide for automatic jurisdiction of the Court over genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. His delegation
was in favour of universal jurisdiction, and thus regretted the omission of the
proposal by Germany … It would reluctantly accept option 1 [automatic
jurisdiction]… as a compromise. However, it was opposed to jurisdiction of the
Court being subjected to a regime of acceptance by States, which should not be
allowed the possibility of protecting those responsible for the most odious
crimes.88
In a similar vein, the delegate from Cameroon “said that he would have much preferred
universal jurisdiction with respect to all the core crimes, but would settle for automatic
jurisdiction. The opt-in regime would run counter to the fundamental concept of the
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Statute.”89 These contributions demonstrate a preference for universal jurisdiction, but a
willingness to compromise in the interest of moving the Conference and international
criminal justice forward. It is interesting to note that many African delegations expressly
disapproved of any jurisdiction regime based solely on state consent or opt-in measures.
This reflects a commitment to international norms and a desire to establish a tangible
institution with effective enforcement capabilities. Yet the progressive commitments by
various African delegations faced weighty opposition, which demanded a significant
amount of compromise.

5.6.3

Automatic Jurisdiction

Automatic jurisdiction was the primary preference of African delegations in Rome when
designing the ICC’s jurisdiction regime or ‘trigger mechanism.’ Automatic jurisdiction
means that states that ratify the Rome Statute automatically accept the ICC’s jurisdiction
over the core crimes covered in Article 5 (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
aggression). This decision, it is argued, “represents a major advance in international law
because in the past, the acceptance of jurisdiction has, in most cases, been subject to
additional State consent.”90 To provide some context, the International Law
Commission’s draft statute presented a form of jurisdiction it referred to as ‘inherent
jurisdiction.’ Under this framework, genocide was inherently within the Court’s
jurisdiction (if a State Party issued a complaint). Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn
explain, “[t]he Court could exercise its jurisdiction over other crimes once the state with
custody of the suspect and the state on whose territory the crimes were committed
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accepted the jurisdiction through ratification and specific declaration.”91 This type of
inherent jurisdiction regime is etched in a state-based, sovereign frame, relying on
traditional consent-based applications of international law. A significant amount of
discussion regarding the options for the Court’s jurisdiction took place in 1998, with
states such as Germany and the United Kingdom taking a keen interest. It is worth noting
that it was the Republic of Korea that presented a proposal for ‘automatic jurisdiction’ at
the opening of the Conference, “in which the Court could exercise its jurisdiction when
any four possible states involved (the territorial state, the states of nationality of the
accused and the victims, or the custodial state) had consented to the ICC jurisdiction over
the case by ratification or acceptance on an ad hoc basis.”92 Benedetti, Bonneau, and
Washburn go on to explain that, “African states and like-minded states supported the
automatic jurisdiction of the Korean proposal.”93 Curiously, however, automatic
jurisdiction was a compromise for the ten African states that actually preferred an even
stronger Court and enmeshment of norms couched in a universal jurisdiction regime. This
is important because this compromise suggested that states could choose whether or not
to be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, integrating and protecting sovereign principles
within the framework of the Court. The justifications for African support of automatic
jurisdiction are worth exploring in greater detail.
Based on the summary records of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, automatic
jurisdiction was the primary choice for 20 African delegations, representing a general
regional preference and key negotiating position. Egypt, for example, stated that it
“supported automatic jurisdiction over the core crimes, which should include aggression.
States not parties to the Statute should not be subject to the Court by virtue of universal
jurisdiction, because that would run counter to international law.”94 This is particularly
interesting, since it has been argued that automatic jurisdiction extended traditional

91

Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome,
1994-1998, 162.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid., 163.
94
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting, (9 July 1998), 310, para.
87. See also 29th meeting (9 July 1998), 300, para. 103, where Gabon made a similar point: “the Court’s
jurisdiction for all crimes under article 5 should be automatic for States parties. The possibility of allowing
States parties to take measures affecting non-parties might run counter to the law of treaties.”.

119

approaches to jurisdiction in international law by moving away from additional opt-in
(consent) by states. This suggests that the moderate approach embodied by automatic
jurisdiction was more agreeable than a universal jurisdiction regime when moving away
from strict, consent-based trigger mechanisms for the Court.
Other states such as Morocco reached the same conclusion, though for different
reasons. To this point, the Moroccan delegate said “that Court action should be triggered
by a State party. If the Court was to be as universal as possible, States should be allowed
to decide whether or not they accepted its jurisdiction, at least during the initial phase
following its establishment.”95 This perspective has some important implications, namely,
that the Court may need to be less effective in its infancy to generate broad(er)
acceptance by States. This seems to suggest that universality and institutional strength are
inversely related. In other words, in order to achieve universal membership, the
institution ought to preserve state sovereignty over and above evolving international
criminal law norms. In its rejection of universal jurisdiction, this interpretation also
suggests that States Parties have consented to potential Court action by virtue of ratifying
the Statute.
More general understandings of automatic jurisdiction were expressed by others.
For example, the delegate from Côte d’Ivoire said that “in ratifying the Statute, States
should accept the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the four categories of core crimes,
including aggression.”96 This implies that ratification constitutes more than a symbolic
act, it enacts a tangible acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction over the core crimes. In
many respects, such an approach ensures that the states that sign and ratify the treaty
intend to strengthen the Court by conceding to its jurisdiction if any of the core crimes
are committed and domestic courts fail to investigate or prosecute them. This safeguard
mitigates concerns that States Parties will unduly block Court action, or else stagnate its
institutional strength and utility. Such a pragmatic approach abandons traditional consentbased conceptions of jurisdiction in international law, while accepting that the universal
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application of the Statute would most likely result in the failure of the Conference.
Problematically, while automatic jurisdiction sufficiently addresses how Court action
might be triggered in situations involving States Parties, it inadequately addresses how
the Court might effectively respond to atrocity crimes involving non-States Parties.
While consensus broke down on the jurisdiction issue somewhat in the African
context, and more so generally, the final compromise largely reflects a narrow conception
of automatic jurisdiction, with mixed features for dealing with non-States Parties.
Specifically, the Rome Statute provides jurisdiction to the ICC over the core crimes if the
national and/or territorial state is a States Party. According to Article 12, the
Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction:
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or
have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of
that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in
accordance with Part 9.97
This explains that ratification of the Rome Statute is the usual mechanism by which
jurisdiction is triggered. Notwithstanding this, the final text of the Statute restricts the
States Parties that trigger jurisdiction when compared to the Korean proposal, since it
eliminates both the state of nationality of the victims and the custodial state from the list
of states that could trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. Further, while not universal, this
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approach allows jurisdiction to be based on the ratification of the Statute by the national
and/or territorial State of which the alleged crime(s) occurred, which is loosely consistent
with what African delegations envisioned in Rome, albeit considerably more restricted.
Regarding non-States Parties, the Rome Statute provides that jurisdiction may be
triggered if the state expressly accepts it (i.e. consent regime). The exception to this is if a
situation is referred to the Court by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter under Article 13(b). Interestingly, the Council can refer any situation to the
Court, regardless of ratification or consent by the state(s) involved. This particular
inclusion can be framed optimistically as a form of universal jurisdiction, though it
remains subject to heavy criticism. Relying on the Council to achieve institutional and
normative consistency and effectiveness has been met with logical suspicion.

5.6.4

Conclusions about the Court’s mixed jurisdiction regime

Indeed, this power structure raises difficult questions and exposes the Court to criticism,
since it is foreseeable that some crimes will remain outside of the Court’s jurisdiction,
particularly situations involving non-States Parties which are also permanent members of
the Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States, and their allies. Naturally, this
arrangement highlights the problematic use of the veto as a means to curtail international
criminal justice norms for politically motivated reasons. Former ICC Judge Hans-Peter
Kaul identified another related weakness: “In civil wars, the most common form of
conflict today, the present compromise provision does not allow for any jurisdiction
unless the state in question is a Party to the Statute.”98 Nevertheless, the automatic
jurisdiction regime embodied in the Rome Statute reflects an institutional structure that a
significant majority of African delegations wanted in Rome, though in a limited form.
The role of the Security Council, while marred with practical difficulties, expands
the jurisdictional capacity of the Court beyond a strict ratification/implied consent
approach and encroaches on the idea of universal jurisdiction, albeit in a relatively weak
way. It is weak in the sense that it reinforces the existing power structure and hierarchy in
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international political life; the Security Council reserves ‘watchdog’ privileges that other
states simply do not and will not have. Inconsistency in normative commitment and
institutional trust riddle the Security Council-Court relationship in significant ways and
severely undermine arguments about the Court’s potential universal jurisdiction capacity
within its current construction. Referring to the findings with respect to how African
states conceptualized the Court’s relationship with the Security Council, vesting only the
Council with the power to apply the Court’s jurisdiction in non-consensual non-States
Parties was likely approached with a reasonable degree of skepticism, especially from the
states that pushed for consent-based jurisdiction altogether. It also effectively insulates
dual Security Council members and non-States Parties from the Court’s reach altogether.
While imperfect, this mixed jurisdictional regime reflects a modest version of automatic
jurisdiction that most African delegations preferred, while providing an additional
element of jurisdictional capacity with respect to some non-States Parties. Given the
strong opposition to universal jurisdiction on the part of the United States, for example,
the compromise reflected in the final Statute provides measured jurisdictional capacity
for the Court, while insulating powerful ‘norm spoilers’ at the same time by virtue of
political prowess.
The seven African delegations that supported a consent-based jurisdiction regime
for the Court at the Conference did not see this vision reflected in the final version of the
Rome Statute. Of these states, only Nigeria and Tunisia ultimately ratified the Statute.
Algeria, Morocco, and Sudan signed but did not ratify. Ethiopia and Libya neither signed
nor ratified. This means that of the African states that preferred a consent-based
jurisdiction regime, only 25 per cent ultimately ratified the Rome Statute. Since 75 per
cent of these states chose not to ratify, it might be argued that the compromise on trigger
mechanisms was a deal breaker for these states. It is interesting to note that Algeria,
Libya, Morocco, and Sudan are members of the Group of Arab States, which may explain
the consistency in decision making among this group if those states were negotiating as a
coalition or bloc. Least of all, the coalescence among this group of states can be
understood as an expression of a shared experience within Arabic states in Africa. This
can be couched in a deep ideological commitment to the principles of state sovereignty
and non-interference, which frame a particular outlook and approach to international
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relations and institutional design rooted in the primacy of states and the comparative
weakness of institutions and norms.
Automatic jurisdiction was agreeable to 30 African states, comprising 81 per cent
of delegations that spoke to this issue, which represents a clear regional preference. Of
the 10 delegations that preferred universal jurisdiction but accepted automatic jurisdiction
as a compromise, only Cameroon signed but did not ultimately ratify the Statute. This
suggests a correlation between a state’s willingness to establish the strongest possible
Court with its overall commitment to be subject to it. This correlation similarly holds
when the analysis is expanded to include all 30 states that accepted an automatic
jurisdiction regime at the Conference, since 73 per cent of this group of states ratified the
Rome Statute.99 This demonstrates a general willingness to be subject to the Court, given
its primary reliance on States Parties to trigger jurisdiction. It is of interest to note that
Angola, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, and Zimbabwe went on to sign the
Statute but did not ratify it. Only Swaziland and Togo neither signed nor ratified. While
the jurisdiction regime issue was among the most contentious at the Rome Conference,
the majority of African states preferred a version of the approach that is largely reflected
in the final text of the Rome Statute, which may offer a marginal degree of explanatory
power with respect to its broad regional acceptance.100

5.7

Prosecutorial Powers

In an effort to ensure the independence of the Court, most African states preferred giving
the Prosecutor the power to investigate (alleged) crimes proprio motu. Benedetti,
Bonneau, and Washburn explained that “[o]pponents defending the sole legitimacy of the
Security Council to act on behalf of the international community or to qualify serious
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crimes feared the risks of politicization.”101It was argued that a strong, independent
Prosecutor with the ability to initiate investigations on his/her own volition would be a
safeguard against political posturing by the Security Council and by States. Many African
states took an early position on this issue. For example, the SADC States enumerated in
its sixth principle of consensus that, “[t]he independence of the prosecutor must be
guaranteed by the Statute and should have the necessary powers to initiate investigations
and prosecute ex-officials.”102 Additional regional consensus on this issue was articulated
in the Dakar Declaration, particularly where it states “[t]hat the independence of the
Prosecutor and his functions must be guaranteed.”103 It is important to note that in Rome,
delegations used the terms proprio motu and ex officio (i.e. prosecutorial discretion by
virtue of office) interchangeably.104 For the purposes of this analysis, the terms are
understood as closely related and are treated synonymously.105 The most significant
points of contention regarding the independence of the Prosecutor pivoted on issues of
oversight and information sourcing. Specifically, states were concerned about a
Prosecutor’s ability to go ‘rogue’ or to act with no effective oversight mechanism. In
addition, delegates expressed concern about how and where the Prosecutor would gather
evidence when conducting an investigation. On this basis, it is useful to evaluate how
African states understood and negotiated prosecutorial powers in Rome.
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Given the strong regional consensus on the issue preceding the Conference, it is
relatively unsurprising that 28 African states expressly preferred to give the Prosecutor
proprio motu powers.106 This constitutes 58 per cent of the total African delegations in
attendance at the Conference and 80 per cent of the African delegates that vocalized a
clear position on the issue in the plenaries, reflecting a clear ‘majority preference’ of
African delegations. Of the 13 SADC states in attendance at the negotiations, nine clearly
stated a preference for conferring proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor.107 The
remaining SADC states did not indicate a preference on this particular issue.108 This
suggests a high level of (regional) organizational consensus since there was no explicit
dissent expressed by any SADC member state(s) in the summary records of the plenary
meetings or the meetings of the Committee of the Whole.
This was best illustrated when the delegate from South Africa, speaking on behalf
of SADC States, took a clear position on this issue early in the Conference. Specifically,
the South African delegate said that “the SADC States believed that the Prosecutor
should be independent and have authority to initiate investigations and prosecutions on
his or her own initiative without interference from States or the Security Council, subject
to appropriate judicial scrutiny. The independence of the Court must not be prejudiced by
political considerations.”109 Similarly, Lesotho’s delegate demonstrated SADC’s
commitment to the adoption of an independent Prosecutor when he said that “[t]he
Prosecutor’s power to initiate proceedings without awaiting referrals by the Security
Council or States would help to assure the Court’s independence and ensure that justice
was served in cases where the Council or States failed to act. There were many
procedural safeguards against the unlikely eventuality that the Prosecutor would ‘run
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wild.’”110 Lesotho remained committed to its preference for an independent Prosecutor
throughout the Conference. To demonstrate this commitment, Lesotho subsequently
submitted that:
if an independent and effective Court was to be established, it was essential that
the Prosecutor should have the authority to initiate investigations ex officio. If
investigations and prosecutions could only be triggered by States and to some
extent by the Security Council, the functioning of the Court would be dependent
on the political motivations of those entities and as a result be severely hampered,
because in practice States and the Security Council would be reluctant, or unable,
to lodge complaints or refer situations to the Court.111
This position raises the complex political issues associated with restricting the
Court’s jurisdiction to the whims of states and the Security Council. Under this
construction, the independence of the Prosecutor is a mitigating factor in a highly
politicized state-based institutional model. This presumes the Prosecutor’s ability to act
outside of the political sphere, or at least not to be directed solely by national or
collective political interest(s).
Functional safeguards were an important feature of the Prosecutor’s independence
and were frequently referred to by many African delegations that promoted this
institutional feature. For example, the delegate from Lesotho explained that “[t]he
Prosecutor should be able to initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of
information obtained from any source. Judicial review of the decision to commence an
investigation would be the task of the Pre-Trial Chamber.”112 This suggests that these
states wanted a scenario whereby the Prosecutor would be able to act independently when
opening an investigation, with the potential for judicial review by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
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This was not a vision of unchecked Prosecutorial powers; it advanced a role with built-in
assurances against rogue behaviour emanating from the institution itself, rather than
states or the Security Council.
Similar positions were taken by African states outside of SADC. For example, the
delegate from Burkina Faso said that “he too, favoured empowering the Prosecutor to
initiate proceedings… That would enable an independent prosecutor with a purely
judicial role to act in cases where States or the Security Council might block
investigations because of the political interests at stake. The Prosecutor’s powers should
nevertheless be subject to control by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”113 These positions
demonstrate a broad commitment to adopting an independent Prosecutor, with
appropriate controls to monitor decision-making processes when opening an investigation
proprio motu. Of the 28 African delegations that preferred to confer proprio motu powers
to an independent Prosecutor, almost all qualified their endorsement with reference to the
role of judicial oversight from the Pre-Trial Chamber, or else made generalized
statements about the importance of providing adequate safeguards against unchecked
prosecutorial power.114
However, some states did not share the view that the Prosecutor should be subject
to review by the Pre-Trial Chamber at the early stages of an investigation. The Congolese
delegate, for example, stated that “[t]he Prosecutor should have ex officio powers to
initiate proceedings and should not be subject to controls by the Pre-Trial Chamber,
which should only intervene once proceedings had commenced, to check abuses.”115
Later in the Conference, he clarified this position when he said that “[t]he Prosecutor
must be able to initiate investigations proprio motu… The Pre-Trial Chamber should be
entitled to act only after the Prosecutor had done so, and the latter must have very broad
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powers in order to carry out an effective investigation.”116 While framed differently,
Congo seemed to share a similar view that the Prosecutor should be independent, yet it
still details the necessity of Pre-Trial Chamber oversight in the overall functioning of the
Court. This conceptualization of the powers of the Prosecutor is largely consistent with
the examples provided from Lesotho and Burkina Faso and reflects the majority position
taken by many African states in Rome.
The Moroccan, Libyan, and Egyptian117 delegates indicated a preference for
giving the Prosecutor limited power to initiate proceedings to mitigate fears associated
with unchecked power. Each of these delegations expressed the preference to limit the
sources of information that the Prosecutor could use in opening his or her investigation to
information obtained only from states and state-based sources. This constituted less than
one per cent of the African delegations at the Conference and of the African delegations
that took an express position on the issue during the negotiations.
To better understand this position, the Moroccan delegate expressed that “[t]he
Prosecutor should have the right of initiative in cases, but there must be adequate
safeguards to avoid misuse of his powers and to ensure that the rights of the accused were
respected.”118 This position was reiterated and expanded upon when the delegate
expressed “that the Prosecutor should have an independent role and be able to initiate
investigations ex officio. However, such action should be subject to the agreement of the
Pre-Trial Chamber. Information should only be obtained from States and organizations in
the United Nations system.”119 This makes clear that the Moroccan position was that the
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Prosecutor should be limited by Court oversight and should also be restricted by the
sources of information he or she could use to initiate the opening of an investigation. This
would exclude the Prosecutor from initiating Court action on the basis of information
obtained from important civil society actors such as survivors/victims and key nongovernmental organizations, for example. While Morocco was willing to give the
Prosecutor a version of proprio motu powers, it also sought to curtail his or her
independence by restricting sources of information available for initiating an
investigation and subjecting decision making to institutional oversight from the Pre-Trial
Chamber. As such, it is reasonable to argue that the Moroccan preference was for limited
proprio motu powers for the Prosecutor–not a purely independent role.
This sentiment was echoed by the Libyan delegate who said, “the power vested in
the Prosecutor should be restricted. He or she should be able to commence an
investigation on the basis of information obtained from a State, but not on the basis of
information from non-governmental organizations, victims or their representatives.”120
This position seeks to restrict the type of information that would be available to the
Prosecutor, and compromises his or her independence to conduct a thorough and
objective investigation. Information obtained from a state may be censored in significant
ways; least of all, this approach runs the risk of constructing a narrative based on
evidence that supports the practical and political national interests of the state(s)
involved. However, given the primacy of states in the international system, this
preference is consistent with Libya’s largely realist approach to institutional design and
norm enforcement, which permeates the summary records of the plenary meetings and
meetings of the Committee of the Whole in distinct ways. Notwithstanding this, such an
approach does grant the Prosecutor the power to start an investigation, but effectively
limits the source of information upon which it might be based. This construction would
not establish a truly independent Prosecutor and does not express a preference for
conferring true proprio motu powers to him or her.
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Such an approach is consistent among the seven African delegations that
preferred to give the Prosecutor no power to initiate an investigation.121 This constituted
10 per cent of the total African delegations present at the Conference and 16 per cent of
those that articulated a preference in the plenary meetings. This was the position taken by
Tunisia, which was made clear when its delegate “said that his country had some
misgivings as to the powers being granted to the Prosecutor in the draft proposed. His
delegation believed that action should only be initiated on the basis of a complaint
submitted by a State.”122 Such a position restricts prosecutorial powers by limiting cases
to those referred to the Court by states. This framework does not allow the Prosecutor to
initiate an investigation into a situation on his or her own volition and emphasizes the
priority of state sovereignty in its institutional model. This position was echoed by Kenya
when its delegate said that, “his delegation saw no reason why the Prosecutor would
require ex officio powers to trigger Court action. The twin triggers of States and the
Security Council, subject to appropriate controls, were sufficient to cover all cases which
would need to go before the Court.”123 This demonstrates an effective trust in States and
the Security Council and seeks to limit the powers of the Prosecutor as a consequence.
The Kenyan and Tunisian delegates plainly endorsed the preservation of states’ primacy
in the international order and sought to mitigate prosecutorial power and intervention in
domestic affairs to that end.
Applying a different rationale, Sudan preferred that the Prosecutor not be given
proprio motu powers because it feared that the power of the Prosecutor would be too
great. To this point, the Sudanese delegate opined that “the Statute gave the Prosecutor,
acting proprio motu, a role beyond the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Prosecutor
should be under reasonable and logical control, and should not act ex officio.”124 This
position suggests that institutional oversight by the Pre-Trial Chamber was a necessary
institutional feature to screen the powers of the Prosecutor. Related concerns were raised

121

These states included Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tunisia.
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by Egypt, particularly with respect to information received by the Prosecutor as a basis
for initiating an investigation. Such positions iterate a mistrust in the Prosecutor’s
discretionary capabilities and suggest that institutional oversight by the Pre-Trial
Chamber ought to be required to limit the Prosecutor’s independence. Limitations in this
respect seriously affect the independence of the Prosecutor and his or her ability to
initiate an independent investigation.
Some delegations agreed that the Prosecutor should not have proprio motu
powers because of the pressures it would place on him or her. These pressures, it is
argued, would compromise his or her independence in the role and negatively impact the
Court. To this point, the delegate from Algeria said that “he did not support the power of
the Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu. Such powers might expose him or
her to all sorts of pressures and prevent him or her from carrying out his or her work
impartially and independently.”125 It is unclear exactly what sorts of pressures the
delegate was referring to, although it seems to suggest that the Prosecutor may be subject
to political posturing from states or other interested parties. Similar concerns were raised
by the Kenyan delegate when he said that “Kenya continued to doubt the desirability of
conferring proprio motu powers on the Prosecutor, particularly because of the danger that
pressure might be exerted on him or her to act or not to act, to the detriment of his or her
independence. However, it would not stand in the way of consensus on that issue.”126
This suggests that Kenya shared concerns with Algeria about the pressures the Prosecutor
might be exposed to and its impact on his or her independence. However, the fact that the
delegate expressed that this issue was not significant enough to obstruct consensus
suggests that it was a concern, but not a barrier to Kenya’s particular support of the
Statute in its entirety.
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Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 317, para
33. Note that similar concerns were raised by the delegate from Nigeria in the 7th plenary meeting (18 June
1998), at 111, para. 87, when he said that “He also had a strong reservation to the ex officio powers of the
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reservations about conferring proprio motu powers on the Prosecutor: to do so might hamper the
Prosecutor’s effectiveness in practice.”
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5.7.1

The final text and conclusions

The final text of the Rome Statute details the powers of the Prosecutor under Article
15.127 Some key elements of the Statute include the Prosecutor’s ability to initiate
investigations proprio motu based on information concerning crimes within the Court’s
jurisdiction.128 The Statute also includes the possibility for consultancy with States,
organs of the UN, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable
sources when assessing the information received.129 Article 15(3) enumerates that the
Prosecutor must submit a request for authorization of an investigation to the Pre-Trial
Chamber based on the information he or she has collected.130 As such, the final text
largely reflects the preference of the majority of African delegations in Rome–an
independent Prosecutor with the ability to initiate investigations proprio motu,
accompanied with broad sources of consultancy when gathering information and
appropriate judicial oversight from the Pre-Trial Chamber.
The seven African states that did not want to give the Prosecutor proprio motu
powers did not see this reflected in the final text of the Rome Statute. Libya and Ethiopia
did not sign or ratify the Rome Statute. Algeria and Sudan both signed it; Kenya, Nigeria,
and Tunisia all signed and ratified it. However, it would be an omission not to point out
that Algeria, Libya, and Sudan are each also members of the Group of Arab States, and
this may explain the cohesion in decision-making among these states, outside of the
narrow prosecutorial powers issue, based on shared culture and experience. A notable
outlier is Tunisia, since it is a member of the Group of Arab States, yet preferred not to
confer proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor, but signed and ratified the Rome Statute
anyway. Nevertheless, the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio
motu or to base an investigation on information from sources other than State(s) may
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have been decidedly problematic for some, especially African states that are also in the
Group of Arab States.
On the other hand, most African states expressed a preference for the type of
prosecutorial powers reflected in the final text of the Rome Statute. Of these 28 states,
only Rwanda, Swaziland, and Togo neither signed nor ratified the Statute. Angola,
Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, and Mozambique signed the Statute but did
not ratify it. On this basis, the ratification rate is 68 per cent among the African states that
vocalized a preference for conferring proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor. This
suggests that 32 per cent of African states felt strongly enough to enumerate a preference
for an independent prosecutor in the plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of
the Whole but were not entirely committed to the Statute and chose not to ratify it.
Curiously, of the six states that endorsed proprio motu powers and ultimately did not
ratify the Rome Statute, half belong to SADC: Angola, Mozambique, and Swaziland. The
final text of the Statute reflects the type of prosecutorial powers that SADC endorsed
from the earliest stages, which raises questions about the other provisions which might
explain this defection. It is worth noting that 89 per cent of the African states that
preferred conferring proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor did sign the Statute,
reflecting tacit approval among the majority of this group of states.

5.8

Conclusion

The final text of the Rome Statute enumerates that a situation can be investigated and
prosecuted at the ICC if referred by a States Party, which reflects an automatic
jurisdiction regime. Alternatively, the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation proprio
motu, subject to appropriate judicial oversight in situations involving States Parties.
Lastly, the Security Council may refer a situation to the Court, even with respect to nonstates parties. The Security Council may also defer a situation at the Court, if it is in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security to do so. This chapter has
deconstructed the particular preferences of African states at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference with respect to the role of the Security Council, the trigger mechanism for the
Court’s jurisdiction, and the power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio
motu. While there is no one monolith, this chapter has drawn attention to some general
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patterns and consistencies in the construction of preferences on these provisions among
African states.
Generally, the states that preferred to construct the Court in the ways reflected in
the final text of the Statute displayed a strong commitment in the form of treaty
ratification. It is important to note that these trends are general, since not every state
spoke to every issue. However, relying on the information provided by the summary
records of the plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole indicates
that there is a general correlation between how much of the final text of the Statute
reflected the preferences of various African delegations and that states’ commitment to be
bound by it. This is particularly visible when considering the ways that situations can
come under the Court’s jurisdiction. The next section analyzes the preferences of African
states on the provisions concerning crimes, including the inclusion of war crimes
committed during internal armed conflict, the inclusion of so-called ‘treaty crimes’–
especially terrorism and drug trafficking, and the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the
prohibited list of weapons used in conflict.
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Chapter 6

6

African Positions at the Rome Diplomatic Conference,
continued

The previous chapter provided insight into African positions on contentious aspects of the
Rome Statute negotiations with respect to issues concerning the Court’s jurisdiction,
including the role of the United Nations Security Council and the independence of the
Prosecutor. In addition to those issues, there was significant contention surrounding some
of the provisions of the Statute that dealt with the nature of crimes covered by the Statute,
most notably the inclusion of war crimes committed during internal armed conflict; the
inclusion of so-called ‘treaty crimes,’ especially terrorism and drug trafficking; and the
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Similar to the jurisdiction provisions, African
states engaged with the difficult issues with respect to the nature of crimes, demonstrating
meaningful and affective diplomacy throughout the negotiations. Likewise, African
delegates expressed a keen interest in designing an ICC that covered the sorts of crimes
that were most relevant to the region. In many respects, African interventions with
respect to the provisions dealing with crimes provided further evidence to suggest that
positions were constructed from an Afro-centric point of view. On this basis, the
preferences of African states on the controversial parts of the Statute with respect to
crimes is summarized in Table 6-1.
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Table 6-1: African Positions on Controversial Elements and Key Issues on crimes
provisions at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 1998
Controversial Element and key issues

Number of African
states that supported
the stated
controversial
elements of the
Statute

Inclusion of war crimes in internal
armed conflict

25

No inclusion of war crimes in internal
armed conflict

7

Inclusion of ‘treaty crimes’

Terrorism

9

Drug trafficking

5

Unspecified

1

No inclusion of ‘treaty crimes’

12

Prohibition of nuclear weapons

17

No inclusion of nuclear weapons

1

6.1

Internal Conflict

Among the most debated issues was whether war crimes committed during internal
armed conflict (non-international armed conflicts) should be included and if so, what the
threshold should be to distinguish these acts from isolated internal disturbances or acts of
violence.1 52 per cent of the African states in attendance at the Conference expressed a
preference to include internal conflicts in the Statute, in many cases because of direct

1

See Thomas Graditzky, “War Crime Issues before the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court,” U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 5.2 (1999), 208:
“One of the most controversial issues relating to war crimes was whether to include a provision covering
non-international armed conflicts.”
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experience(s).2 Stephen John Stedman provides a contemporaneous analysis and
explained that:
in 1995, there were five ongoing wars (in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
and Sudan), and several countries that were candidates for state collapse or civil
war (Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire), and a host
of other countries where low-level ethnic and political conflict remained
contained, but unresolved (Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda).3
This suggests that this issue had a geopolitical component, which informed a want
and need for the establishment of an ICC with jurisdiction over war crimes committed in
internal conflicts. It is important to highlight the significance and importance of the
negotiations to countries with firsthand experience (past or present) with widespread
internal conflict and violence in shaping the institutional design of the proposed Court.
This is one area of the negotiations that showcases how various African experiences with
post-colonial violence directly influenced state preferences in the negotiations and
permeated the summary records of the plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee
of the Whole. It demonstrates that the African experience was a driving factor that
directly affected African support for, and engagement in, the drafting of the Rome
Statute. To reflect this point, the delegate from Benin “said that the adoption of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court was a major step forward for humanity as a
whole and for Africa in particular. Africa had suffered from the most serious violence for
decades.”4 This regional component was demonstrated by reference to country-specific
experience(s) with widespread human rights violations by Burundi, the Democratic

2

These states included Angola, Botswana, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Note that South Africa expressed its preference to include war crimes committed in internal conflict on
behalf of the South African Development Community (SADC) States. As such, the SADC states are
individually listed in this preferential group.
3
Stephen John Stedman, “Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in The International
Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael Edward Brown (Harvard University: Center for Science and
International Affairs, 1996), 237.
4
Summary Records of the plenary meetings, 8th plenary meetings (18 June 1998) A/CONF.183/SR.8, 128,
para. 106.
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Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Namibia, Uganda,
and frequent reference to the Rwandan genocide throughout the plenary meetings and
meetings of the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference.5
The main issue at the Conference with respect to the inclusion of war crimes
committed during internal armed conflict surrounded clarifying the defining nature and
threshold of internal conflict itself. The initial proposal to address this issue presented in
the Rome Statute negotiations employed the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), which covers non-derogable rights contained in Article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions. More particularly, the initial proposal suggested the use of the
threshold contained in Article 1, paragraph 2 of Protocol II, which says: “This Protocol
shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts.”6
However, difficulty arose in the negotiations because the Rome Statute deals with
war crimes outside of those contained in common Article 3. As such, Graditzky
explained that some delegations argued that the acts not mentioned by Common Article 3

5

For example, see Summary records of the plenary meetings 4th plenary meeting (16 June 1998)
A/CONF.183/SR.4, 87, para. 56: The delegate from Namibia said, “In view of the atrocities the world had
witnessed during the previous century and Namibia’s own recent history, his Government supported the
establishment of an effective and independent international criminal court” [emphasis added]. See also
Summary records of the plenary meetings, 8th plenary meeting, 118, para. 58: The delegate from Burundi,
“said that his country had suffered for almost five years from genocide and attacks by bands of terrorists
against innocent people; he requested that an ad hoc international criminal tribunal be set up for Burundi in
order to help national reconciliation efforts.” See also Summary records of the meetings of the Committee
of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998) A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, 292, para. 76: The delegate from
Guinea-Bissau said that “He attached prime importance to the inclusion of sections C and D, since his
country continued to suffer from non-international armed conflicts” [emphasis added]. See also Summary
records of the plenary meetings, 7th plenary meeting (18 June 1998), A/CONF.183/SR.7, 112, para. 91:
The delegate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that “The international community had
proved powerless to prevent atrocities or even punish the perpetrators. Indeed, his own country had suffered
the influx of millions fleeing from the genocide in Rwanda. His delegation therefore believed that the
creation of an international criminal court was an imperative” [emphasis added]. See also Summary records
of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, 337,
para. 23: The delegate from Uganda said, “Whether or not the perpetrators controlled territory was
immaterial: they might be operating from a neighbouring country, with or without that country’s consent,
as was currently the case in Uganda” [emphasis added].
6
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 1, paragraph 2.
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should have a higher threshold.7 On this basis, some delegates proposed to “resolve this
issue by inserting the restrictive threshold of Article 1, paragraph 1 of Additional
Protocol II before the list of additional acts at issue.”8
The international humanitarian law framework provided by Article 1 in Protocol
II espouses a high threshold based on the actors involved and the level of territorial
control necessary to reach the categorical label of non-international armed conflict.9 The
specific problem with employing this threshold in the broadly termed ‘African context’
is, as it was at the time, its focus on organized armed groups, or else state or dissident
armed forces, acting under responsible command, exercising control over and operating
out of a part of the states’ territory. This implies an organizational and territorial aspect,
which effectively limits its application in many internal conflicts. As Charles Jalloh
highlights, “keeping in mind the types of non-State actor conflicts that we see in that
region of Africa today… more conflicts are of an intra-state rather than inter-state nature
and feature rebel groups and other non-State actors as key perpetrators.”10
Within the context of the Rome Statute negotiations, Graditzky explained,
“[o]pposing delegations and other involved actors reacted strongly [to inserting the
restrictive threshold of Article 1] since many internal conflicts would be excluded.”11
This is consistent with the view taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
which argued that “[t]he restrictive definition of the material field of application in
Article 1 will have the effect that Protocol II will be applicable to a smaller range of

7

Graditzky, “War Crime Issues,” 209.
Ibid.
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Protocol II Article 1(1): This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all
armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)
and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol; Article 1(2): This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances
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being armed conflicts.
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University International Law Review 28.2 (2013): 415.
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internal conflicts than Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”12
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions enumerates human rights that are nonderogable in character, amounting to peremptory norms of international law or jus
cogens. It was therefore understood that embedding the framework contained in Article 1
of Protocol II within the structure of the Court would severely limit its utility in
addressing war crimes allegedly committed during internal conflicts, particularly if the
sorts of crimes fell outside of those listed in Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.13 In this frame, the utilization of Article 1 of Protocol II would have been
limited in terms of the actors and crimes in which it covers. This was especially
problematic for African states that had dealt with (and continue to deal with) the
complexities of war crimes committed during internal conflict by rebel groups and other
non-State actors without satisfying the territorial control threshold.
To reconcile this issue, Sierra Leone made reference to its own experience with
internal conflict. The delegate said that he
had reservations, for example, regarding the chapeau of section D, which referred
to organized armed groups that exercised ‘control over a part of [a State party’s]
territory.’ That wording was very restrictive: in his own country, for example, the
rebel forces did not occupy a territory. Thus, as presently drafted, section D would
exclude the type of internal conflict presently taking place in Sierra Leone.14
As a result, Sierra Leone proposed using the language that internal conflict “applies to
armed conflicts that take place in a territory of a State when there is protracted armed
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International Committee of the Red Cross, “Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977,” available at https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475; accessed 1 April 2020.
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the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
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conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups.”15 This is an example of an African country using its own experience to lead
negotiations in an important manner. The practicality and relevance of this proposal to
the region was demonstrated by the Ugandan delegate when he said that:
Uganda shared other delegations’ concern about the watering down of the Court’s
jurisdiction over situations of internal conflict. As currently worded, the second
sentence of the chapeau of article 5 quarter, section D, severely limited the
Court’s scope in that regard. Whether or not the perpetrators controlled territory
was immaterial: they might be operating from a neighbouring country, with or
without that country’s consent, as was currently the case in Uganda. His
delegation thus supported the proposal by the representative of Sierra Leone with
regard to the chapeau of section D.16
This not only highlights the importance of the proposal made by Sierra Leone, but
it also demonstrates a need for the provision to cover the sorts of crimes being committed
in several African states during the Rome Diplomatic Conference. To further illustrate
this point, the delegate from Guinea-Bissau said that “[h]e attached prime importance to
the inclusion of sections C and D [on internal conflict], since his country continued to
suffer from non-international armed conflicts.”17 This is another example of how countryspecific experience guided some African states in the negotiation of particular aspects of
the ICC, especially with respect to the inclusion of war crimes committed in internal
conflict. Acknowledging the relevance of particular crimes in domestic contexts
reinforced the need for an effective system of international criminal justice, which
influenced national preferences during the negotiations in pointed ways. This is important
because it directly affected African preferences throughout the Rome Diplomatic
Conference which are strongly evidenced through a content analysis of the plenary
meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole.
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More generally, 32 African states took a clear position on non-international armed
conflict: 25 expressed a preference to include internal conflicts within the war crimes
provisions;18 seven expressed a preference not to do so.19 The states that preferred to
include war crimes committed during internal conflict did so for mixed reasons. Several
African states emphasized the evolving contemporary reality of internal armed conflicts.
For example, the delegate from South Africa, speaking on behalf of the South African
Development Community (SADC) States, said that “most atrocities were now committed
in the context of internal armed conflicts. The member States of SADC therefore
supported the inclusion of sections C and D in the Statute [on internal armed conflict].”20
Similarly, Ethiopia, stated that, “[n]on-international armed conflicts should be included,
being the main cause of crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court.”21 Mali also said that “[m]ost conflicts were internal in nature, so sections C and D
[on internal conflict] should be included in the Statute.”22 This rationale emphasizes not
only the changing nature of conflict but prioritizes the Court’s utility to address the
crimes which it is designed to respond to, based on the broadly understood ‘African’
experience. While traditionally conceptualized as state-on-state aggression, the 1990s
brought to the fore a new wave of warfare defined by violent internal conflict – including
in many African countries, which directly influenced state preferences and
conceptualization of the object and purpose of the ICC.23
Other states relied on specific experiences with violent internal conflict even more
directly when forming a domestic preference. For example, the delegate from Namibia
said, “[i]n common with several African delegations, he believed that the question of
internal conflicts must be addressed, since in one case the entire Government had been
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involved in genocide and the judicial system in situ had not been effective.”24 This
statement reflects a degree of regional consensus on this issue. Further, it makes
reference to the violent internal conflict that had taken place in Rwanda to highlight the
need for the ICC Statute to deal with similar situations, should they occur in the future.
Curiously, one might have expected Rwanda itself to take a position on this issue based
on first-hand experience, yet it did not.25 The delegate from Rwanda did say “that his
delegation hoped that the many references made to the genocide that had involved the
people of his country in 1994 denoted a desire to bring the organizers of that genocide to
justice… While supporting the establishment of a permanent international criminal court,
Rwanda believed that its establishment would not obviate the need for ad hoc
tribunals.”26 It is curious that the Rwandan genocide was a major catalyst for the
establishment of an ICC and bolstered regional and global commitment to the norms
undergirding it, yet Rwanda itself demonstrated a degree of apathy at the Rome
Conference and neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute, which casts doubt as to
whether or not Rwanda wanted to ensure that future crimes of a similar gravity could not
go unpunished by committing to a permanent international criminal justice mechanism.27
Nevertheless, jointly and separately, the African majority position on the
inclusion of war crimes committed during non-international conflict may explain why the
delegate from Togo said that “[s]ections C and D on non-international armed conflicts
must be included in the Statute, as the credibility of the Court depended on it.”28
Ultimately, the African contributions with respect to the inclusion of war crimes
committed during non-international armed conflict demonstrate the relevance of
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continental and domestic experience(s) in shaping preferences and negotiating positions.
This effectively demonstrates that the majority position on the part of African states to
include war crimes committed in internal conflict was strongly influenced by the regional
experience with such conflicts. While there is a geopolitical aspect to explaining African
support for the inclusion of internal conflict in the war crimes provisions, it would be
negligent to ignore that the International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that 80
per cent of victims of armed conflicts since 1945 have been victims of non-international
armed conflicts,29 which highlights the importance of the issue to the overall utility and
effectiveness of the Court altogether.
Notwithstanding this, it is necessary to evaluate the rationale of the seven African
delegations that preferred not to include internal conflict in the Rome Statute. The
primary justification for taking this position hinged on traditional concepts of sovereignty
and non-interference in domestic politics. For example, the delegate from Tunisia, when
addressing crimes against humanity, said that “his delegation interpreted crimes against
humanity as taking place only in international armed conflicts; otherwise intervention by
the Court would amount to interference in internal affairs contrary to the principles of the
United Nations.”30 Related points were made by the delegate from Algeria, who said that
“he was somewhat concerned about the inclusion of sections C and D [on internal
conflict], since that might lead to interference in the internal affairs of countries. It would
be difficult to draw a line between a genuine armed internal conflict and internal
disturbances.”31 He reaffirmed these concerns later in the Conference when he said that
Algeria “continued to oppose inclusion of internal armed conflicts under the Court’s
jurisdiction, on account of the practical difficulty of distinguishing between true armed
conflict and policing operations intended to restore public order.”32 Sudan felt similarly
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hesitant to endorse an inclusion of internal conflicts within the Statute. When speaking on
behalf of the Group of Arab States, the Sudanese delegate said that “the Arab States were
afraid that the inclusion of non-international conflicts within the Statute would allow
interference in the internal affairs of States on flimsy pretexts.”33
Given that this was the position of the Group of Arab States, it may be inferred
that it reflects the views of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia–six of
the seven African states that expressly preferred not to include non-international armed
conflict in the Statute and belong to the Group of Arab States. The sixth state, Burundi,
did not provide a justification for taking this position. The delegate simply said that “[t]he
Court should not have competence with respect to internal conflicts.”34 This may be a
consequence of Burundi’s own experience with internal conflict, exemplified by the
military coup in 1993, which started a civil war between the Tutsi armed forces and Hutu
rebel groups.35 It is logical to infer that delegates negotiating the Rome Statute would
have considered its impact on their own domestic realities. Those states with questionable
human rights records, or that were otherwise coping with the sorts of crimes being
discussed at the negotiations, would likely have had a special interest in seeking to limit
the Court’s reach in those contexts.
Nevertheless, defection from the African majority position with respect to internal
conflicts primarily emanated from the Group of Arab States in Rome. The heart of the
justification(s) provided by these states thematically rests on realist principles, which
permeated the negotiations throughout. These included the primacy of state sovereignty
above all else. This was emphasized by the Libyan delegate when she said that “sections
C and D [on internal conflicts] should not be included. She was ready to consider
guarantees that would secure the integrity and sovereignty of States.”36 This demonstrates
a clear ideological difference from the majority of African states that considered the
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Court’s role in addressing war crimes committed in internal conflicts as not only
important, but necessary.
The minority position articulated in the summary records of the plenary meetings
and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole seems to rely on three distinct and
consistent fears: first, that state sovereignty would be compromised; second, that
governments would be unable to maintain effective order within borders; and third, that
unsolicited intervention on the part of other states (or the Court, for that matter) will be
justifiable. Separately or combined, the potential realization of these fears compromises
the foundation of the nation state and the international state-based system; this forms the
basis of normative and institutional rejection, least avoidance. As Sivu Maqungo
explained, “it was always going to be difficult to convince governments, particularly,
African governments to accept an institution that threatened to lift or even pierce the veil
of their hard won sovereignty.”37 This challenge explains the polarization in the
approaches of African states, many being willing to give up some degree of sovereignty
in exchange for normative commitment, while others were unwavering in their
ideological ascription to the primacy of state sovereignty and non-intervention for any
purpose(s) in the post-colonial political landscape.

6.1.1

The final text and conclusions

Article 8 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC Prosecutor the ability to investigate war
crimes committed in both international and internal armed conflict.38 The provisions
concerning internal armed conflict specifically enumerate violations of Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions at Article 8, 2 (c).39 Importantly, Article 8, 2 (e) details

37

Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo, “The African Contribution Towards the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court,” in African Yearbook of International Law, ed. A.A. Yusuf (African Association of
International Law: 2001), 339.
38
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8: War Crimes.
39
Ibid., at Art. 8.2(c): “In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations
of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts
committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other
cause: i. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture; ii. Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
iii. Taking of hostages; iv. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous

147

other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in internal conflicts and
enumerates specific war crimes in these contexts.40 Of additional relevance, both Article
8, paragraph 2 (d) and Article 8, paragraph 2 (f) employ the language and threshold
provided in Paragraph 2 of Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions:
Paragraph 2 (c) [or Paragraph 2 (e)] applies to armed conflicts not of an
international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or
other acts of a similar nature.41
This inclusion seeks to clarify the threshold to distinguish ‘regular’ internal violence from
internal conflict, an attempt to pacify the concern raised by some states (including some
African states) that the Court could intervene in domestic affairs on weak bases. A key
distinction between the two paragraphs is the additional text in paragraph 2 (f) that
follows, and, which says: “It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a
State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups.”42
This text is a verbatim application of the proposal made by Sierra Leone in the
course of the negotiations, referenced above. This proposal effectively mitigated the use
of the restrictive threshold contained in Paragraph 1 of Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions. This is a clear example of African involvement in the institutional design of
the Court based on domestic experience with the issues involved.
It is also important to note that a further attempt was made to assuage the fears of
the delegations that touted the primacy of sovereignty and non-interference. Specifically,
Article 8, paragraph 3 of the Rome Statute states that “Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e)
shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-establish law and order
in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate
means.”43
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This inclusion reflects an acknowledgement of the concerns raised by states
throughout the course of the negotiations, including the African states that preferred not
to include war crimes allegedly committed in internal conflicts in the Statute because it
would allow for intervention on weak grounds. This inclusion shifts responsibility back
to the government to maintain the state, consistent with the object and purpose of the
bedrock complementarity principle espoused by the Court. That is, the Court is meant to
be a complement to national institutions and may only intervene if a state is unwilling or
unable to do so–a last resort.44
Notwithstanding this, of the seven African states that preferred not to include
internal conflict, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan did sign the Rome Statute, but did
not ratify it. Burundi and Tunisia signed and ratified the Statute. Libya neither signed nor
ratified. This suggests that the compromise solution or the substance of the Statute was
great enough to overcome a delegations’ preference on this particular issue, since 86 per
cent of this group ended up at least signing the Statute. More demonstrably, 29 per cent
of this group exercised a strong commitment to the Court by ratifying the Statute. The
other 71 per cent of African states that preferred not to include internal conflict acted
consistently by not ratifying the Statute, since the final text included internal conflicts
within the war crimes provisions in Article 8.
With respect to the 25 African states that preferred to include war crimes
committed during internal conflicts, Ethiopia, Swaziland, and Togo neither signed nor
ratified the Statute; together, these three comprised 12 per cent of this group of states.
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe demonstrated a low-level of
commitment to the Rome Statute and signed but did not ratify it. The other 18 States did
ultimately ratify the Rome Statute; they comprised 72 per cent of the delegations that
enumerated a preference to include internal conflicts. While 88 per cent of the African
states that preferred to include war crimes committed in internal conflict within the Rome
Statute signed it, 28 per cent of the 88 per cent per cent did not ultimately ratify it.
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It is important to note that the final text of the Rome Statute has been criticized on
the grounds that some war crimes provisions apply to international conflicts yet are
excluded from internal ones. The crimes that apply in international conflicts but not
internal ones include: “launching indiscriminate attacks likely to cause incidental loss of
life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects; widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the environment; attacking undefended places which are not military
objectives; improper use of flags and markings; use of human shields; and the use of
starvation as a method of warfare.”45 Scholars such as Willmott have problematized this,
arguing that “These acts, committed in the course of non-international armed conflict,
cannot be prosecuted by the ICC as war crimes.”46 Dörmann explains this asymmetry as
having two explanations: the first is that some provisions simply do not apply to internal
conflicts. The second is that “several states took the view that these have not yet reached
the status of customary international law and should therefore not be included.”47
The unequal application of crimes in international and internal conflicts may
explain why 20 per cent of the African states that preferred to include war crimes
committed in internal conflict in Statute ultimately decided not to ratify the final text,
notwithstanding their preferred inclusion. Scholars such as Graditzky argue that
“however disappointing the list of the included crimes might seem, the presence of
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provisions relating to non-international armed conflicts is itself one of the greatest
achievements of the Conference.”48 The inclusion of internal conflicts within the war
crimes provisions of the Rome Statute was indeed consistent with the majority preference
of African delegates at the Conference. This is similarly reflected by the strong
ratification rate among states that expressed this preference in the summary records of the
plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole.

6.2

Treaty Crimes: Terrorism and Drug Trafficking

At the Rome Conference there was significant discussion about whether the Court should
cover so-called ‘treaty crimes’ that is, crimes already defined and established by treaties–
especially terrorism and drug trafficking.49 Kirsch and Robinson explained that “whether
to include the drug trafficking or terrorist crimes (referred to in the negotiations as the
‘treaty crimes’) was also hotly debated, as a minority of States pressed keenly for their
inclusion.”50 With respect to African states, nine preferred to include terrorism in the
Statute and five supported the inclusion of drug trafficking.51 This reflects a general lowlevel of regional preference; 19 per cent of African delegations at the Conference pushed
for the inclusion of terrorism; 10 per cent for drug trafficking.
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It is also important to highlight that Namibia enumerated an unspecified
preference to include “some treaty crimes… though definitions were not yet clear
enough.”52 Through a similar lens, Cameroon and the SADC States took a loose position
on the inclusion of treaty crimes, generally understood. For example, the Cameroonian
delegate said that “he had an open mind concerning the other crimes–terrorism, crimes
against United Nations and associated personnel and the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances.”53 The delegate from South Africa said that “[t]he member
States of SADC had a flexible attitude with regard to the inclusion of treaty crimes: drug
crimes and crimes against United Nations personnel represented major challenges that
might usefully be reflected in the Statute.”54 Congo was similarly vague about the
inclusion of treaty crimes. Its delegate said, “[h]e was not opposed to the inclusion of
treaty crimes, since the role of the Court was to ensure legal protection for the
international community.”55 Since Cameroon, Congo, and South Africa (and by
extension, SADC States) were ambiguous with their preferences to include treaty crimes,
these positions are excluded from the analysis on terrorism and drug trafficking. It is
worth noting that the delegate from Tanzania, Mr. Tuvako Manongi, coordinated
consultations on treaty crimes throughout the negotiations.56 This is important because it
demonstrates a high level of engagement within the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the
part of African delegations and African individuals, thus giving the resultant Statute an
inherent African identity.
Algeria took a leading role in the push to include treaty crimes–particularly
terrorism. To illustrate this point, the Algerian delegate said in the meetings of the
Committee of the Whole that:
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terrorism should be within the Court’s jurisdiction. He agreed with the
representative from Norway that it was a matter of great concern to the
international community, as reflected in the large number of international
instruments that had been prepared in order to deal with the various aspects of the
phenomenon and in the efforts of States to explore other ways and means of
strengthening their cooperation in order to end those acts… With regard to illicit
drug trafficking, the idea of creating the Court had been revived as the result of a
desire to bring the authors of those crimes to justice. Illicit drug trafficking should
be included in the competence of the Court.57
With respect to drug trafficking, the delegate from Algeria referred to the push for the
establishment of an ICC by Trinidad and Tobago in 1989, which reignited the stagnant
project and ultimately resulted in the Diplomatic Conference nine years later.58 Regarding
terrorism, Algeria referenced its preference to include it within the Statute four times in
the summary records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the
Whole.59 Algeria advanced the position that terrorism and drug trafficking were
important and serious crimes that threaten international peace and security. It proposed
that the Court’s credibility would be strengthened by including treaty crimes and pushed
for this outcome throughout the course of the negotiations. It is especially important to
emphasize that Algeria has dealt with terrorism throughout much of its history, but was
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experiencing particularly serious violence in the historical moment leading up to the
Rome Conference. According to Anneli Botha,
the period between 1995 and 1998 could probably be described as a black period
in Algeria’s history, categorized inter alia by collective massacres directed at
rural and isolated communities. According to eyewitness reports, terrorist
elements responsible for the massacre in Bentalha (Baraki), south of Algiers, on
22 and 23 September 1997 had a list of primary targets. This was an action that
confirmed that these attacks were intended to terrorise and punish the population
hostile to them, or those who formerly supported them but who had since
withdrawn their support, or relatives and current supporters of rival armed
groups.60
This domestic experience likely contributed to Algeria’s desire to include treaty crimes,
especially terrorism, within the Court’s mandate. This is another example of how
domestic experience shaped national preference at the Rome Conference and informed a
states’ idealized vision of the Court.
However, low-level regional support for the inclusion of treaty crimes was made
especially clear since 12 African states expressly preferred not to include treaty crimes,
either terrorism or drug trafficking, which suggests a split on this issue.61 Some of these
states took a sympathetic position, while maintaining that treaty crimes should not be
included. Senegal, for example, “[a]greed that terrorism, crimes against United Nations
personnel and drug trafficking were important and serious, but thought that they should
not be within the Court’s jurisdiction.”62 The delegate from Sierra Leone said that “while
appreciating the seriousness of the treaty crimes and their adverse effect on society, his
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delegation thought that those offences should not be included at the current stage.”63
These positions were a natural consequence of the difficulty in reaching consensus on
this issue within the time constraints of the Conference.
The delegate from Nigeria raised a different issue and said that “though he
sympathized with the desire to include treaty crimes, the list proposed was selective.
Treaty crimes should be left to national courts.”64 This position highlights the selectivity
involved with narrowing in on drug trafficking, terrorism, and less frequently, crimes
against UN personnel, while omitting other serious crimes. The problem with the scope
of crimes was addressed by the Libyan delegate when he said,
moreover, it was not acceptable that the Court’s jurisdiction should be confined to
matters of interest to some States while ignoring different issues of concern to
others. In addition to so-called aggression and so-called terrorism, the Court
might deal with drug trafficking, insults to religion, violation of humanitarian
values, forbidding of religious rites, white slavery, organized crime, involvement
of children in war, violence and prostitution, economic and financial crimes,
aggression against the environment and other threats.65
This supports the inclusion of some crimes while approaching others with a degree of
condescension. Moreover, it reflects a detailed list of crimes (drug trafficking, insults to
religion, violation of humanitarian values, forbidding of religious rites, white slavery,
organized crime, involvement of children in war, violence and prostitution, economic and
financial crimes, aggression against the environment), some of which were ultimately
included in the Statute.66 Along the same mixed preference pattern, Côte d’Ivoire
supported the inclusion of treaty crimes, with the exception of drug trafficking, and
“urged the inclusion of crimes against United Nations and associated personnel within the
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competence of the Court.”67 It is interesting to note that both Burundi and Libya
expressly posited that economic embargoes should have been included as a crime covered
by the Statute.68 Madagascar preferred that the Court cover “trafficking in narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, the deposit of toxic or nuclear waste within the territory of a
State, and the sale of arms or munitions to Governments not recognized by the
international community or to military leaders, except in cases authorized under
international law.”69 It is also worth noting that Comoros and Madagascar submitted a
proposal to include the crime of “mercenarism” in the Statute.70 This demonstrates the
diversity in preferences with respect to what crimes should be included in the Statute on
the part of several African states, beyond the focused consideration of terrorism and drug
trafficking, in many cases based on country-specific and regional experiences.
Alternatively, Ghana considered that the inclusion of treaty crimes would
complicate the relationship between the Court and national judicial institutions.
Specifically, the delegate from Ghana said that “[t]he inclusion of the treaty crimes,
particularly terrorism and drug trafficking, would only heighten national sensitivities, and
would therefore not be conducive to the desired cooperation envisaged for their effective
prosecution.”71 This position emphasizes the importance of constructing an institution
with the greatest potential to work cooperatively with domestic courts. This is in keeping
with the principle of complementarity, which is a cornerstone of the Court’s structure.
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Further complicating the notion of consensus among African delegations,
Cameroon and South Africa took a flexible approach to the inclusion of treaty crimes.
While these States were not against including them, they did not indicate any meaningful
degree of support or focus on this issue. Lesotho was also sympathetic and proposed that
treaty crimes could be included in the Statute at a later stage. The delegate explained that
this position was a result of “the controversy that still surrounded questions of definition
and scope, as well as time constraints.”72 These concerns were further addressed by the
delegate from Mali, who said that “it would be premature to include treaty crimes in the
Statute, which should be referred to a review conference.”73 Similarly, Benin said that
“the consideration of the other treaty crimes should continue in the Preparatory
Commission, with a view to their inclusion at a later stage.”74 Ultimately, the majority of
African states that took a position on the inclusion of treaty crimes within the Statute
either preferred not to include them in the Statute, or else had no substantive preference
either way.
The final text of the Rome Statute does not include treaty crimes. Kirsch and
Robinson explained that “the majority regarded these crimes as crimes of a
fundamentally different character than the ‘core crimes,’ and feared that they might
overburden the Court.”75 However, the Final Act of the Conference recommended that a
future review conference reopen the idea of adding terrorism and drug trafficking to the
Statute. Specifically, Annex I(E) states:
Having adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Recognizing that terrorist acts, by whomever and wherever perpetrated and
whatever their forms, methods or motives, are serious crimes of concern to the
international community,
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Recognizing that the international trafficking of illicit drugs is a very serious
crime, sometimes destabilizing the political and social and economic order in
States,
Regretting that no generally acceptable definition of the crimes of terrorism and
drug crimes could be agreed upon for the inclusion, within the jurisdiction of the
Court,
Affirming that the Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for a
review mechanism, which allows for an expansion in future of the jurisdiction of
the Court,
Recommends that a Review Conference pursuant to article 123 of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court consider the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes
with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition in their inclusion in the list of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.76
This suggests that the importance of treaty crimes to some states was significant
enough for the Final Act to recommend reconsideration at a later date, even if the
majority of states (including most in Africa) did not approach this issue with the highest
priority. There is a certain irony in the fact that the ICC project was reinvigorated by a
State that wanted to address drug trafficking, yet the resultant Court does not address
such crimes. This speaks to the evolution of international criminal law, which was
informed by the mass and widespread atrocities in the Second World War, the former
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. These modalities of crime overshadow acts such as drug
trafficking, which have a traditional conceptualization as occurring during times of war
and peace and fall under the jurisdiction of domestic courts.77 The threshold of the Rome
Statute requires the Court have “jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to
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the international community as a whole.”78 Although seemingly peculiar to compare acts
of genocide to drug trafficking, for example, it is important to consider that the latter may
severely complicate international and domestic relations in some situations. In addition,
such acts may undergird an organized criminal network which facilitates the perpetration
of the core crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. The
effective prosecution of such crimes may have a deterrent or preventative effect on the
perpetration of the core crimes.
Nine African states wanted to include acts of terrorism in the Rome Statute:
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Tunisia.
Six African states wanted to see drug trafficking within the Court’s jurisdiction, namely:
Algeria, Botswana, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, and Tunisia. Namibia suggested that
some treaty crimes should be included in the Statute, without specificity. Thus, the
preferences of these states were not reflected in the Statute on this issue. Of the African
states that preferred the inclusion of treaty crimes, four did not ratify the Rome Statute:
Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya. This suggests that 67 per cent of the African states
that preferred to include treaty crimes (either terrorism, drug trafficking, or both)
ultimately went on to ratify the Statute even though this was not included the final text.
This may be explained by the recommendation in the Final Act of the Conference to
consider the inclusion of these crimes at a later date. The implication of this is that the
inclusion of treaty crimes did not fundamentally influence accession to the Statute in the
African context, since most of the states that wanted them to be included went on to ratify
the Statute anyway.
Of the 14 African states that took a flexible position or expressly rejected the
inclusion of treaty crimes, 10 went on to ratify the Rome Statute.79 Cameroon, Libya,
Morocco, and Togo did not accede to the Statute, although Cameroon and Morocco did
sign it. Nevertheless, diplomatic negotiation efforts the part of many African states with
respect to the inclusion of treaty crimes within the Statute demonstrate how national
experience shaped preferences. This is most strongly demonstrated by states that
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preferred to include crimes which were not even “on the table” such as Comoros and
Madagascar, with the joint proposal to include so-called “mercenarism.” Similarly,
Algeria’s preference to include terrorism within the list of crimes covered by the Statute
can be directly tied to its own experience with such crimes. These two examples
demonstrate that domestic experience shaped the preferences of some African states at
the Rome Conference with respect to the crimes included in the Statute.

6.3

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Falling under the war crimes heading, provisions relating to the prohibition of weapons
were highly contested at the Conference. According to von Hebel and Robinson,
“particularly controversial was the inclusion or non-inclusion of nuclear weapons… The
inclusion of nuclear weapons was strongly supported by Arab countries, India, Pakistan
and countries in the Pacific region, and also had support from several African, Asian and
Latin American countries.”80 Kirsch and Robinson explain the division on this issue as
related to the fact that some delegations felt it was unreasonable to omit nuclear weapons
while at the same time including lesser weapons on a prohibited list. Others, however,
“argued that including nuclear weapons would be creating new law, since fifty years of
negotiations had produced neither a conventional nor a customary prohibition on the use
of nuclear weapons. Moreover, these delegations believed that to use the Statute to
attempt to achieve a ban, where fifty years of disarmament negotiations had not, would
be fatal for the creation of the Court.”81 It is useful to understand African support and/or
opinion on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Rome Statute, to better grasp the
conceptualization of the Court by African delegations in Rome.
To this end, based on the summary records of the plenary meetings and meetings
of the Committee of the Whole, 18 African states, comprising 38 per cent of the African
delegates in attendance at the Conference spoke to the issue of including nuclear weapons
on a prohibited list. Of them, 17 states preferred to expressly criminalize the use of
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nuclear weapons; seven belonged to the SADC and four were Arab States.82 Only one
African state, Guinea, opined that nuclear weapons should not be included on the list of
prohibited weapons.
In line with the explanation provided by Kirsch and Robinson, the delegate from
Guinea said that “it would be premature to include nuclear weapons… as there was no
treaty banning them.”83 In light of this explanation, it can be inferred that the delegate
from Guinea acknowledged that this particular issue had been and remained legally and
politically challenging. This position highlights the direct impact(s) that a nuclear weapon
prohibition could have not only on the success of the Conference, but the Court’s efficacy
if it were to be included in the Statute and the Court came to be. Since nuclear weapons
were ultimately not included in the final text of the Rome Statute, Guinea was the only
African state that had its preferred outcome reflected in the Statute. It is worth noting that
Guinea did ultimately ratify the Rome Statute.
It is worth noting that the other 17 African states that addressed the question of
nuclear weapons supported their inclusion on the prohibited list of weapons; these
comprised the majority African position on this issue. In keeping with the explanation
provided by Kirsch and Robinson, the delegate from Libya said that “his delegation also
found it contradictory to regard the use of certain types of weapons as a crime but not the
use of the most destructive and dangerous weapons of all.”84 This suggests that a list of
prohibited weapons ought to include the most serious types, most of all nuclear weapons.
Other African states believed that the drafting of the Rome Statute provided an
opportunity to develop law on nuclear weapons, rather than avoid the issue. For example,
Namibia said the inclusion of nuclear weapons, “would allow the addition of weapons as
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yet undeveloped.”85 This sentiment was echoed by the delegate from Benin when he said
that “nuclear weapons should have been outlawed once and for all. He had not gained
satisfaction on these points, but nevertheless welcomed the considerable progress
achieved.”86 While Benin supported the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the prohibited
list, it can be inferred that the overall contribution of the Statute outweighed this
particular disappointment. In this sense, it is clear that several African states saw the
Conference and the Court as an opportunity to develop the law on nuclear weapons and
contribute to the resolution of a complex international political debate muddied by the
interdependent relationship between hard power and global ordering principles. This was
extremely important for those African governments that viewed the ICC and the Rome
Diplomatic Conference as an opportunity to restructure the political hierarchy, or at least
begin to level the political playing field between and among states.
SADC States Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania,
and Zimbabwe each expressly endorsed the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the
prohibited list. The SADC Negotiating Principles did not specifically address this issue,
though it can be inferred from the summary records of the meetings of the Committee of
the Whole that this was a uniform position and negotiation strategy. The South African
delegate addressed this point when he “drew attention to matters of concern to his
delegation and to some extent to the Southern African Development Community…
Nuclear weapons and other weapons causing indiscriminate injury or suffering should be
included.”87 As such, it is understood that the SADC States preferred to include nuclear
weapons on the prohibited list.
The Rome Statute does not reflect this vision and failed to satisfy the majority of
African states on this issue. For example, Ghana was particularly disappointed with the
exclusion of nuclear weapons from the prohibited list. This was made clear when its
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delegate said, “as for nuclear weapons, their exclusion from the list of prohibited
weapons rendered that list well-nigh meaningless.”88 Ghana was not alone in its
dissatisfaction. Egypt was also especially displeased with the exclusion of nuclear
weapons from the prohibited list. This was made clear when its delegate said,
with regard to section B, subparagraph (o) [on prohibited weapons], he was
disappointed to note that the Bureau proposal offered only one option, which was
supported by nuclear States but which was totally unacceptable to his delegation
because it made no reference to nuclear weapons. If the International Criminal
Court was to be an international rather than a European body, a text acceptable to
all must be found.89
These comments demonstrate the depth of disapproval felt by Egypt with respect to the
absence of nuclear weapons on the prohibited list at the end stages of the Conference.
This interjection suggests there was a racial, if not colonial, realpolitik explanation for
the negotiation outcome on this issue, which was strongly opposed by Egypt and others.
To be sure, at the end of the Conference, the issue of nuclear weapons remained
focal. In response to the final package presented by the Bureau of the Committee of the
Whole, India interjected and proposed two amendments (one dealing with war crimes and
one dealing with the role of the Security Council). With respect to the relevant
amendment on war crimes, the delegate from India
drew attention to document A/CONF.183/C.1/L.94, which contained amendments
proposed by his delegation to article 8 concerning war crimes… The effect of
these amendments would be to include weapons of mass destruction, i.e.
nuclear… among the weapons whose use would constitute a war crime. The
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absence of any mention of such weapons in the draft represented a retrograde
step.90
However, the delegate from Norway proposed a motion that no action be taken on the
proposals submitted by India. This was recommended since the final text reflected
a compromise formula designed to achieve broad support and reflecting as far as
possible a consensus approach. A package, almost by definition, would contain
elements which displeased some delegations. It was essential to maintain the
integrity of the package offered in order to avoid destroying the balance achieved
with such difficulty and making it impossible to achieve the ultimate goal of an
independent, effective and credible international court.91
It is interesting to note that Malawi and the majority of SADC states supported the
Norwegian proposal. The Malawian delegate said that, “while he appreciated the
rationale behind the Indian proposals, he considered that the issues they raised had
already been fully discussed, and therefore supported the Norwegian proposal. The
delegations of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland,
Zambia and Zimbabwe associated themselves with his delegation’s view.”92 This
suggests that Namibia and Tanzania were the only SADC States that expressly preferred
to include nuclear weapons in the Statute, and did not clearly endorse the rejection of
India’s proposal to prohibit them at the final moment of the Conference. Lesotho,
Swaziland, and Zambia did not take an express position on this particular issue in the
plenary meetings or meetings of the Committee of the Whole. Nevertheless, this implies
a degree of acceptance of the decision to exclude nuclear weapons from the final text of
the Statute on behalf of these African states. Ultimately, of the 17 African States that
expressly preferred to prohibit nuclear weapons, 53 per cent went on to ratify the Rome
Statute. This constitutes a slim majority, particularly when compared to the other
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provisions considered in this analysis.93 This suggests that this issue was important and
the decision not to prohibit nuclear weapons could indeed explain accession depression
among this group of states.94 Least of all, it is important to acknowledge that the
prohibition of nuclear weapons only applies to states that have nuclear weapons. This
issue is and was fundamentally political and interlinked with conceptions of hard power,
which subsequently reinforce(d) the existing global order.

6.4

Concluding Remarks about African Diplomacy at the
Rome Conference

It is apparent that African delegations contributed meaningfully at the Rome Conference,
as states and as part of coalitions and regional blocs. On balance, African states took part
in the negotiations with the view to push back against traditionally powerful states. To
illustrate this point, the delegate from Malawi “appealed to delegations to make an effort
to achieve compromises. It was unhelpful for powerful countries to attempt to force their
point of view on the rest by threatening not to sign the Statute.”95 It is clear that many
African delegations approached the Rome Conference with the attitude that compromises
would be required in order to ensure success, which was a better alternative than outright
failure. Balancing the interests of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council
with those of low and middle power states demanded strategic compromise. The salience
of the need for compromise was most apparent with respect to the Court’s relationship to
the Security Council and the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the prohibited list–i.e. the
elements of the Statute that directly impact traditionally powerful states. Notwithstanding
this, as Otto Triffterer pointedly explained,
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the only alternative to the establishment of a permanent ICC by the Rome Statute
would have been the failure of the Conference, in spite of decades of
comprehensive preparations, endeavours and various proposals. A compromise,
therefore, was required in many cases … Closing the Conference without the
adoption of a Statute for the ICC would have delayed the whole idea for decades,
if not destroyed it altogether.96
African states compromised during the Rome Conference and afterward, by committing
to the Rome Statute by signing and/or ratifying it, illustrated by Figure 6-1.
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Figure 6-1

Compromises made by African states and their affect
on Rome Statute ratification
12

Prohibition of nuclear weapons
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0

Universal jursdiction
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43

25
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5

Independence from UNSC
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Limited UNSC referrals: aggression only

67

0
14
14

No veto for UNSC
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80
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Figure 6-1 illustrates general trends about the African states that wanted a different kind
of Court, feature by feature. It is apparent that for the most part, compromise was
achieved, and African states were willing to commit to the Rome Statute, even to the
strongest degree in the form of ratification. In three instances the majority of African
states that wanted a different kind of Court did not end up ratifying the Rome Statute:
those that preferred consent-based jurisdiction, those that preferred that the United
Nations Security Council be able to refer only acts of aggression to the Court, and those
that preferred not to include war crimes committed in internal armed conflict. In many
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cases, the same states preferred a different kind of Court– on the balance, the cumulative
compromise may have been too great.97
In the end, African states compromised to ensure the success of the Rome
Conference and committed to the Rome Statute by signing and ratifying it more than
states from any other region. No African state was completely satisfied by the final text
of the Statute. To reconcile this problem, some delegations viewed the Statute as
evolutionary, which could be improved upon by future generations. To illustrate this
point, the delegate from Botswana said that
although imperfect, the Statute of the International Criminal Court clearly
expressed common values of justice, governing how the human race wanted to
live in the future. He had supported the adoption of the Statute because it reflected
the consensus of humanity as represented at the Conference. Generations to come
should be able to perfect the Statute, and he urged those who felt that the
document fell short of their expectations to reflect further and resolve to improve
it during the review process.98
General statements were offered at the end of the Conference by several African states:
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Egypt, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. It is important to identify that
Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan are members of the Group of Arab States, and Sudan’s
comments were made on its behalf. General themes of disappointment emerged
throughout the statements of Egypt and Sudan, namely: the inclusion of aggression
without definition or substance; the absence of nuclear weapons from the list of
prohibited weapons enumerated in the Statute; disappointment with the ability of the
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Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio motu; the inability of states to issue
reservations; and a role for the General Assembly over and above the Security Council.99
Algeria’s comments were far more general and convey a degree of disappointment
balanced with positivity. Specifically, it said that “Algeria [had] always longed for such a
Court, and had always been committed to its achievement. Algeria had given a great deal
without achieving all that it had wanted. It had some fears and regrets. It hoped the
signing of the text would augur well for the future.”100 This statement made clear that
Algeria compromised a great deal and was not fully satisfied by the final text.
Nevertheless, it preserved optimism about the long-term success of the Court and its
commitment to the same.
In the African context, the division between the Group of Arab States and the rest
of Africa is quite apparent when approaching the difficult components of the Statute
issue-by-issue, or when viewing the Statute in its entirety. It also apparent when
considering a state’s overall attitude towards the Court. For example, Sierra Leone
expressed that it was pleased that the Court preserved jurisdiction over internal armed
conflict– a logical satisfaction based on its country-specific involvement on that
particular issue. It was also pleased that the Prosecutor was given proprio motu
powers.101 Botswana reiterated the point that the Statute was an important historical
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landmark and that future generations could improve upon it.102 Benin identified some
pointed concerns. More specifically, it identified the importance of the Statute to Africa
in general, while highlighting that “[t]he text adopted was not a perfect one. Benin was
not entirely satisfied with the provisions on war crimes. It was also concerned about the
role given to the Security Council under the Statute” and questioned whether it was fair
“that the Council should be able to block investigations of the Court. Benin would have
preferred that nuclear weapons were formally banned by its inclusion in war crimes
provisions of the Statute. Benin hoped all would work together for the effective
implementation of the Statute.”103 This statement fused the concerns raised by some of
the Arab States with general concerns about balancing its interests with those of nuclear
or else P5 states in a multilateral negotiation process. However, Benin erred on the side
of positivity, stressing the importance of cooperation in order to effectively implement
the Statute.
The outcome of the Conference from an African perspective was explained by
Sivu Maqungo, delegate for South Africa and Rome Statute Drafting Committee
member:
as expected, reservations from some African States on the fact that the crime of
aggression was not included to their satisfaction were voiced, the absence of
nuclear weapons in the list of weapons whose use in armed conflict is prohibited
was also vented as a major concern. Moreover, the issue of inclusion of internal
armed conflict within the Statute was a point of dissatisfaction from other African
States. However, after much deliberation and due to the overwhelming vociferous
support for the package deal by, notably, Francophone and Anglophone African
States the retractors yielded to the wishes of the majority and thus Africa decided
that, with all its deficiencies, the package by the Bureau was an acceptable
deal.104
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This pitted African-Arab States against the rest of ‘Africa’ to some degree. It also
suggests that the majority African position was one of support for the final package and
for the establishment of the ICC. On the whole, African States accepted the final text of
the Statute and were willing to commit to it– Senegal being the first State to ratify the
Rome Statute on 2 February 1999. Nevertheless, general trends suggest that Arab-African
States were less likely to ratify the Statute, since 67 per cent of the African members of
the Group of Arab States still had not ratified the Rome Statute at the time of writing.
Notwithstanding this, Comoros, Djibouti, and Tunisia are Arab-African States that had
ratified the Rome Statute. The majority of this Group had signed, but not ratified the
Statute, including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan, demonstrating a loose level of
commitment to it. Libya and Mauritania had neither signed nor ratified the Statute. In
many respects, the compromises reached in the final text of the Rome Statute can be
understood as too great to satisfy the preferences of Arab-African States and others
throughout the region, more generally.
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Chapter 7

7

African Commitment to the Rome Statute1

The aims and normative goals of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) can
only be achieved by the adoption of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.2 In order to be truly effective, states must sign, ratify,
and implement the Statute. As an international institution, the ICC cannot oblige states to
commit to the Rome Statute. It necessarily relies on state cooperation and consent in the
form of accession to be effective, which requires a mitigation of sovereignty. States must
meaningfully contribute to the evolution of the international criminal justice norm by
committing to its tangible application and establishing binding principles of international
law. Importantly, the Rome Statute requires that States Parties implement its contents into
domestic legislation, under the auspice of complementarity–i.e. the ICC is to be
complementary to national jurisdictions and can only intervene when a state is unwilling
or unable to do so.3 Commitment to the goals of the ICC and its normative
underpinnings, generally framed, can be positioned on an ideational spectrum ranging
from none (no signature or ratification), weak (signature only), strong (signature and
ratification), and strongest (signature, ratification, and implementation in domestic
legislation).
The willingness of states to establish binding principles of international criminal
law with reference to the Rome Statute has been mixed. This uneven landscape troubles
the predictability of the ICC and has contributed to substantive criticism in its nascency.
In this frame, African states have ratified the Rome Statute more than any other region.
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An earlier version of this chapter was published as Sarah Nimigan, “Africa and the International Criminal
Court: (Re)constructing the Narrative,” International Criminal Law Review 21.2 (2021): 203-241.
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (17 July 1998), A/CONF.183/9 (hereafter Rome Statute
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Statute are already covered by universal jurisdiction and customary law. See, for example, Xavier Philippe,
“The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the two principles intermesh?”
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At the time of writing, 33 African states were States Parties to the Statute.4 This might be
compared to other geographic regions as categorized by the Assembly of States Parties to
the Rome Statute: 19 States Parties come from Asia-Pacific States; 18 from Eastern
Europe; 28 from Latin America and Caribbean States; and 25 from Western European
and Other States.5 It is also important to acknowledge that South Africa was the first
African State to develop implementation legislation in the form of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court Act, 2002, which served as a regional example for
African States domesticating the Rome Statute.6 An overview of African commitment to
the Rome Statute is illustrated in Table 7-1.

Table 7-1: African Commitment to the Rome Statute
Country
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo/Cape Verde
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d’Ivoire
Djibouti

4

Signed Rome
Statute
X
X
X
X
X

Ratified Rome
Statute

Domestic
Legislation

X
X
X

X
Draft Law
X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Draft Law
X
X
X

This includes the following states (listed in order of ratification): Senegal; Ghana; Mali; Lesotho;
Botswana; Sierra Leone; Gabon; South Africa; Nigeria; Central African Republic; Benin; Mauritius;
Democratic Republic of the Congo; Niger; Uganda; Namibia; Gambia; Tanzania; Malawi; Djibouti;
Zambia; Guinea; Burkina Faso; Congo; Liberia; Kenya; Comoros; Chad; Madagascar; Seychelles; Tunisia;
Cabo Verde; Côte d’Ivoire.
5
Assembly of States Parties, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, available at asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.as
px, accessed 5 May 2020.
6
The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC Act 27 of 2002, 16 August 2002. See also Max du
Plessis, “South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute: An African Example,” Journal of International
Criminal Justice 5.2 (2007): 460-479.
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The importance of Table 7-1 is that 47 per cent of all African States have signed,
ratified, and taken steps to implement the Rome Statute domestically and 62 per cent
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have signed and ratified it. The decision to ratify the Rome Statute by the majority of
African States is especially important, since a disproportionate amount of violence and
widespread human rights violations plague the continent and the likelihood of ICC
intervention in African contexts was (and remains) comparatively high. The behaviour
and decision-making of African states in deciding to ratify the Statute and be bound to
the institutional canon of the ICC can best be explained using two international relations
(IR) theories: rational choice and constructivism. This work analyzes patterns of
behaviour related to Rome Statute commitment in Africa, against the backdrop of the
overall regional commitment to international criminal justice norms that undergird it.
The choice of states to join the ICC is far more than symbolic; it carries
obligations that affect the domestic, regional, and international political and legal
landscape to varying but interrelated degrees. The overall conclusion is that using a
rational choice lens provides an incomplete view as to why African states have
committed to the Rome Statute. Similarly, norms shape national preferences to varying
degrees, but the dynamization of interests collectively and individually must be
accounted for, beyond a valuation of moral imperative. Thus, the influence of
international criminal justice norms in shaping African preferences, coupled with
complex and dynamic domestic political factors yields the most holistic explanatory
approach. This rationalist-constructivist approach provides a strong foundation for
explaining state behaviour in this context.7

7

This work employs the approach advocated by Abbott and Snidal to the multidisciplinary study of IR-IL.
See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the Next
Generation of IR-IL Scholars,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International
Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3356, at 52: “It is likewise essential to draw on the range of theoretical perspectives within each discipline,
both for explanatory analysis and for international legal design. Law and legalization involve values and
interests; they operate through instrumental and normative channels; they involve power as well as rational
design; they are shaped by and shape the behavior of private acts as well as states.” See also Martha
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International
Organization 52.4 (1998): 888. The authors say that “Rationality cannot be separated from any politically
significant episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative context conditions
any episode of rational choice.”
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7.1

General Remarks About Rome Statute Ratification
Processes

The Rome Statute was open for signature following the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(Rome Conference) on 17 July 1998. It entered into force four years later, in July 2002,
once it was ratified by 60 States. Formally, a state must issue a deposit of its instrument
of ratification of the Rome Statute to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order
to become a States Party.8 Fourteen African states were among the first sixty to ratify the
Statute, as illustrated in Table 7-2. It is worth noting that Senegal was the first state to
ratify. These African States contributed substantially to the necessary ratifications
required for the Rome Statute to enter into force and the ICC to become a reality by
effectively committing to the Court’s overall utility and normative value by legalizing the
Statute.9
Table 7-2: African States Among the First Sixty Rome Statute Ratifications
Date of Ratification
02 February 1999
20 December 1999
16 August 2000
06 September 2000
08 September 2000
15 September 2000
20 September 2000
27 November 2000
27 September 2001
03 October 2001
22 January 2002
05 March 2002
11 April 2002
11 April 2002

8

State
Senegal
Ghana
Mali
Lesotho
Botswana
Sierra Leone
Gabon
South Africa
Nigeria
Central African Republic
Benin
Mauritius
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Niger

The Rome Statute, Art. 125.
See Table 1. Note that Burundi was the 26th African State to ratify the Rome Statute on 1 December 2004.
It issued a deposit of withdrawal to the United Nations Secretary General on 27 October 2016 and the
withdrawal took effect one year later on 27 October 2017, in accordance with Art. 127(1) of the Rome
Statute.

9
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7.2

Explaining African commitment to the ICC using
international relations theory

A robust literature seeks to explain state behaviour with respect to commitment to
international institutions, including courts and tribunals, and even the ICC, largely with a
specific focus on powerful states.10 The aim of this analysis is to build upon this work
and expand the theoretical application of major international relations theories to explain
the behaviour of weak states, particularly African states, and the pronounced regional
commitment to the Rome Statute in the form of ratification and implementation.

7.3

Rational Choice

A rational choice theoretical approach presumes that a state will act rationally to
maximize its interests, which is situated within the broader prism of the interests of other
states and the distribution of power in the international system.11 While it is true that
individuals negotiated the Rome Statute, its obligations are placed upon states and thus,

10

See John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19.3
(1994): 5-49; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006). See also David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a
World of Power Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For a neoliberal account, see Kenneth
W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 42.1 (1998): 3-32. The sum of these parts is the basic presumption that powerful states
preserve control over international institutions, since they are merely a reflection of existing power
structures and realities. For a general theoretical understanding of legalization and world politics, See
Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal,
“The Concept of Legalization,” International Organization 54.3 (2000): 401-419. Note that the use of
rational choice methodologies makes good sense when explaining the actions of powerful states. For
example, the United States made clear that the costs of ratifying the Rome Statute outweighed the benefits.
Since the United States disproportionately intervenes in international conflict(s), the risks of soldiers being
exposed to Court prosecution was not acceptable to the Bush administration, or any administration
thereafter. US hostility towards the ICC was made especially clear by the Trump administration, and more
particularly by John Bolton, who openly discredited and opposed the ICC in the context of a possible
investigation into grave crimes committed in Afghanistan. Bolton threatened sanctions against the ICC and
its staff and said, “We will not cooperate with the ICC… for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already
dead to us.” See “John Bolton threatens ICC with US sanctions,” BBC News, 11 September 2018, available
at www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45474864; accessed 10 May 2020.
11
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, 3.
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the state remains focal point of analysis under a rational choice model. In other words,
the state is a unitary, rational actor, that follows a rationalist ‘logic of consequences.’
According to Goldsmith and Posner, “a state… can make coherent decisions based upon
identifiable preferences, or interests, and it is natural and common to explain state action
on the international plane in terms of the primary goal or goals the state seeks to
achieve.”12 In this vein, it can be presumed that African delegations at the Diplomatic
Conference negotiating the establishment of an ICC constructed preferences either in
advance of the Conference, or throughout, based on domestic and/or regional goals. This
is particularly likely given the strong regional commitment to the ICC project– most
notably by the South African Development Community (SADC) and more generally at
the African Conference in Dakar leading up to the negotiations in Rome.13 It is also
important to note that African civil society organizations were heavily involved in the
creation of the ICC and several joined the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
(CICC), putting exogenous pressure on states to commit to the Rome Statute.14 From an
intergovernmental standpoint, the African Union (Organization of African Unity at the
time) supported the establishment of the ICC and encouraged its members to join the
Rome Statute.15

12

Ibid., 6.
Note that SADC states met as early as 1994 to discuss the ICC project and to coordinate a regional
negotiation strategy for its establishment. The Dakar Declaration was the result of the African Conference,
which provided a general regional position heading into the negotiations in 1998.
14
Phakiso Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” in African Perspectives on
International Criminal Justice, eds. Evelyn A. Ankumah and Edward K. Kwakwa (Accra: Africa Legal
Aid, 2005), 248. Note that non-governmental organizations based in Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda,
Rwanda, and Ethiopia (among others) joined the CICC and lobbied for the establishment of an ICC.
15
See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Official Records, Summary of the plenary meetings, 6th plenary meeting, 17 June 1998
(A/CONF.183/SR.6), 104, para. 116. At the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1998), the observer for the
Organization of African Unity said that “Africa had a particular interest in the establishment of the Court,
since its peoples had been the victims of large-scale violations of human rights over the centuries: slavery,
wars of colonial conquest and continued acts of war and violence, even in the post-colonial era. The recent
genocide in Rwanda was a tragic reminder that such atrocities were not yet over, but had strengthened
OAU’s determination to support the creation of a permanent, independent court to punish the perpetrators
of such acts.” See also Hassan Jallow and Fatou Bensouda, “International criminal law in an African
context,” in African Guide to International Criminal Justice, ed. Max du Plessis (Institute for Security
Studies, 2008), 42. The authors said that “At a meeting on 27 February 1998, the council of ministers of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union) took note of the Dakar declaration and called
13
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Analogously, using a rational choice model, Goldsmith and Posner posit that most
states ratify multilateral human rights treaties due to a ‘coincidence of interest.’ Namely,
the authors argue that human rights treaties “often requires many of the parties to do
nothing different from what they have done in the past.”16 In the context of the ICC, this
rationale has a particular relevance to democracies with robust judicial institutions, since
the ICC cannot intervene if a national system has initiated genuine proceedings.17
On the other hand, this is often untrue in African contexts. It is relatively
uncontroversial to contend that extensive human rights abuses amounting to the threshold
of the crimes contained in the Rome Statute still occur throughout the African continent
and this was similarly true during the period of African Rome Statute ratification (19992013). In this respect, ratification of the Rome Statute would in many cases contradict the
coincidence of interest argument, especially with respect to African states experiencing
ongoing conflict and/or widespread and systematic human rights abuses. From a rational
choice perspective, it seems plausible and quite likely that many African delegates in
attendance at the Rome Conference considered that the Court they were negotiating had
potential domestic relevance, or else direct application. This is especially true in states
run by dictators, despots, autocrats, or other oppressive or corrupt leadership models. To
cede sovereignty by signing and ratifying the Statute would risk the possibility of
bringing ICC prosecutions into the domestic fold. As Deitelhoff argues, “[p]lagued by
military uprisings and failing state structures, these [developing] countries could
realistically expect their heads of state to be summoned before the court, so they had to

on all OAU member states to support the creation of the ICC. This resolution was later adopted by the
OAU summit of heads of state and government in Burkina Faso in June 1998.”
16
Ibid., 89. See also Oona A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 51.4 (2007): 588-621. The overall argument made by Hathaway is that treaty
ratification can best be explained by considering the domestic constraints it places on states. The less the
obligation on states, the more likely the probability of ratification. See Hathaway, “Why Do Countries
Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” 588: “states with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to
commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records because there is little prospect that
the treaties will be enforced. Conversely, states with more democratic institutions will be less likely to
commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records – precisely because treaties are
likely to lead to changes in behavior.”
17
The Rome Statute, Art. 17.
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expect the highest costs.”18 This is relevant to African states with ostensibly weak
domestic judicial systems, which trouble the complementarity principle since such states
would most often be unwilling and/or unable to investigate and prosecute the most
serious international crimes.
Some potential benefits of committing to the Rome Statute are considered in the
literature. For example, it may be the case that “Poorer states might have seen the Rome
Statute as a key to unlock greater flows of official development assistance (ODA), even
while intellectuals and governmental advisers in the Global South might have seen the
ICC’s mandate as an extension of the West’s neocolonial projects.”19 This assumption
has been empirically challenged in the context of human rights treaty ratification.
Specifically, Nielsen and Simmons concluded that there is “practically no support for the
idea that treaty ratification produces significant increases in aid.”20 Thus, relying on the
human rights experience, it is unlikely that African states assumed Rome Statute
ratification would result in increased aid, since similar actions have not yielded this result
in the past. At the very least, there would be no guarantee that ratification of the Rome
Statute would have a direct correlation to increases in development assistance or aid. This
uncertainty would tip the scales in any rational cost-benefit analysis, since accession to
the Rome Statute carries significant sovereignty costs.
Nevertheless, some behaviour might indicate a form of ‘soft coercion’ on the part
of the European Union (EU) to increase ratification of the Rome Statute in African States
in exchange for development aid. Specifically, the EU highlighted the importance of
ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement on
development assistance. The agreement regulates cooperation between the EU and
African, Caribbean, and Pacific states on political, commercial, cooperation and

18

Nicole Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC
Case,” International Organization 63.1 (2009): 42.
19
Sandeep Prasanna, “Did some African states ratify the Rome Statute to marginalize political
competitors?” ICC Forum available at iccforum.com/forum/permalink/91/1198; accessed 10 May 2020.
20
Richard A. Nielsen and Beth A. Simmons, “Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the
International Human Rights Regime?” International Studies Quarterly 59.2 (2015): 205.
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development issues. The EU can impose sanctions or freeze aid to problem states, and
human rights feature strongly in its framework for development and cooperation.21
In this vein, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement includes the Rome Statute under
the umbrella of ‘promoting the strengthening of peace and international justice.’ More
specifically, Article 11 (on peacebuilding policies, conflict prevention and resolution, and
response to situations of fragility) states:
In promoting the strengthening of peace and international justice, the Parties
reaffirm their determination to:
-share experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for the
ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court; and
-fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due
regard to the Rome Statute.
The Parties shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and implementing the Rome
Statute and related instruments.22
The Cotonou Agreement also states in the Preamble that, “the establishment and effective
functioning of the International Criminal Court constitute an important development for
peace and international justice.”23 Thus, it appears that the European Union has framed
the ICC as a key component to development, both domestically and internationally.
Although it seems somewhat peculiar (and raises neocolonial sensitivities) to push
African states to ratify the Statute, it does not seem to tie any development aid to
ratification directly. Nevertheless, this use of soft power has the potential to shape and

21

Sanctions have been imposed on Zimbabwe (2002), Central African Republic (2003), Guinea-Bissau
(2004, 2011), Togo (2004), Burundi (2015), and Madagascar (2020) for widespread human rights
violations or other political violence. It is interesting that three of these six are States Parties to the Rome
Statute, and Burundi was a States Party until 2017, meaning it was in 2015 at the time the sanctions were
authorized for election violence. The link between Rome Statute ratification and behaviour change in this
frame remains unestablished.
22
Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of
the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States of the Other Part, Ouagadougou, 22
June 2010, available at eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/namibia/documents/eu_namibia/cotonouagreement_en.pdf; accessed 8 May 2020.
23
Ibid.
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influence developing states that might feel pressure to conform to European ideals,
particularly in the interest of securing development assistance.24
However, there are 45 African contracting Parties to the Cotonou Agreement.25
Of them, 12 have failed to ratify the Rome Statute, comprising 27 per cent of the group of
African contracting Parties to the Cotonou Agreement.26 The high number of non-States
Parties to the Rome Statute that are contracting members to the Cotonou Agreement
weakens the argument that the European Union is using treaty ratification to spike
development aid in African states. While it is important to acknowledge the possible
influence that such an approach may have on weak states, including the contracting
African states Parties to the Cotonou Agreement, the reality is such that ratification rates
are high, but not as high as they should be if tangible development incentives are directly
correlated. More importantly, many African states that are contracting Parties to the
Cotonou Agreement worked tirelessly to establish the ICC. It is disingenuous in many
respects to reduce African commitment to the Rome Statute to aid incentives or other
forms of coercion. Phakiso Mochochoko, head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and
Cooperation division of the ICC and delegate for Lesotho during the Rome Statute
negotiations crystallized this point when he explained that
contrary to the view that the ICC was shoved through the throats of
unwilling Africans who were dragged screaming and shouting to Rome
and who had no alternative but to follow their Western Masters under
threat of withholding of economic aid if they did not follow, the historical

24

For an example of such an argument, see Stephen R. Hurt, “Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou
Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention,” Third
World Quarterly 24.1 (2003): 161-176. Hurt argues at 161 that “the new EU-ACP agreement has
significantly shifted the relationship further from one of co-operation to one of coercion. The new approach
taken by the EU can be understood within the context of the hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism within
political elites.”
25
These States include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
26
More specifically, the following states have not ratified the Rome Statute: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Swaziland, Togo, and Zimbabwe.

182

developments leading up to the establishment of the Court portray an
international will of which Africa was a part.27
The significance of this point cannot be understated. The involvement, activism, and
agency that African states had over the development and establishment of the ICC was
and remains extraordinarily high. This is further compounded by the fact that a strategic
partnership agreement was signed at the EU-Africa summit in 2007 saying that,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide should not go
unpunished and their prosecution should be ensured by measures at both
domestic and international levels. In this context, the partners agree that
the establishment and effective functioning of the International Criminal
Court constitute an important development for peace and international
justice.28
This suggests that the goals underpinning the Rome Statute and the ICC were mutually
constructed on the part of ‘Africa’ and the EU.29 Thus, the utility of employing a
reductionist calculus to explain African ratification of the Rome Statute in exchange for
increased development aid is questionable at best and provides minimal (or else
incomplete) explanatory value.
Instead, a different explanation for high ratification rates relies on ‘credible
commitments’ theory. More specifically, Simmons and Danner contend that
the states that are both the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility
of an ICC case affecting their citizens have committed most readily to the
ICC, while potentially vulnerable states with credible alternative means to
hold leaders accountable do not. Similarly, ratification of the ICC is
associated with tentative steps towards violence reduction and peace in

27

Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” 243.
The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 12 August 2007, 8, para. 30, available
at <africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en_0.pdf>.
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those countries precisely least likely to be able to commit credibly to
foreswear atrocities.30
In the African context, the overall application of this argument is that states use the ICC
as a springboard to peace, signalling commitments to justice–i.e. ratification is a nod to
the international community, used to signal a states’ credible commitment to the aims and
goals of the ICC: peace, stability, and justice in respect of accountability. This is
particularly relevant in states that self-identify as having progressive human rights
agendas (e.g. Botswana, Senegal, South Africa), or else having a particularly legitimate
legal tradition (e.g. Ghana).
On the other hand, this theory has been subject to criticism, most notably from
Chapman and Chaudoin who argue that “countries for whom compliance is likely to be
easiest–democracies with little internal violence–are the most likely countries to join the
ICC. On the other hand, countries with the most to fear from ICC prosecution,
nondemocracies with weak legal systems and a history of domestic political violence,
tend to avoid ratification.”31 Prima facie, Chapman and Chaudoin’s approach does not
explain the widespread ratification rates in African contexts, which the authors
acknowledge as the ‘Sub-Saharan Africa Exception.’32 In opening up the ‘black box’ of
the state to consider domestic political factors or motivations, the authors address the
important point that the ICC’s involvement in Central African Republic (CAR),
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Uganda focused on the prosecution of
rebels and not heads of state or other senior government officials. The same is also true in
Mali and the second situation opened in CAR (otherwise referred to as CAR II). It is also
important to note that all of these situations were brought to the ICC by self-referral.
Quoting legal scholar Tom Ginsburg, the authors raise the point that some countries “are
‘trying to make a strong commitment to prosecute, without necessarily committing to

30

Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court,”
International Organization 64.2 (2010): 225.
31
Terrence L. Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin, “Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal
Court,” International Studies Quarterly 57.2 (2013): 400.
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Ibid., 404.
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being prosecuted.’”33 This point, which is of particular relevance in the African context,
casts doubt about the merits of employing a generalizable credible commitments theory
advanced by Simmons and Danner in all African States. Yet, while it might be true that
leaders commit to the ICC for the purpose of self-preservation, it is also true that there is
no absolute guarantee that once a state accedes to the Rome Statute that government
leaders or other senior officials will not find themselves in the crosshairs of the Court, as
was the case in Kenya, for example.34 Any rational state engaging in a cost-benefit
analysis must account for this possibility and include it in its calculus.
Thus, scholars have suggested that “some states engaged in a simpler rational
choice analysis regarding ratification: whether ratification would marginalize domestic
political competitors and benefit the sitting government. Internal politics, just as much as
international power dynamics, provide an important framework for understanding
whether and why a state ratified the Rome Statute.”35 The traditional view that states
have fixed foreign policy interests no matter the leadership is questionable at best,
particularly with respect to accountability for serious human rights violations such as the
crimes covered by the Rome Statute (that is, genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, aggression). Domestic political considerations matter when attempting to make
sense of African commitment to the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, employing such an
approach largely fails to account for the analytical value of international criminal justice
norms as independent conject variables, which may also inform state behaviour and
shape state preferences. This is especially the case because ratifying the Rome Statute is
always a gamble for any rational decision-maker–once the Rome Statute has been
ratified, the ICC, and particularly the Prosecutor, has the ability to act autonomously and
perhaps even unpredictably. Contributing to the significance of this point, a state may
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Ibid., 405. See also Kenneth A. Rodman and Petie Booth, “Manipulated Commitments: The International
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Prasanna, “Did some African states ratify the Rome Statute to marginalize political competitors?” See
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withdraw from the Rome Statute after ratification, but this only comes into effect one
year after the deposit of withdrawal to the United Nations Secretary-General. Further, the
ICC retains jurisdiction over that state during the time in which it was a States Party. On
this basis, ratification cannot only be explained as a politicized opt-in/opt-out process
used to maximize domestic leadership interests because the long-term costs are simply far
too uncertain and therefore, too high.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Burundi is the only African
state that quit the Court when it acted incompatibly with domestic political interests.
While South Africa and The Gambia filed notices of withdrawal, both ultimately reversed
those decisions and remained States Parties to the Rome Statute.36 Some African States
Parties such as Kenya, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia threatened to withdraw, but never
formally did so.37 From a Pan-African perspective, the African Union (AU) adopted a

36

The Gambia reversed its formal withdrawal almost immediately after the election of President Adama
Barrow in 2017. The Gambia’s previous President, Yahya Jammeh, had a troubling human rights record. It
is likely that Jammeh wanted to withdraw from the ICC to avoid accountability for crimes committed by
him or else under his leadership, akin to Burundi. On the other hand, Jammeh was the leader of the Gambia
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non-binding decision for a continent-wide mass withdrawal strategy from the ICC.38
However, this never materialized and African States Parties have collectively remained
committed to the Rome Statute, save for Burundi. Instead, many African States Parties
have prioritized the need to amend the Rome Statute, or else engage in genuine processes
to begin to mend the points of contention that have troubled the Africa-ICC
relationship.39 As such, there must be ‘something else’ that contributes to the explanation
of African states’ disproportionate commitment to the Rome Statute beyond material selfinterest.

7.4

Constructivism and African Rome Statute ratification

The ICC operates at the nexus of international relations (IR) and international law (IL).
Scholars have attempted to bridge the gap between the two disciplines, in order to
generate an enriched understanding and increase explanatory or predictive capabilities.
International law inherently considers the evolutionary nature and significance of norms,
since it is the product of shared ideas, values, and beliefs, translated by states into law.
This reality makes the study of international law highly compatible with constructivist
accounts of international relations. Norms are generally defined as a “standard of
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”40 Early constructivists such as
Wendt and Ruggie offered an alternative theoretical lens to study global politics and
explained international relations as a social construct, placing a special analytical focus
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on ideations and identity factors in analyzing global phenomena.41 By emphasizing the
significance of norms and identity in international relations as factors that shape state
behaviour, constructivism offers a useful lens through which to study the evolution of
international law, and more particularly, international criminal law. The enmeshment of
international criminal justice norms in the Rome Statute and through the work of the ICC
constructs the ‘logic of appropriateness’–the expected behaviour of states operating the
international system. Constructivist accounts “understand legal norms as social norms,
and so as constituted and powered primarily by social practices.”42 This provides an
analytical framework to consider the Rome Statute itself as a social construct and not
epiphenomenal.
It is also important to note that “Constructivism has made important contributions
to understanding the operation of international law by showing how norms may constitute
or even trump interests.”43 This is particularly useful for explaining African ratification
of the Rome Statute. By requiring states to cede sovereignty, the Rome Statute directly
opposes conventional understandings of material interests. The evolution of the
international criminal justice norm has been remarkable and has direct explanatory value
for understanding the behaviour of African states with respect to Rome Statute
ratification and overall commitment. As Risse and Ropp observe, “we witness the gradual
emergence of a new model of criminal accountability used by states acting collectively
through the International Criminal Court (ICC) to hold individuals responsible for human
rights violations.”44 Since African states continue to contribute immensely to this model,
a constructivist account as to why is worthwhile.
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General comments about what Finnemore and Sikkink call the ‘life cycle’ of the
international criminal justice norm can be made in the African context.45 The idea of
international criminal justice for atrocity crimes began with the Nuremberg Tribunal and
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East following the Second World War.
However, in the African context, the regional experience with genocide in Rwanda
illuminated the reality that serious widespread and systematic human rights crises were a
problem on the continent.46 This experience prompted the pursuit of accountability,
which was complemented by the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) by the United Nations Security Council in 1994. More generally, the use
of ad hoc tribunals to address post-conflict violence was gaining salience in the 1990s
(e.g. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the ICTR). The
idea of an ICC reappeared at the United Nations in 1994, when the need for a permanent
international criminal justice institution became apparent.
The push for a permanent institution to assure accountability for atrocity crimes
was undergirded by several ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ constituting a strong civil society
network, operating under the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC)
umbrella headed by William Pace. Over ninety African nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) joined the CICC.47 Pace recruited Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, to do for the ICC Statute what he had done for landmines.48 As a result,
Canada mobilized a key negotiation coalition called the ‘Like-Minded Group’ during the
1995 Ad Hoc Committee Meetings for the establishment of an ICC at the United Nations,
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of which several African states became a part.49 Even without the support of the most
powerful states, the merger of civil society and weak and middle power government
coalitions created a strong push for the establishment of the Court, causing the
international criminal justice norm to ‘cascade’ by the time of the Rome Diplomatic
Conference in 1998.50
From a regional perspective, the states from the South African Development
Community (SADC) took a particularly keen interest in establishing an ICC. Justice
Ministers and Attorneys General from SADC states began meeting as early as 1994 to
discuss the issue and to take a uniform negotiation strategy.51 In 1997, SADC states
established ten principles of consensus for negotiating an ICC, otherwise referred to as
the ‘SADC Principles.’52 This meeting was jointly organized by the NGO South African
Lawyers for Human Rights and the Justice Ministry of South Africa. Richard Dicker of
Human Rights Watch also attended this meeting. According to Dicker, he was invited to
the SADC meeting in Pretoria to ensure that the negotiating principles used the strongest
human rights language possible.53 Dicker emphasized that African commitment to the
establishment of the ICC was an organic regional effort and was not directly informed or
influenced by Western NGOs or actors.54 Human Rights Watch played a supportive role
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for SADC States in formulating an ICC negotiation strategy. The initiative and leadership
role taken by SADC states on the ICC issue provided a basis for norm diffusion
throughout the rest of the continent. SADC States have been strong supporters of the ICC
and 75 per cent of its members have ratified the Rome Statute to date.
A similar regional conference took place in Dakar, Senegal in 1998 as a response
to the SADC principles.55 The so-called ‘African Conference on the International
Criminal Court’ was attended by twenty-five African states and resulted in the Dakar
Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998.56 In the
Dakar Declaration, “African States affirmed their commitment to the establishment of the
International Criminal Court and underlined the importance that the accomplishment of
such a court implies for Africa and the world community as a whole.”57 This regional
conference was organized by the NGO No Peace Without Justice and was convened by
the government of Senegal. According to Niccolò Figà-Talamanca of No Peace Without
Justice, this conference solidified the Pan-African movement that brought African
support to the idea of an ICC.58
At the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998, African states continued to engage
meaningfully in the negotiations, taking on leadership roles and actively participating in
the process, including the drafting committee that produced the final draft of the statute.
The only African state that voted against the Statute in Rome was Libya. According to
former South African diplomat Pieter Kruger, “African states had mostly voted yes.
There may have been one or two abstentions, but Africa as a whole was supportive of the
ICC at that stage–and it was without coercion.”59 On this basis, African commitment to
the Rome Statute needs to be situated within its broad and deep-seated normative context.
The instinct to view the ICC project as ‘Western’ or Eurocentric is simply inaccurate.
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Against this backdrop, the internalization of the international criminal justice
norm in the African context is apparent and important. According to Niccolò FigàTalamanca, the idea of an ICC gained African support because it was an anti-colonial
movement.60 The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
vehemently opposed a strong, independent ICC and sought to establish a court that would
pivot around the authority of the Security Council. At the same time, small or weak states
like those in Africa saw the Rome Statute negotiations as an opportunity to achieve an
important result for humanity, in “which they were the drivers and not the followers of
the great powers’ priorities.”61 As such, the Rome Statute itself is an expression of a new
institutional approach, since coalitions or blocs of small and/or weak states mitigated the
interests of powerful states in the international political system to achieve an outcome
that reflected their values and beliefs. Thus, the Rome Statute not only expresses norms
about international criminal justice, it also signifies a commitment to a new global order,
of which ‘Africa’ is an integral part. While regional and domestic power dynamics are
important, so too are the manifold normative bases for ratifying the Rome Statute and
remaining committed to it for the many African states that were active drivers of the ICC
project from the earliest stages of its ideation and establishment.

7.5

Anti-ICC Rhetoric, Two-level Games, and Sustained
Rome Statute Commitment

Though African support for the ICC was extraordinarily high during the early stages of
its development, the Africa-ICC relationship has been turbulent throughout the course of
its existence. Explanations for the fallout of the Africa/AU-ICC relationship are perhaps
the most salient in the literature.62 The point of this section is not to reproduce those
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explanations, but rather to consider how domestic and international politics via two-level
game theory might explain sustained African commitment to the Rome Statute, using
Kenya as its analytical lens.63

7.6

Background

For the purpose of context, at the time of writing, the Security Council had referred two
situations involving non-states parties to the ICC Prosecutor: Darfur, Sudan in 2005 and
Libya in 2011. The ICC issued arrest warrants for the sitting heads of state in both
situations, namely Omar al-Bashir in 2009 and 2010, and Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.
This was perceived by the African Union and some African states as a derogation of the
principle of state sovereignty and the Court was purported to be a politicized tool of
powerful states used to directly influence African politics and governance.64 These
sentiments were exacerbated when the Prosecutor opened a case in Kenya proprio motu
and indicted Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2012 for post-election violence
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perpetrated in 2007.65 Within the AU and some African states, the ICC’s pursuit of
African heads of state mobilized feelings of distrust towards the Court and fostered a
sense of fear that the ICC could be a very real threat to African leaders.66 The postulation
that the Court was pursuing accountability as an objective and universal imperative was
called into question and rhetoric of neocolonial politicization was instrumentalized in AU
and (sometimes) domestic politics, largely from the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya,
Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.67 It is significant that four out of these six
states are non-states parties to the Rome Statute and the two States Parties to the Rome
Statute had both been subjects of ICC intervention (i.e. proprio motu in Kenya; selfreferral in Uganda).
The use of anti-ICC rhetoric from leaders of non-states parties is logical, since it
justifies defection from the accountability and international criminal justice norms
typified by the ICC. It is instructive to highlight that the non-states parties that engaged in
anti-ICC rhetoric never supported the idea of an international criminal court, particularly
at its liberal cosmopolitan maxim. This is tangentially evidenced by statements of
delegations at the Rome Diplomatic Conference and more consequentially confirmed by
subsequent unwillingness to be bound by the Rome Statute System.68 As such, anti-ICC
rhetoric from this group of states is expected, since its normative and ideological
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foundation was/is fundamentally incompatible with domestic interests, even from its
earliest stages of development.

7.7

Kenya: Anti-ICC Rhetoric and Domestic Political Strategy

However, the President of Kenya similarly made use of anti-ICC rhetoric to further
domestic political interests. More specifically, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta
described the ICC as a “tool of global power politics and not the justice it was built to
dispense.”69 It is important to note that all African leaders who chose to speak out against
the ICC framed their opposition in anticolonial rhetoric and stereotypical tropes in an
attempt to diminish the Court’s institutional credibility, legitimacy, and overall normative
value under the auspice of Pan-African solidarity.
Kenyatta won the 2013 Kenyan Presidential election running on anti-ICC
campaign, which united formerly divided ethnic groups against a common enemy: the
interventionist, neocolonial, ‘Western’ ICC.70 It is important to note that Kenyatta’s
running mate was William Ruto and both were accused of bearing responsibility for the
2007 post-election violence at the ICC. Together they formed the Jubilee Alliance, which
united former rival ethnic groups the Kikuyu and Kalenjin in an unlikely strategic
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partnership. Since Kenyatta and Ruto were both suspects at the ICC at the time that they
were elected President and Deputy President, institutional delegitimization was important
to maintain and gather domestic political support. Using the ICC to achieve domestic
political ends worked. When William and Ruto were elected in 2013, it was explained
that “[t]he ICC was definitely a factor in this election… It got people out. People were
saying, ‘They’re our boys, they’re our sons, we need to protect them.’”71 This suggests
that Kenyatta was able to strategically mobilize domestic support in direct opposition to
the ICC.
While initially cooperative with the Court, after Kenyatta won the election, he
wielded his Presidential power to stifle the ICC’s investigation process.72 This forced the
Prosecutor to drop the charges against him due to a lack of evidence. Since Kenyatta ran
on an anti-ICC campaign, it was logical to calculate that the costs of noncompliance with
the Court would be inconsequential among domestic constituents. Strangely, however,
Kenya has remained a States Party to the Rome Statute after Kenyatta’s election, even
though the government actively sabotaged the Court’s effective operationalization in the
country. It is also significant that the government of Kenya has actively attempted to
reform the Rome Statute from within the Court’s institutional channels.73 This suggests a
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sustained commitment to the Statute, whether for Kenyatta’s own strategic interest or
otherwise.
The behaviour of the government of Kenya demonstrates that the undercurrent of
support for the international criminal justice norm is usually stronger than domestic
political maneuvering, but not for depoliticized reasons. Kenyatta played a two-level
game in order to distract constituents from domestic political problems by blaming an
international institution, i.e. the ICC, while remaining a member. Aside from using the
Court to unite domestic constituents against a common enemy during his campaign, once
he was elected President, Kenyatta blamed the Court for his leadership struggles. For
example, he said, “we’ve had to contend with the ICC pursuing weak, politicized cases.
This has become a huge distraction from our duty to serve our people and this continent
fully. That is not what Kenya signed up for when we joined the ICC.”74 Berating the
Court provided Kenyatta with a strategic opportunity to achieve his political goals by
fostering an anti-ICC stance among his domestic constituents from the earliest stages of
his Presidency.

7.7.1

Strategic Opportunities and Constraints at the International Level

Kenyatta calculated that the ICC could be exploited to bolster domestic political support
without damaging relations with the African Union and several other African states.
Important in this calculus was the fact that the AU had already taken an ‘anti-ICC’
position on immunities for sitting heads of state, stemming from the indictment of alBashir,75 and was actively trying to fast-track the establishment of its regional court to
prosecute international and transnational crimes, including those covered by the Rome
Statute.76 This position correlatively informed the foreign policy positions of some AU
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member states with respect to the ICC, shown in Table 7-3.77 States are placed into
particular categories based on commitment to the Rome Statute and relative levels of
cooperation with the ICC. It is necessary to note that these positions can be fluid,
depending on the ideological approach of particular statesmen and their governments–e.g.
The Gambia reversing its withdrawal immediately following the election of President
Adama Barrow. Nevertheless, pre-existing regional opposition to the ICC created a
strategic opportunity for Kenyatta to manipulate the Court to his benefit and rally AU
support for his opposition position.
Table 7-3: African Foreign Policy Positions on the ICC
Country
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo/Cape Verde
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d’Ivoire
Djibouti
DRC
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea

Liberal

Protectionist
X
X

Swing

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
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Indeed, the African Union supported Kenyatta, most expressly by changing its
previous legal stance on immunities for sitting heads of state to include even those in
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States Parties to the Rome Statute.78 However, the majority of African states have
continued to approach the Court from a liberal foreign policy position (43 per cent). This
can be compared to the 37 per cent of African states that approach the ICC from a
protectionist position and 20 per cent that swing. This regional dynamic may help to
explain why Kenya remains committed to the Rome Statute, since most African states
continued to take a liberal foreign policy position with respect to the Court, regardless of
the protectionist stance advanced by the AU. This is supported by the fact that at the time
of writing, African states boasted the highest number of regional ratifications of the
Rome Statute, but no state had ratified the Malabo Protocol to regionalize international
criminal justice at the AU Court of Justice and Human Rights.79 Nevertheless, the
substantial amount of protectionist and swing states signalled to Kenyatta that the use of
anti-ICC rhetoric and efforts to withdraw from the Statute would not be a significant
problem for Kenya’s relations on the continent.80 Even so, it was important for Kenyatta
to situate the potential consequences of withdrawal in its broader context–i.e. how it
might affect relations with those from Western Europe and Other States that vehemently
support the ICC and the international criminal justice norm that undergirds it.
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Dire Tladi, “Of Heroes and Villains, Angels and Demons: The ICC-AU Tension Revisited,” German
Yearbook of International Law 60 (2017): 59. Tladi explained that “the position of the AU… which
emerges in light of the Kenyatta prosecutions, seems to be that heads of State cannot be prosecuted at all,
even by international courts.”
79
At the time of writing, fifteen African states had signed the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol), including: Benin, Chad,
Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, Mauritania, Togo,
and Uganda. No states had ratified the Malabo Protocol at the time of writing. The Malabo Protocol
requires ratification by fifteen states to enter into force.
80
This is further supported by that fact that Kenya belongs to the East African Community (EAC) with
other member states Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The fact that Tanzania is the
only member state of the EAC that takes a liberal foreign policy position towards the ICC is a further
indicator that regional costs would be inconsequential for Kenyatta taking an anti-ICC position. On the
other hand, it is worth noting that in 2013 the European Union was Kenya’s greatest export partner,
accounting for 20.6 per cent of Kenya’s total exports. See Trade between the EU and Kenya, Information
on the EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, April 2015, available at
eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/kenya/documents/press_corner/trade_between_the_eu_and_kenya_210
5.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021. This relationship might have tacitly influenced Kenya’s decision to
remain a States Party to the Rome Statute. See also Obel Hansen, “Will Kenya Withdraw from the ICC?”
Thomas Obel Hansen explained the role of European diplomacy and soft power on Kenya’s decision to
remain a States Party: “Undoubtedly, European diplomats are now urging Kenya to stay with the ICC.
Even if it is unlikely that ‘hard sanctions’ will be associated with a withdrawal, it would surely frustrate
some European capitals if Kenya proceeds to withdraw.”
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In this vein, since the charges against Kenyatta were dropped, he had no substantive
reason to push for Kenya’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute. He had already ‘beaten’
the ICC and is at no risk of being prosecuted by the Court again, unless he commits other
atrocity crimes or more evidence against him with respect to the 2007 post-election
violence becomes available.81 Therefore, there was/is no reason for Kenya to incur the
potential reputational or material costs associated with pulling out of the Rome Statute.
Kenyatta strategically calculated the potential reputational costs of leaving the Court,
evidenced by the fact that the Kenyan Parliament passed two resolutions to withdraw
from the ICC: one in 2010 and one in 2013 but neither resolution materialized. In 2016,
government spokesman Manoah Esipisu explained that the Cabinet was still deciding
whether or not to proceed with withdrawal, depending on the reputational costs that
South Africa incurred for doing so.82 Indeed, South Africa’s post-apartheid reputation as
a leader in human rights was severely damaged when it attempt to withdraw from the
Rome Statute, which provided the Kenyan government with important information to
assess the costs and benefits of remaining a States Party.83 Therefore, international
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Scholars have argued that the ICC had a deterrent effect in Kenya, since the 2013 election was
comparatively peaceful. The explanation for this is twofold: (1) Kenyatta had a rational self-interest to
make sure the 2013 election was peaceful to avoid future intervention by the ICC and (2) ethnic tensions
had been eased as a result of the Jubilee Alliance. See Claudio Corradetti, “The Priority of Conflict
Deterrence and the Role of the International Criminal Court in Kenya’s Post-Electoral Violence in 2007-8
and 2013,” Human Rights Review 16.3 (2015): 257-272.
82
‘ICC debate: Africa vs ‘infamous Caucasian court’?’ IPP Media, 2 November 2016, available at
www.ippmedia.com/en/news/icc-debate-africa-vs-infamous-caucasian-court; accessed 10 February 2021.
See also Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘What’s at stake as Kenya weighs withdrawal from the ICC’, The
Conversation, 9 November 2016, available at theconversation.com/whats-at-stake-as-kenya-weighswithdrawal-from-the-icc-68353; accessed 12 February 2021: “Shortly before making the announcement
that it was withdrawing, South African President Jacob Zuma met Kenyan leaders in Nairobi, suggesting
some form of coordination may have taken place.” See also anonymous employee of South Africa
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), interview by author, Pretoria, 20
February 2019: it was confirmed that Kenya indeed waited to see what happened to South Africa after its
withdrawal from the Rome Statute to decide if it would follow suit. The reputational costs for South Africa
were severe both domestically and internationally, which informed Kenya’s decision to remain a States
Party to some degree.
83
See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “State Withdrawals from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
South Africa, Burundi, and The Gambia,” in The International Criminal Court and Africa, eds. Charles
Chernor Jalloh and Ilias Bantekas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 238-239: “withdrawal from the
ICC is costly for poorer developing states in terms of its impact on a state’s (perceived or real) commitment
to international criminal justice and may lead to retaliatory measures (such as cutbacks in EU or US
international assistance/development aid).” See also “South Africa: Decision to leave International
Criminal Court a ‘deep betrayal of millions of victims worldwide’” Amnesty International, 21 October
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normative pressures acted as a constraint on Kenyatta that influenced his decision to
remain committed to the Rome Statute.
From a regional perspective, while many African states have openly criticized the
Court, all of the African States Parties that initially ratified the Rome Statute have
remained committed to it, except for Burundi. Kenya would be considered an outlier if it
abandoned the Statute, which was/is counterintuitive for the achievement of domestic,
regional, and/or international political goals. The effective strategizing by Kenyatta
allowed him to exploit the ICC for his own ends at both domestic and international levels
of political engagement, which required tactful manipulation of the opportunities and
constraints presented at both levels.
It is argued that domestic political dynamics matter and continue to inform
commitment to the Rome Statute in Kenya. Unlike the African states that never ratified
the Rome Statute, Kenya expressed a strong commitment to the normative foundation of
the ICC at its earliest stages.84 It is apparent that support for the norms that undergird the
international criminal justice project informed state support throughout the negotiation of
the Rome Statute, and continue to shape the willingness of Kenya to remain subject to it.
This is supported by the statement of the Kenyan Ambassador at the 16th Session of the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute in 2017 when he said,
In our belief in the noble objectives of the Statute and its potential
capacity to end impunity, Kenya played a key role in championing for the
establishment of the Court and firmly remains a steadfast ally in the fight
against impunity. As a firm adherent to the rule of law, Kenya actively

2016, available at www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/south-africa-decision-to-leave-internationalcriminal-court-a-deep-betrayal-of-millions-of-victims-worldwide/; accessed 12 February 2021.
84
See, for example, Rome Diplomatic Conference, Summary records of the plenary meetings, 3rd plenary
meeting, 16 June 1998, (A/CONF.183/SR.3), 77, paras. 63-68. The Kenyan delegate “reaffirmed Kenya’s
commitment to the establishment of an effective, impartial, credible and independent international criminal
court… There must therefore be a strong political will on the part of the States parties that would sign and
ratify the Statute… His delegation would support all efforts to that end.” See also Wolf, “The Electoral
Consequences of Kenya’s ICC Cases,” 253. Wolf notes that the fact that the “morally impaired political
elite… had (almost unanimously) supported Kenya’s ICC membership without imagining that any Kenyan
would ever ‘visit’ The Hague.” This problematizes the notion that entering the Rome Statute System was a
rational choice by the Kenyan government and suggests that other factors influenced Kenya’s decision to
join the ICC in the first place.
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supports the international criminal justice system. Even as we
constructively criticize the Court, it remains our aspiration that the highest
standards of justice, human rights and the rule of law, are achieved as
envisioned by the Rome Statute.85
In this respect, anti-ICC rhetoric in Kenya can be framed as a form of pushback politics,
i.e. using jargon and logic to contest the rules and authority of the Court within the
existing structure.86 Kenyatta was displeased with how the ICC was operating, but was
not compelled to abandon the Rome Statute System for a myriad of strategic reasons.
What is perhaps most surprising is that even with extreme anti-ICC rhetoric, Kenyatta
did not reduce the costs of non-compliance to the point where withdrawal was a logical
or strategic choice to appeal to domestic constituents or other states in Africa or
elsewhere.87 In this respect, the normative strength of the accountability and international
criminal justice norm in domestic and international contexts is a constraint on Kenyatta
that helps to explain sustained commitment to the Rome Statute. The ICC’s involvement
in Kenya demonstrates the complexity of competing interests. Ultimately, however, antiICC rhetoric and threats of withdrawal were used to achieve strategic political ends at the
domestic and international levels but had no substantive impact on Kenya’s overall
commitment to the Rome Statute for rational and normative reasons.
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Statement by H.E. Amb. Koki Muli Grignon, Charge d’Affaires, A.I., of the Republic of Kenya to the
United Nations, General Debate of the Assembly of States Parties during the 16th Session of the Assembly
of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 7 December 2017, available at asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-KEN.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021 [emphasis added].
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Mikael Rask Madsen, “Two-level politics and the backlash against international courts: Evidence from
the politicisation of the European court of human rights,” British Journal of Politics and International
Relations 22.4 (2020): 728-738.
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See Rorisang Lekalake and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, “Support for the International Criminal Court in
Africa: Evidence from Kenya,” Policy Paper No. 23 Afrobarometer (August 2015), available at
afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno23_kenya_anti_co
rruption.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021. This large N-studies quantitative study concluded that “a majority
of Kenyans believe that the ICC is an important tool in the fight against impunity, see it as an impartial
institution, and reject the notion of withdrawal from the court.” It is also important to acknowledge the
nuance within this conclusion that “Further analysis reveals that opinions are sharply divided along ethnic
lines, reflecting the deep discord between the country’s notoriously factious ethnic groups.” See Geoff
Dancy, Yvonne Marie Dutton, Tessa Alleblas, and Eamon Aloyo, “What Determines Perceptions of Bias
towards the International Criminal Court? Evidence from Kenya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64.7-8
(2020): 1443-1469. Note also the role of civil society as a driver of the international criminal justice norm,
acting as a constraint on Kenyatta’s decision making.
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7.8

The Curious Case of Côte d’Ivoire

The paradox surrounding African ratification of the Rome Statute is typified by the fact
that Côte d’Ivoire consented to the Court’s involvement and ratified the Statute only after
the ICC initiated an investigation into alleged crimes committed by its nationals.88 In
order to explain this behaviour, the expected benefits of Rome Statute ratification to Côte
d’Ivoire must be understood. This is an especially peculiar case, since the ICC targeted
former Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo; his wife, Simone Gbagbo; and the leader of
the pro-Gbagbo militia, Charles Blé Goudé as bearing the most responsibility for crimes
against humanity perpetrated in the context of post-election violence in 2010-2011.89 In
2003, former President Gbagbo authorized the Prosecutor to open an investigation
proprio motu in response to widespread and violent internal conflict in Côte d’Ivoire–a
non-states party at that time. As such, the government leader that initially consented to
the Court’s jurisdiction as a non-States Party in 2003 was subsequently targeted by the
Prosecutor for investigation and prosecution.90 The incoming President, Alassane
Ouattara surrendered Laurent Gbagbo and Blé Goudé to the ICC and transferred them to
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It is important to note that Côte d’Ivoire formally consented to the Prosecutor’s investigation in 2003,
which was initiated proprio motu. It reaffirmed its consent to the Court’s jurisdiction formally in 2010 and
2011. The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC authorized the Prosecutor’s investigation on 3 October 2011 with
respect to post-election violence. Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute much later in 2013. Côte d’Ivoire
also implemented domestic legislation to amend its penal code to integrate the Rome Statute in March
2015. See LOI nº 2015-133 du 9 mars 2015 modifiant et complétant la loi nº 60-366 du 14 novembre 1960
portant institution d’un Code de Procédure pénale, Art. 139, available at
www.gouv.ci/doc/accords/1512502230CODE-PENAL-2015-134.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021. It is
worth noting that the case against the former President of Côte d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo and his aide
Charles Blé Goudé resulted in an acquittal for alleged crimes against humanity in January 2019. For
context, Gbagbo was transferred to the Hague after he was captured by opposition forces, backed by the
French military and United Nations peacekeeping forces in November 2011. Laurent Gbagbo’s wife
Simone Gbagbo remains at large, with a warrant out for her arrest. Côte d’Ivoire has challenged the Court’s
jurisdiction, arguing that domestic Ivorian courts have prosecuted her for similar crimes, including
genocide and other crimes. President Ouattara granted her amnesty in 2018. The Court urges the surrender
of Simone Gbagbo to The Hague. See Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11.
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Human Rights Watch, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Events of 2018,’ available at www.hrw.org/worldreport/2019/country-chapters/cote-divoire; accessed 10 May 2020. Note that it is estimated that at least
3,000 people were killed, and more than 150 women were raped in the 2010-11 post-election crisis.
Gbagbo lost the election and refused to leave office, sparking widespread and systematic violence and
human rights abuse.
90
Gbagbo initially consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC in 2003 as a response to widespread internal
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
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the Hague in November 2011. Simone Gbagbo was never transferred to the ICC and
remains at large. Notwithstanding this overall sentiment of cooperation, Ouattara did not
ultimately ratify the Rome Statute until two years later in 2013.
In order to explain this behaviour, it is important to acknowledge that the 20102011 post-election violence emanated from both sides: from Gbagbo and Ouattara, and
from their respective supporters. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been particularly
vocal on this point. In the 2013 World Report, HRW argued that, “Eighteen months after
the end of the 2010-2011 post-election crisis, justice for the grave crimes committed
remained disturbingly one-sided. Ivorian authorities and the International Criminal Court
have yet to arrest and prosecute any member of President Alassane Ouattara’s camp for
post-election crimes, reinforcing dangerous communal divisions.”91 This point frames
two important political realities. First, Ouattara and his supporters were exposed as a
potential target of the ICC. Second, the decision to cooperate with the Court was likely
informed by two interdependent goals: (1) an attempt to mitigate his own personal
exposure by becoming a ‘friend of the Court’ and bolstering the perceived legitimacy of
the new political regime and (2) the effective removal of Gbagbo from the Ivorian
political landscape. However, the cost of ratifying the Statute without sufficient
guarantees that he and his supporters would not be directly targeted by the Court would
be sufficient to stall ratification.92 The use of rational choice in this context makes their
actions particularly telling, since Ouattara’s behaviour can be readily explained utilizing a
political calculus shaped by individual power and interests. As William Schabas cautions,
“when a State is actively engaged in initiation of the process, there is a potential for
manipulation. In effect, the State quite predictably uses the international institution to
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Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire, Events of 2012,” available at
www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-divoire#; accessed 10 May 2020.
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The point that Ouattara was using the ICC as a political tool to remove Gbagbo from the Ivorian political
landscape is further supported by the fact that he sent a letter to the ICC after taking office to reaffirm Côte
d’Ivoire’s consent to the Court’s jurisdiction originally granted by Gbagbo. See Office of the Prosecutor,
Letter Reconfirming the Acceptance of the ICC Jurisdiction (14 December 2011). Ouattara reaffirmed Côte
d’Ivoire’s willingness “to fully cooperate and without delay with the ICC, especially regarding all the
crimes and abuses perpetrated since 2004.” Given that Gbagbo was the President of Côte d’Ivoire from 26
October 2000 to 11 April 2011, the time period emphasized by Ouattara would directly implicate Gbagbo
and his supporters.
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pursue its enemies.”93 Through this lens, the ICC is just as exposed to political
instrumentalization as a result of self-referrals by States Parties as it is by referrals from
the UNSC.94 Yet, the AU and many African States Parties have been seemingly
accepting of politicizing the ICC when it emanates from the power of African leaders, but
less so when it stems from the power of the Security Council.
Notwithstanding this, it is still unclear why Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome
Statute in 2013. This decision was a risk, since the Prosecutor could open new
investigations on all sides of the conflict with little jurisdictional difficulty. It is
impossible to know whether or not a deal was made by the OTP and Ouattara, or whether
future Prosecutors would be obligated to uphold such a deal. However, the
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Africa Legal Aid explained that “ratification of the
Rome Statute was delayed because it was determined to be unconstitutional by Côte
d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Court. Civil society organisations, both national and
international, set up conferences, advocated and conducted trainings and with the help of
some supportive members of Parliament, they made sure the Constitution was properly
amended so that ratification became possible.”95 Thus, the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in Ivory
Coast directly facilitated ratification in this case. If the aim is to appear legitimate, there
are few good reasons to oppose commitment to the Rome Statute, particularly in a postconflict society.
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To further support this conclusion, President Ouattara stated in a 2011 letter to the
Prosecutor of the ICC that
For reasons you are aware of, the transfer of power following the
presidential election of 31 October and 28 November 2010 could not
occur in the peaceful manner I wished for. A serious crisis has ensued,
during which it is unfortunately reasonable to believe that crimes falling
under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court have been
committed. These crimes are of such gravity that I call for your assistance
to make sure that the main perpetrators will not remain unpunished, hence
contributing to restoring the rule of law in Côte d’Ivoire.96
President Ouattara made clear that Ivorian judicial mechanisms were insufficient to deal
with the types of crimes committed in the post-election conflict. According to the
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the letter also made a promise of
cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor and confirmed Côte d’Ivoire’s intent to
become a State Party to the Rome Statute “with the shortest possible delay.”97 The
significance of this behaviour is that while the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is technically a
proprio motu referral stemming from Gbagbo’s initial consent in 2003, the reality is such
that the Prosecutor’s investigation into the 2010 post-election violence in Ivory Coast was
actually a self-referral by Ouattara, reaffirming the new governments’ consent to ICC
involvement. This reality complicates the objectivity of prosecutorial decision making
and raises questions about the malleability of case selection.
Indeed, Ouattara publicly acknowledged the need to bring all of those involved in
the perpetration of atrocious crimes to justice– “regardless of political affiliation or
military rank.”98 Notwithstanding this, in 2016, one week after Prosecutor Bensouda
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Human Rights Watch, “Turning Rhetoric into Reality: Accountability for Serious International Crimes in
Côte d’Ivoire,” 3 April 2013, available at www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/03/turning-rhetoricreality/accountability-serious-international-crimes-cote-divoire; accessed 10 February 2021.
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announced that she would be investigating alleged crimes committed by pro-Ouattara
members, Ouattara publicly stated that no more Ivorians would go before the ICC. He
explained that domestic justice systems were operational and capable of prosecuting
atrocity crimes, eliminating the need for ICC intervention in Ivory Coast.99 In 2018, it
was made clear that President Ouattara’s ethos surrounding international criminal justice
and accountability shifted when he announced an amnesty for over 800 people involved
in the perpetration of serious crimes committed in the context of the post-election internal
conflict–including Simone Gbagbo, whose arrest warrant at the ICC is still outstanding.
As Amnesty International highlights, “Ouattara listed Simone Gbagbo, who is serving a
20-year sentence for other offenses related to the post-election crisis, as one of the people
who would benefit from an amnesty, casting doubt on the willingness of the Ivorian
justice system to try her for her alleged role in crimes against humanity or war
crimes.”100 Against this backdrop, an ideological shift has taken place in Ivory Coast.
What remains consistent is an undercurrent of protectionism and the
instrumentalization of the Court to fulfill a myriad of political goals in Ivory Coast.
Immediately following his election, Ouattara had an interest in appealing to the ICC for
help as a demonstration of leadership through his commitment to justice for victims.
Using the ICC to further entrench an anti-Gbagbo narrative through its selectivity in
cases, which was directly influenced by Côte d’Ivoire’s approach to cooperation with the
OTP and its influence over evidence gathering and investigative processes, offered a
direct benefit to Ouattara. Least of all, managing a conflict-ridden country is
cumbersome. The promise of a better life by committing to accountability and the
international criminal justice norm vis-à-vis the ICC signalled domestically and to other
states that atrocity crimes would not be tolerated under the new leadership. Prosecutorial
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discretion on the part of the OTP largely obfuscates Ouattara’s responsibility for how
justice is dispensed by the Court. However, the fact that justice has been so one-sided in
Côte d’Ivoire raises genuine concern about the authenticity of the President’s
commitment to justice and his strategic involvement with the Court. This was
compounded by his shift in international criminal justice related policy, which must be
situated in its broader context.
In 2016, African hostility toward the ICC was mounting. At the same time, the
Ivorian experience had left many victims disenchanted due to the selectivity of the
Court’s cases and the inefficiency of the process altogether.101 In combination, the
necessity to remain committed to the ICC to secure legitimacy domestically and
regionally was rapidly declining. Thus, the mitigation of sovereignty to the Court in the
current climate likely incurs more costs than benefits for Ouattara. Côte d’Ivoire’s
ratification of the Rome Statute can reasonably be explained by domestic political
interests, which have shifted over time. Notwithstanding this, while other African states
were considering leaving the Court in 2016, Ouattara reaffirmed his commitment to it.102
It is worth noting that Gbagbo and Blé Goudé remained in ICC custody until 2019, which
may explain why Ouattara remained committed to the Court, since it was actively
targeting his enemies.
While Côte d’Ivoire remains committed to the Rome Statute and the ICC, it
would appear that it would now prefer to dispense justice locally. The framing of this
reality, i.e. that Ivory Coast is now capable of prosecuting international crimes
domestically, acknowledges the value of the accountability norm, while keeping the ICC
at a comfortable distance under the auspice of complementarity. This may be a
consequence of the fear that the Prosecutor will move on to consider pro-Ouattara
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suspects in the aftermath of the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé trials. Nevertheless, this example
provides a useful illustration of the interplay between domestic politics and the
overarching influence of the international criminal justice norm to explain commitment to
the Rome Statute in an African context.

7.9

Conclusion

This analysis provided a lens through which to view the interrelationship between
African commitment to the ICC and the diffusion of the international criminal justice
norm on the continent more broadly. While the ICC has been criticized on neocolonial
bases, it is important to reconstruct the narrative to more accurately reflect African
agency and ownership over the international criminal justice project and the ICC in
particular. African states committed to the ICC as a counter to impunity for the
perpetration of international crimes through the establishment of the Court. The
significance of the fact that 62 per cent of all African states have ratified the Rome
Statute cannot be understated. This is especially pertinent due to the propensity of
violence on the continent reaching the threshold of the crimes contained in the Rome
Statute, which logically increases the probability of ICC intervention in domestic political
and legal matters.
The mobilization of the Rome Statute and therefore, the ICC, to restructure or
equalize the global order is similarly important. Since powerful states opposed the
creation of a strong, independent Court in exchange for one under the strict control of the
Security Council, African states approached the ICC project as fundamentally
anticolonial. This perspective reflects a desire to restructure global politics. In many
ways, the establishment of the ICC demonstrated the emergence of a new multilateral
diplomacy model which could achieve results even without the support of powerful
states. In concert, the shared idea that accountability for atrocity crimes is important,
coupled with the desire to achieve an outcome that would benefit humanity with or
without powerful states, typify the Africa-ICC relationship from 1994 to present-day to
varying degrees.
Activism and agency in the establishment of the ICC by SADC states, the
government of Senegal, and others, along with strong support from NGOs and the
African Union, created a strong normative backbone for the establishment of an ICC in
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Africa from the earliest stages. This important historical experience continues to
influence state behaviour and commitment to the ICC throughout most of Africa. This is
supported by the willingness of most African states to remain a part of the Rome Statute
System, even when domestic or regional political dynamics present a logical or strategic
opportunity to defect. It is important not to underestimate the ability of African
governments to instrumentalize the ICC for domestic political ends, while also
acknowledging that ongoing commitment to the ICC in the form of treaty ratification and
implementation contributes to the value of the Rome Statute System, whether intended or
not.
Using the example of Côte d’Ivoire, it is apparent that domestic politics are
important considerations for understanding why a state might ratify the Rome Statute or
else make use of the ICC. While it is possible and indeed likely that the ICC was used for
strategic political interests in that case, the reality remains that once Ivory Coast became
a States Party to the Rome Statute in 2013, ICC intervention on any side of the conflict
became possible with little jurisdictional difficulty. On this basis, it is fundamentally
important to consider both rational and normative explanations for Rome Statute
ratifications in Africa and the interplay between the two as valuable tools of analysis.
Similarly, Kenya’s sustained commitment to the Rome Statute is best explained by
considering both domestic and international political factors, with a particular focus on
Kenyatta as the central strategic actor. While Kenyatta approached the ICC negatively for
his own objectives, the fact that Kenya remains a States Party to the Rome Statute
suggests that the normative value surrounding the Court is a relevant constraint on
governments, which informs sustained commitment to the Statute regardless of
contradictory domestic political interests.
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Chapter 8

8

Head of State Immunity

The previous chapters have helped to establish an understanding of what kind of
International Criminal Court (ICC or ‘Court’) African states wanted before and during
the Rome Diplomatic Conference. The ICC entered into force in 2002 and began its work
almost exclusively in African situations. The first case brought to the Prosecutor was a
self-referral by Uganda in 2003. The first investigation opened by the Prosecutor proprio
motu was in Kenya in 2007. And the first case involving a non-States Party that was
referred to the Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was the
situation in Darfur (Sudan) in 2005. The UNSC’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the
ICC has been widely understood as the impetus for the breakdown of the relationship
between the African Union (AU), some African states, and the Court. Some reasons for
this can be linked back to the concerns of politicization raised by African governments at
the Rome Diplomatic Conference, since the UNSC was yielding its power to interfere in
the sovereign activities of a non-States Party, while others are linked to the Prosecutor’s
targeting of a sitting head of state and the severity of the consequences for such a
decision, since the ICC indicted then-President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir in 2009.1 What
is perhaps most important for the purposes of this dissertation is to establish the link
between what African states vocalized in Rome as legitimate concerns with embedding
the authority of the UNSC within the Court’s structure, which provided the necessary
foreshadowing for the ICC’s controversial involvement in Sudan. It is nevertheless
important to recall that the AU is not a States Party to the Rome Statute, and therefore its
antagonism towards the Court has mattered inasmuch as it affected or influenced the

1

See for example Awa Adamu, “Lack of Objectivity in Security Council Referrals and its Effects on
International Criminal Court’s Prosecution,” International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts 9.1
(2021): 2120-2134. See also Bethel Aregawi, “The Politicisation of the International Criminal Court by
United Nations Security Council Referrals,” Accord (2017), available at
https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/politicisation-international-criminal-court-united-nationssecurity-council-referrals/; (accessed 1 February 2021). See also Christa-Gaye Kerr, “Sovereign Immunity,
the AU, and the ICC: Legitimacy Undermined,” Michigan Journal of International Law 41.1 (2020): 195225. See also Manisuili Ssenyonjo, “The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International
Criminal Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders,” International Criminal Law Review
13 (2013): 385-391.
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behaviour and policy choices of States Parties to the Rome Statute, which will be
evaluated herein. Ultimately, the aim of this chapter is to outline the most serious point of
contention in the ‘Africa-ICC’ relationship, i.e. head of state immunity, situate it within
its broader historical context, and consider the compatibility of the ICC’s approach to
international criminal justice within the African context with respect to the indictment of
sitting heads of state.

8.1

Framing the relationship between the AU and the ICC

The relationship between the African Union (AU) and the International Criminal Court
has been tumultuous. Focal in the discourse surrounding the AU-ICC relationship is the
issue of head of state immunity: the AU takes the position that sitting heads of state and
senior government officials enjoy immunity during their tenure of office, while the ICC’s
establishing treaty, the Rome Statute, specifically waives immunity for heads of state and
senior officials who are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. The crystallization of the
AU position emanated from the ICC’s indictment of former Sudanese leader, Omar alBashir in 2009 via United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1593, and
relatedly, the indictments of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and Kenyan
President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2011.2 The Court’s pursuit of al-Bashir is particularly
contentious from the perspective of the AU since Sudan has never ratified the Rome
Statute and therefore, has not consented to the involvement of the ICC in its domestic
political and legal affairs.
However, the UNSC has a special jurisdictional role under the Rome Statute.
Article 13(b) grants the Security Council the power to refer situations to the ICC

2

Note that the ICC also indicted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi via Security Council Resolution 1970
for alleged crimes against humanity, particularly the murder and persecution of civilians who opposed his
political leadership. See “ICC issues Gaddafi arrest warrant: Libya has dismissed the move by the ICC,
rejecting the authority of the tribunal,” Reuters (28 June 2011), available at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/6/28/icc-issues-gaddafi-arrest-warrant; (accessed 1 January 2021):
Gaddafi opposed the ICC intervention on the basis that it was a “crusade against his country and an attempt
by the West to recolonize Libya.” The justice minister of Libya at the time, Mohammed al-Qamoodi, stated
that “Libya… does not accept the decisions of the ICC which is a tool of the Western world to prosecute
leaders in the Third World.” Note that the arrest warrant was terminated following Gaddafi’s death on 22
November 2011.
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Prosecutor where crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court are alleged to have taken
place.3 This includes situations involving non-States Parties to the Rome Statute,
providing the Court with a form of universal jurisdiction. Relatedly, Article 16 of the
Rome Statute allows the UNSC to defer an investigation or prosecution for a renewable
one-year period. Both powers were given to the UNSC for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.4
Against this backdrop, this chapter considers the international criminal justice
norm, typified by the ICC, and its compatibility with the AU on the issue of head of state
immunity by using the Court’s indictment of Omar al-Bashir as its analytical lens. It
argues that the AU does endorse and support the international criminal justice norm,
albeit from a different position than the ICC with respect to immunity for sittings heads
of state, primarily for protectionist reasons. Nevertheless, the AU has attempted to use the
mechanisms available within the Rome Statute System to mediate its disagreements
regarding the al-Bashir case including at the UNSC, the Assembly of States Parties, and
the Court itself. The AU and the ICC have identified the same goal with respect to
international criminal justice: long-term peace and stability. The point of departure,
however, is on how best to achieve this goal. The ICC prioritizes ending impunity,
emphasizing criminal accountability and claims that justice is a ‘key prerequisite’ for
lasting peace.5 On the other hand, the AU has placed an emphasis on containing peace
and stability on the continent, which it argues can be eroded by arresting sitting heads of
state.6 This is evidenced by the AU’s tacit support of ICC indictments against rebels and

3

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, Art. 13(b): Exercise of
jurisdiction. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears
to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations.
4
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 16: Deferral of investigation or prosecution. No
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12
months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions.
5
International Criminal Court, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/about.
6
African Union, Observations of the African Union on the Scope and Application of the Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction, presented to at the United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Seventyfifth session (15 December 2020) available at
https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/universal_jurisdiction/au_e.pdf; accessed 5 January 2021, 4: “However,
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warlords, and its direct opposition to the Court, i.e. when it requested its members not to
cooperate with the ICC by arresting and/or surrendering sitting heads of state, especially
al-Bashir. The AU has also asserted that reconciliation is primordial in post-conflict or
transitional societies, over and above the retributive approach typified by the ICC. On
this basis, the AU and the ICC have fundamentally disagreed about the primacy of
arresting and surrendering al-Bashir while he was President of Sudan to the Court in
order to achieve the mutually constituted objective of long-term peace and stability in
Darfur. Considering that al-Bashir was never arrested, even when traveling to African
States Parties of the Rome Statute, suggests that the predictive and expected behaviour of
African states was not to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the ICC. On this basis, the
AU’s interpretation and understanding of the international criminal justice norm was
prioritized over and above that of the ICC in some African states.
It is important to note that the AU and relevant African states provided complex
legal justifications using both the Rome Statute and customary international law to
uphold the immunity of al-Bashir while he was a sitting head of state. The ICC failed to
adequately respond to these arguments in a cogent manner, which has created a serious
institutional legitimacy and credibility crisis for the Court. The instrumentalization of
head of state immunity by both the AU and the ICC in the al-Bashir case is a clear
demonstration of the deep politicization that undergirds the operationalization of the
Court at the domestic, regional, and international level(s). Neither the AU nor the ICC
approached the issue of al-Bashir’s immunity from a depoliticized position, yet neither
abandoned the international criminal justice norm in formulating justifications for the
immunity (or lack thereof) of al-Bashir during his tenure as President of Sudan. This
suggests a mutual respect and acknowledgement of the norm, but exposes its potential for
political instrumentalization, since it has not yet reached its conceptual maxim.7

whilst affirming universal jurisdiction, the AU has also taken cognizance of the political use and abuse of
the principle by some States against African leaders in particular. Essentially, African States have
consistently echoed concerns with the selective and political manner in which universal jurisdiction is
exercised by non-African foreign States against African State Officials, and which has the potential to
undermine the peace efforts and stability on the Continent as well as other existing international law
principles such as the principle of sovereign equality of State.”
7
See generally Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change,” International Organization 52.4 (1998): 887-917: It is argued here that many African states and
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8.2

Resolution 1593 and beyond

The situation in Darfur, Sudan was referred to the ICC Prosecutor by UNSC Resolution
1593, which was made possible by Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.8 To be sure, UNSC
referrals are the only possible avenue to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction in non-states
parties to the Rome Statute where genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and/or
aggression are alleged to have taken place. The UNSC based its decision to refer the
situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor on a proposal by the International Commission
of Inquiry, which enumerated reasons to refer the situation to the Court.9 At the time of
writing, the UNSC has referred only two situations involving non-States Parties to the
ICC: Darfur (Sudan) in 2005 and Libya in 2011. It is important to acknowledge that ICC

African individuals were in fact the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ that helped to establish the Rome Statute and
thus, the ICC. In this vein, it would be unwise for the AU to reject the presence of the norm altogether.
Similarly, the fact that so many African States have ratified the Rome Statute and integrated into domestic
law further suggests an African commitment to the ‘norm cascade.’ Nevertheless, the operationalization of
the ICC has raised practical and political difficulties with the implementation of the norm and has stagnated
its ‘life cycle’ thus, not reaching the point of ‘norm internalization.’ See also Jutta Brunnée, “International
Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility,” Netherlands Yearbook of
International Law 36 (2005): 3-38. See also Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, “Interactional
international law: an introduction,” International Theory 3.2 (2011): 307-318.
8
UN Doc. S/Res/1593 (2005); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998,
A/CONF.183/9, Art. 13(b): “Exercise of jurisdiction. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect
to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (b) A situation in
which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;” Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005.
9
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005: the reasons
for the proposed UNSC referral included that the crimes being committed were a threat to peace and
security; the investigation and prosecution of crimes would “be conducive, or contribute to, peace and
stability in Darfur, by removing serious obstacles to national reconciliation and the restoration of peaceful
relations” and that investigation and prosecution in Sudan of those with authority and prestige was
impossible at the local level. Therefore, having trials “away from the community over which those persons
still wield authority and where their followers live, might ensure a neutral atmosphere and prevent the trials
from stirring up political, ideological or other passions;” the UNSC and ICC’s authority “might compel
both leading personalities in the Sudanese Government and the heads of rebels to submit to investigation
and possibly criminal proceedings;” the ICC would facilitate a “veritably fair trial;” the ICC could start its
work immediately as opposed to ad hoc tribunals or other internationalized courts or alternative
mechanisms of justice; and the ICC proceedings “would not necessarily involve a significant financial
burden for the international community [emphasis added].”
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intervention has not manifestly contributed to the proliferation of ‘justice’ in the form of
criminal accountability in either instance.10
In many respects, the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC was an
important test case used to measure the institutional effectiveness of the ICC in the
context of non-States Parties and ultimately, the malleability of the concept of universal
jurisdiction advanced by the Rome Statute. It is clear that this approach was an overreach
both normatively and conceptually: it has done more damage to the international criminal
justice regime and the institutional credibility of the ICC than it has helped to end
impunity, deter atrocity crimes, or contribute to peace and security. It is for this reason
that Phakiso Mochochoko, Head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation
Division of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, has referred to UNSC referrals as a
“poisoned chalice,” and has advanced the idea that the ICC would be far better off
without any involvement from the UNSC in the future.11 This stemmed largely from the
fact that the UNSC does not oblige cooperation from states (other than the states
involved–i.e. Libya and Sudan). Cooperation from other states is voluntary, which has
revealed an ostensive lack of political will to uphold and/or strengthen the accountability
norm in the international political sphere. The UNSC has, as a matter of practice, referred
situations to the Court without providing any of the necessary support to ensure its
institutional effectiveness.12 The only value of a UNSC referral appears to be symbolic,
which has had severe reputational consequences for the ICC, and the international
criminal justice regime altogether.

10

See Security Council Meetings Coverage, “We Have Failed Darfur’s Victims, International Criminal
Court Prosecutor Tells Security Council, Noting Continuing ‘Total Impunity,’” SC/11441 (17 June 2014):
ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda told the UNSC that “systematic and wide-spread crimes continued to be
committed with total impunity in Darfur nearly ten years since the situation was referred to the
International Criminal Court.”
11
Sarah Nimigan, “Carrots, Sticks, and the ICC: Prospects for Cooperation? Part 1,” IntLawGrrls, (9
December 2018), blogpost available at https://ilg2.org/2018/12/09/carrots-sticks-and-the-icc-prospects-forcooperation-part-1/; accessed 3 January 2021.
12
“In Hindsight: The Security Council and the International Criminal Court,” Security Council Report (31
July 2018) available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/201808/in_hindsight_the_security_council_and_the_international_criminal_court.php; accessed 4 January 2021:
“The Council has also been relatively indifferent towards states’ non-cooperation with the ICC on existing
referrals, refraining from taking action on the 13 decisions of the court regarding the non-compliance of
UN member states.”
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In effect, allowing the UNSC to refer non-States Parties to the Court provides the
ICC with a politicized and weak form of universal jurisdiction over atrocity crimes.
Indeed, the involvement of the UNSC in the situations in Darfur and Libya have been
explained as a manifestation of a global order whereby powerful states can act in an
interventionist way and make determinations about the standards of appropriateness in
weak(er) states, subject to political interests.13 This has readily been interpreted by the
AU and African leaders as a violation of state sovereignty and an imposition of ‘Western’
values.14 From the perspective of the AU, this realization triggered colonial sensitivities
and reiterated that the ICC operates squarely within the realm of power politics rather
than an objective and/or neutral legal space. This point has only been strengthened by the
UNSC’s willingness to get the ICC involved in African situations, but not others of equal
gravity, based solely on political factors.15
This manifestation of overt politicization is precisely why the relationship
between the ICC and the UNSC was so contentious during the negotiation of the Rome
Statute in 1998. As Williams and Schabas have explained, “[t]hose delegations that had
opposed any Security Council involvement had argued that it would politicize the ICC

13

See for example Mary Kimani, “Pursuit of justice or Western plot? International indictments stir angry
debate in Africa,” Africa Renewal (October 2009) available at
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2009/pursuit-justice-or-western-plot; accessed 4
January 2021. See in particular, the comments of AU Commission President Jean Ping to a French radio
network RFI that the “ICC always targets… Africans. Does it mean that you have nothing on Gaza? Does it
mean you have nothing [on the] Caucasus? Does it mean that you have nothing on the militants in
Colombia? There is nothing on Iraq? We are raising this type of question because we don’t want a double
standard.”
14
See for example “Uganda’s Museveni calls on African nations to quit the ICC,” Reuters (12 December
2014), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc-idUSKBN0JQ1DO20141212; accessed 3
January 2021: “I supported the court at first because I like discipline. I don’t want people to err without
accountability… But they have turned it into a vessel for oppressing Africa again so I’m done with that
court. I won’t work with them again.” Museveni advised that “I want all of us to get out of that court of the
West. Let them (Westerners) stay with their court.” See also Siobhán O’Grady, “Gambia: The ICC Should
be Called the International Caucasian Court,” Foreign Policy (26 October 2016), available at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/26/gambia-the-icc-should-be-called-the-international-caucasian-court/;
accessed 3 January 2021: Gambian Information Minister Sheriff Bojang said that “the ICC, despite being
called International Criminal Court, is in fact an International Caucasian Court for the persecution and
humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans.”
15
Key examples of similar gravity which were not referred to the ICC by the UNSC include, but are not
limited to: Iraq, North Korea, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Ukraine. Note that the investigation in
Afghanistan was initiated by the prosecutor proprio motu and similarly not by UNSC referral (for obvious
reasons). It is interesting to note that the Pre-Trial Chamber denied Bensouda’s request to open the
investigation at first, solely for political reasons. This decision was reversed unanimously on appeal.
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and undermine its credibility. As before Rome the arguments of inequality based on the
role of the P5 [that is, the permanent five members of the UNSC: China, France, Russia,
United Kingdom, United States] was presented and that the veto would be used to stop
referrals involving these States or their more indirect interests.”16 It is relevant to note
that African states were particularly opposed to the use of the UNSC veto in the function
of the Court. For example, the South African Development Community had established
negotiating principles for the establishment of the ICC in 1997, which clearly enumerated
that “[t]he ICC should be unfettered by the veto of the Security Council.”17 Further
African negotiation coordination efforts were undertaken in Senegal in 1998 with the
signing of the Dakar Declaration which stated more broadly, “that the International
Criminal Court shall operate without being prejudiced by actions of the Security
Council.”18 It is apparent that African states were generally concerned about the role of
the UNSC and its potential influence on the ICC’s politicization and judicial
independence. In the course of the Court’s history, it is apparent that such concerns were
both appropriate and well-conceived. The complication of the United States, Russia, and
China not ratifying the Rome Statute has further inflamed perceptions of inequality and
has posed serious credibility challenges for the Court, particularly from the perspective of
the AU and its member states that have been subject to UNSC intervention that triggers
the Court’s jurisdiction over the alleged behaviour of non-States Parties.19 The UNSC has
manifestly failed to apply the same standard in all situations in need of ICC intervention,
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Sharon A. Williams and William A. Schabas, “Part 2. Jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law:
Exercise of jurisdiction,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (Portland: C.H Beck, Hart, Nomos,
2008), 568.
17
SADC Negotiating Principles for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (11-14 September
1997, Pretoria, South Africa).
18
Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (6 February 1998,
Dakar, Senegal).
19
Note that there have also been concerns raised by the relationship between the UNSC and the ICC from
scholars and observers. See for example Louise Arbour, “The Relationship Between the ICC and the UN
Security Council,” Global Governance 20.2 (2014), 196: “Yet for all the good that Security Council
referrals do in expanding accountability and combating impunity, there is a danger they could, and already
do, undermine the wider aims of international criminal justice. Such referrals not only could erode the legal
principles at the heart of this project, not least the fundamental tenets of the rule of law, but also on a more
practical level could provoke a backlash against the ICC over the perceived use of international justice as a
bargaining chip or tool to gain political powers [emphasis added].”
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which has devalued the institution’s legitimacy and credibility and contributed to
backlash from the AU and some African states.
The point is not to dispute that horrific violations of international criminal law
amounting to the crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute were being committed in both
Darfur and Libya. Rather, the bigger concern is twofold: (1) the UNSC has demonstrated
a willingness to refer situations in Africa to the ICC, but not in other situations of
comparable gravity; this behaviour has knowingly compromised perceptions of
institutional fairness, objectivity, and neutrality–all of which are quintessential features of
a legal institution such as the ICC; (2) the UNSC has failed to ensure that existing
referrals to the ICC are effectively enforced and knowingly degraded the effectiveness,
legitimacy, and credibility of the ICC and risked its long-term institutional sustainability.
It is important to couch the AU’s problems with the ICC in its broader political context,
which can be perspicuously linked to the significant compromise reached during the
Rome Statute negotiations to provide the UNSC with referral and deferral powers under
the Court’s jurisdiction regime–an outcome that African states did not want. This
particular compromise was an attempt to assuage the fears of powerful states by
reinstituting their power within the apparatus of the ICC, which has had a
disproportionate impact on the AU and many African states and has insulated the
permanent five members of the UNSC and their interests and/or allies all at the same
time. AU opposition to this type of political posturing can be viewed as a counter to the
dominant global order, which the ICC was intended to operate independently from.

8.3

Peace v. Justice and Head of State Immunity

The majority of African states (and the AU, formally the Organization of African Unity)
were historically strong supporters of the ICC from the earliest stages of its
development.20 However, in 2008, the AU’s Peace and Security Council issued a press
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See for example The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 24th Ordinary Session (22-31
October 1998), Banjul, The Gambia, 27 Resolution on the Ratification of the Treaty on the International
Criminal Court, ACHPR/Res.27(XXIV) 98: “Calls on all States Parties to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights to carry out all the appropriate constitutional procedures to sign and ratify the Rome
treaty on the International Criminal Court.”
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release identifying concern over the indictment of al-Bashir, citing the problems it posed
for the pursuit of peace and reconciliation, which were inherently prioritized over ‘strict’
legal justice.21 This is thematic; a resurrection of the ‘peace versus justice’ debate
saturates the AU’s opposition calls towards ICC decision-making and operationalization
processes, particularly those led by the Prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno Ocampo. On
a practical level, the AU postulates that indicting sitting heads of state has the ability to
further compromise peace and security efforts. Instead, healing and reconciliation are
prioritized above criminal accountability in delicate post-conflict or transitional societies,
such as Darfur. Moreover, the argument that restorative or alternative transitional justice
approaches have a greater suitability in African contexts is not an uncommon position,
which the AU has expressly integrated in its opposition to al-Bashir’s indictment by the
Court.22 It is relevant to point out that as a response to the arrest warrant, the African
Union’s Peace and Security Council called for the establishment of an AU High-Level
Panel on Darfur (AUPD), led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki (‘The
Mbeki Panel’). The AUPD issued an in-depth report, enumerating how to achieve the
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African Union Peace and Security Council, Comminiqué of 142nd meeting, 21 July 2008,
PSC/MIN/2(CLI); see also African Union Peace and Security Council, Comminiqué of the 175th meeting,
5 March 2009, PSC/PR/Comm(CLXXV): “Council expresses deep concern over the decision taken by PreTrial Chamber I of the ICC on 4 March 2009, to issue an arrest warrant against the President of the
Republic of the Sudan, Mr. Omar Hassan Al Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the
far reaching consequences of this decision. Council notes with regret that this decision comes at a critical
juncture in the process to promote lasting peace, reconciliation and democratic governance in the Sudan,
and underlines that the search for justice should be pursued in a way that does not impede or jeopardize the
promotion of peace.” Note that genocide was added to al-Bashir’s arrest warrant in 2010.
22
See generally Julena Jumbe Gabagambi, “A Comparative Analysis of Restorative Justice Practices in
Africa,” Globalex (October 2018), available at
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Restorative_Justice_Africa.html; accessed 4 January 2021: “The
paper argues that restorative justice is a paradigm that was in use in Africa prior to the coming of
colonialists and should be revived by African countries because it promotes healing and restores
relationships between offenders, victims, and community much better than the western adversarial
system… restorative justice can work much better in the 21st century in Africa than the court proceedings;”
Fainos Mangena, “Restorative justice’s deep roots in Africa,” South African Journal of Philosophy 34.1
(2015): 1-12; Brian Kagoro, “The paradox of alien knowledge, narrative and praxis: transitional justice and
the politics of agenda setting in Africa,” in Where Law Meets Reality, eds. Moses Chrispus Okello, Chris
Dolan, Undine Whande, Nokukhanya Mncwabe, Levis Onegi and Stephen Oola (Cape Town: Pambazuka
Press, 2012), 8: “It is fair to surmise that African victims of crimes against humanity, gross human rights
violations, war crimes and genocide are trapped between inadequate local remedies and expensive, highly
politicised, ineffective, remote and relatively low-impact international criminal justice options… local
activists vest their hopes in an international system whose ethos has historically been imbued with selfinterest and bigotry, heavy handedness and short-term objectives.”
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interrelated goals of “accountability and fighting impunity, on the one hand, and
reconciliation and healing, on the other” in Darfur.23 The report proposed that an
integrated justice and reconciliation process would be the best pathway to address the
conflict in Darfur. It called for national criminal justice processes; a hybrid criminal
tribunal to address those bearing the most responsibility for atrocity crimes in Darfur;
reconciliation and truth-telling mechanisms; traditional justice mechanisms to deal with
appropriate crimes; and compensation programs for victims.24 It is interesting to note that
AUPD determined that “Criminal justice will be a significant, though not sufficient, pillar
in the justice and reconciliation framework for Darfur.”25 The recommendation to employ
national and hybrid court systems effectively limits the potential role of the ICC, and
places an emphasis on local capacity building efforts. The establishment of the Mbeki
Panel iterates AU commitment to achieving peace and stability in Darfur from an Afrocentric point of view, with a broad(er) lens than strict mechanisms of international
criminal justice– but not to their exclusion.
Indeed, the UNSC was similarly aware of the need to approach justice in Darfur
holistically and not rely solely on the ICC. To this point, Security Council Resolution
1593 expressly stated that:
The Security Council,
Taking note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations
of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60),
Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal
Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect…
5. Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and
encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of
Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to
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complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the effects to restore longlasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary.26
It is on this basis that the AU requested the UNSC to use its deferral powers under
Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend ICC proceedings against then President Omar
al-Bashir, due to the ongoing peace process in Sudan.27 Even though the preamble of
Resolution 1593 makes explicit mention of this deferral power, the UNSC ignored the
AU’s request, which further damaged AU-ICC relations and perceptions of institutional
credibility. Demonstrating this point, Ghana’s Foreign Minister at the time, Alhaji
Muhammad Mumuni explained, “the AU actually addressed a resolution to the Security
Council asking… to defer the warrant [against al-Bashir] for one year, and it was
virtually ignored. That we thought was a slap. We thought that as Africans, and having a
clear understanding and clear interest in the interest of peace in the Sudan and in Darfur,
we thought that was a matter (where) the Security Council should have listened to Africa,
at the very minimum.”28 The AU was not alone in its concern over the potentially
destabilizing effects of indicting al-Bashir. It has been explained that “US diplomats in
the Hague described the prosecutor’s coming move against Bashir as ‘a high stakes
gamble– not only for the ICC but for global politics.’”29 Furthermore, “Chinese and
Russian diplomats warned that the prosecutor’s move could threaten the fragile progress
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in Darfur… they argued that the prosecutor was interfering recklessly with the diplomatic
process.”30 Thus, the far-reaching consequences of prosecuting the sitting head of state in
Sudan was a concern for many in Africa and elsewhere. The United States, China, and/or
Russia did not utilize UNSC powers to stop the indictment of al-Bashir through an ICC
deferral. Consequentially, the prosecutorial strategy to indict al-Bashir and the related
political inaction on the part of the UNSC to stop it singlehandedly led to the fallout of
the relationship between the AU and the ICC.
However, since he was overthrown by military coup on 11 April 2019, the
possibility of al-Bashir being prosecuted at the ICC has been revived. He is accused of
committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Darfur from 2003 to
2008. However, the ability of the Prosecutor to build a strong enough case to secure a
conviction (particularly for the genocide charge) has been called into question.31 This
raises doubts about the appropriateness of the initial indictment, particularly if the
evidence was weak and/or insufficient to substantiate the charges brought against him.
This concern is substantiated by the fact that former Chief Prosecutor Ocampo had to
appeal the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to omit the genocide charge saying that the
standard applied was too high.32 The Appeals Chamber allowed the inclusion of the
genocide charge on al-Bashir’s arrest warrant, though concerns about its viability at trial
based on the evidence remain high.33 While it is undeniable that horrific violations of
international criminal law occurred in Darfur, the necessary question is whether or not alBashir can be held criminally responsible for those crimes and/or whether it would have
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been appropriate to remove him from office to stand trial at the ICC when the Prosecutor
had limited evidence to substantiate the charges brought against him.34
In the aftermath of the acquittal of former Vice-President of the Central African
Republic, Jean-Pierre Bemba by the ICC Appeals Chamber, and the acquittal of former
President of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo by the Trial Chamber, it is clear that the
standard of proof at the ICC is high for former government leaders, as it should be for all
defendants. In this vein, it would be devastating for the ICC and the victims in Sudan
seeking criminal accountability to finally get al-Bashir in custody, only to see him be
acquitted due to a lack of evidence. This example also illuminates that the incoming
Prosecutor is at the behest of the strategy taken by Ocampo with respect to the charges
against al-Bashir and will similarly be dependent on the investigation materials obtained
by Ocampo and Bensouda in building the most high-stakes case in the history of the
Court. These difficulties should be taken very seriously; ICC prosecution of al-Bashir
should be compartmentalized as but one remedial approach to justice for the victims in
Darfur–not the only one. This point was emphasized by the UNSC in its initial referral,
and by the AU throughout the Court’s involvement in the situation in Darfur, for good
and important reasons.
Notwithstanding this, the al-Bashir example effectively demonstrates that in a
protectionist fashion, African political leaders and the African Union as a collective are
largely opposed to the indictment of sitting heads of state, and that once a leader is
removed from power, justice becomes reprioritized. Indeed, since being overthrown, alBashir has become ‘available’ for justice: the Sudanese government has tacitly agreed to
his transfer to the ICC, or least of all to accept assistance from the ICC to prosecute him
in a national or hybrid court.35 States in Africa and elsewhere no longer have to choose
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whether to prioritize justice above regional political obligations and interests, including
the inevitably destabilizing consequences of inciting regime change (or least of all, a
power vacuum) by arresting a sitting head of state.36 In the case of al-Bashir, Sudanese
civilian protests led to the military coup that removed him from power–not the ICC,
UNSC, or any other state.
While this demonstrates the ICC’s utter dependence on the voluntary cooperation
of states to operate effectively, it also raises questions about the significance of local
agency when triggering justice processes altogether, and perhaps more importantly, its
longer-term impact(s) on peace and stability in post-conflict and transitional societies
such as Sudan.37 Importantly, criminal accountability at the ICC has been emphasized as
a priority by the military junta governing Sudan. More specifically, Mohammed Hassan
al-Taishi, member of the ruling Sovereign Council said that “the ICC would be among
the four mechanisms for transitional justice in Darfur, which will also include a special
criminal court and truth and reconciliation in Sudan… everyone who had arrest warrants
issued against them will appear before the ICC.”38 This indicates that the form of justice
championed by the ICC still matters, thereby strengthening the international criminal
justice regime and the accountability norm, more broadly. Karen Allen from the Institute
of Security Studies has described the potential indictment of al-Bashir as a “delicate
balancing act between politics and the law” while reiterating that there is in fact a “global
appetite for individual responsibility.”39 The legal maxim ‘justice delayed is justice
denied’ is relevant in the al-Bashir case, though it is also important to acknowledge that
‘something is better than nothing;’ it seems that the remedy, either symbolic or material,
provided by a potential ICC conviction against al-Bashir is still significant over a decade
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after the initial arrest warrants against him were issued. The transitional military
government will necessarily seek justification from the international community, the AU,
and other African states for pushing al-Bashir out of power. In this sense, the ICC is
exposed to instrumentalization for political purposes, which will nevertheless
concurrently strengthen the international criminal justice norm as a result.

8.4

Framing the fallout of AU-ICC relations vis-à-vis alBashir

When the UNSC referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC, eleven states on the Security
Council voted in favour, none voted against, and four states, Algeria, Brazil, China, and
the United States, abstained.40 It is perhaps relevant to note that aside from Algeria,
African non-permanent members of the UNSC at the time included Benin and Tanzania,
both of which voted in favour of the referral. Consequently, the Prosecutor began
investigating the situation in Darfur. The Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately issued arrest
warrants for seven suspects, including al- Bashir, beginning in 2007. Al-Bashir was
indicted first in 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and second in 2010 for
genocide. The genocide charge was included once Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo was able
provide the necessary evidence to charge al-Bashir with genocide, which was denied at
the initial indictment by the Pre-Trial Chamber due to a lack of evidence.
On this basis, tensions between the AU and the ICC can be traced back to 2008
when it became clear that the ICC Prosecutor intended to indict al-Bashir. At that time,
the AU’s Peace and Security Council identified a ‘double standard’ with respect to
international justice and emphasized the “AU’s concern with the misuse of indictments
against African leaders.”41 The centrality of Africa in the operationalization of the ICC in
every situation at that time led to assertions by some African politicians of selectivity,
neo-colonialism, ‘white justice,’ and reference to the ICC as the ‘African Criminal
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Court.’42 This anti-ICC rhetoric has had a significant impact on African states and the
AU’s identity, interests, and behaviour, which have shaped interactions with the Court to
varying degrees ever since. The ICC and the UNSC’s flippant attitude towards the
concerns raised by the AU and avenues for remedy further escalated feelings of mistrust
throughout much of the Court’s operational history.
Further compounding criticisms of institutional selectivity, the ICC did not extend
its reach into situations outside of Africa until 2016. At the time of writing, the Court’s
hyper-focus on ‘Africa’ was still visible: ten out of thirteen situations under investigation
at the ICC involved African states.43 This reality has been matched with an institutional
unwillingness to consider the AU’s position on key issues (i.e. head of state immunity
and UNSC capability to refer and defer cases in sensitive and complex conflict and postconflict contexts). Resultantly, the Court, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), and the
UNSC manifestly failed to mitigate the escalation of AU concerns, which fostered a
culture and policy of non-cooperation with the ICC on the part of the AU for the arrest
and surrender of al-Bashir to the Court.44 Specifically, at the 13th AU Summit it was
decided that, “in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been
acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate… for the arrest and surrender of
President Omar El [sic] Bashir of The Sudan.”45 It is interesting to note that Chad issued
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a formal reservation to this decision, demonstrating that it was adopted with some level
of opposition from AU-ICC member states.
Nevertheless, all of the African States Parties to the Rome Statute are also
members of the AU, which effectively created a political climate of conflicting and
overlapping mandates and obligations. African States Parties to the Rome Statute had to
choose whether to uphold obligations to the AU or to the ICC regarding the arrest and
surrender of Omar al-Bashir. This dualism ultimately led to increased AU pushback
against the Court, first as a response to the Kenyan suggestion that African states should
collectively withdraw from the ICC in 2013, and again in the form of its ‘ICC withdrawal
strategy’ document in 2017.46
Ultimately, Kenya, Namibia, and Uganda, threatened to withdraw, but never
did.47 Burundi, The Gambia, and South Africa filed written notices of withdrawal from
the Rome Statute, though The Gambia and South Africa withdrew their notifications and
remained States Parties. Burundi did leave the Court, though this behaviour is readily
explained by the fact that the prosecutor opened an investigation proprio motu in
response to alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated in the context of political
(election) violence, and withdrawal from the ICC has been understood as an attempt to
skirt accountability for those crimes.48 Indeed, collective African withdrawal from the
Court did not happen, though AU frustrations with the operationalization of the ICC in its
pursuit of al-Bashir (and other African sitting heads of state) remained visible.
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Within the AU, those initially opposed to the ICC largely came from East African
states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda). However, AU Assembly
Chairperson Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn stated in 2013 that “it
should be underscored that our goal is not and should not be a crusade against the ICC,
but a solemn call for the organization to take Africa’s concerns seriously.”49 This
underscores the divisions within the AU with respect to the ICC–not all African states
support the idea that they ought to abandon the ICC altogether and the real objective is to
achieve genuine dialogue and constructive reform.
Desalegn also claimed that the ICC was “degenerat[ing] into some kind of race
hunting.”50 This type of rhetoric has infiltrated the backdrop upon which AU-ICC
relations operate. This also reflects the competing identities and norms at play on the
continent. There is a desire not to completely reject the ICC, while at the same time
reiterating strategically charged political rhetoric stemming from influential states within
the AU. This is compounded by the lack of meaningful dialogue between the ICC and the
AU, and the inherent distrust of the AU in general. These biases are significant because
their internalization had the dual impact of shaping state (and regional) identity and
perpetuated constructions of an ‘us versus them’ approach to ICC-AU relations at both
the organizational and institutional levels. The AU has engaged in a two-level game
whereby it has openly criticized the ICC while simultaneously seeking avenues for
mediation. In many respects, South Africa’s withdrawal was a useful experiment for the
rest of the continent to evaluate the reputational consequences that would stem from
leaving the Court. Indeed, South Africa faced significant reputational costs associated
with its decision to withdraw, which offers some explanatory value as to why other
African countries decided to remain States Parties.51
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Notwithstanding this, calls for the ICC to take African concerns seriously
permeate the AU discourse. Moreover, attempts by the AU to facilitate communicative
diplomacy through the UNSC with respect to ICC cases concerning sitting heads of state,
particularly in the case of al- Bashir is worth noting in this respect. Morally charged
judgments aside, the AU had clearly formulated objections to the ICC’s conduct on the
continent and the failure to engage in meaningful dialogue with respect to these points
allowed the AU to take a step away from the institution and provide its membership with
politically instrumental insulation and solidarity. Pitted against the idea that there needs
to be ‘African solutions to African problems’ coupled with constructions of identity that
reinforce an ‘us versus the West’ power structure within the AU, isolationist movements
by African states may be better understood. It is also necessary to acknowledge the
longstanding tradition of brotherhood and protectionism afforded to African leaders by
the AU and the related reluctance to censure a sitting head of state, no matter how
untoward their domestic politics may be.52 This reality similarly informs constructions of
identity, both inside and outside of the AU.
It is clear that African states chose to uphold regional political obligations over
international ones, since al-Bashir was never arrested, even when he travelled to ICC
member states throughout the continent, including Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, South
Africa, and Uganda. African interests and the AU legacy of brotherhood among
government leaders prevented the effective operationalization of the Rome Statute and alBashir’s arrest at various junctures between the years 2009-2019. However, despite the
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widespread regional culture of non-cooperation with the Court, dual AU-ICC member
states chose to remain States Parties to the Rome Statute.
As a result, the AU began to soften its approach towards the Court in 2018, by
seeking remedial strategies to resolve tensions and confusions, most notably through its
request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the issue of
immunities for sitting heads of state, and the establishment of an expert working group on
the same topic through the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP). Similar
efforts were initiated with respect to the UNSC’s deferral powers: the AU proposed an
amendment to the Rome Statute to empower the United Nations General Assembly to act
if the UNSC fails to act on an ICC deferral request after six months. Thus, the AU has
formalized its concerns and thought about potential avenues for remedy, rather than
continuing to promote African abandonment of the ICC en masse. However, the political
palatability and legal feasibility of African concerns and proposed solutions have failed to
gain traction outside of the AU, which has resulted in a lack of genuine dialectical
engagement within the institutional framework of the Court. Due to the long-term neglect
of these concerns, the AU has reemphasized (more) local responses to international
criminal justice–i.e. through the effective use of “national and continental judicial and
legislative mechanisms to deal with impunity in order to ensure that justice is served in a
fair manner.”53 This includes expanding the mandate of regional justice mechanisms such
as the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights, to cover the same crimes as the
Rome Statute: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression–with the
caveat that heads of state and senior government officials are immune from prosecution
during their leadership. However, African commitment to establish an AU-backed,
regional international criminal court has been weak, which suggests that capacity
building at the local level and sustained commitment to the ICC remain paramount
prerogatives for the longevity of international criminal justice mechanisms on the
continent.
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8.5

Head of State Immunity and International Criminal

Law: An overview
Since the indictment of al-Bashir, the judges at the ICC have manifestly failed to issue
cogent decisions on the issue of head of state immunity.54 As noted above, al-Bashir
travelled to several States Parties on official business but was never arrested, which
forced the Court to opine on issues of non-cooperation with respect to those states. The
decisions reached by the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers on this issue have coalesced on
the point that al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity from arrest, but the reasons for arriving
at this conclusion have been inconsistent and subject to widespread criticism not only
from the AU and relevant African states, but from the broad community of ICC scholars,
observers, and stakeholders.55 This suggests that the AU’s points of concern were far
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from baseless with respect to the legal issues surrounding immunity, particularly as it
applies to non-States Parties, as was the case with al-Bashir.
In the context of the ICC, the Rome Statute espouses an understanding of
accountability whereby no-one is immune from prosecution for violations of the most
serious international criminal crimes, namely: genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and aggression. Specifically, article 27 of the Rome Statute deals with the
irrelevance of official capacity and says,
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.56
Prima facie, Article 27 is quite clear on the issue and thus, States Parties should
understand their obligation to waive any immunities afforded to individuals in this
respect. However, this inclusion is novel and contradictory to longstanding international
legal doctrines that do afford immunities to sitting heads of state and high-ranking
officials from criminal jurisdiction both domestically and in other states.57 Taken further,
Article 27 actually undercuts established standards of international law with respect to the
absolute personal immunity afforded to heads of state, whether at home or in a foreign
country on official business.58 The jurisprudence provided by the International Court of
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Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case (2002) clearly established that senior government
officials do have immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law, if the arrest
warrant is issued by a national court.59 On this basis, Article 27 can readily be interpreted
as a contradiction to longstanding standards of customary international law.
However, the idea that heads of state and government are not free from criminal
responsibility can be framed as a developing legal concept. For example, the finding by
the Special Court for Sierra Leone that Charles Taylor did not enjoy any immunity from
prosecution even though he was the sitting head of state of Liberia at the time is the most
relevant articulation of this idea. It has been explained that “this historic ruling by the
Court is a significant contribution to the modern international law norm asserting that
Heads of State and other high-ranking government officials are not absolved of criminal
responsibility for serious international crimes.”60 Nevertheless, there appears to be two
fundamentally different understandings of the treatment of immunity at the national and
international levels. The Special Court for Sierra Leone characterized these differences
based on the fact that “the principle of state immunity derives from the equality of
sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to international criminal tribunals which
are not organs of a state but derive their mandate from the international community.”61
This implies that international tribunals or courts have the ability to strip immunities that
national courts cannot. However, all international courts and tribunals preceding the
establishment of the ICC derived their mandates from the ideation and direct support of
the United Nations. In contrast, the ICC is treaty-based and derives its mandate from the
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consent of states, independent of the United Nations. The Rome Statute has not achieved
universal ratification, which directly challenges the argument that the ICC derives its
mandate from the ‘international community;’ rather, it appears to derive its mandate from
the 123 states that have voluntarily agreed to be bound by it (64 per cent of all states, at
the time of writing). The ICC is very much limited as a result of its dependence and
preoccupation with the principle of sovereignty and the mixed political will of states to
uphold the norms embedded in the Rome Statute.
On this basis, the juxtaposition of this reasoning in the context of the ICC is
inherently problematic, since the ICC depends on the consent, membership, and
cooperation of sovereign states in order to operate effectively. Therefore, it not only
derives its mandate from the ‘international community,’ broadly understood, but more
particularly from its member states (and perhaps non-member states) who feel compelled
to cooperate to achieve particular judicial and/or political outcomes, which are fluid and
can change over time. With the benefit of retrospect concerning the al-Bashir example, it
is clear that the ‘modern’ norm is not upheld when it clashes with interests and objectives
of states or regional organizations of states–in this case, the AU. Nevertheless, Charles
Jalloh argued in 2003 that “the trend in the jurisprudence suggests that the scope of
immunity is highly contested and will therefore continue to evolve.”62 At the time of
writing, the scope of immunity is still contested and it is unclear that the evolution of the
norm and/or the jurisprudence has clarified the matter in the interim, but instead
complicated it further. While it is clear that providing immunity for heads of state and
senior government officials who perpetrate the core crimes covered by the Rome Statute
is ethically and morally obtuse, the legal reasoning required to settle the issue at the ICC
has been unsatisfactory. In the absence of political will, the legal reasoning needs to fill
in the gaps and compel states to uphold the Rome Statute, even if it runs counter to the
political interests of its member and non-member states. The unwillingness of the UNSC
to contribute to the Court’s overall effectiveness with tangible commitments is a
contributing and limiting factor to this end.
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Returning to the ideational foundation of the ICC, the contestation of immunity at
the national and international levels was something that the drafters of the Rome Statute
were very much aware of. It has been explained that “this slowly developing tendency in
international law [the progressive agreement that heads of state and government were not
free from criminal responsibility] has to be contrasted with domestic law where head of
state immunity in international criminal proceedings still might be regarded up till today
as absolute.”63 Thus, Article 27 was met with the inclusion of Article 98, which was
“accepted as political compromise.”64 Article 98 deals with cooperation with respect to
waiver of immunity and consent to surrender and says,
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can
first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for
the surrender.65
The interpretation and application of Article 98 as it relates to Article 27 has been highly
contested by scholars, some African states, and extensively by the AU. It seems fair to
suggest that there is a contradictory relationship between the two articles, especially in
light of how observers of Rome Statute negotiations have described the origins of this
particular statutory inclusion. On this basis, the relationship between the two articles is
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opaque and confused the obligations of states to either arrest al-Bashir or to uphold his
immunity under customary international law.
It is also clear that questions regarding the interrelationship of Articles 27 and 98
have been highly contentious in the operationalization of the Court when it has pursued
heads of state, particularly al-Bashir. Scholars such as Dapo Akande have argued that the
Pre-Trial Chamber manifestly failed to consider Article 98 when issuing al-Bashir’s
Arrest Warrant. More specifically, Akande argued that “I continue to be astounded that
the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Bashir Arrest Warrant failed to address [Article] 98, a
provision directly applicable to the precise situation that was before them. This was
nothing short of a dereliction of duty on the part of the judges. I really am hard pressed to
think of a decision of an international tribunal where the tribunal simply ignores– does
not even mention– what is perhaps the key provision which deals with the case at
hand.”66 This omission at the earliest stages of the Court’s pursuit of al-Bashir set the
course for recurring judicial missteps and patterns of procedural deficiency.
States that allowed al-Bashir to visit but failed to arrest him have provided legal
justifications for this behavior at the Court. For example, Malawi argued that it did not
arrest al-Bashir because he was the head of a state not party to the Rome Statute, and
therefore was immune from arrest under customary international law. However, the PreTrial Chamber decided that “customary international law creates an exception to Head of
State immunity when international courts seek a Head of State’s arrest for the
commission of international crimes. There is no conflict between Malawi’s obligations
towards the Court and its obligations under customary international law; therefore,
Article 98(1) of the Statute does not apply.”67 Thus, Malawi failed to comply with its
obligations to cooperate with the ICC because the nature of international courts provides
an exception to the immunity of al-Bashir, which he might enjoy under national courts.
This conclusion is relatively consistent with the reasoning in Charles Taylor. However, it
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is necessary to reiterate that the ICC is constituted by States, and not the ambiguously
termed ‘international community’ since it is not sponsored or otherwise dependent on the
United Nations. Even though UNSC Resolution 1593 obliged Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’
with the ICC, it never expressly imposed obligations onto any other state regarding
cooperation, further blurring the line between national and international obligations with
respect to non-States Parties. Compounding this confusion, the AU required its member
states not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, which
effectively created the potential for trilateral conflicting obligations onto dual AU-ICC
member states.68
Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber also decided in Malawi that “there is an
inherent tension between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Statute and the role immunity
plays when the Court seeks cooperation regarding the arrest of a Head of State. The
Chamber considers that Malawi, and by extension the African Union, are not entitled to
rely on Article 98(1) of the Statute to justify refusing to comply with the Cooperation
Requests.”69 The justification for the reasoning stemmed from the evolving trend that
head of state immunity no longer exists in the Post Second World War era, amounting to
customary international law. This reasoning was repeated in the judgment involving the
non-cooperation of Chad, another States Party to the Rome Statute that failed to arrest alBashir when he was on its territory.70 On this basis, it has been argued by Dire Tladi that
“the Court proceeded to decide the cases as if Article 98 was not included in the
Statute.”71 This was picked up by the AU Commission, which stated that the decision
has the effect of “rendering Article 98 of the Rome Statute redundant, non-operational
and meaningless.”72 This is a highly contested issue among international legal scholars
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and commentators.73 Inasmuch as the origins of Article 98 can be traced back to political
compromise as a counter to the inclusion of Article 27 in Rome, the position that a
conflict between the two articles does not exist is ostensibly weak. The more palpable
argument is that there is a contradictory relationship between Articles 27 and 98 as a
result of political compromise in Rome, which has not been dealt with sufficiently by the
Court, demonstrated by inconsistent reasoning on the issue. Moral and political
imperatives aside, the ICC needs to establish a sound legal position on the question, or
else be exposed to ongoing scrutiny. This lack of consistency has exacerbated tensions
with the AU, further contributing to AU discontent and pushback towards the Court.
With reference to the previous chapters, it is clear that African states wanted to avoid the
potential for these sorts of political conflicts at the ICC from the ouset of its institutional
design. Thus, this is a direct reflection of the concerns raised by African states at the
Rome Diplomatic Conference with respect to the politicization of the ICC and the
involvement of the United Nations Security Council in the function of the Court.
This point was further aggravated by the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber
abandoned its reasoning in Malawi and Chad when it advanced a new decision that the
Security Council referral itself implicitly waived al-Bashir’s immunity by referring the
situation in Darfur to the ICC and requiring Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court.74
This approach has been colloquially referred to as the ‘Security Council route.’ In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that because the
situation was referred to the ICC via Security Council Resolution 1593, this “implicitly
waived the immunities granted to Omar al-Bashir under international law and attached to
his position as a Head of State.”75 Three years later in the South Africa Decision, the Pre-
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Trial Chamber adopted another position and decided that the very nature of the UNSC
referral made Sudan analogous to a States Party of the Rome Statute, and therefore alBashir’s immunity was waived under Article 27.76 While each of these approaches arrive
at the same conclusion, i.e. that al-Bashir does not have immunity, the pathways taken to
get there have been wholly inconsistent.
In his minority opinions in South Africa and Jordan, Judge Marc Perrin de
Brichambaut offered yet another judicial avenue to lift al-Bashir’s immunity. He opined
that immunity is lifted when al-Bashir visits states that have ratified the Genocide
Convention, since he was a person being charged with the crime of genocide. This
approach has been subject to scrutiny for a host of reasons, most crippling of which is the
point that the Court’s ability to exercise its own jurisdiction would be dependent upon the
ratification of other treaties by States Parties, compromising the institutional dependence
of the Court.77 It is perhaps instructive to recall the uncertainty surrounding the genocide
charge against al-Bashir in the first place. To this point, the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur that recommended the situation be referred to the ICC in 2005
determined that genocide had not been committed in Darfur. More specifically,
The Commission concluded that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a
policy of genocide… The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued
and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the
militias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting from the
gravity of the crimes perpetrated in the region. International offences such as the
crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may
be no less serious and heinous than genocide.78
With this finding in mind, it is prudent to question if it is appropriate to strip immunity on
the basis of a charge that might not stick or is reflective of an overzealous prosecutorial
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strategy. This is supported by the fact that the genocide charge against al-Bashir was
initially rejected in 2009 because the prosecutor failed to adequately establish that alBashir acted with genocidal intent. However, the Appeals Chamber relaxed the standard
of proof required at the charging stage and thus, genocide was included in a second arrest
warrant in 2010. Nevertheless, it is clear that the prosecutor has a significant amount of
work to do before trial to substantiate the genocide charge. On this basis, using the
genocide charge as a modicum for stripping al-Bashir’s immunity is a bad idea optically,
politically, and legally. This is significant because it undermines the authority of the
Court altogether, and rests authority on unsubstantiated allegations, which may or may
not result in a guilty verdict.
However, the most important aspect of Judge Brichambaut’s minority opinion in
Jordan was the point that “the issue of Omar Al-Bashir’s immunity… has given rise to
different legal positions in the decisions of this Court. It is therefore of the utmost
importance and urgency that the Court take a clear stance on the legal issues bearing on
the obligation of States Parties to cooperate with the Court in the arrest and surrender of
Omar Al-Bashir.”79 This plea demonstrates the seriousness of the issue and the
unpredictability of the judiciary at the same time. As Dire Tladi has explained, “The ICC
has essentially adopted an à la carte approach to the applicability of immunities in the
Rome Statute system, in which any approach in a wide selection of options is acceptable
as long as the option leads to the conclusion that Al Bashir must be arrested and
surrendered.”80 From a political standpoint, such inconsistent decision-making obfuscates
the obligations of states, and compromises the development of the norm that heads of
state and other senior government officials do not enjoy immunity from prosecution for
atrocity crimes.
It is certain that the most significant problem emanating from the Court’s
decisions with respect to al-Bashir’s immunity is the lack of judicial consistency. While
the overall sentiment at the Court is that the immunity of al-Bashir is uncontentious and
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non-existent, legally and politically there has been no cogent justification for saying so
beyond moral imperative, which is nonetheless important from an ethical standpoint, but
not a legal one. Indeed, it has been argued that the “reversal of the Malawi and Chad
decisions demonstrates the continuing uncertainty about this complex issue. As things
stand, not only States and commentators but also different Chambers disagree about the
correct interpretation of Article 98(1) in relation to Article 27(2), customary international
law, and Resolution 1593.”81 At the Appeals Chamber in the Jordan Decision, the Court
attempted to bridge two approaches when it decided that there is no immunity for heads
of state in international criminal courts exercising proper jurisdiction, and also finding
that the Security Council referral required Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ with the ICC,
meaning that UNSC Resolution 1593 made Sudan a de facto States Party to the Rome
Statute, and implicitly removed al-Bashir’s immunities under Article 27 as a result. This
decision has similarly been met with disappointment and skepticism.82 From a political
standpoint, further engraining the powers of the UNSC within the jurisdictional apparatus
of the Court to strip immunity for heads of states of non-States Parties only contributes to
perceptions of unfairness and renders the Court practically dependent on the UNSC, as
opposed to its own independent authority. Resolution 1593 requires Sudan to ‘cooperate
fully’ with the Court but does not mention whether or not it is subject to the Rome Statute
as if it were a States Party, nor does it explicitly address the issue of immunity in its
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original resolution or another to clarify the issue.83 Reading in these authoritative
presumptions was both legally dubious and politically unwise, especially from the
perspective of the AU and some African states.
The UNSC has made no attempt to clarify the role of immunities in Resolution
1593. From a practical standpoint, the UNSC appears to be completely disengaged from
the Court and its correlative powers emanating from Resolution 1593. It has been noted
by the Pre-Trial Chamber that “the past 24 meetings of the Security Council of the United
Nations following the adoption of Resolution 1593 (2005), including meetings held on
the occasion of the biannual reports made by the Prosecutor to the Security Council of the
United Nations, have not resulted in measures against States Parties that have failed to
comply with their obligations to cooperate with the Court.”84 This suggests that the
UNSC as a collective political body does not feel strongly about States Parties choosing
not to arrest al-Bashir. Permanent five members China and Russia have expressly sided
with the African Union and the Government of Sudan on this issue.85 This sends a
message that informs the predictability of state behavior and tacitly suggests that there
was no political obligation to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the Court. In the absence
of heavy political consequences for noncooperation by the UNSC, choosing AU and/or
regional interests over and above the ICC appears rational, since the reputational damage
incurred by noncompliance with the Court was relatively inconsequential.
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Importantly, because Article 98 emerged as a political compromise in response to
Article 27, the idea of circumventing this strong politicization through creative legal
interpretation and application in the interest of moral appeal is wholly simplistic and
deeply problematic, especially when it further engrains the power of the UNSC within the
practical functioning of the Court. There is a direct relationship between Article 27 and
Article 98, and this was constructed on purpose by the drafters of the Rome Statute. As
Dov Jacobs has similarly pointed out,
as a consequence of the [Appeals] Judgment, Article 98(1) is rendered mostly
meaningless. Of course Article 98(1) does not actually list what immunities need
to be respected by cooperating States, but it is somewhat difficult to imagine that
if the drafters of the Rome Statute really thought that Article 27 removed all
immunities, even in the horizontal relationship between States, as an established
rule of customary international law, it would have bothered to introduce Article
98(1) in the first place.86
Thus, in order to pacify the uneven acceptance and diffusion of the so-called ‘modern’
norm that heads of state and government no longer enjoy immunity under customary
international law, compromise was required in Rome, suggesting that this was not (and is
not) a universally accepted custom that can bind non-States Parties to the Rome Statute.
The issue is magnified when it is framed as a ‘modern’ norm. The expectation that this
evolutionary moral imperative be internalized universally at such a premature stage in the
development of international criminal law is politically and practically unrealistic. While
universal accountability is morally and ethically altruistic, it remains legally, and
especially politically, difficult to enforce. Article 98 cracks the door for states to preserve
sovereignty with respect to cooperation and compliance, particularly regarding the
obligations concerning non-States Parties by deferring to a consent-based jurisdiction
regime. The most significant problem is the identification of conflicting norms at the
international, regional, and domestic levels that have problematized the
operationalization of the Court. With respect to dual members of the AU and the Rome

86

Dov Jacobs, “You have just entered Narnia: ICC Appeals Chamber adopts the worst possible solution on
immunities in the Bashir case.”

245

Statute, there is a conflicting regional standard that has been implemented through AU
resolutions reaffirming immunities for sitting heads of state and demands for noncooperation with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, which is directly at
odds with international and domestic obligations. Perhaps what is most offensive is the
underlying feeling that the UNSC was using an African case to firmly establish the
‘modern norm’ which may or may not have been viewed as ‘low hanging fruit’ since
situations and leaders perpetrating crimes of comparable gravity were not targeted in the
same way. Even if that is not the case, colonial sensitivities and concerns raised by
African states in Rome indicate serious concern about integrating the politicization of the
UNSC within the ICC as deeply problematic.
Equally important, while the kneejerk reaction is to view the AU position hastily,
it is important to take its concerns seriously. This is not a question of morality– of course
those most responsible for serious crimes ought to be held to account. The accountability
norm is good, impunity is bad, and al-Bashir should be brought to justice. Inasmuch as
these sentiments permeate all facets of the international criminal justice project, it turns
into a normatively biased enterprise, void of sufficient analytical scrutiny. At the nexus of
international relations and international criminal law, moral appeals are insufficient
justifications for imposing standards or expectations that are not, as it turns out,
universally held at any particular time, in any particular place. It is important to situate
the ICC within its broader context. The immunity issue was identified as being
problematic during the course of the Rome Statute negotiations. The ICC has operated
disproportionately in Africa and it should be unsurprising that this foreseen statutory
conflict has come to a head through the interpretation and application of the Rome Statute
in the case of al-Bashir.
Notwithstanding this, the AU has not abandoned the international criminal justice
norm. Conceptually, there is much agreement between the ICC and the AU regarding the
importance of fighting impunity, least of all for the most serious violations of
international criminal law. Functionally, however, the approach to immunities for sitting
heads of state taken by the ICC might rightly be viewed as unreasonably progressive,
since it has been routinely argued that “the case law of the ICC is contrary to customary

246

law in relation to immunities.”87 The tendency to view the AU with constructed distrust
ought to be levied against what is at stake. Inasmuch as the AU might be framed as an
organization designed to insulate powerful Africans by maintaining a culture of impunity,
AU members might view the ICC with a similar distrust based on its inconsistent
decision making, hyper-focus on African situations, and attempts to incite regime change
by obliging African states to prioritize the Rome Statute over the prescribed interests of
‘Africa’ without cogent reasoning. All of these stereotypes must be rightly understood as
symptomatic of a colonial history that continues to inform identity, interests, and
behaviors, fundamentally rooted in mutually constituted sentiments of mistrust and
skepticism.

8.6

Domestic Courts and the immunity of al-Bashir

It is useful to highlight that domestic courts in South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda have
opined on al-Bashir’s immunity during the course of his tenure as President and each
determined that there was no immunity and therefore, an obligation exists to arrest and
surrender the suspect to the ICC. The Supreme Court of South Africa found that head of
state immunity does not apply in the context of international criminal law, and that there
was an obligation to arrest al-Bashir while he was in South Africa, demonstrating an
ideological polarization within political and legal branches, since the Zuma government
facilitated his escape from the country despite a domestic arrest warrant being issued.88

87

Dov Jacobs, “Some additional thoughts on African withdrawals from the ICC,” Spreading the Jam:
International Law, International Criminal Law, Human Rights and Transitional Justice (27 October 2016)
blogpost available at: https://dovjacobs.com/2016/10/27/some-additional-thoughts-on-african-withdrawalsfrom-the-icc/; accessed 2 April 2021. Note that South Africa fundamentally relied on this argument at the
Court. In its submissions before the Pre-Trial Chamber, see Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome
Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of
Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July 2017, 13 (32): “the position expressed by South Africa at the
hearing is that Omar Al-Bashir enjoys immunity from criminal proceedings, including from arrest, under
customary international law, and since that immunity had not been waived by Sudan or otherwise, the
Court was precluded by article 98(1) of the Statute from requesting South Africa to arrest and surrender
Omar Al-Bashir and, consequently, South Africa was not obliged to arrest Omar Al-Bashir and surrender
him to the Court.”
88
Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2015
(5)SA 1 (GP). The South African High Court also determined that there was a legal obligation to arrest alBashir while he was in South Africa, but the Cabinet facilitated his escape from the country following the

247

The Kenyan Court of Appeal also found that that the government had an international
obligation to arrest al-Bashir. It opined that “the Government of Kenya by inviting al
Bashir to Kenya and failing to arrest him acted not only with complete impunity but also
in violation of its international obligations.”89 The Kenyan decision also stated that alBashir should be arrested if he ever returns to Kenya. Similarly, the High Court in
Kampala questioned Uganda’s failure to arrest al-Bashir when he visited the country and
issued a domestic warrant for his arrest, should he ever go back to Uganda.90 While he is
no longer a sitting head of state, the Ugandan decision is symbolic in the sense that it
overtly criticizes Museveni’s decision not to arrest al-Bashir when he was visiting
Uganda as President of Sudan. Thus, there was not a monolithic ‘African’ position to
oppose the ICC by insulating al-Bashir. On the contrary, every domestic African court
that ruled on the immunity of al-Bashir determined that he had none, since he was
properly indicted by the ICC. Despite this streamlined legal reasoning, the reality in this
case was that regional political dynamics and protectionist leadership interests espoused
by the AU visibly trumped international (and domestic) legal obligations.91 This was
tacitly facilitated by the UNSC itself, since it placed no formal duty on states other than
Sudan to cooperate with the ICC. Similarly, this case demonstrates that the consent-based
jurisdiction of the ICC is not only at the behest of ‘states’ but more particularly, leaders
of states, which offers significant enforcement and cooperation challenges for the ICC
when executing arrest warrants for sitting heads of state and other senior government
officials that may have developed relationships, working or personal, with indicted
fugitives, which may inform interests and behaviour.

AU Summit meetings, see The High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) Case Number:
27740/2015 (24 June 2015).
89
Civil Appeal 105 of 2012 & Criminal Appeal 274 of 2011 (Consolidated), available at
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/148746/; accessed 5 January 2021.
90
Jonathan Kamoga, “Uganda arrest warrant for Bashir,” The East African (21 December 2019), available
at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-arrest-warrant-for-bashir-1433336;
accessed 2 January 2021; “Ugandan court issues arrest warrant for Sudan’s Bashir,” The Independent (19
December 2019) available at https://www.independent.co.ug/ugandan-court-issues-arrest-warrant-forsudans-bashir/; accessed 2 January 2021.
91
Note that under the auspice of complementarity, the Rome Statute requires States Parties to adopt
legislation to domesticate the Statute. South Africa was the first state to adopt implementation legislation,
namely the Rome Statute Implementation Act (16 August 2002); Uganda passed implementation legislation
entitled the Ugandan ICC Act (10 March 2010).
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8.7

Institutional weaknesses revealed by the al-Bashir
indictment

It is important to highlight that the AU’s concerns about the operationalization of the
Court have drawn attention to some serious institutional weaknesses (e.g. inconsistent
judgements on complex legal issues such as head of state immunity; non-cooperation
from states–including States Parties to the Rome Statute to enforce ICC arrest warrants;
and a lack of UNSC involvement with respect to its own referrals to enforce ICC arrest
warrants in both States Parties and non-States Parties), all of which need to be addressed
in the interest of strengthening the ICC going forward. The al-Bashir indictment brought
all of these weaknesses to the fore and created serious credibility challenges for the Court
as a consequence.
The effective application of the Rome Statute with respect to immunities for
heads of state and other senior government officials has been practically and politically
difficult for States Parties and non-States Parties alike. This contention has structured the
division between the ICC, the AU, and several African states, and remains a fundamental
disunity between the Court and much of the continent. Mapping the trajectory of AU
criticisms towards the ICC on the issue of al-Bashir’s immunities during his tenure as
President demonstrates recurring trends and points of disagreement, which ought to be
considered through negotiation and meaningful dialogue, in order for effective resolution
to take place. This is an important prerogative, since the AU presents an opportunity to
(re)acquire greater Pan-African support for the ICC: a necessary step to encourage
African states that are not signatory to the Rome Statute to consider ratifying the Statute,
contributing to the proliferation of international criminal justice on the continent.
Moreover, given the ICC’s hyper-focus on African situations, it would be prudent to
consider the feedback provided by subjects of the Court’s interventions as a matter of
institutional self-reflexivity and constructive reform. Least of all, this feedback offers a
gauge to measure the acceptance of the international criminal justice norm embedded in
the Rome Statute, particularly with respect to the immunity of sitting heads of state of
non-States Parties indicted by the ICC vis-à-vis the UNSC.
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The relevant insights are the prioritization of regional and/or domestic political
interests in several African states that chose not to arrest al-Bashir when given an
opportunity to do so. Also interesting is the reliance and recurrent use of human rights
and transitional justice vernacular in the justifications for noncompliance with the ICC.
Catchphrases such as ‘lasting peace’ and ‘reconciliation and reconstruction’ are tightly
knit with the aims of transitional justice and by extension, the diffusion of international
human rights. It seems appropriate to reflect on this point. This type of discourse and
rhetoric clearly reflects an internalization and diffusion of international human rights
objectives and more importantly, the norms that undergird a substantial part of the
international criminal justice project. Moreover, AU calls for more local responses to
international crimes indicate that valuation that is placed on accountability mechanisms,
while simultaneously refocusing the need for national capacity building and pan-African
regional mechanisms better suited to provide ‘African solutions to African problems.’
Moreover, the desire for streamlined integration of international criminal law
mechanisms at the AU suggests that it is mindful of the international standards of
appropriateness in this respect. Even if AU member states substantially fail to respect
these norms, they are at least integrated into the regional normative foundation at the
conceptual level. Thus, even though the various developments at the AU can be framed
as ‘anti-ICC,’ or ‘anti-international criminal justice,’ the AU has clearly stated that it
remains committed to international criminal justice and the values closely associated with
the norms that provide legitimacy, or perhaps more accurately, perceptions of legitimacy
on the continent. The most basic interpretation is that the AU is identifying how noncooperation with the ICC is actually what is required to achieve the stated goals of the
Court, which can be seen as an attempt to prioritize regional interests and delegitimize
the ICC simultaneously.
Even when the AU asked its member states not to comply with the ICC in the
arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, it still couched its opposition within the Rome Statute
itself. Moreover, the regional position was that more human rights violations would occur
with compliance than without it, due to the destabilizing effects of arresting sitting heads
of state. The persuasiveness of this strategy is certainly suspicious, though worth
considering and situating in its broader (normative) context.
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Alternatively, reflexivity with respect to Western interpretations of ‘international
criminal justice’ might result in an admission of bias. It is unlikely that an immunity
provision would derail the international criminal justice project altogether. If anything,
such a provision would allow the ICC to continue operating without the recurring
legitimacy crises that result from failing to capture sitting heads of state. In reality,
impunity with respect to these individuals is the norm. The same is not true for former
heads of state, including al-Bashir, who will most likely be prosecuted for his alleged
crimes. Nevertheless, to date, the ICC has failed to cement universal jurisdiction and
therefore, accountability for atrocity crimes. Since the current international criminal
justice landscape depends on state consent and cooperation to function, pragmatic
approaches to political and legal conflicts of interest are imperative to the long-term
success of the project.
While it is impossible to demonstrate empirically that charging sitting heads of
state and government officials is a risk to security and peace, it is also impossible to
demonstrate the opposite. At a minimum, dialogue concerning this issue ought to take
place in order to bridge the gap and normative divergence between the ICC and the AU
on this key issue. Taken further, suppose the AU’s concerns about the arrest and
surrender of al-Bashir were realized– it would be necessary to determine who or what
was responsible for crimes committed as a result of the fallout of unsolicited, ICCprovoked, regime change and/or power vacuum. The capacity of the ICC to handle
societal and regional instability as a result of indicting a head of state remains suspect at
best, and potentially damaging at worst. Symbolic value aside, it is unclear that such an
outcome is (or ought to be) compatible with the stated aims of the ICC, particularly in the
absence of material UNSC support or involvement.

8.8

Conclusion

There is a fundamental distinction between the need for dialogue, negotiation, and
bargaining on one hand, and non-cooperation on the other. Many of the concerns raised
by the AU are understandable, and at least worthy of a conversation. It is well established
that the ICC was envisioned with African perspectives in mind. Conceptually, the Rome
Statute is agreeable to African states; the operationalization of the Rome Statute seems to
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be the substantive objection. Notwithstanding the ongoing disagreement concerning
immunity for sitting heads of state, the norm of international criminal justice continues to
be embodied by both the AU and the ICC, though with varying interpretations.
Practically speaking, the failure on the part of the ICC to establish and maintain a
coherent position on head of state immunities with respect to al-Bashir has tarnished
perceptions of judicial cogency. The idea that norms can diffuse unevenly is important in
this context. Thus, while the AU continues to embody a perspective rooted in customary
law that supports head of state immunities, the trajectory of the evolution of the norm is
uncertain, yet not necessarily fixed. There appears to be two potential outcomes with
respect to AU-ICC relations: (1) the continued proliferation of non-cooperation and a
reversion to national and/or regional court(s) to address violations of international
criminal law that better suit African political interests; or (2) reasoned negotiation and
bargaining between the AU and the ICC with respect to critical issues of contention,
especially regarding the role of the UNSC and the meaning of article 98, which are
perhaps not as ill-founded as they first seem. With respect to the status of immunity for
sitting heads of state, al-Bashir demonstrated that the ICC has been unable to effectively
integrate this norm into the structure of the international criminal justice regime. The
function of the UNSC has acted as a fundamental impediment to its proliferation and
solidification by tacitly informing the expectations and obligations of state behaviour
when interacting with the Court.
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Chapter 9

9

Regional Criminal Justice Mechanisms and The Malabo
Protocol1

The principle of complementarity is a cornerstone of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).2 Complementarity establishes the relationship
between the ICC and the national legal systems of state parties. Under the Rome Statute
system, states have the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute violations of
international criminal law. The ICC is to be ‘complementary’ to national jurisdictions,
and act as a secondary catch-all when national justice mechanisms fail.3 ICC intervention
is triggered when a state is unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute. In short, the
ICC is understood as a court of last resort, to be used when all else has failed.4 Based on
this principle, states should be scrutinized for failing to investigate and prosecute
atrocious crimes long before the inaction of the ICC is called into question. This is
appropriate, since the ICC is inherently (and purposefully) limited in scope.
The ICC straddles the boundaries of international politics and international
criminal law. It is tasked to balance the political interests of states while applying the
Rome Statute and its ‘objective’ rule-of-law principles. Complementarity reiterates the
political preoccupation with sovereignty by vesting national judicial mechanisms with the
primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes. Interference on the part of the
ICC is only permissible when a sovereign state fails in its duty to implement and enforce
international criminal law. This could be explained by a lack of political will, a lack of
capacity, or both. Notwithstanding the various explanations for state inaction, the

1

An earlier version of this chapter was published as Sarah Nimigan, “The Malabo Protocol, the ICC, and
the Idea of ‘Regional Complementarity,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 17.5 (2019): 10051029.
2
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into
force 1 July 2002); see Preamble; Arts. 1 and 17.
3
Ibid.
4
For a detailed summary of complementarity see Paul Seils, Handbook on Complementarity: An
Introduction to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes (International
Center for Transitional Justice, 2016), available at https://www.ictj.org/publication/handbookcomplementarity; accessed 14 June 2019.
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relationship between states and the ICC is sequenced and clear.5 However, a textual
interpretation of the Rome Statute makes it less apparent how regional mechanisms
might fit within the complementary schema. This is increasingly relevant, given recent
moves on the African continent to regionalize international criminal law.
In June 2014 the African Union (AU) adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo
Protocol).6 The Malabo Protocol extends the jurisdiction of the proposed African Court
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to include international and transnational crimes,
including those covered in the Rome Statute.7 The yet-to-be established ACJHR would
sit in Arusha, Tanzania. At the time of writing, eleven states have signed the treaty;8
fifteen ratifications are required for the treaty to come into force. While the impact of the
Malabo Protocol can only be imagined for now, the potential role of the ACJHR within
the broader international criminal justice project is worth thinking about. It is proposed
here that ‘positive complementarity’ offers the most appropriate lens through which to
analyze this role.9
This chapter argues that regional courts such as the ACJHR can and should
complement national courts and the ICC. The Malabo Protocol raises particular legal

5

See generally Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National
Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Leidin: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 11-30; Steven Freeland,
“It’s a Good Idea… Isn’t It? The Impact of Complementarity at the International Criminal Court on
Domestic Law, Politics and Perceptions of Sovereignty,” in International Courts and Domestic Politics:
Studies on International Courts and Tribunals, ed. Marlene Wind (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2018): 93-116; Max du Plessis, “Complementarity: a working relationship between African states
and the International Criminal Court,” in African Guide to International Criminal Justice (Institute for
Security Studies, 2008) 123-142.
6
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
27 June 2014 (hereafter the ‘Malabo Protocol’).
7
The core crimes refer to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, aggression. The Malabo Protocol
also includes the following crimes: unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism,
corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes,
illicit exploitation of natural resources. Note that the Malabo Protocol not only focuses on individual
accountability but also the role of corporate liability, see Art. 46(c): Corporate Criminal Liability.
8
Signatory states include: Benin, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania,
Sierra Leone, Sao Tome & Principe, Uganda.
9
See for example International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy, 20092012, 1 February 2010, at 5: ‘Positive complementary is a strong interpretation of partnership with other
jurisdictions or a “proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings”’; Darryl
Robinson, “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal
Court,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2003): 482.
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concerns about jurisdictional gaps and immunities for heads of state and other senior
government officials, as well as practical concerns with respect to capacity and funding.10
While these concerns are worth noting, they are neither wholly nor partially destructive
of the aims of the international criminal justice project in the African context or
elsewhere. There is a need to reimagine the principle of complementarity by including
regional courts such as the ACJHR since it presents an opportunity to prosecute crimes
which the ICC cannot. The core atrocity crimes covered by the Rome Statute are not
perpetrated in a vacuum. In many respects, the ACJHR offers an opportunity to prosecute
crimes which undergird and finance genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
aggression in Africa.11 This may have a preventative or deterrent consequence and/or
help the ICC in its own work by laying the foundation to link mid-level to senior
offenders. This will allow for the clear and streamlined integration of regional justice
mechanisms within the international criminal justice project, of which the Rome Statute
System is an integral part. The ACJHR offers the potential to pivot expressions of
international criminal justice from a concentration on international initiatives to more
accurate reflections of local contexts and realities. Framed in this way, the idea of
including regional institutions into the international criminal justice system could be
important to its holism and long-term success.

10

See, generally Lutz Oette, “The African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur: A Precedent for Regional
Solutions to the Challenges Facing International Criminal Justice?” in Africa and the Future of
International Criminal Justice, ed. Vincent Nmehielle (Eleven International Publishing, 2012); Kristen
Rau, “Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability Avoidance? The International Criminal Court and
Proposed Expansion of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,” Minnesota Law Review 97 (2012):
669-708.
11
Note that thematic understandings that other crimes covered by the Malabo Protocol demonstrably fund
and facilitate the perpetration of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. See, on
Joseph Kony (Uganda) using the ivory trade to buy arms and finance the LRA, Peter Fabricius, “The LRA
rising again?” Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, 6 July 2016, available at https://issafrica.org/isstoday/the-lra-rising-again; accessed 14 June 2019; Oil and gold have been smuggled in exchange for arms
in Sudan, see: Human Rights Watch Report, China’s Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil (2003), available
at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/26.htm; accessed 14 June 2019; Colum Lynch, “Russia
Blocks U.N. Report Linking Alleged Sudanese War Criminal to Gold Profiteering,” Foreign Policy, 4
April 2016, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/04/russia-blocks-u-n-report-linking-allegedsudanese-war-criminal-to-gold-profiteering/; accessed 14 June 2019. Note also that the role of corporations
in facilitating these crimes, such as Canadian company SNC-Lavalin and its role in sustaining the Gaddafi
regime and civil war, see Mark Kersten, “SNC’s business in Libya sustained a brutal regime. They should
be held to account,” 8 April 2019, available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-sncsbusiness-in-libya-sustained-a-brutal-regime-they-should-be-held/; visited 14 June 2019 as some brief and
cursory illustrations of this point.
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After all, the raison d’être of complementarity is to motivate states to dispense
justice for the most serious crimes, while simultaneously ensuring such crimes will not go
unpunished if states are unwilling or unable to do so. The ICC is not intended to be, nor is
it capable of being, a standalone response to atrocity. Therefore, the inclusion of all forms
of jurisdiction recognized by international law (including regional mechanisms such as
the ACJHR) should be built-in to establish a positive interpretation of complementarity.
This will contribute to the proliferation of more ‘local’ justice and restructure/redistribute
the division of labour to meet the demands and expectations for justice at the national,
regional, and international level(s). Reimagining complementarity to include regional
mechanisms such as the ACJHR could reflect an important part of the constructive
reform that the ICC needs to regain its legitimacy in Africa and beyond.

9.1

The Malabo Protocol

In 2009 the AU had identified a need to accelerate the integration of the contents of the
Rome Statute at the regional level.12 This was to some degree, a response to the AU’s
claims that the ICC unfairly targets Africans with selectivity and bias, jeopardizes peace
by prioritizing justice, and reinforces a neocolonial Western power structure, especially
since the United Nations Security Council reserves control over the ICC without three of
its permanent members being subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.13 Mostly though, it was
in response to ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and the concerns
about its potentially destabilizing effects on the continent.14 This was addressed by the
AU at the 2013 Extraordinary Session.15 The underlying impetus for fast-tracking the

12

The AU had been working on the idea of including international crimes at the regional level as early as
2004 and therefore, it cannot be framed as a direct response to the operationalization of the ICC; ICC-AU
relations led to the AU court being fast-tracked.
13
See generally Jean-Baptise Jeangène Vilmer, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court:
counteracting the crisis,” International Affairs 92.6 (2016): 1319-1342; Tim Murithi, “Between Political
Justice and Judicial Politics: Charting a Way Forward for the African Union and the International Criminal
Court,” in Africa and the International Criminal Court, eds. Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, and Moritz
Vormbaum (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014), 179-194.
14
AU PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII), 21 July 2008. Note that Sudan has neither signed nor ratified the Rome
Statute and the case was referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council.
15
Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court, AU Decisions and Declarations.
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1, October 2013, §10, at (iv): NOW DECIDES (iv) To fast track the process of
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regional court was rooted in AU concern over the indictment of sitting heads of state, but
was mostly reactionary to the operationalization of the ICC altogether.16
In an effort to fast-track the process, the AU Assembly adopted the ‘Malabo
Protocol’ in 2014, designed to expand the mandate of the already drafted African Court
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to include jurisdiction over fourteen serious
international crimes including genocide (Article 28B), war crimes (Article 28D), crimes
against humanity (Article 28C), and aggression (Article 28M), among other transnational
crimes.17 The scope of the Malabo Protocol is vast, far greater than any other
international criminal justice mechanism. For example, it criminalizes trafficking with
respect to persons (Article 28J), drugs (Article 28K), and hazardous waste (Article 28L),
the illicit exploitation of natural resources (Article 28L Bis) and enumerates terrorism
(Article 28G) and corruption (Article 28I) as distinct international crimes, among others.
In addition, the Malabo Protocol includes corporate criminal liability (Article 46C),
which is an important inclusion especially in the African context. The Malabo Protocol
reflects region-specific crimes, which have profound socioeconomic and political
consequences on the continent. The ACJHR is structured to have three sections: General
Affairs, Human and Peoples Rights, and International Criminal Law. The focus of this
paper is solely on the third.
The Malabo Protocol has been heavily criticized for its Article 46A bis, which
deals with immunities and says: “No charges shall be commenced or continued before the
Court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or
entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions,
during their tenure of office.”18

expanding the mandate of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) to try international
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
16
Robert Eno, “The Malabo Protocol and Complementarity of International Criminal Justice: Challenges
and Prospects,” in Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, ed. Evelyn Ankumah (Africa Legal Aid, 2018), 30-38, at 31. Consider also that the United Nations
Security Council refused to consider deferral requests in the al-Bashir case in the interest of stabilizing
peace talks/negotiations in Sudan.
17
Malabo Protocol, Art. 28A.
18
Malabo Protocol, Art. 46A bis.
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This inclusion frames the argument that the ACJHR is merely an attempt to perpetuate a
culture of impunity for leaders who commit the most egregious crimes on the continent.19
It is worth noting that the Rome Statute lifts immunity for heads of state or government
under Article 27 (irrelevance of official capacity).20 However, customary law provides
immunity for heads of state and other senior government officials both at home and
abroad.21 Therefore, Article 27 may be viewed in opposition to established international
legal standards with respect to absolute personal immunity afforded to heads of state,
whether at home or in a foreign country on official business.22 The juxtaposition of head
of state immunity within the Rome Statute and customary international law is
inconsistent at best, particularly as it applies to non-States Parties vis-à-vis United
Nations Security Council referrals.23 It is for this reason that the AU has requested an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the status of immunity for
heads of state and government leaders, which is yet to be delivered.24
As such, viewing Article 46A bis of the Malabo Protocol as a digression of
international criminal law lacks cogent justification beyond moral appeal, which is
nevertheless important. However, the ICC is the only court that mandates the irrelevance
of official capacity universally and has been mostly unsuccessful at implementing it.25

19

See Max du Plessis, “Shambolic, shameful and symbolic: Implications of the African Union’s immunity
for African leaders,” Institute for Security Studies, November 2014, available at
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper278.pdf; accessed 10 June 2019.
20
The Rome Statute, Art. 27.
21
Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, “A Seed for World Peace Growing in Africa: The Kampala Amendments on
the Crime of Aggression and the Monsoon of Malabo,” in The International Criminal Court and Africa:
One Decade On, ed. Evelyn A. Ankumah (Intersentia, 2016), 347-400, at 369. See also Judgment in the
Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Corr), Appeals
Chamber, 6 May 2019.
22
Roseanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and
International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 169. See also Paola Gaeta,
“Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7.2
(2009): 315-332; Asad Kiyani, “Al-Bashir and the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity,” Chinese
Journal of International Law 12 (2013): 467-508.
23
The Rome Statute, Art 98: Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender,
which may be viewed as conflicting with Article 27(1), i.e. irrelevance of official capacity.
24
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Challenging ICC, AU seeks opinion on head of state
immunities from top UN court, 1 February 2018, available at
www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20180201/globaljustice-weekly-au-seeks-icj-opinion-head-stateimmunities-witnesses-take-stand; accessed 2 June 2019.
25
The ICC has indicted al-Bashir (arrest warrant outstanding/unexecuted), Kenyatta and Ruto (charges
dropped). Gaddafi (deceased), former head of state: Gbagbo (acquitted).
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While there are important normative imperatives for saying that official capacity does not
matter and there is universal jurisdiction for violations of international criminal law, there
are also tangible political and legal difficulties with implementing this ideal. Most
notably, the ICC lacks the ability to function effectively without the cooperation of
states.26 While there are few, if any, noble arguments to support head of state immunity
for international crimes, the lack of cooperation and political will to arrest and surrender
individuals indicted by the ICC is incredibly damaging to the legitimacy and reputation
of the Court altogether. The unfortunate current reality is such that even if the Malabo
Protocol comes into force with Article 46A bis, it will be of little consequence to heads of
state in Africa, whether indicted by the ICC or not.27

9.2

The Peculiar Nexus of Law and Politics

Setting up realistic expectations and reasonable parameters for the operationalization of
international criminal law is necessary. Imposing transnational authority is only as
effective as the commitment on the part of states to be subject to it. Thus, the diffusion of
international norms such as the irrelevance of official capacity under international
criminal law at the ICC is contingent on buy-in by states. Not all norms will diffuse
evenly across time and space. Implementing strategies to facilitate meaningful dialogue
may be useful to reach a shared understanding of ‘international criminal justice.’ Yet, it is
unsurprising that the AU is looking inward to establish legal systems that accurately
reflect afro-centric, regional perspectives otherwise referred to as ‘African Solutions for
African Problems.’
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In contrast, the Rome Statute was born out of consensus-based negotiation and
compromises were struck in order to ensure its success.28 The nature of political
negotiation complicates coherence to varying degrees. However, it is important to
consider that “the aim of the [Rome] Statute is not to negate sovereignty… which
illustrates clearly that the concerns of States with respect to their sovereign interests in
criminal justice was at the forefront of the negotiations from the earliest stages.”29
Complex political realities complicate the international criminal law initiative in
substantive and uneven ways. The point is not that the ICC had (has) no moral or legal
basis to be involved in African situations. The hypocrisy lies in the ICC’s inability to
intervene in most other places due to political bargaining and/or alliance. This is not
unfair to Africans, it is unfair to victims who are denied justice on political bases. The
double standards which are clearly visible in the administration of ‘international justice’
reveal substantive cleavages created by deep politicization.30
The AU-ICC narrative typically pits the organization against the institution on the
basis of sovereign interference, the unfair and biased focus on Africans, and opposing
interpretations of customary international law.31 Explicably, the ACJHR may (ostensibly)
contribute to the idea of universal jurisdiction by offering an African alternative to filling
immunity gaps and contributing to the proliferation of justice for international crimes
committed on the continent. It is also worth noting that there is no one monolithic antiICC position shared by ‘Africa’ or the constitutive populations of AU member states.
Most often, it is the states which have been the target(s) of ICC investigation and
prosecution that are particularly disapproving and scathing of the institution. Curiously,
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even some of the strongest critics of the ICC within the AU remain members of both.32
On this basis, it is important to consider the potential integration of the Malabo Protocol
within the Rome Statute System under the auspice of positive complementarity.
The AU has made efforts to work with the ICC on the idea of regional
complementarity with respect to the ACJHR. One approach might be to amend the Rome
Statute to include regional courts in its conception of complementarity. For example,
Kenya has submitted a proposed amendment to the Rome Statute to the Working Group
on Amendments with respect to the Preamble of the Rome Statute. As previously noted,
the Preamble of the Rome Statute says: “Emphasizing that the International Criminal
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.”33
Kenya has proposed that it be amended to read: “Emphasizing that the
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to
national and regional criminal jurisdictions.”34 To elaborate, the Kenyan delegation
explained that regional complementarity “is not a way to oust the ICC. It is the opposite.
The regional jurisdiction gets just the first bite. National jurisdiction may be difficult to
exercise. Rather than spring-boarding [from national to international jurisdiction], the
ICC would be what it was meant to be, the last resort.”35 The Kenyan delegate also
identified that the proposal to include regional courts would “allow judicial proceedings
to take place closer to the location where the alleged crimes had been committed.”36
Through this lens, regional complementarity is a compelling and useful concept. Framed
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as an intermediary and cooperative jurisdictional mechanism, regional courts such as the
ACJHR may yield greater prospects for justice than national courts and the ICC alone.37
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that national jurisdictions should
always get the first bite. It is a state’s primary responsibility and obligation to investigate
and prosecute these crimes. Difficulties aside, the diffusion of obligation should begin at
the national level. This would be the best way to ensure that judicial proceedings take
place closest to where the alleged crimes were committed and foster the greatest sense of
‘local’ justice. National jurisdictions should necessarily endeavour to build their capacity
in order to prosecute these crimes. This will establish agency and ownership over the
justice process and will (likely) contribute to greater localized deterrence. Regional
jurisdictions may serve as an effective middle-ground between national and international
jurisdictions to prosecute cases which require specialization and high degrees of human
capital and judicial capacity to succeed. Prima facie, more justice is better than less and
local mechanisms allow victims to see and feel that justice has been done. Situating
international criminal law within its broader objective(s) indicates a need to fill impunity
gaps in new and creative ways.
However, it would be remis to not point out that the Malabo Protocol excludes the
ICC and international jurisdictions from its conception of complementarity. Article 46H,
Complementary Jurisdiction (1), says: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall be
complementary to that of the National Courts, and to the Courts of the Regional
Economic Communities where specifically provided for by the Communities.”38
Article 46(H) also enumerates that the ACJHR would only have jurisdiction if the state is
unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation and prosecution. This keeps the
caseload down at the ACJHR while simultaneously encouraging national and regional
courts to build their capacity and commitment to investigate and prosecute egregious
crimes.
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The exclusion of international jurisdictions and the ICC in particular from the
principle of complementarity in the Malabo Protocol raises some suspicions about the
authenticity of a vision of mutual cooperation and/or assistance. While the Rome
Statute’s exclusion of regional jurisdictions can be reconciled by the fact that no such
institutions existed at the time of drafting, the Malabo Protocol was drafted in 2014
(sixteen years after the Rome Statute). This omission has subjected the Malabo Protocol
to strong criticism. For example, Garth Abraham has argued that, “the only reasonable
interpretation of this exclusion can be that it is a conscious snub to the ICC and aims
specifically to protect African HOSG [heads of state and government] and senior
government officials from prosecution.”39
On the other hand, “Don Deya, director of PALU [Pan African Lawyers Union],
the organisation that was tasked with drafting the Protocol, is adamant that throughout the
process it has been clear that the ACJHR intends to cooperate with, and complement the
ICC.”40 This inconsistency may be reflective of what Max du Plessis referred to as “a
case of irresponsible treaty making.”41 Nevertheless, in the absence of a clearly
enumerated formal relationship, alternative approaches are required. According to
Knotternus and de Volder, “there are also other avenues to establish a formal relationship
between the courts, including the auxiliary documents of the Criminal Chamber, which
will have to regulate its procedural functioning, and the possibility of a memorandum of
understanding or relationship agreement between the African Court and the ICC.”42 Yet,
(outside of the immunity issue) the drafters of the Malabo Protocol seem to view the
intended relationship between the ACJHR and ICC as a complementary one, which seeks
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to incorporate an intermediary regional focus into the existing international criminal
justice framework.43 This is an avenue that may yield several benefits to victims, national
jurisdictions, regional groups of states and peoples, and the ICC;44 this ought to be given
fair consideration by civil society, practitioners, and academics altogether.

9.3

Interpreting the Complementarity Principle Positively

and Purposively
An understanding of complementarity based on a positive interpretation is imperative to
the success of the ICC and the international criminal justice project as a whole. In support
of regional complementarity, it has been argued that “a purposive interpretation of the
[complementarity] principle can include regional courts. In assessing the admissibility of
a case before the Court, it is important to consider whether any action, if any, has been
taken not only in the national courts of the State, but also at regional courts.”45 Some
judges interpret the law by looking at the words and give them their usual and natural
interpretation, otherwise understood as the ‘textual’ or ‘ordinary meaning’ approach to
interpretation. This approach is said to reinforce the promise of objectivity and neutrality.
On the other hand, purposive approaches provide judges with a broader scope to develop
the law, since the aim is to determine the “normative message that arises from the text…
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interpretation shapes the content of the norm ‘trapped’ inside the text.”46 Importantly,
judges do remain bound by the text of the statute: “That language sets the outer limits of
any possible interpretation… one cannot read into them what they do not contain.”47 On
this basis, it is useful to conceptualize what the ‘fundamental values’ of complementarity
are and how its language might allow the ICC judges to incorporate regional jurisdictions
under its purview.
Employing a purposive approach to an interpretation of the complementarity
principle is necessary yet challenging. The nature of the Rome Statute negotiations
resulted in high politicization, compromise, and intentionally built-in ‘constructed’
ambiguities.48 At the same time, the notion that international criminal law ought to be
approached with the same rigidity as domestic criminal law is deeply flawed.
International criminal law requires a supportive international political environment. The
legitimacy of the international criminal justice project is subject to scrutiny by
individuals, states, organizations, institutions, and civil society. Therefore, although
international criminal law is an enhanced form of domestic legal systems, its scope and
character are markedly different.49 This is especially true of the ICC, which is a
complicated hybrid of civil and common law systems, has six official languages, and has
eighteen judges with unique backgrounds and perspectives (both legally and personally).
Therefore, approaching the Rome Statute with a degree of sensible flexibility paired with
ongoing dialectical/deliberative processes to arrive at reasoned and consistent
interpretations of the law will be essential to the success of the ICC.
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Practically speaking, it seems that a purposive interpretation of complementarity
under the Rome Statute requires that the ICC be used fundamentally as a court of ‘last
resort’ and maintain the primacy of state sovereignty. According to former ICC
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo: “As a consequence of complementarity, the number
of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary,
the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of
national institutions, would be a major success.”50 Ocampo was referring to national
institutions, though the point ought to stand for regional courts as well. Complementarity
in its simplest form suggests that the fewer number of cases at the ICC, the better the
court is doing, provided that the matters are being prosecuted elsewhere. Therefore, an
intermediary between domestic and international jurisdictions seems to embody the spirit
of complementarity. However, the idea that a regional body could act as a check on
national mechanisms and the adjoining responsibility to prosecute extraordinary
international crime implies a power-sharing arrangement with the ICC, since both will
function as supranational institutions with (potentially, but not necessarily) competing
mandates. It also requires that the regional court and the ICC be cooperative with other
relevant institutions and each other in order to function as a ‘complement’ and provide
mutual assistance in the truest sense. This is not impossible and could foreseeably
strengthen each jurisdictional level if executed effectively.
A purposive and positive interpretation of complementarity would suggest that the
ICC should not investigate or prosecute the same crimes as the ACJHR, if it were to be
effective in its work. As Knottnerus and de Volder argue,
When the African Court has already decided to investigate or prosecute crimes
that are also covered by a preliminary examination or investigation of the ICC, the
Prosecutor of the ICC should not proceed with a prosecution against the same
persons on the basis that this is not in the interests of justice (Article 53) or
possibly because these cases are inadmissible as the concerned persons have
already been tried for the same conduct by another court (ne bis in idem, article
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20). The same logic should also withhold the Prosecutor of the African Court to
address cases that fall within its jurisdiction, but have already been completed by
the ICC.51
The significant challenge is one of cooperation and mutual assistance at the institutional,
governmental, and individual level(s).52 Nevertheless, the purpose of complementarity is
to limit the involvement of the ICC and nudge states (or in this case, a regional grouping
of states) to prosecute violations of international criminal law. A positive and purposive
interpretation of complementarity demands a pragmatic approach at multiple levels of
interpretation, understanding, and enforcement.
The principle of complementarity means that international criminal justice in
Africa is not synonymous with the ICC. While the ICC is one vehicle for the
operationalization of international criminal justice, it is not necessarily the only one, nor
should it be. The ICC was never intended to monopolize international criminal justice in
Africa, or anywhere for that matter. Consider the expansion of the ACJHR as a potential
trade-off. In the worst case, it might insulate sitting heads of state and senior government
officials from accountability. On the other, it will expand subject matter jurisdiction to
include crimes that are especially relevant to the continent, but beyond the scope of the
Rome Statute.53 Consideration must be given to the idea that ‘international criminal
justice’ could exist alongside or perhaps even outside of the Rome Statute system. One is
not necessary ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than the other, it is simply different. It is important to
emphasize that this remains subject to proper funding and support by states.
To be sure, the ACJHR and the ICC have been criticized on similar grounds:
namely, the ICC has been said to cover too many international crimes, even narrowly
defined.54 Paradoxically, the ICC is also questioned about not covering enough serious
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crimes, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, for example.55 Unlike the Rome Statute
(which was limited by international negotiation constraints), the model espoused by the
ACJHR expands jurisdiction in a flexible way, which is necessary to prosecute offenders
responsible for a myriad of crimes that are harmful to civilians. The expansion of crimes
seeks to address the underlying and/or root causes of violent conflict on the continent.
Moreover, since the focus is on mid-level suspects, the likelihood of states obstructing
the process allows for laying the foundation for later charges by the ICC against senior
offenders if coordinated effectively as a robust system of international criminal law.
The ICC is the best victims can hope for in many cases and falls somewhere on
the ideational spectrum between ‘something is better than nothing’ and setting global
standards for international criminal justice. Including other modes of justice will not
delegitimize, destabilize, or dismantle the international criminal justice project as a
whole. Rather, it could strengthen the regime by fostering a sense of local ownership,
agency, and commitment to the project. Advancing this type of thinking depends on a
confidence in the broad norms that underpin the Rome Statute. After all, the ICC will still
be there to dispense justice if the ACJHR substantively fails to do so, intervening where
and when it should– as a last resort. Manifestations of privilege associated with the rigid
advancement of universalist ‘best-practice’ could sometimes do more harm than good. At
a minimum, it risks stagnating the growth and development of the international criminal
justice system and local capacity-building efforts by eschewing a monolithic
interpretation and application which lacks local buy-in.
Some argue that the likelihood of states establishing regional tribunals with
overlapping subject-matter jurisdiction with the ICC should be expected over time. For
example, Jackson says, “these may be continent wide, as with the African Court, or
multilateral, or even bilateral, where two states establish a criminal tribunal to prosecute
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crimes in a specific conflict.”56 Pragmatically, as with most courts, the ICC is limited
with respect to funding and resources.57 After all, the Rome Statute does not restrict its
member states from entering other treaties such as regional groupings or organizations
with a mandate to address similar things.58 Strategic cooperation at national, regional, and
international levels could offer more efficient, complete, and cost-effective approaches to
justice in Africa. Setting clear expectations, engaging in mutual assistance, and building
capacity at national and regional levels will keep the pressure off of the ICC, as
complementarity intended.59 Thus far, an analysis and theoretical framing for thinking
about regional approaches to international criminal law and complementarity using the
example of the ACJHR has been presented. The following sections consider tangible
examples to enrich the analysis above and seek to address practical concerns about the
integration of regional mechanisms (the ACJHR in particular), into the landscape of the
international criminal law system.

9.4

Innovative Regional Approaches to International Justice

Interestingly, the Rome Statute does not specifically address the role of ad hoc, hybrid, or
special courts/tribunals with respect to complementarity. Although typically viewed as a
composite of national jurisdictions, they have a distinct character from usual domestic
courts based on ties to the United Nations and the international community more broadly.
This is important to consider given the recent resurgence of special tribunals and hybrid
courts as a mode of dispensing justice in Africa.60
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The Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic (CAR) is a good
example of this. In April 2015, the Central African Transitional Parliament adopted
organic law 15-003 establishing the Special Criminal Court (SCC) to prosecute the most
serious crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.61 The SCC
employs international and national staff and applies a combination of CAR law (Central
African Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure) alongside international legal norms
to deliver justice for victims of the atrocious conflict(s) there. Most important, the SCC’s
hybridity stems from its combination of law and process.
The SCC was designed to operate alongside ICC involvement, since there are two
ICC referrals in CAR. Situation I covers the period since 2002 (peak violence in 2002
and 2003) and Situation II covers 2012 onwards (peak violence between 2012-2015).62
Yet, the ICC has been limited in its indictments and prosecutions.63 Conjoined efforts on
the part of the United Nations and the government of CAR to stabilize the country
contributed to the establishment of the SCC, albeit through domestic legislation alone.
Labuda argues that, “[f]rom a purely legal perspective, the SCC is indeed a state court
operating on the basis of a national law, which in turn suggests that genuine proceedings
undertaken by the SCC’s organs could render a case inadmissible in line with Article 17
of the ICC Statute.”64 Nevertheless, it is important to consider how the SCC fits
alongside the ICC in terms of complementarity since the enumeration of special or hybrid
courts does not appear in the Rome Statute and the SCC has some distinctly international
components in terms of staff and UN support that supersede strict interpretations of
domestic or national court systems.
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The SCC’s relationship with the ICC could be considered controversial. The
SCC’s Article 37 says that if the ICC Prosecutor exercises jurisdiction over a specific
case, it has primacy.65 According to Labuda, “the SCC has primacy but only if the ICC is
not involved… In terms of jurisdictional priority, the ICC comes first, then the SCC, and
last are the ordinary CAR courts.”66 Understood in this way, the SCC contradicts the idea
of the ICC being a court of last resort. The Special Prosecutor will be unable to
investigate an individual that the ICC is already pursuing, or least of all will be required
to ask the Prosecutor of the ICC for permission to engage with suspects under her
(potential) purview, which is “irreconcilable with even the widest interpretations of
complementarity under Article 17.”67 Complementarity requires that the ICC yield to any
court willing or able to prosecute egregious international crimes.
The ICC is not bound by SCC law and will continue to rely on the Rome Statute
in its operation. Therefore, a purposive and positive understanding of complementarity
will reaffirm the ICC as a court of last resort and encourage the Special Prosecutor to
pursue individuals at the highest levels of responsibility at the SCC and CAR courts. This
situation is hypothetical at present since investigations did not begin until last year,
though a relationship between the ICC, SSC, and CAR courts could present a novel
approach to international criminal justice in CAR and perhaps in the international
community more broadly.
The Habré case at the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) in Senegal is a
notable example of universal jurisdiction and international criminal justice in Africa.68
The EAC was a court created by the AU to see justice done for victims in Chad who
suffered under Habré’s rule from the years 1982-1990. In effect, the EAC was mandated
to prosecute international crimes in Dakar, Senegal “on behalf of Africa.”69 The former
Chadian head of state was convicted of crimes against humanity. This has been
considered a landmark case in many respects and has been described as an “excellent
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example of how regional solutions in Africa could and should work.”70 This case was the
first time that a former head of state was tried in an African court. AU Commission
Chairperson Dr. Dlamini Zuma said that “the judgment comes at a time when the AU is
actively fighting impunity and promoting accountability for egregious wrongs… the
judgment by the EAC, being an African Union mechanism, is significant in that it
reinforces the AU’s principle of African solutions to African problems.”71 The EAC was
created inside in the existing Senegalese court structure.72 Its mandate was to prosecute
Habré and all “person or persons most responsible” for international crimes including
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture.73 The statute relied largely
on the definitions of crimes contained within the Rome Statute. The EAC was a mixed
system, since the legal system in Senegal is French-based. This allowed for victims’
participation in the proceedings, to be represented by legal counsel, and to seek
reparations. The process was well sequenced; Senegal and Chad signed a legal
cooperation agreement with the AU regarding testimonies, declarations, and the
transportation and security of witnesses and experts.74 This case demonstrates that mutual
assistance and cooperation can be possible, but only if political will, human capital, and
overall capacity allow.75
Trends in international relations and international criminal law seem to suggest
that opening up the discussion with respect to complementarity is not only appropriate,
but necessary. It is unclear how national jurisdictions fundamentally differ from
jurisdictions established by groups of states or international organizations such as the
United Nations. This is not necessarily a competitive or mutually exclusive ‘nationalregional-hybrid-international’ scenario, or an inherent transfer of authority in any
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direction. On this basis, both the ACJHR and the ICC could operate in a mutually
cooperative manner if timed, sequenced, and prioritized strategically from the outset.
Regional mechanisms such as the ACJHR could be an essential part of a robust system of
global justice.76 The important thing is to make clear the expectations and roles of each
jurisdiction now in order to best realize the shared commitment to increased justice and
accountability in Africa for victims and perpetrators of egregious international crimes.
The ACJHR has fifteen signatories and no ratifications,77 which nevertheless demands
some targeted preparation and strategizing in the interim. Practical concerns aside, at a
minimum, the enumeration of an African vision of international criminal law offers a
meaningful lens through which to evaluate the project’s success both on the continent and
more generally.

9.5

Resolving Competing Mandates

Informed by interviews with elites with specific relevant knowledge, an ideal distribution
of investigatory and prosecutorial roles has been imagined. In its simplest structure,
national jurisdictions would investigate and prosecute foot soldiers, regional jurisdictions
would pursue rebel leaders, military commanders or intermediaries, and the ICC would
deal with heads of state and senior government officials.78 The representation below
highlights the distribution of responsibility which is necessarily inverted in terms of
caseload (volume), but (more) equal in terms of maximizing jurisdictional capacity
regarding the culpability of individuals targeted at each level. For illustrative purposes, a
national jurisdiction could foreseeably prosecute hundreds and thousands of foot soldiers,
the ACJHR could prosecute less than fifty commanders or leaders, and the ICC one to
five individuals. Jurisdictional demands vary in terms of expertise, resources, and
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capacity, depending on the seniority of individual suspects and the corresponding crimes
being investigated and prosecuted. Parsing out an equitable distribution of jurisdictional
fora helps to facilitate mutual cooperation and assistance and eliminates an unfair burden
on any or all system(s). The interrelationship between the crimes covered by the ACJHR
and the core crimes covered by the Rome Statute will establish links to root causes and a
more holistic approach to criminal justice. The ACJHR may be beneficial in isolation,
though its greatest strategic advantage for the development of international criminal law
is that it offers the potential for progressive developments in the holistic investigation and
targeted prosecution of crimes at the ICC.
This arrangement offers some key benefits. First, national jurisdictions would
undertake the greatest volume of cases, hopefully from all sides of the conflict. Although
almost all courts will have difficulty prosecuting government leaders, this approach is
highly important for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The crimes committed by foot
soldiers would conceivably be the most intimate, direct, and localized forms of violence
perpetrated against victims. Evidence gathering and investigation strategies, once
capacitated, will mimic existing domestic legal approaches, including modes of
accountability. The accused can be directly linked to the crime, easily identified, and
evidence gathered. Victims should have the opportunity to look their perpetrator in the
eye and see justice done; this yields greater prospects for transition, stability, and healing
in the wake of mass atrocity.
The significant point is that the immunity critiques only scratch the surface of
what is at issue. Pigeonholing the Malabo Protocol in the immunity provision undersells
its potential contribution to the continued development of a robust system of international
criminal justice. More importantly, it is helpful to recall that the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) retains the ability to refer cases to the ICC79 if the ACJHR and national
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jurisdictions fail to prosecute those most responsible for serious violations of
international criminal law. Eight of the eleven states that have signed the Malabo
Protocol are also States Parties to the Rome Statute and show no signs of withdrawing
from the ICC. The Malabo Protocol simply indicates who can be prosecuted regionally
and who cannot.80
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) might be used to explain
the treaty conflict and subsequent obligations of States Parties to both the Rome Statute
and the Malabo Protocol.81 The relevant question is which provision takes priority, since
at present the relationship between immunities (ratione personae) and a state’s legal
obligations are profoundly unclear.82 In this regard, the interpretative rule pacta sunt
servanda (the agreement shall be honoured) found in Article 26 of the VCLT is useful.83
There are two primary interpretations of the rule. The first does not favour the earlier
treaty but makes each treaty enforceable, “even though they may pose potentially
incompatible obligations.”84 The second interpretation favours the earlier treaty. The
important part is that under either interpretation, “Treaty I shall be honored unless a State
makes the policy choice of breaching and incurring responsibility.”85 This implies that
States Parties to both the Rome Statute and the Malabo Protocol will retain an obligation
to waive immunity and surrender suspects regardless of their official capacity or else
incur responsibility. Borgen explains, “The disagreement concerns the effect of pacta
sunt servanda on Treaty II: Is the second treaty abrogated or should it simply be followed
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to the fullest extent possible without frustrating the first treaty?”86 Some scholars argue
that this type of treaty conflict is resolved by the state choosing which obligation to
fulfill, referred to as the principle of political will.87 The underlying point is that States
Parties will be forced to make a decision to fulfill obligations to either the AU or the ICC,
but not both concerning this particular provision. The burden and risk of breaching either
or both treaties, it is argued, will lead states to negotiate a solution.88 However,
abrogating Treaty II (in this case the Malabo Protocol) makes little sense. Instead, it
should be followed to the fullest extent and prosecute everyone it can outside of heads of
state and government in the interest of positive complementarity and international
criminal justice more generally.
Importantly, the UNSC retains the power to refer anyone accused of bearing the
most responsibility for atrocious crimes to the ICC. Moreover, States Parties to both
treaties maintain an obligation to honour the Rome Statute according to the interpretive
rule pacta sunt servanda, even if the Malabo Protocol is being followed to the fullest
extent possible. This suggests that sitting heads of state and government officials will
remain captured by the Rome Statute, even if they cannot be prosecuted regionally.
Skeptics typically situate the Malabo Protocol against the backdrop of the
escalating crisis between the ICC and the AU. The strained relationship has had a
profound impact on the discourse. For example, it has been explained that “the charged
atmosphere appears to have left scant room for a detailed and comprehensive assessment
of the drafting of the Malabo Protocol, and for a calm evaluation [of] how the interplay of
national, regional and international jurisdiction could best advance the judicial response
to crimes of international concern.”89 This is a problem that needs to be addressed, since
calls for substantive consideration on the issue of integrating regional courts into an
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understanding of the concept of complementarity with the ICC can be found in AU
meeting transcripts as early as 2009.90 Opportunities for more (local) justice should be
supported, not dismissed. Most important, both the AU and ICC are receptive to the idea
of complementary regional courts, which indicates the significant potential of the
ACJHR.91
To be clear, the Malabo Protocol may have been accelerated due to tense relations
between the AU and the ICC, but the AU had been working on it since 2004.92 The
propensity to narrowly view the ACJHR as an attempt to insulate politically powerful
Africans from the ICC provides an incomplete and/or false narrative with respect to its
political and legal trajectory. The strategic approach identified above supports the view
that the ACJHR could effectively maximize its jurisdictional capacity by investigating
and prosecuting some of those most responsible for egregious crimes, even if this
excludes sitting heads of state and government. It is highly important to prosecute rebel
leaders, junta, military commanders, and other intermediaries between government and
soldiers on the ground in any idealized system of international criminal justice. It is
possible that the gap between who can be prosecuted regionally and who cannot is a
natural one, leading some to argue that leaders’ cases cannot succeed nationally and
regionally.93 Many of the reasons for this appear to be obvious: the political self-interest
of individuals and states insulate those with power. Ultimately, the capacity of national
and regional courts, as with the ICC, cannot be separated from the political will of states,
which is necessarily tied up with sovereign interests. Until universal jurisdiction is
adhered to, the ICC needs to endure the growing pains it is currently experiencing.
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A purposive approach to complementarity could alleviate some of the current
credibility and legitimacy pressures on the ICC. Specifically, some have argued that “the
Court is emerging as an institution where only rebels can be and will be successfully
prosecuted.”94 However, if regional courts such as the ACJHR could effectively
investigate and prosecute rebels, junta, or military leaders, this would free up human and
material resources for the ICC. This could allow the Office of the Prosecutor to develop a
more robust and targeted strategy for the successful prosecution of heads of state and
government, which is vitally important for the longevity of the institution. The primary
concern should always be what is best for justice, by any and all means possible.
The distribution of jurisdictional responsibility has the potentially cumulative
effect of uncovering more evidence and contributing to multi-level information sharing
and capacity building. This could be mutually constitutive in strategizing complex modes
of liability, which is required to hold heads of state and government to account at the
ICC.95 Establishing evidentiary ties between foot soldiers, military commanders, and
heads of state will establish linkages and culpability at various levels of perpetration.
Looking at complementarity in this way is more relational than vertical/hierarchical,
since each jurisdictional mechanism offers an opportunity for interdependence in order to
bolster, support, and strengthen the other–only if effective coordination and political will
allow. Neither the ACJHR nor the ICC would have primacy but would work together
towards constituting what Cassese refers to as “a system of international justice.”96
Regional agency and ownership over the international criminal justice project could
contribute to a renewed sense of commitment to ‘international criminal law’ as such and
work to establish a cooperative and trilateral international judicial system in African
contexts.
A pragmatic question considers the implications of competing obligations of
States Parties to both the Rome Statute and the ACJHR. Since a key aspect of
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complementarity is the integration of the Rome Statute into domestic law, it remains
unclear how double signatories might implement competing obligations, particularly
concerning the issue of immunity.97 For example, South Africa’s initial withdrawal from
the Rome Statute stemmed from its conflicting obligations to the AU and the ICC with
respect to the (non)arrest of al-Bashir.98 South Africa chose to uphold its regional and/or
strategic political commitments to the AU over and above those of the ICC when it
allowed al-Bashir to attend an African Union summit in Johannesburg and failed to arrest
and surrender him to the Court. The traditional customary immunity that South Africa
owed to the head of state and head delegate of Sudan at the AU summit clashed directly
with its obligations to the ICC. This raises suspicion about the nature of competing
obligations in international law, especially between AU-instruments such as the Malabo
Protocol and the Rome Statute. This also brings African regional political interests and
dynamics into the fold. The operation of international criminal law is more intersectional
than universal inasmuch as it is dispensed alongside complex (and perhaps competing)
political, moral, and legal realities. The (perceived) duality between the Malabo Protocol
and the Rome Statute raise important questions about the frictions between national,
regional, and international political and legal systems and possibilities for synergistic
justice.
Most telling, at the peak of the ‘ICC withdrawal movement’ in 2016, when
Burundi, The Gambia, and South Africa had initiated procedures to withdraw from the
Rome Statute, the most vocal critics that ‘should’ have followed suit never did (e.g.
Kenya, Namibia, and Uganda).99 This is further confused by the fact that the Gambia has
reversed its decision by deciding to stay in the ICC, and South Africa has also halted their
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withdrawal.100 Thus, Burundi remains the sole dissenter for transparent reasons.101 It is
important to emphasize that the ICC is a vehicle for much more than retribution; it is a
manifestation of norms and values and a promise to victims that even if domestic systems
fail, the rule of law endures. The Prosecutor of the ICC maintained her commitment to
continue with the investigation in Burundi until she left the Office of the Prosecutor in
2021, reaffirming this promise.
This demonstrates that African concerns with the ICC, outside of Burundi, are not
rooted in a desire to forego international legal obligations, or the rule of law, but are
instead a manifestation of unresolved dispute. This is further reflected in the soft
language enacted throughout the AU’s Proposed Withdrawal Strategy, which reads more
like a plea for reasoned deliberation and compromise than abandon.102 However, colonial
histories and longstanding power imbalances lend to the calls for African Solutions for
African Problems. Such structural imbalances ultimately shape a mutually constructed
skepticism on the part of both ‘Africa’ and ‘the West,’ which will continue to make
cooperation and trust difficult in the absence of a genuine dialectical process. The
positive point is that neither the ICC nor the AU seem to propose that the two courts are
in conflict or are necessarily incompatible. Nevertheless, although the ACJHR is an
innovative and creative solution in the abstract sense, making it a tangible reality remains
severely debilitated.
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9.6

An Operational, Yet Ineffective Court

More robust critiques of the Malabo Protocol stem from practical concerns rather than
principled ones. The funding demanded for running a regional court and the cost for
adding the additional chamber is crippling. For example, with respect to funding, “the
unit cost of a single trial for an international crime in 2009 was estimated to be US $20
million. This is nearly double the approved 2009 budgets for the African Court and the
African Commission standing at US $7 642 269 and US $3 671 766, respectively.”103 For
the purpose of comparison, “the ICC budget [in the same year]… for investigating just
three crimes, and not the raft of offences the African Court is expected to tackle–is more
than 14 times that of the African Court without a criminal component; and is just about
double the entire budget of the AU.”104 In 2012, the Pan-African Lawyers Union
estimated that it would cost $4.42 million USD and 211 people to staff the ACJHR.105 It
can be deduced that investigating and prosecuting international criminal cases on the
continent is flagrantly expensive. For example, the ICC’s budget continues to increase
annually. In 2016 the approved budget was 17.3% over what it was in 2015.106 States
have been reluctant to increase the budget of the ICC, but minimal growth has occurred.
In the case of the ACJHR, such a financial burden is plainly unrealistic.
Staffing a court with prosecutors, investigators, and judges requires significant
resources. The Protocol lacks a funding breakdown and it remains unclear where the
money might come from. This raises concerns with respect to independence from the
start. Furthermore, it has been argued that historic AU donors such as the European
Union may not be willing to finance the ACJHR based on the immunity provision.107 The
widespread disapproval on the part of the international community and global civil
society with respect to immunities may challenge the ACJHR’s ability to secure donors,
should the Malabo Protocol receive the necessary ratifications to enter into force.
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Looking internally, “the capacity of African states to muster the resources and
will to guarantee these facilities–even as many of them struggle to guarantee the
independence of their own domestic judicial institutions–is open to serious question.”108
Furthermore, for African States Parties to the ICC and the ACJHR, the double burden of
funding in addition to domestic obligations would be encumbering. This raises questions
not of willingness to prosecute, but of ability. The financial burden would be
extraordinary, which has led some to argue that the ACJHR is ‘stillborn.’109
Regionalizing international criminal justice may require a more pragmatic
approach than the ACJHR lays out. As du Plessis suggests, “Of course, we should all
applaud if the AU were in due course to unveil a comprehensively funded, strongly
resourced, legally sound, and politically backed African court that fearlessly pursues
justice for those afflicted by the continent’s warlords and dictators, at the same time as
fulfilling effectively its parallel human rights roles.”110 Unfortunately, the Malabo
Protocol is unlikely to have the capacity to satisfy each of these requirements at this time
or in the foreseeable future.

9.7

Conclusion

The prospect of the ACJHR offers a unique opportunity to forge the idea of regional
complementarity in the Rome Statute System. However, the strained relationship between
the AU and the ICC and insufficient resources may act as impediments to the tangible
realization of the ACJHR separately or mixed. Against this backdrop, such assumptions
are aggravated by the immunity provision contained in Article 46A bis of the Malabo
Protocol, which is further confused by the absence of a clearly defined relationship
between the ACJHR and the ICC. Each of these concerns makes the likelihood of
integrating the ACJHR within the ICC’s complementary schema extremely difficult.
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Notwithstanding this, a purposive interpretation of complementarity to include regional
jurisdictions presents interesting opportunities for (re)thinking and (re)situating the
principle in its broader socio-political-legal context. Perhaps more important, the
enumeration of an afro-centric approach to international criminal law offers an important
perspective through which to understand the strained AU-ICC relationship and way(s)
forward in the African context and more generally as part of a strategy aimed at
constructive reform.
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Chapter 10

10

Africa and the ICC Judiciary

Various attitudes and dynamics of the ICC judges have shaped the operation of the ICC
in visible ways. It is useful to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of the judiciary, since
it is an essential component of the Courts legitimacy and credibility. The aim of this
chapter is to explain some of the problems with the ICC bench, which have become a
focal point of concern by scholars and observers of the Court.1 This has a direct
application when viewed through the lens of Africa, since it is these judges who have
opined on the criminality solely of Africans, at the time of writing. It is necessary to
highlight that the problems identified within the judiciary are undergirded by assertions
of politicization throughout the state-based nomination and election processes via the
Assembly of States Parties (ASP), which directly affects the makeup of the bench in
discernible ways. This is directly correlated with the institutional design of the ICC as
enumerated by the Rome Statute with respect to judicial nomination and election
processes, but more pointedly with the way that states manipulate the judicial nomination
and election design features of the Court for political purposes.
It is impossible to divorce any credible evaluation of the ICC (including the
judiciary) from its relationship with African States Parties or ‘Africa’ more broadly, since
it is there where the Court has operated almost exclusively. It is equally important to
acknowledge that African governments and African individuals have engaged with, and
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occupied important roles within, various components of the ICC’s institutional structure.2
The so-called ‘Africa bias’ at the ICC has contributed to the proliferation of rhetoric that
the Court is merely a forum for Europeans to prosecute Africans.3 While it is
inappropriate to deny the complexities of colonialism and its impact on the global order
(of which the ICC is a part), it is likewise important to emphasize the agency exercised
by many African states and African individuals in the operationalization of the ICC, and
in the context of this chapter, the judiciary in particular. It is also necessary to
acknowledge ‘Africa’ and Africans as bona fide actors within the apparatus of the Court
and its structures, rather than continuing to view ‘Africa’ through the oppressive
rhetorical canon of European subjugation and paternalism. As Judge Solomy Balungi
Bossa from Uganda has argued, “hundreds of African legal practitioners have made the
International Criminal Court what it is. Frankly, it is absolutely ridiculous to accuse the
Court of being racist.”4 With respect to the nomination and election of judges at the ICC,
while it appears rational to criticize the ICC judges as individuals, it is also important to
challenge the States Parties that nominate and (perhaps more importantly) elect particular
candidates, which illuminates a deeper seated institutional and political problem.
The reality is that at the time of writing, African States Parties had nominated
more candidates to the ICC judiciary than any other region and had the third highest
number of judges elected to the bench in the Court’s history. Nonetheless, at the time of
writing, African defendants are the only ones who have been subject to ICC decisions–
many of which have been openly challenged by scholars, observers, and even the judges
themselves. For example, consider the acquittal (on appeal) of Jean-Pierre Bemba, former

2

Note, for example that former ICC Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria) served as President of the ICC
(2018-2020); Fatou Bensouda (The Gambia) served as the first Deputy Prosecutor under Luis MorenoOcampo and became the second Chief Prosecutor from 2012-2020.
3
See for example Dr. David Hoile, “Is the ICC a tool to recolonise Africa?” New African (31 March 2017),
available at https://newafricanmagazine.com/15261/; accessed 10 October 2020: “A hundred and twentythree years later, Europe appears to still be trying to steal both Africa and the Africans. They are now using
their new creation, the International Criminal Court (ICC), to steal Africans from Africa to put on showtrials in Western Europe.” The article goes on to argue that “Broadly, the ICC has emerged as a de facto
European court, funded by Europe, directed by Europe, and focused almost exclusively on the African
continent, and thereby serving Western political and economic interests in Africa.”
4
Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, “Africa and the International Criminal Court: Then and Now,” in Africa
and the International Criminal Court, eds. Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, Moritz Vormbaum (Springer,
2014), 19.
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Vice President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who was detained at the ICC
for over ten years. Similarly, former President of Côte d’Ivoire and associate Charles Blé
Goudé were acquitted at the trial stage when the defense successfully filed a motion that
there was ‘no case to answer’ after eight years in ICC custody. The administration of
justice at the ICC has been extraordinarily and unduly slow, which has had a
disproportionate impact on African suspects, survivors/witnesses, and relevant postconflict societies.
Notwithstanding this, Africans are strongly represented on the bench and have
been just as responsible for the judgements issued against Africans as any other judge(s).
To be sure, African judges have dealt with a significant number of situations and cases at
the ICC at the time of writing, across all divisions.5 Africans have been both subjects and
authors of justice at the ICC. The dynamism of this reality is important to reiterate in any
fair assessment of how ICC judges have contributed to international criminal justice,
most particularly in African contexts. It is worthwhile to unpack the merits of this
assertion in the context of the ICC judiciary at its various procedural stages, in order to
provide a meaningful analysis of how African states and Africans engage within and
outside of the various judicial processes at the Court, including: nomination of judicial
candidates, election of judicial candidates, and the decision-making of ICC judges. It is
plainly visible that ‘Africa’ permeates each of these procedural stages, and African states
and African judges have been equitably responsible for the shortcomings and deficiencies
of the bench at the ICC to date, while being disproportionately impacted by the same.

10.1

Technical Specifications: an overview of judicial
election processes at the ICC

Article 36 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) sets out criteria
for the qualification, nomination and election of judges. Judges are to be “persons of high

5

More specifically, at the time of writing, Chile Eboe-Osuji sat on fifteen cases; Antoine Kesia MbeMindua sat on twenty-four cases; Solomy Balungi Bossa sat on three cases; Reine Alapini-Gansou sat on
fifteen cases; Sanji Monageng sat on twenty-one cases; Fatoumata Dembélé Diarra sat on thirteen cases;
Akua Kuenyehia sat on twenty-three cases; and Joyce Aluoch sat on fifteen cases.
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moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their
respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices.”6 Judges are nominated
by States Parties and are elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP)
for a non-renewable (maximum) nine-year term. Typically, the ASP elects six judges per
election cycle. The ICC bench is comprised of eighteen judges, who are the individuals
that received the highest number of votes by the ASP. For the votes to count, a two-thirds
majority of the States Parties must be present and voting at the election meeting.7 All
States Parties to the Rome Statute are able to nominate one candidate for each election
cycle. The candidate need not be a national of the nominating state, but must be a
national of a States Party to the Rome Statute.
Each candidate’s suitability for the position is evaluated by the Advisory
Committee on the Nomination of Judges (ACN), the determinations of which are
disseminated to States Parties before the election. For illustrative purposes, the ACN
ranked the 2020 candidates into four categories:
(a) highly qualified: the candidate excels in terms of the experience and
knowledge about the Court and its jurisprudence; it is very likely that he/she
would be able to make an important contribution to the work of the Court;
(b) qualified: the candidate has some relevant experience and knowledge about
the Court; he/she could contribute to the work of the Court;
(c) only formally qualified: the candidate meets the requirements set out in the
Rome Statute for election as a judge, but it is uncertain if the candidate could
make a noteworthy contribution to the work of the Court;
(d) not qualified: the candidate does not meet the formal requirements set out in
the Rome Statute.8
The Committee is composed of nine members from all five regions and their
recommendations are based on the written and oral responses of candidates through

6

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), Article 36.3(a).
International Criminal Court: The Judges of the Court, available at https://www.icccpi.int/Publications/JudgesENG.pdf; accessed 4 July 2020.
8
Report on the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of its seventh session, ICCASP/19/11 (30 September 2020), 6.
7
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interview-based assessments. Importantly, in December 2019, the ASP by consensus
adopted a resolution to strengthen the advisory role of the ACN in an effort to better
guide States Parties in the nomination and election of judges.9 Candidates provide a
statement specifying how their experience amounts to the necessary experience in
criminal law or international law. They also provide a curriculum vitae, which is publicly
available on the ASP website. In sum, candidates are nominated by States Parties, are
subject to review by the ACN, and are elected by the ASP.
The Rome Statute breaks down specific representative requirements that directly
influence the makeup of the ICC bench. Candidates are required to be fluent in at least
one of the working languages of the Court, namely English and/or French.10 Further,
States Parties are required to consider nominating and electing candidates who will
provide a fair representation of the various legal systems of the world; equitable
geographic representation; a fair representation of female and male judges; and no two
judges can be nationals of the same state.11 The Rome Statute also particularizes the need
to include judges with legal expertise on issues such as violence against women and
children.12 To assure that the representative requirements outlined in the Rome Statute
are upheld, the ASP has provided a series of minimum voting requirements, which
specify how many judges are required based on professional experience, geographic
region, and gender. These representative requirements are reiterated on the ballot paper
during the election. In combination, the representative requirements outlined in the Rome
Statute and implemented by the ASP provide a clear framework for a presumably diverse
and equitable bench. Nevertheless, it is up to States Parties to nominate and elected the
best possible candidates, while remaining mindful of these key representative factors.

9

Resolution on the review of the procedure for the nomination and election of judges, Resolution ICCASP/18/Res.4 (6 December 2019).
10
Ibid., Art. 36.3(c). Note: this requirement has been viewed as a limiting factor by scholars in the Court’s
nascency, since many defendants do not speak either English and/or French. See: Julie Fraser and Brianne
McGonigle Leyh, eds., Intersections of Law and Culture at the International Criminal Court (United
Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2020).
11
Rome Statute, Art. 36(7); Art. 8(a).
12
Ibid., Art. 36.8(b).
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10.1.1

Practical Consequences of Judicial Nomination and Election
Processes at the ICC

On this cursory basis, the nomination and election of ICC judges is a highly political
process, since they are both nominated and elected by States Parties to the Rome Statute.
This structural politicization has the potential to complicate the overall merit and quality
of the bench at the ICC at both the nomination and election stage(s). Arguably, the
primacy of meritocracy is further troubled by the Rome Statute’s representative
requirements, specifically: gender, geographical region, and legal competence.13
Fulfilling the prescriptive representative requirements contained in the Rome Statute, by
its very design, could restrict candidates based on arbitrary factors such as gender and/or
region and/or legal competence. Consequentially, it is quite possible that a superior
candidate may be unsuccessful if they do not ‘tick the necessary boxes’ as set out in the
Rome Statute and articulated by the ASP.14 Notwithstanding this, equitable representation
on the bench was an institutional design choice made by the drafters of the Rome Statute.
This appears logical in the sense that it is an international court and the panel of those
making judgements ought to reflect that fact. Nevertheless, it is similarly important to
acknowledge that such a design choice can be a limiting factor in terms of overall quality
and merit when strictly executed in practice, depending on the credible engagement on
the part of states to nominate and elect the best possible candidates among the spectrum
of qualifying factors. This is because states may nominate candidates for political or
arbitrary reasons, which has to the potential to trouble the pool of candidates from which
States Parties are required to choose from. This is not an inherent problem linked to the
institutional design of the ICC per se, but with the cavalier engagement by States Parties

13

Legal competence refers to the process whereby States Parties nominate candidates under either List A
(competence in criminal law) or List B (competence in international law – i.e. human rights, humanitarian,
etc.). See specifically Article 36(b) of the Rome Statute, which states, “Every candidate for election to the
Court shall: (i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant
experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings
[List A]; or (ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as international
humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity
which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court [List B].”
14
See ICC Assembly of States Parties: Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.6, “Annex I: Illustrative tables of
minimum voting requirements” available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASPASP3-Res-06-ENG.pdf, 6-7 accessed 2 February 2021.
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to adequately contribute to, and improve the quality of, the ICC judiciary through
rigorous and transparent national nomination procedures and legitimate international
election processes. This is important because States Parties need to demonstrate credible
commitment to the institutional robustness, legitimacy, and credibility of the ICC in all
facets, including the judiciary in order to withstand internal and external pressures on the
Court.

10.1.2

Representative Requirements in Practice

The Rome Statute enumerates a minimum gender requirement of at least six women or
men on the bench. It is worth noting that the current makeup of the bench reflects a
perfect gender balance: there are nine women and nine men on the bench following the
2020 judicial election. The ICC has been lauded by scholars and observers as being a
comparatively progressive international Court in terms of its gender balance, which is a
fair assertion throughout most of the Court’s history.15 Such claims importantly
emphasize the gendered nature of international law and international politics beyond the
scope of the ICC, but also suggest that the gender balance on the bench can shift
progressively or regressively over time, based on the mindful and inclusive nominations
and elections of candidates by states.16 It is interesting to note that leading up to the 2020
election, there were half as many women (six) as there were men (twelve) on the bench.
For illustrative purposes, the 2020 election of six judges had nine female candidates and
eleven male candidates who were nominated by States Parties. There were four outgoing

15

See Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,”
in International Courts and the African Woman Judge, eds. Josephine Jarpa Dawuni and Akua Kuenyehia
(New York: Routledge, 2018), at 63: “Despite the progress made by the Rome Statute in achieving gender
parity on the bench, the outcome of women’s access to other international benches remains uneven.”
However, when the analysis is expanded to consider the total number of ICC judgeships, the gender
balance appears to improve (27 total men, 20 total women). Importantly, there was a time when the ICC
bench was comprised by a majority of women.
16
See Nienke Grossman, “Achieving Sex-Representative International Court Benches,” The American
Journal of International Law, 110 (2016): 82. In surveying the gender balance of international court
benches in 2015, Grossman argues, “For courts where states were required by statute to take sex into
account when nominating and voting for judges, a higher percentage of women sat on the bench in mid
2015.” She concludes that among those courts (including the ICC, European Court of Human Rights,
African Court on Human Peoples’ Rights, and the ad litem benches of the International Criminal Tribunals
for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, thirty-two percent of the judges were women as opposed to fifteen
percent among courts that did not require a ‘fair representation’ of women and men judges.
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male judges and two outgoing female judges, which presented an opportunity to
reprioritize an equitable gender balance on the bench.17 On a positive note, the Rome
Statute safeguards the inclusion of women judges at the ICC and is reflective of a
progressive development in the landscape of international law and international criminal
justice. Throughout the Court’s history, of the fifty-four judges ever to be elected to the
ICC, twenty-nine have identified as male and twenty-five as female–not a completely
perfect balance, but a notable and progressive one, nonetheless. The voting requirements
based on gender were illustrated by the Assembly of States Parties in Table 4 of Annex 1:
Illustrative tables of minimum voting requirements, which suggest that if four women
remained on the bench after 2020, at least two women must be elected by minimum
voting requirement. With respect to men, if eight remained on the bench after 2020, the
minimum voting requirement would be fulfilled. Thus, it was conceivable that all
incoming judges could have been women in this election cycle. While this did not
happen, the ASP went above the minimum voting requirement with respect to gender by
electing four incoming female judges. This is significant for achieving the goal of gender
parity in the international legal landscape.
In terms of judicial competence, candidates are elected from either ‘List A’–those
having competence and experience in criminal law and procedure, or ‘List B’–those
having competence and experience in international law, such as international
humanitarian law or international human rights law.18 According to article 36.3(b) of the
Rome Statute,
Every candidate for election to the Court shall:
(i)

Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the
necessary relevant experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, advocate or
in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings [List A]; or

17

The outgoing Judges were elected in 2011. The outgoing male Judges include Howard Morrison (United
Kingdom); Robert Fremr (Czech Republic); Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria); Anthony Thomas Aquinas
Carmona (Trinidad and Tobago). The outgoing female Judges include Miriam Defensor-Santiago
(Philippines) and Olga Venecia Herrera Carbuccia (Dominican Republic).
18
Rome Statute, Art. 36(3)(i); Art. 36(3)(ii).
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(ii)

Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive
experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the
judicial work of the Court [List B].19

The Rome Statute requires that at least nine candidates be elected from List A and at least
five candidates be elected by List B. At the time of writing, there were eleven judges
elected from List A on the bench, and seven elected from List B. It is worth noting that at
the 2020 judicial election there were four remaining judges from List B on the bench,
which therefore required that at least one incoming judge be elected from List B to
satisfy the minimum requirement of five. Similarly, five outgoing judges were elected
from List A, which required that at least one incoming judge be elected from List A to
satisfy the minimum requirement of nine. It is important to emphasize that again in the
2020 election the ASP went above the minimum voting requirements by electing three
judges from List B and three judges from List A. This effectively increased the
representation of List B candidates on the bench altogether from five to seven. The
representation of judges elected from List A decreased from thirteen to eleven, reflecting
a rebalancing of the bench based on competence and experience. As a matter of practice,
the bench has emphasized List A candidates as a maxim–a natural consequence of the
construct of the Rome Statute. To be sure, of the fifty-four judges elected to the ICC to
date, thirty-three were elected from List A and twenty-one were elected from List B. It is
instructive to recall that the first judicial election in 2003 assembled the first ICC bench
with eight Judges from List B and ten Judges from List A. Thus, the current bench at the
time of writing reflects a (more) similar structure to the original judiciary on the basis of
competence and experience.
This was an unexpected shift because over time, the number of List B electees
had been reduced so as to allow only for the minimum number required by the Rome
Statute. The reasons for this were manifold; the strongest of which being that some
observers have argued that List B should be eliminated altogether, since it facilitates the
election of judges with no judicial training or experience (i.e. career diplomats and

19

Ibid., at 36.3 (b).
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academics).20 However, this is not a generalizable point of view and is certainly
contentious on the basis that List A Judges have made just as many problematic
judgements in the Court’s nascency as those elected by List B. The notion that career
academics or diplomats offer a unique perspective beyond a nuanced criminal law
background is not de facto incompatible with the intent and purpose of the ICC. It is
pertinent to reiterate that it is the responsibility of States Parties to nominate candidates
on the basis of merit, regardless of what list they are nominated from.
In addition, the Rome Statute calls for equitable geographic representation on the
bench. The ICC uses the five regions of the world as described by the United Nations to
frame geographic representation: Western European and Other States Group (WEOG);
Eastern European States; Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC);
African States; and Asia-Pacific States. Each region ought to have at least three judges
on the bench to be considered equitably represented. At the time of writing, the Western
European and Other States Group had the greatest geographic representation with five
judgeships; African States had four; the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States
had four; Eastern European States had three; and Asia-Pacific States had two. This
construct reflected a fair degree of regional parity, although Asia-Pacific States are
technically ‘underrepresented’ by one seat according to the Rome Statute.
This underrepresentation can be situated within its broader political context.
Specifically, the 2020 election of six judges had seven nominees from Latin American
and Caribbean States; seven nominees from African States; three nominees from Western
European and Other States; two nominees from Eastern European States; and one
nominee from Asia-Pacific States. In 2020, there were two outgoing Judges from Latin
American and Caribbean States, and one outgoing judge in each other region. Thus, to
fulfill the proposed regional voting requirements, two incoming judges ought to have
come from Latin American and Caribbean States; one from Eastern European States; and

20

Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 4: “In particular, so-called ‘List B candidates’ (those
candidates nominated for having ‘established competence in relevant areas of international law… and
extensive experience in a professional legal capacity’) often lack that experience [in criminal law and
procedure]… Similarly, the fact that so many government officials, including career diplomats, have
previously been elected to the ICC judgeships is a cause for concern.”
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one from Asia-Pacific States. Since only two nominees came from Eastern Europe, each
had a fifty-fifty chance of being successfully nominated on this basis alone.21 The point is
not to criticize these candidates on their merits, but rather to question whether States
Parties had done a sufficient job in nominating the best possible candidates for the job,
from the greatest number of states, to create a more competitive election environment.
Regional political dynamics should not influence a States Party’s willingness to nominate
qualified candidates, even if another country in the region has already submitted a
nomination. Regional apathy devalues the nomination and election process altogether,
which has far reaching consequences for the perceptive legitimacy of the Court.
This is particularly telling in the context of Asia-Pacific States, since the only
candidate put forward from the region in the 2020 election was Khosbayar Chagdaa from
Mongolia. Chagdaa had also been nominated in 2017 but was not elected. Judge Raul
Cano Pangalangan (Philippines) was outgoing, leaving a vacancy for a judge from the
region to maintain a balanced bench in terms of geographic representation, per the Rome
Statute. Prima facie, the vacancy of Judge Pangalangan ought to have secured the
successful election of Chagdaa in the interests of fair and equitable geographic
representation on the bench. The practice of regional groups nominating only the number
of candidates to fit the number of seats available for that group is referred to as a ‘clean
slate.’ Mackenzie et al. explain that in the context of the ICC, States Parties are not
formally obliged to vote for a ‘clean slate,’ “but they may decide to do so in order to
retain regional balance.”22 This institutional flexibility allows States Parties to focus on a
candidates overall merits, above strict regional representation requirements. With specific
reference to Chagdaa, it is worth noting that the Advisory Committee on Nominations of
Judges determined that he “did not have in-depth knowledge of the Rome Statute or the
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court” and furthermore, the ACN “was not
persuaded that the candidates’ oral proficiency in English… met the high standard

21

Gocha Lordkipanidze from Georgia was elected in 2020.
Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Malleson, Penny Martin, and Philippe Sands, Selecting International Judges:
Principle, Process, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 110.

22
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prescribed under article 36, paragraph 3(b)(i) of the Rome Statute.”23 On this basis, it was
determined that Chagdaa was only formally qualified for appointment as judge of the
International Criminal Court. Thus, the quality of the candidate was called into question
leading up to the election. Mongolia withdrew Chagdaa after the fourth election round
after he received eight votes of the required two-thirds majority (eighty).24 The reasons
for Mongolia’s decision to withdraw Chagdaa are presumptive, but nevertheless it is
apparent that his election was highly unlikely following the fourth round. Thus, States
Parties decided to prioritize factors over and above the retainment of regional balance on
the bench. This is a positive outcome and demonstrates that States Parties are making a
concerted effort to emphasize merit-based judicial appointments at the ICC. In choosing
not to elect the candidate from the Asia-Pacific region, Latin American and Caribbean
States claimed another seat on the bench, increasing regional representation from
GRULAC to four judges from its previous three.

10.2

Realpolitik and ICC Judgeships: Financial

Contributions to the Court
Notwithstanding this, it is important to acknowledge the reality that at present, most ICC
judges come from Western European and Other States–even within a statutory context
that demands regional parity. This reality subjects the Court to criticism on colonial
grounds, whether logical or not.25 It is most important to consider that it remains the
ultimate responsibility of States Parties to nominate and elect candidates that can fulfill

23

Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of
its seventh session, ICC-ASP/19/11, 30 September 2020, 12, paras. 2 and 4.
24
Note that Chagdaa received 33 of the required two-thirds majority (78) in the first round; 16 of the
required two-thirds majority (74) in the second round; and 14 of the required two-thirds majority (79) in the
third round. See 2020–Election of six judges–Results available at https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/elections/judges/2020/Pages/Results.aspx; accessed 1 January 2021.
25
While it is argued that merit and attitude should be weighed more heavily than representational markers,
the need for an inclusive and representative judiciary is essential. It is well understood in many legal
systems that diversity among the bench is imperative for a fairer justice system. See for example Lawrence
R. Baca, “Diversity Among Judges: Building a Better Bench,” Judges’ Journal 43 (2004): 30-35, at 30.
The author describes his experience as being “one Indian in a sea of white justice.” Quite naturally,
stakeholders want to see an ICC that is representative of international society. Similar arguments have been
made in other legal contexts with respect to the need for more women on the bench.
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the representative requirements outlined by the Rome Statute while also meeting the
primordial merit and attitude-based qualifications that will best achieve the overall
purpose of the ICC. However, since States Parties nominate candidates, there is
reasonable concern about the politicization of the process (i.e. by states arbitrarily
appointing candidates in the absence of a competitive national nomination process; the
so-called ‘horse-trading’ or ‘vote-trading’ of candidates as a result of diplomatic lobbying
at ICC judicial elections; and the related inquisitive suspicion that financial contributions
by states are correlated with increased representation and influence on the bench,
illustrated by Table 10-1, below).26

26

See David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 81-83, at 82: “Major powers with large military, development,
and aid budgets have significant leverage, and there is evidence that they used it during the first round of
ICC elections. ‘Votes can be traded against promises of development assistance,’ one delegate reported to
researchers. While the Jordanian diplomat chairing the Assembly asked states to refrain from the
bargaining and horse-trading that had become typical in elections for other international judgeships, it
appears the practice endured.’” Note also: the assessed contributions by States Parties are based on the
scale of assessments used by the United Nations for its regular budget.
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Table 10-1: Top Ten ICC Budget Contributors and Judgeships27
Country

Japan
Germany
France
United
Kingdom
Italy
Brazil
Canada
Republic of
Korea

2019
Assessed
Dues
(amount in
Euros and %
of total)
24,201,348
16%
16,115,590
11%
12,509,604
8%
12,085,392
8%
8,751,057
6%
8,217,956*
6%
7,234,872
5%
6,229,598
4%

Current
Judgeship

Previous
Judgeship

Total
Success
Nominations Rate
(%)

Yes

2

3

100

Yes

1

2

100

Yes

2

3

100

Yes

2

3

100

Yes

2

3

100

No

1

3

33

Yes

1

2

100

Yes

1

2

100

*Brazil owed 10,475,986 Euro at the time of writing and was the only leading assessment with an
outstanding balance owed to the Court. Brazil has a mixed record of making its payment (e.g., Brazil owed
11,413,371 euro in accumulated assessments in 2015).

The implication of this is that 39 per cent of the current ICC bench was nominated by the
leading financial contributors of the Court (35 per cent of all-time ICC judgeships). It is
also important to note the overarching reality that the top ten assessments comprise 72
per cent of the Court’s total. For the purpose of comparison, the regional total for Africa
in 2019 was 1,930,634 Euro, which comprised 1.3 per cent of the ICC’s total assessments
for the year. The demonstrable point is that the ICC has disproportionately operated in
African situations while being largely funded by a core group of states, mostly from

27

Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Nineteenth session,
New York, 17 July 2020, ICC-ASP/19/12, Financial statements of the International Criminal Court for the
year ended 31 December 2019, 45-46, available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP19/ICCASP-19-12-ENG-FS-ICC-17Jul20-1900%20cln.pdf; accessed 30 July 2020.
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Western Europe. While the United Nations assessment scale is largely responsible for
this, the very construct provides circumstantial support to embolden politicized
arguments which pit the ICC and Europe against Africa and Africans.28 This is further
strengthened by the reality that WEOG has had sixteen all-time ICC judgeships, the most
of any region, and the leading financial contributors from the Western European and
Other States Group have had a 100 per cent success rate for nominees. This matters
inasmuch as it supports the claim that that realpolitik influences judgeships and provides
powerful states with a reasonable assurance of influence on the bench, with little
contestation. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that African States have
had eleven ICC judgeships (the third most, regionally at the time of writing).29 Thus,
even though other states contribute more financially to the ICC, African states continue to
be represented on the bench and have comprised 20 per cent of the total ICC judgeships
to date.

10.3

Regional Participation in the Nomination Process

Strong African representation on the ICC bench can most readily be explained by the
disproportionately high regional engagement in nomination processes. To be sure, at the
time of writing, the African region had nominated more ICC judicial candidates than any
other region. There had been 149 all-time nominations for ICC judges and Africa had
submitted 47 of them, comprising 32 per cent of all-time nominations. Engagement in the
judicial nomination process is broken down by region in Table 10-2, below.

28

The United Nations Assessment scale is based upon rule 160 of the Rules of Procedure of the UN
General Assembly (A/520/Rev.18) and is summarized as the amount of money that the General Assembly
determines that a state is able to pay to cover the expenses of the Organization. This scale is used to
disperse funding obligations to states at the ICC.
29
Note that the overall breakdown of ICC judgeships by region is as follows: WEOS (16); GRULAC (12);
African States (11); Asia-Pacific (8); Eastern Europe (6). Thus, it is apparent that Western Europe has a
significant leg up on the other regions when considering lifetime judicial appointments at the ICC. Yet,
even more important to note, it is a handful of core States within Western Europe and Other States that
have nominated the bulk of the Judges–i.e. the leading financial contributors: Italy (3), France (2),
Germany (2), the United Kingdom (3), and Canada (2) have provided the nominations for twelve of these
sixteen Judges (75 per cent). This is significant when one considers that there are twenty-five States Parties
to the Rome Statute in the region. Similar trends are identified in the Group of Asia-Pacific States, since
seven out of nine Judges were nominated by a core group of States: Japan (3), Korea (2), and the
Philippines (2), prior to its withdrawal as a States Party to the Rome Statute.
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Table 10-2: Regional engagement in the nomination of ICC Judges and success rates
Region

Number
of
States
Parties
(by
region)

Total
Number of
Regional
Nominations

Total
contribution
to all-time
ICC judge
nominations
(per cent)

Number of
Judges
successfully
elected

Success
Rate
(per
cent)

25

Per cent of
States
regionally that
have
nominated at
least one
candidate
56

Group of Western
European and Other
States
Eastern European
States
Asia-Pacific States
Latin American and
Caribbean States

28

19

16

64

18

67

22

15

6

30

20*
28

50
54

19
33

13
22

11
10

61
38

African States

33

64

47

32

10

24

*This analysis includes the Philippines because it successfully nominated two candidates (one in 2011 and
one in 2015), prior to its withdrawal from the Rome Statute on March 17, 2018.

This breakdown is important for any analysis of the ICC judiciary inasmuch as it
demonstrates the level of active regional engagement by States Parties to contribute to the
makeup of the bench. The level of apathy across regions is quite striking when one
considers the contributive value of the ICC. Perhaps more practically, it is curious that
any States Party would be willing to subject its nationals to the Court without seeking
adequate representation on the bench. It is logical that African States and Latin American
and Caribbean States have contributed the greatest percentage of nominations by region,
since it is comparatively more likely for the Court to be involved in these regions. Least
of all, GRULAC and African States have had the greatest first-hand experience with the
types of crimes covered by the Rome Statute, which might create a greater normative
valuation to the work of the Court and increased support. This is important because both
Latin American and Caribbean States and African States continue to nominate the most
candidates, reflecting regional engagement and a generalized ability to claim credible
commitment to the work of the ICC. Such engagement also provides a strong counter to
the influence of powerful states throughout the judicial nomination and election
processes, which is an important objective for small and middle power states operating
within international institutions such as the ICC.
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Notwithstanding this, it is necessary to highlight that regional representation in
the African context has not been wholly equitable. Table 10-3 illustrates African regional
nominations, at the time of writing, based on geographic location and regional affiliation,
namely membership to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);
South African Development Community (SADC); and East African Community (EAC).
Table 10-3: African regional representation on the ICC bench
State

National
Language

Benin

Geographic
Location/Regional
Affiliation
West Africa/ECOWAS

Francophone

Gender of List
nominee
Elected
From
Female
B

Botswana

South Africa/SADC

Anglophone

Female

B

Democratic Republic
of the Congo

South Africa/SADC

Francophone

Male

B

Nigeria

West Africa/ECOWAS

Anglophone

Male

A

Ghana

West Africa/ECOWAS

Anglophone

Female

B

Mali

West Africa/ECOWAS

Francophone

Female

A

Sierra Leone

West Africa/ECOWAS

Anglophone

Female

A

South Africa

South Africa/SADC

Anglophone

Female

B

Kenya

East Africa/EAC

Anglophone

Female

A

Uganda (two elects)

East Africa/EAC

Anglophone

Female
Male

A
A

On this basis, while there has been Francophone representation from Africa on the bench,
the majority of African judges have been English-speaking, and none have represented
Arabic-speaking North Africa, though Tunisia is the only State Party that could nominate
a potential candidate from the region, and it has done so three times, including in the
2020 election, unsuccessfully. The Horn has also not been represented on the bench,
although Djibouti is the only country from the region that is also a State Party to the
Rome Statute, and it has never nominated a candidate. Central Africa remains
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unrepresented as well, even though Central African Republic and the Congo have each
nominated a candidate, unsuccessfully. What is perhaps more curious is the fact that most
African judges have come from West Africa (five) and West African states are more
widely represented than the States Parties in the South African Development Community
(SADC) that were so actively involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute from the
earliest stages. SADC States Parties have made a combined eleven nominations:
Botswana (1); Democratic Republic of the Congo (3); Lesotho (1); Madagascar (2);
Mauritius (1); South Africa (2); and Tanzania (1). Therefore, SADC as a whole has had a
27 per cent success rate of successfully nominating a candidate to the ICC. This is
important inasmuch as it demonstrates that historical involvement in the drafting of the
Rome Statute is not a definitive marker of representation on the bench.
The same trend holds when the analysis is expanded to consider nominations from
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). For example, Senegal
was especially active in its commitment to the Rome Statute project and hosted the
African regional conference in 1998 in Dakar to mobilize regional support for the
treaty.30 Since then, Senegal has nominated three candidates to the ICC bench and has
had a zero per cent success rate. Sierra Leone has similarly nominated three candidates
and only one was elected (in 2020). ECOWAS states have collectively nominated twenty
candidates, including: Benin (2); Burkina Faso (1); Ghana (3); Mali (1); Niger (2);
Nigeria (3); Senegal (3); Sierra Leone (3); and The Gambia (2). This amounts to a 25 per
cent sub-regional success rate in the nomination of judicial candidates at the ICC. The
significance of this is that ECOWAS states have demonstrated a particularly strong
commitment to the nomination of candidates, even in the face of repeated defeat. This
demonstrates a strong commitment to the ICC and a keen interest in contributing to its
development. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to Tunisia, which has

30

Note that this pattern does not hold when consideration in given to Trinidad and Tobago, the country that
initiated the entire ICC project from the beginning in 1993. Trinidad and Tobago have nominated five
candidates and four have been elected thus reflecting an 80 per cent success rate – the most of any States
Party in the Latin American and Caribbean States region. Consider that Colombia has nominated four
candidates and has a zero per cent success rate. It is important to note that Trinidad and Tobago is a
regionally dominant contributor to ICC judgeships.
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nominated a candidate on three occasions unsuccessfully but continues to engage in the
nomination and election process on a consistent basis.
This might be contrasted with the experience of the states in the East African
Community (EAC), particularly Kenya and Uganda. Kenya has nominated one candidate
and Uganda has nominated two candidates to the ICC bench. All three of these
candidates were ultimately elected to the ICC judiciary. The fact that Uganda is the only
African States Party that has been represented on the ICC bench more than once is
noteworthy (Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko in 2007 and Solomy Balungi Bossa in 2017).
Perhaps also important, Judge Nsereko was first nominated unsuccessfully in 2003, but
was re-nominated in 2007 and elected. As such, all three individuals that have been
nominated by States Parties from the EAC were eventually elected. Kenyan candidate
Joyce Aluoch was elected in 2009, the same year that the Prosecutor began to investigate
the post-election violence in Kenya. Indeed, the most distinguishable marker that
separates the EAC experience is the fact that the ICC has been involved in both the
Kenyan and Ugandan contexts. This is relevant, since ICC involvement in a state may
prompt increased political motivation to be represented on the bench. The ICC has
similarly been involved in the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Mali. An extra-regional example of this is Georgia, since it is a state subject to ICC
activity and has similarly successfully nominated a judicial candidate in 2020. It is
perhaps explanatory to consider that such representation could also be viewed as a way to
increase institutional trust in those regions where the Court is actively involved, although
such conclusions are plainly speculative and circumstantial, but nevertheless appear to
present a patterned consistency in rates of electoral success among a particular group of
states.
It also worth highlighting that all of the African States Parties to the ICC also
belong to the African Union (AU). This informs voting patterns at ICC elections since,
“the African Union always votes as a bloc.”31 It has been explained that “gathering the
support of such a major voting bloc can go a long way in securing a judicial seat, but
banding together is also seen as important for the furtherance of African states’ priorities

31

Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 40.
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at the ICC, especially in the face of the prominent influence of major donor states.”32 On
this basis, while sub-regional considerations are perhaps relevant, it is similarly important
to acknowledge a bigger ‘pan-African’ presence, intended to counter the influence of
powerful states such as those in Western European and Other States. This reality may
provide additional explanation as to why African representation on the ICC bench has
continued to proliferate over time, since African states constitute the greatest number of
States Parties to the Rome Statute.

10.4

Politicization and National Nomination Processes

Representative concerns only scratch the surface of the problematic politicization during
the judicial nomination and election process at the ICC. For example, William Pace from
the Coalition for the International Criminal Court has explained that, “unfortunately,
governments don’t always nominate the best people… often for political reasons.”33 This
sentiment was echoed by Stef Blok, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
who said that “many states… frequently put mediocre judges up for election.”34 Since the
judges that were elected through such processes have been responsible for dispensing
international criminal justice exclusively against Africans thus far, this is a very real
problem–especially when it is situated within its broader political context. The optics are
bad, and the stake are high, which makes improving the quality of the bench a
fundamentally important concern for any supporter of the ICC and international criminal
justice, more broadly. The intersecting need for states to nominate and elect
representative and qualified judges is a practical concern that continues to loom over the
ICC and directly impact the Court’s legitimacy and institutional credibility.
Notwithstanding this, it is also important to acknowledge that African States have

32

Ibid.
Sophie van Leeuwen, “Election: We might not get the best ICC judges,” Justice Hub (15 September
2014), interview available at https://justicehub.org/article/election-we-might-not-get-the-best-icc-judges/;
accessed 1 July 2020.
34
Stef Blok, “The International Criminal Court must do better. Reforms are urgently needed,” The
Washington Post (2 December 2019), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/02/international-criminal-court-must-do-betterreforms-are-urgently-needed/; accessed 30 July 2020.
33

303

similarly nominated subpar candidates, which is counterintuitive at a minimum.35 The
reality that the ICC has an established track record of involvement in African contexts
should be enough motivation for African states to nominate high quality candidates, since
the likelihood of them dealing with African situations and cases is extraordinarily high.
This is a problem that begins and ends with States Parties and will require institutional
and domestic political reform to overcome. The ICC has provided institutional guidance
on judicial nomination procedures and has advised Foreign Ministers of ICC States
Parties to
place a particular emphasis on those candidates who possess substantial practical
experience in criminal trials; can meet the many demands associated with
adjudicating complex and time-intensive cases; and demonstrate a willingness to
learn, including through ongoing trainings. We believe that candidates who
possess these qualities, in addition to satisfying the Rome Statute criteria, will be
best equipped to meet the challenges ahead.36
These institutional recommendations are general and provide minimal guidance to
governments in the nomination process. General assertions about a ‘willingness to learn’
fail to adequately address the importance of assembling a bench of individuals with the
right personality. According to one current ICC trial judge, the right personality would be
someone with the need to understand colleagues, which requires a genuine curiosity
about other systems and backgrounds and a commitment to learning about different
approaches to law and to life.37 Another ICC judge “highlighted the need for a general

35

See for example Audu Emakpe (pseudonym), “Justice Ishaq Bello’s Nomination is a Poor Choice for
ICC Job,” International Justice Monitor (30 September 2020), blogpost available at
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2020/09/justice-ishaq-bellos-nomination-is-a-poor-choice-for-icc-job/; accessed
20 October 2020. This blogpost highlights that Nigeria’s nomination of Ishaq Bello in 2020 was “shrouded
in secrecy… smacks of cronyism, a trait that the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has
become notorious for. Applications were not invited from suitable candidates. Civil society organizations
were shut out. No interview was conducted.” Note that the ACN determined that Bello was only formally
qualified for appointment as judge of the International Criminal Court, since he limited knowledge of the
workings of the Court.
36
ICC: Recommendations for Nominating and Electing Candidates to Serve as Judges, Letter to Foreign
Ministers of ICC States Parties (18 May 2011), circulated by Human Rights Watch, available at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/18/icc-recommendations-nominating-and-electing-candidates-servejudges; accessed 10 October 2020.
37
Anonymous ICC Judge, interview by author, 12 December 2018, by Skype.
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awareness of different legal cultures and the ability to work in cross-cultural legal
environments as useful skills in the ICC context.”38 These are personality and character
traits that are difficult to discern in the absence of a thorough screening and vetting
process at the national level.
It is likewise problematic that there is an overarching theme of secrecy
surrounding national nomination processes that has been well-documented in the
literature. For example, career academic and women’s rights activist Akua Kuenyehia
from Ghana described her inaugural 2003 nomination and election in detail. In the
context of her experience with the government of Ghana, she described: “I did not hear
about the vacancy [for ICC judge]; I had a call from the Attorney-General. I went to see
him, and he told me ‘the President has asked us to nominate you for the ICC.’ I told him I
was not interested and he said ‘well, that means you are turning the President down.’
That made me take the matter seriously, and I decided to accept the President’s
nomination.”39 Kuenyehia was nominated under List B. She did not have any judicial
experience but had taught international law at the University of Ghana and had worked
on international committees relating to women’s human rights issues throughout her
career. In this context, it is relevant to note Article 36(8)(b) of the Rome Statute: “States
Parties shall also take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on
specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence against women or children.”40
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Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges, 59.
Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,” 6364.
40
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 36(8)(b). Note that Judge Joyce Aluoch
(Kenya, elected in 2009 by List A) had experience at the Court of Appeals in Kenya but had also chaired
the African Union Committee of Experts on the Rights of the Child (2001-2005) and was a member and
vice-chair of the UN Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (2003-2008). Judge Adelaide
Sophie Alapini-Gansou (Benin, elected in 2017 by List B) was a founding member of WILDAF-Benin
Network (Women’s Rights and Development in Africa), working as legal counsel to women victims of
violence for the Women’s Rights and Development Centre. Judge Navanethem Pillay (South Africa,
elected in 2003 by List B) advocated for women’s rights throughout her career, including co-founding the
international women’s rights group Equality Now in 1985; Judge Fatoumata Dembélé Diarra (Mali, elected
in 2003 by List A) is the founding president of the Office on Relief for Impoverished Women and Children
and Observation of the Rights of Children and Women (ODEF), and also participated in several sessions of
the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana,
elected in 2009 by List B) was a long-time women’s rights activist. Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa (Uganda,
elected in 2017 by List A) had experience representing indigent women and children in Uganda. In
combination, this suggests that African candidates with demonstrative experience with women’s and/or
children’s rights have had a particularly good chance of being elected to the ICC bench. This applies
39

305

Thus, Kuenyehia was a particularly attractive candidate based on her career-long
experience with promoting women’s human rights and might have been viewed as highly
electable by the Ghanaian government. However, regardless of her objective suitability as
a candidate for ICC judge, the unilateral and unsolicited decision-making on the part of
the government is particularly striking. In the absence of a broad dissemination of the
note verbale, other potential candidates could never know that the position was available,
which inherently limits the prospect for a competitive and rigorous nomination process
among those with a genuine desire to fill the position.41 Such an approach to ICC judicial
appointments reemphasizes the deeply political nature of the process as a whole and
places an emphasis not necessarily on merit first but on political nepotism and/or power
and influence. Mackenzie et al. explain that “ICC nomination rules are meant to insulate
nominations from political influence. In practice, a recurring theme across the interviews
was the strong vested interest of governments in strictly controlling the nomination
process in order to influence the composition of international courts… Personal
relationships and alliances frequently come into play.”42 This reality supports the notion
that states guide nomination processes for reasons of self-interest and not for the broad
interest of the ICC, as such.
The lack of transparency within domestic nomination procedures has been a topic
of concern for scholars of the ICC. For example, it has been argued by scholars such as
Grossman that
little to no statutory guidance to states exists for selecting candidates at the
national level. States are left to craft their own procedures, with no international
or domestic oversight. Even on courts where some guidance is provided (such as
the ICC and ICJ [International Court of Justice]), scholars have raised doubts that
it is followed. A series of interviews about selection procedures on these courts

similarly to the African male judges, each of which cite a demonstrable commitment to gender and/or
children throughout their scholarly works or civil service.
41
Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,” 64.
Note that the government of Ghana did consider three candidates for evaluation and Kuenyehia was
selected based on assessments by The Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney-General and Minister
of Justice and the Judicial Council. The Attorney-General and a bipartisan Parliamentary Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Issues made the final decision on what candidate to select.
42
Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges, 65.
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showed that ‘few well-informed insiders appear to be familiar with the details,’
and processes varied significantly across states and were ‘marked by their lack of
transparency and accountability.’ One interviewee described the process of
nominating judges to the ICJ and ICC as ‘not very institutional-like, [more] a
friendship thing.’ Others wrote that ‘one cannot apply to become an international
judge’ but rather must be ‘called’ and that perhaps the most important factor is
‘being on the radar screen of, and appreciated by, one’s own government,
particularly by some key civil servants.’43
In the context of ICC judicial nominations, it makes sense that governments would want
to nominate a predictable and familiar candidate to the bench. It is likely for this reason
that many judicial nominees have experience working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
or other similar posts. These candidates provide a modest degree of judicial insulation,
should government actors or their allies become the subject(s) of interest at the Court.
These candidates also have particular knowledge about government interests that other
candidates would lack.
Some scholars have referred to such nominations as a form of ‘cronyism.’ For
example, Nigeria’s nomination of Justice Ishaq Bello in 2020 was subject to scrutiny on
the basis that “[t]he process that led to Bello’s nomination is shrouded in secrecy. It
smacks of cronyism, a trait that the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has
become notorious for. Applications were not invited from suitable candidates. Civil
society organizations were shut out. No interview was conducted. Nigeria should not be
allowed to infect the world with her cronyism.”44 These trends undergird recent efforts by
the ASP to bolster national nomination processes, specifically by encouraging States
Parties to take responsibility for national procedures for nominating candidates to the
Court and by expanding the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges’ (can)
mandate to provide provisional assessments on the suitability of potential candidates
prior to their nomination.45 Using Ishaq Bello as an example, tcanACN determined that
“[b]ased on both his professional experience and his answers during the interview, and
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Nienke Grossman, “Achieving Sex-Representative International Court Benches,” 90.
Audu Emakpe (pseudonym), “Justice Ishaq Bello’s Nomination is a Poor Choice for ICC Job.”
45
ICC-ASP/18/Res.4, Annex II (c); 8 bis.
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bearing in mind particularly his lack of detailed knowledge of the workings of the Court,
the Committee concluded that the candidate was only formally qualified for appointment
as judge of the International Criminal Court.”46 Bello was not elected in 2020. While
these trends are positive in that they acknowledge the deficit on the part of States Parties
to adequately safeguard national nomination processes, it remains up to States Parties to
genuinely commit to fixing the problem.47
Even still, this is a multilayered problem inasmuch as States Parties engage in
vote-trading and aggressive diplomatic lobbying leading up to and during the election.
The influence ocanhe ACN is limited in the sense that it only provides guidance to the
ASP and does not directly inform how States Parties will vote for a particular candidate.
Problematically, it has been explained that “[m]any individuals who participate in the
ICC process believe it to be even more politicized than other international judicial
elections.”48 Practically, the politicization of judicial nomination processes takes the form
of aggressive diplomatic campaigning and vote-trading practices.
Campaigning for judicial nominees at the ICC is a well-established political
practice. According to Mudukuti, “[c]andidates engage in expensive and time consuming
campaigns, visiting embassies, travelling to UN Headquarters in New York, meeting
diplomats and anyone else… relevant for their successful election.”49 In this light, it is
well-documented that ICC election procedures are riddled with “a toxic campaigning
culture… campaigning dynamics often override merit-based considerations: candidates
with the strongest campaign, rather than those most qualified, are most likely to be
elected.”50 This practice is particularly problematic, in part because not every state can
afford to engage in such aggressive lobbying efforts, but mostly because it erodes notions
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ICC-ASP/19/11, 12, para. 7.
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of electing a candidate based on merit alone. To illustrate this reality, Judge Akua
Kuenyehia from Ghana explained that she “did not actively lobby for her election. In fact,
she did not go to New York as most candidates do to personally lobby to be elected.”51
Kuenyehia was elected on the first ballot in the 2003 election. However, in this case, the
government did a significant amount of lobbying. It was explained that “[t]hough
Kuenyehia was not present during the elections, it is a fact that the Head of the Ghana
Mission, the Foreign Minister, and other diplomatic representatives from Ghana did an
enormous amount of lobbying on her behalf.”52 This example effectively demonstrates
the reality of a strong campaign culture surrounding ICC judicial nomination procedures,
even if not engaged with by the candidates themselves.
Perhaps even more egregious is the practice of vote-trading. More specifically,
vote-trading implies that “a state will vote for a candidate in exchange for a vote in the
same or another election (for the same or another body), or in exchange for other benefits
or inducements.”53 The ‘other benefits or inducements’ could include development aid.
As Mackenzie et al. explain, “[o]ne interviewee who was part of a delegation in the first
ICC elections told us that the practice of vote-trading in exchange for aid was more
prevalent in the ICC than the ICJ [International Court of Justice] elections.”54 This is
particularly problematic since such deals reinforce political power structures rooted in
realpolitik. These sorts of ‘deals’ are fundamentally incompatible with the objectives of
the ICC and severely bind less powerful states to the political goals of more powerful
states. This reality may further explain why Western European and Other States have
such a strong success rate for the election of their nominees at the ICC. Although this
practice has been discouraged by the ASP Bureau, evidence suggests that it continues to
take place.55
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Addressing this complex problem will require a widespread culture change within
and among the ICC States Parties. It is redundant to point out that this is a problem that
should never exist if States Parties were truly commitment to the institutional success of
the ICC. Still, this points to a much bigger issue: the indifference on the part of States
Parties with respect to the ICC’s posterity and credible development and the overarching
and contradictory influence of power politics in the operationalization of the Court,
which privileges developed states and binds the less powerful, including those in Africa.

10.5

Repeat Nominations, African modes of Engagement,

and ACN Determinations
Many African States have demonstrated a particularly keen commitment to the
candidates put forward for judicial election. This is most pointedly illustrated by the fact
that African States have re-nominated unsuccessful candidates six times in the history of
ICC judicial elections at the time of writing.56 Four of these candidates were elected on
their second attempt, namely: Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko (Uganda, initially nominated
in 2003 and successfully elected in 2007); ICC President Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria,
initially nominated in 2009 and successfully elected in 2011); Antoine Kesia-Mbe
Mindua (Democratic Republic of the Congo, initially nominated in 2011 and successfully
elected in 2014); and Reine Adelaide Sophie Alapini-Gansou (Benin, initially nominated
in 2014 and successfully elected in 2017). In the 2020 election, there were two repeat
nominations from African States. First, Gberdao Gustave Kam from Burkina Faso had
been nominated as an ICC judge three times (2009, 2011, and 2020) under List B; and
Raymond Sock from The Gambia was initially nominated in the first judicial election in
2003 and was nominated again seventeen years later at seventy-four years of age under
List A in 2020. Neither candidate was successfully elected in 2020.
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In 2020, the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges considered Kam
from Burkina Faso to be ‘qualified’ for the job and considered Sock from The Gambia to
be ‘only formally qualified.’ Of the seven African candidates nominated during the 2020
election cycle, the ACN determined two to be ‘highly qualified’–Haykel Ben Mahfoudh
nominated by Tunisia under List B and Miatta Maria Samba nominated by Sierra Leone
under List A.57 Both states had nominated candidates twice before, with no success. This
is significant inasmuch as both states continued to nominate candidates, and more
importantly, provide ‘highly qualified’ candidates in the ACN’s view. This further
demonstrates that Tunisia and Sierra Leone remain committed to the integrity of the ICC
through their national judicial nomination and election processes. Positively, Miatta
Maria Samba was successfully elected in the third round of the 2020 judicial election.
Haykel Ben Mahfoudh remained in the election until the final (eighth) round but was
ultimately defeated by Althea Violet Alexis-Windsor from Trinidad and Tobago 86 to 32
(79 votes constituted the two-thirds required majority).
It is worth noting that the reasons for Kam’s classification as ‘qualified,’ as
opposed to ‘highly qualified’ by the ACN have been met with criticism from some
observers. For example, Owiso and Nakandha explain that “[d]espite having extensive
international judicial experience spanning decades as Roster Judge at the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda… as
a Judge at the ICTR... and as President Judge of the Extraordinary African Chambers that
conducted the Hissène Habrè trial, the Committee deemed him simply ‘qualified.’”58 In
reaching its determination, the Committee said that “[t]he candidate demonstrated some
general knowledge of the Rome Statute but nonetheless he had only very limited
knowledge of the Rome Statute framework… The Committee was disappointed that…
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the candidate did not appear to be familiar with the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Court or of its procedures.”59 However, when evaluating Kam’s professional
experience, it is difficult to determine only that he is merely ‘qualified’–particularly when
evaluated against the other candidates nominated under List B that achieved the
designation of ‘highly qualified.’60 This is heightened by the fact that the ACN
considered Tunisian candidate Haykel Ben Mahfoudh ‘highly qualified’ under List B,
while concurrently reporting that “sometimes his answers were inaccurate, for instance
regarding the role of victims’ participation, or were controversial (e.g. in relation to trials
in absentia).”61 It becomes increasingly unclear why it is acceptable for one candidate to
misunderstand the Rome Statute but not for another.
Kam’s nomination was further questioned by the Committee on the basis that
“while the candidate had significant judicial experience in international criminal
tribunals, he had been nominated as a candidate for List B. The candidate did not provide
any explanation for his inclusion on List B rather than on List A.”62 This may explain
why the Committee was more likely to determine that diplomats and academics under
List B were ‘highly qualified’ in the absence of judicial experience.63 Yet, it remains that
the majority of List A candidates have experience in domestic criminal law contexts and
rarely in international criminal law contexts.
Two other African nominees with ‘extensive judicial experience in international
criminal tribunals’ have been successfully nominated under List B: judge Navanethem
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Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of its seventh session, ICCASP/19/11 (30 September 2020), 21, paras. 3-4.
60
Ibid.
61
ICC-ASP/19/11, p. 20.
62
Ibid., 21.
63
Owiso Owiso and Sharon Nakandha, “‘Grading’ the Nominees for International Criminal Court Judges
Election 2021-2030.” Note that the List B candidates that were deemed ‘highly qualified’ include: María
del Socorro (Mexico) who has primarily worked for the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Affairs on issues
ranging from human rights, international cooperation, and climate change; Sergio Ugalde Godinez (Costa
Rica) who has experience as an Associate Professor of International Law at the University for Peace and as
the Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Netherlands (including attending ASP meetings as a country
representative) alongside other diplomatic experience in relevant areas such as advocate and co-agent at the
International Court of Justice, and work on the prohibition of chemical weapons; Ariela Peralta Distefano
(Uruguay) whose professional experience includes being the Executive Secretary for Institute of Public
Policies on Human Rights and other extensive experience in human rights work; Haykel Ben Mahfoudh
(Tunisia) who is a career academic, teaching and researching on relevant subjects such as international
human rights.
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Pillay from South Africa was appointed to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda before her election to the ICC; and judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo was occupied a seat on the bench at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia before his election to the ICC. Moreover, it
has been established that “in cases where a candidate possesses sufficient qualifications
for both lists, he/she should choose on which list to appear.”64 As such, it is relatively
uncontroversial to assert that Kam’s experience is primarily in international law and
therefore makes him an appropriate candidate to consider under List B based on the
historical standards of ICC nomination and election processes. The ACN appears to
mischaracterize the categorization of the lists in this respect and calls into the question its
priorities in making determinations about the suitability of candidates on the basis of
arbitrary or else generally insignificant factors.
It is unclear whether or not such a determination is in line with the object and
purpose of List B. Denying qualified candidates’ proper assessment under this category
only contributes to the inflammation of arguments from those opposed to the inclusion of
List B altogether. The Committee ought to have determined whether or not Kam
demonstrated a willingness to learn about the Rome Statute framework, the jurisprudence
of the ICC, and/ or its procedures instead of expecting a candidate with perfect
knowledge from the beginning. Personality and character traits should be just as
important, if not more, as knowledge-based markers when assessing candidates.
Moreover, List B is not meant solely to include academics and diplomats.65 Individuals
with the necessary experience in international law can take many forms and should not be
approached with such rigidity if merit is to take primacy throughout the judicial election
process.

64

Zhu Wen-qi and Sureta Chana, “Part 4. Composition and administration of the Court, Article 36:
Qualifications, nomination and election of judges,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court -Observers’ Notes, Article by Article – 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (C.H
Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2008), 946.
65
Note that there are some good arguments to suggest that academics can contribute meaningfully to the
bench. See Mackenzie et. al., Selecting International Judges, 53: “academics can make an important
contribution to a complementary and balanced bench, by assisting judges with backgrounds as practitioners
or diplomats to understand the underlying theory of the arguments being made” and at 52: ‘Professors are
very good candidates because officials of government are necessarily very much influenced by the
positions of their countries, whilst the professors have, I would say, more liberty.”
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10.6

Quality Concerns and the Power of Interpretation

It is necessary to understand why the quality of the judges at the ICC has become a
central concern in the Court’s nascency.66 To be sure, at various junctures, (some) ICC
judges have acted inappropriately. Notable examples include French Judge Marc Perrin
de Brichambaut, who made highly unprofessional comments during a presentation at
Peking University Law School in 2017, i.e. describing “The Africans” as “a group of 54
countries who provide the suspects and accused” to the Court. ICC President Chile EboeOsuji led a lawsuit at the Geneva Tribunal of the International Labour Organization in an
effort to sue his own Court for a 26 per cent increase in pay with the knowledge that the
institution did not have a budget for internal litigation or salary increases.67 Japanese
diplomat-turned-judge Kuniko Ozaki requested to return to diplomatic life as the
Japanese ambassador to Estonia during the Ntaganda case, risking a mistrial after six
years of ongoing litigation.68 And the Pre-Trial Chamber decided not to open an
investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, asserting that to do so was ‘not in the
interests of justice,’ despite the Prosecutor’s substantive submissions to the contrary.69
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See generally Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar; Yassir Al-Khudayri, “Raising the Bar
Further: Professional Development for ICC Judges,” International Justice Monitor (10 June 2020),
blogpost available at https://www.ijmonitor.org/2020/06/raising-the-bar-further-professional-developmentfor-icc-judges/; accessed 1 July 2020; Douglas Guilfoyle, “Part II – This is not fine: The International
Criminal Court in Trouble,” EJIL: Talk! (22 March 2019), blogpost available at
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ii-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/; accessed 24
June 2020; Darryl Robinson, “The Other Poisoned Chalice: Unprecedented Evidentiary Standards in the
Gbagbo Case? (Part 1),” EJIL: Talk! (5 November 2019), blogpost available at
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-other-poisoned-chalice-unprecedented-evidentiary-standards-in-the-gbagbocase-part-1/; accessed 24 June 2020; Kevin Jon Heller, “Judge Ozaki Must Resign – Or Be Removed,”
OpinioJuris (29 March 2019), blogpost available at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/29/judge-ozaki-mustresign-or-be-removed/; accessed 24 June 2020; Joseph Powderly, Judges and the Making of International
Criminal Law (Brill/Nijhoff: 2020).
67
Marlise Simons, “In the Hague’s Lofty Judicial Halls, Judges Wrangle Over Pay,” The New York Times
(20 January 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/world/europe/hague-judges-pay.html;
accessed 20 November 2020.
68
Kevin Jon Heller, “Judge Ozaki Must Resign – Or Be Removed.”
69
See generally Tjitske Lingsma, “ICC Judges at Centre of Controversy,” Justiceinfo.net (16 May 2019)
blogpost available at https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/41447-icc-judges-at-centre-ofcontroversy.html; accessed 20 October 2020; Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber II: ICC-02/17 (12 April 2019); Transcription écrite de
l’intervention de Monsieur le Juge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut à la Peking University Law School
(Bejing), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_02039.PDF; accessed 20 October
2020; Kevin Jon Heller, “Problematic Statements by the French Judge at the ICC,” OpinioJuris (5 March
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Compounding these problems, the judges as a collective have manifestly failed to
issue cogent decisions on several complex and important legal issues, which has troubled
the effective development of international criminal law altogether and cast doubt on the
credibility of the ICC in the process.70 There is indeed reason to be critical of the social
and professional quality and overt displays of self-interest demonstrated by some ICC
judges. At their core, judges must be committed to the stated intent and purpose of the
ICC above their own self-interests if the Court is to truly be effective. This is particularly
the case because the ICC is financially and politically overburdened. Hostility towards
the Court on the part of states (whether signatory/ratifier or not) requires a shared
normative commitment to the importance and significance of international criminal
justice, even when it is under pressure from both internal and external factors.71
Governments need to ensure that they nominate candidates with the right mindset and
belief in the norms that undergird the ICC if it is to regain and rebuild its institutional
credibility.
The importance of this issue cannot be overstated: ICC judges are responsible for
dispensing international criminal justice in situations and cases where all else has failed.
This has both direct and far-reaching implications for suspects, victims, communities
(local and international), civil society, political leaders, and other relevant actors. The
Rome Statute is constructed by words, but it is up to the judges to give those words
meaning by providing a direct application and (perhaps more importantly) a specific
interpretation of its values and ideals. It is fundamentally important that ICC judges
create legal principles with tangible and practical utility. This can only be achieved if
judgements create the necessary jurisprudence and establish predictable or at least

2019) blogpost available at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/03/problematic-statements-by-the-french-judgeat-the-icc/; accessed 20 October 2020; Marlise Simons, “In the Hague’s Lofty Judicial Halls, Judges
Wrangle Over Pay.”
70
This is meant to include the inconsistent standard of proof used by the Trial and Appeals division in
Bemba (which led to a successful appeal), or the manifestly diverse opinions issued on al-Bashir’s
immunity during his tenure as head of state of Sudan, as two obvious cursory examples.
71
This refers to the Africa-ICC crisis, which led to the withdrawal of Burundi in 2017 from the Court but
triggered formal opposition from other African states and the African Union; the withdrawal of the
Philippines from the Court in 2019 following the opening of an investigation into alleged crimes against
humanity perpetrated during the war on drugs; and the United States issuing sanctions and travel bans on
ICC staff in 2020 in response to opening an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan.
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consistent legal standards and reasoning. Logistically, judges preserve the integrity of the
Court by upholding the rights of the accused to a fair trial and are ultimately responsible
for ensuring due process throughout proceedings. The spectrum of duties is both
profound and complex. International criminal justice is a passion project which ICC
judges must share if the Court is to maintain its place in the international global
landscape. This is especially because the ICC is not yet a universal institution and states
retain the ability to be subject to its jurisdiction or not. Work remains to be done to ensure
that international criminal justice and the accountability provided by the ICC is wholly
enmeshed in the global order and continually strengthened over time in an evolutionary
trajectory.
In order achieve this aim, it is essential that states nominate judicial candidates
who are qualified and committed to doing what is required to uphold the legitimacy of
the Court and the value of international criminal justice in general. Quite naturally, the
‘international’ aspect of the ICC complicates the makeup of the bench in significant ways
based on individual judges’ identity, which could be informed by a myriad of factors
such as the representative factors including gender, education, personal background,
professional experience, and nationality. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the ICC
judiciary establish a coherent professional culture, which is best achieved by adopting an
overarching spirit of collegiality and mutual respect in the face of fundamental
difference. As former ICC Judge Akua Kuenyehia explained, “working with the Rome
Statute was a novelty for all of us– the civil and common law divide was always a big
problem for all of us… now I think nothing of it, but the blending of the traditions has
been a big challenge, and I had to sit down and understand that this is a new institution
and we are doing something new, and so we had to give each other a chance.”72 Giving
each other a chance remains a vitally important mindset for the optimal operation of the
ICC bench across all divisions.
Thus, despite the multiplicity of individual differences, the judges must share a
genuine commitment to the goals of international criminal justice mechanisms–broadly
understood. This is the collective responsibility of the bench and of the Court itself. This
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Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,” 68.
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does not imply that a conviction should necessarily follow a trial at the ICC as a
guaranteed mode of accountability. Rather, the right to a fair trial is an essential
component of institutional credibility and integrity. As Richard Goldstone has argued,
“the fairness of any criminal justice system must be judged by acquittals and not by
convictions.”73 This points to the prioritization of institutional credibility, rather than a
strict focus on datapoints such as conviction rates, as a better marker of the Court’s
success.
At the same time, the unconventional nature of international crime requires a
degree of sensible flexibility and logical consistency in order to develop appropriate
judicial standards over time. This requires a particular mindedness and the ability to have
reasoned discussion amongst the bench and across divisions, which is required to
streamline the development of international criminal law at the ICC. Such a judicial
approach has a rich history in international human rights law, in particular at the
European Court of Human Rights, otherwise understood as “interpretive decisionmaking.” Although the Rome Statute attempts to restrain or as Powderly says, ‘corset’
interpretive powers, such an approach must be used to adjust ambiguous or flawed
legislation.74 This is compounded by the reality that the Rome Statute is the result of
multilateral diplomacy. In many respects it is up to the judges to make determinations
about the ‘real’ meaning of the Statute where it is otherwise and intentionally ambiguous.
It is clear that the nature of the political negotiations in Rome led to the construction of a
Statute where a literal and/or textual interpretation of the law would be extraordinarily
difficult for judges to employ as best practice when adjudicating contentious matters,
which complicates the professional environment at the ICC in distinct and complex ways.
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Richard Goldstone, “Acquittals by the International Criminal Court,” EJIL: Talk! (18 January 2019),
blogpost available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/acquittals-by-the-international-criminal-court/; accessed 20
November 2020.
74
See generally Joseph Powderly, ‘Curb Your Creativity:’ The Rome Statute and the Attempted Institution
of Interpretive Restraint in Judges and the Making of International Criminal Law, ed. Joseph Powderly
(The Hague: Brill Nijhoff, 2020), 454-541.
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10.7

Rome Conference involvement and its influence on
judicial suitability

Some judicial nominees have appealed to their experience in drafting the Rome Statute as
a basis for their successful election as an ICC judge. For example, French candidate Marc
Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut who was successfully elected from List B in the 2014
election explicitly referenced his involvement in Rome as a basis for his competence and
suitability to serve as an ICC Judge. Specifically, his curriculum vitae stated:
I was responsible for coordinating the French contribution to the preparatory work
for the International Criminal Court and I led the French delegation to the Rome
conference. I was directly involved in shaping some key parts of the Statute
regarding crimes, complementarity and victims. I was able to sign the Statute of
Rome on behalf of France. I was thus able to acquire a solid understanding of the
choices and compromises that prevailed during the drafting of the Statute which is
of great value for further contributions of its future development… Many others
who negotiated the Statute of Rome have performed, and continue to perform with
distinction, these eminent functions.75
Notwithstanding this perspective, other observers view direct involvement in the
negotiation of the Rome Statute as a hinderance to objectivity and neutrality on the
bench. Some argue that “[m]any of those interpreting the Statute, including several of the
judges, ‘remember’ what the drafters meant at Rome, and this colours their understanding
of the various provisions.”76 The significance of this polarization lies in the ability of
judges to arrive at reasonable conclusions, rooted in the text of the Rome Statute and not
politicized interpretations or understandings above all else. Since his election to the ICC
bench, Judge Marc Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut has explained that
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ICC Judicial Nomination Curriculum Vitae of Marc Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut, available at
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Elections/EJ2014/ICC-ASP-EJ2014-FRA-CV-ENG.pdf; accessed
20 October 2020.
76
William A. Schabas, “Georghios Pikis on the Rome Statute,” PhD studies in human rights (9 February
2011), blogpost available at http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2011/02/georghios-pikis-on-romestatute.html; accessed 20 October 2020.
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the judges are still finding their way around the multiplicity and myriad of
problems which derive from the way that the Statute was worded the way that the
Rules of Procedure were worded and then the reality of the variety of cases and
situations they have to deal with. Judges come from different backgrounds, they
have different personalities, they do not spontaneously converge on everything.
There is serious debate within Chambers, there is serious debate among
Chambers, and there is serious debate among the College of Judges. Setting up
broad case law is still a work in progress.77
On this basis, in the absence of a culture of respect, appropriate judicial standards will be
impossible to establish and uphold. Of additional significance, the statements made by
Judge Brichambaut after his election signal that his involvement at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference has not been enough to overcome widespread disagreement on complex legal
issues brought forward in practice.
Interpretive decisions must reflect the ethos that undergirds the Rome Statute.
However, it is important to note that this approach does not allow judges to reach
decisions carte blanche; the Rome Statute, the facts of the case, and jurisprudence will
necessarily restrict a judges’ interpretive powers. While the Rome Statute affirms a
commitment to nullum crimen sine lege, it also allows judges to rely not only on the
Rome Statute and ICC documents, including the travaux préparatoires, but general
principles of international law and decisions arising from national legal systems.78 This
casts a wide net and grants a significant amount of flexibility to judges. Interpretation and
development of the law contained in the Rome Statute is unavoidable in this context,
within its legislative and procedural limits. Some ICC Judges assert that the problem is
not that there is not enough flexibility in the judges’ interpretive powers, but rather that
there is too much flexibility, which results in inconsistent outcomes and contributes to an
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Marc Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut, CILRAP Conversations, interview at Peking University, Beijing, (20
May 2017), available at https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/170520-perrin-de-brichambaut/ at 3:33.
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Annex, List of Authorities A. Travaux Preparatoires, ICC-01/04-01/06-2120-Anx 14-09-2009 1/3 IO T
OA16, list available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2009_06602.PDF; accessed 10 October
2020; Caroline Davidson, “How to Read International Criminal Law: Strict Construction and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court,” St. John’s Law Review 91.1 (2017): 37-38.
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increased lack of cohesion among the bench.79 It is fundamentally important that judges
continue to engage in teambuilding, ongoing trainings, and genuine dialectical processes
in order to progress as a unified component of the Court.
It is also important to consider that the judicial nomination and election cycle as
enumerated in the Rome Statute itself can contribute to a divisive environment. As
current Trial Chamber Judge Kimberly Prost has explained, “as the ICC is designed to
support a diverse bench, it requires a three-year cycle term where six judges depart, and
six new judges arrive. This makes it difficult to foster a judicial culture and can lead to
fractured decision-making. As a result, the consistency of decision-making suffers… the
onus falls upon judges to create practices that can be institutionalized in order to facilitate
the decision-making process.”80 This concern highlights the need for judges to work
together to establish best practices and collegiality in order to achieve consistent
outcomes, over time. This will only be possible if States Parties nominate open-minded
and constructive candidates.

10.7.1

List B Judges: Evaluating the Concern(s)

The current ICC bench has eleven candidates from List A and seven candidates from List
B at the time of writing.81 For clarity, the inclusion of List B allows for judges with no
competence or experience in criminal law, even though the ICC is solely focused on
violations of the most heinous acts of criminality. List B candidates are required to have
competence and experience in relevant areas of international law (i.e. humanitarian law,
human rights law). To be sure, List B candidatures have been significantly more
contentious than those from List A. This is largely because the loose wording of List B
has facilitated the successful nomination and election of career diplomats and academics,
including two who had no formal legal training or experience prior to their posts at the
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Anonymous ICC Trial Judge, interview by author, 12 December 2018, by Skype.
Amna Farooqi, “A Prescription for Optimism–Judge Kim Prost on the Future of the International
Criminal Court,” Global Justice Journal 2(17 January 2020), available at
https://globaljustice.queenslaw.ca/news/a-prescription-for-optimism-judge-kim-prost-on-the-future-of-theinternational-criminal-court; accessed 20 November 2020.
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See, ASP Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.6 at Table 2. Minimum voting requirements for list B (there must
be at least five judges elected by List B on the bench at all times) and with reference to Table 1. Minimum
voting requirements for list A, there must be at least nine judges elected by list A on the bench at all times.
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320

ICC.82 This practice has been the subject of serious criticism, and observers such as the
Open Society Justice Initiative have suggested that List B should be abandoned altogether
because “the fact that so many government officials, including career diplomats, have
previously been elected to ICC judgeships is a cause for concern.”83
It is necessary to consider why it is inherently ‘bad’ to elect government officials
and diplomats to the bench. According to Mackenzie et al.,
by profession, [diplomats] are successful because they make concessions, this
way or the other. The mentality of a diplomat, I think, is not at all what I would
consider to be compatible with the mentality of a judge. There are certain
exceptions, but it remains very odd for me that a diplomat would change his
mental behaviour when he sits as a judge. He will always be a diplomat trying to
make concessions one way or the other, always in the middle of the road.84
Perhaps more practically, it has also been raised that “the ex-diplomat has been a
government representative, so he is not neutral.”85 In combination, these criticisms raise
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Note that Kuniko Ozaki from Japan (Asia-Pacific region) was a career diplomat, having worked in the
Ministry of Justice, she had experience drafting law and worked with the United Nations. She never
attended law school but self-identifies as an ‘academic lawyer’ meaning that she has experience with
research, teaching, and publishing at various universities on international legal subjects. See: Kuniko Ozaki
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French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence and served in the UN Secretariat. He also
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judges could compromise the legitimacy of the court and even potentially raise grounds for appeal.”
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important points about neutrality and the suitability of diplomats to serve on the ICC
judiciary.
The Open Society Justice Initiative opines that at the 2020 ICC judicial election,
the absolute minimum number of List B candidates should be elected to sustain the
minimum total number of five. As a matter of practice, it is argued that “until such a time
as List B is eliminated, the number of candidates elected from List B should not exceed
the minimum number required.”86 It is important to consider the merits of such a
recommendation, which provides a useful analytical basis to evaluate the unified
performance and identity of the ICC bench. The twenty-one judges elected to the ICC
from List B are listed in Table 10-4, below.
Table 10-4: Judges Elected by List B at the ICC (2003-2020)
Name

Region

Gender Division Attended
Rome
Conference
/On behalf of

Current Judges
Maria del Socorro Flores Liera

GRULAC

F

PTC

Y/Mexico

Gocha Lordkipanidze

EE

M

Appeals

Y/Georgia

Sergio Gerardo Ugalde
Godinez

GRULAC

M

PTC

N*

Marc Perrin de Brichambaut

WEOG

M

PTC

Y/France

Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua

African States

M

PTC

N

Péter Kovács

EE

M

PTC

N*

Reine Alapini-Gansou
Previous Judges
Raul Cano Pangalangan

African States

F

PTC

N

AP

M

Trial

Y/Philippines

Miriam Defensor-Santiago

AP

F

N/A

N

86

Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 8.
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Kuniko Ozaki

AP

F

Trial

N*

Mohamed Shahabuddeen

GRULAC

M

N/A

N

Sanji Monageng

African States

F

Appeals

N

Claude Jorda

WEOG

M

PTC

N

Navanethem Pillay

African States

F

N/A

N

René Blattmann

GRULAC

M

Trial

N

Hans-Peter Kaul

WEOG

M

PTC

Y/Germany

Erkki Kourula

WEOG

M

Appeals

Y/Finland

Akua Kuenyehia

African States

F

Appeals

N

Philippe Kirsch

WEOG

M

Appeals

Y/Canada

Anita Usacka

EE

F

Appeals

N

Mauro Politi

WEOG

M

PTC

Y/Italy

*other civil service and/or diplomatic experience

As a cursory observation, the Rome Statute was negotiated by diplomats and the
inclusion of List B facilitates the potential nomination of those who drafted it. This
anomaly could reasonably raise legitimacy concerns and create suspicion about the
intended purpose of List B altogether. It is perhaps ethically ambiguous for an individual
to both draft the law on behalf of government and then interpret, implement, and enforce
it from a neutral unbiased perspective as a judge. The decisions made by the ICC today
will bind future judges in their decision-making–an objective reading of the law in the
Court’s nascency is a central point of concern. On a broader scale, the notion that an
individual could contribute to drafting the law and subsequently be tasked to interpret it
raises paternalistic concerns, which could stagnate the development of the law if it is not
looked at with fresh eyes. This concern is heightened by the fact that List B nominees are
not strictly required to have any criminal law experience and would be tasked with
opining on and developing complex matters of (international) criminal law–a clear
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departure from government-based diplomatic negotiations. It is worth noting that of the
fifty-four judges elected to the ICC bench at the time of writing, twelve are also
diplomats who attended the Rome Conference.87 Four of those twelve are current ICC
judges (two of which were elected in 2020): Maria del Socorro Flores Liera (Mexico, List
B); Gocha Lordkipanidze (Georgia, List B); Kimberly Prost (Canada, List A); and Marc
Perrin de Brichambaut (France, List B).
Altogether, eight of the twelve judges who attended the Rome Diplomatic
Conference were elected from List B.88 This matters since four of the diplomats-turnedjudges had enough expertise in criminal law to be elected from List A, which disturbs the
argument that diplomats at the Rome Conference simply included List B as a collective
strategy to facilitate future employment opportunities for themselves or other career
diplomats–though this indeed has happened, albeit on a limited basis. 22 per cent of all
judges attended the Rome Conference; 38 per cent of all judges elected by List B
attended the Rome Conference. The marginal uptick in the percentage of List B judges
who also attended the Rome Conference is logical, since List B was designed to include
exactly the sort of individual that would have been involved in the drafting of the Rome
Statute and thus have the necessary competence and experience in international law.
Whether it is appropriate to elect individuals with direct experience drafting the law that
they are subsequently tasked to interpret raises a far more important question and is one
which requires serious ethical and practical consideration. Similar concerns can be raised
about diplomats who represent their governments at the ASP, since these individuals will
have particular experience with the inner workings of the Court and potentially be guided
by national approaches or policies towards them.

87

These judges include Erkki Kourula (Finland), Hans-Peter Kaul (Germany), Silvia Fernández de
Gurmendi (Argentina), Phillippe Kirsch (Canada), Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Samoa), Mauro Politi (Italy),
Kimberly Prost (Canada), Raul Cano Pangalangan (Philippines), Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (France);
Maria del Socorro Flores Liera (Mexico); Gocha Lordkipanidze (Georgia); Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko
also attended, not as part of a state delegation but as a part of civil society and the Coalition for the
International Criminal Court.
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This includes Judge Hans-Peter Kaul (Germany); Judge Raul Cano Pangalangan (Philippines); Judge
Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (France); Judge Phillipe Kirsch (Canada); Judge Erkki Kourula (Finland);
Judge Mauro Politi (Italy); Judge Maria del Socorro Flores Liera (Mexico); Judge Gocha Lordkipanidze
(Georgia).
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Expanding the analytical focus, of the fifty-four judges elected to the ICC,
eighteen have been elected from List B.89 Thirty-three per cent of the candidates elected
from List B come from African States. This can be compared to 22 per cent from Latin
American and Caribbean States; 17 per cent from Western European and Other States; 17
per cent from Asia-Pacific States; and 11 per cent from Eastern European States,
respectively. Prima facie, it is unclear why the majority of the List B nominations have
come from African States and why this has not been the subject of any substantive
analysis. However, it is important to note that this pattern is beginning to change. At the
time of writing, there were four African judges on the bench: two were elected from List
A and two were elected from List B. However, in total, eleven judges have been elected
from African States at the ICC: six were nominated from List B, and five were nominated
from List A.90 Nevertheless, in its historical regional context, it remains true that the
majority of African judges at the ICC have been elected from List B.
Only three of the eleven African judges elected to the ICC are men, two of whom
were elected from List B. Of the seven women elected from List B to date, four are from
African States, two are from Asia-Pacific States, and one is from Latin American and
Caribbean States. Of the nine women currently on the bench, seven were elected from
List A, which is significant only inasmuch as gender representation would be largely
unaffected by the dissolution of List B candidatures in the future, should it be
implemented. Expanding the analysis, there have been twenty-four women elected as
ICC judges to date and eighteen of them were elected from List A. Thus, the general
trend indicates that women most often are successfully elected from List A, and the
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These judges include Maria del Socorro Flores Liera (GRULAC), Gocha Lordkipanidze (Eastern
European States), Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godinez (GRULAC), Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (WEOS),
Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua (African States), Péter Kovács (Eastern European States), Raul Cano
Pangalangan (Asia-Pacific States), Reine Alapini-Gansou (African States), Kuniko Ozaki (Asia-Pacific
States), Sanji Monageng (African States), Claude Jorda (WEOS), Navanethem Pillay (African States),
René Blattmann (GRULAC), Hans-Peter Kaul (WEOS), Akua Kuenyehia (African States), Daniel David
Ntanda Nsereko (African States).
90
The judges representing African States that were elected by List A include Joyce Aluoch, Fatoumata
Dembélé Diarra, Solomy Balungi Bossa, Chile Eboe-Osuji, and Miatta Maria Samba. It is interesting to
highlight that four out of the five judges elected from African States by List A are female. The overall
analytical value of this point is ambiguous at this time but remains an interesting feature of African
representation on the ICC judiciary.
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elimination of List B would have only a minimal impact on gender representation on the
bench–perhaps with the exception of African women based on overall election trends.
Another observed trend is that all but none of the current judges elected from List
B, at the time of writing, have been assigned to the Pre-Trial division, which is
responsible for issuing arrest warrants and/or summons to appear based on evidence
submitted by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).91 The Pre-Trial Division is also
responsible for authorizing investigations into situations under consideration by the
Office of Prosecutor proprio motu. Thus, the current construct of the bench is such that
List B elects largely serve as the institutional ‘gatekeepers’ and can therefore be seen as
mostly responsible for triggering Court (in)action at the earliest procedural stages. Only
two judges currently appointed to the Pre-Trial Division were elected from List A.92 Only
one List B candidate has been assigned to another division (Appeals). Thus, 86 per cent
of the List B candidates have been assigned to the Pre-Trial Division and make up the
majority of the division altogether. This was not always the case–previous judges elected
from List B were assigned to different divisions including two that were assigned to the
Trial division and three African judges that were assigned to the Appeals division. This is
significant inasmuch as it effectively demonstrates a strong institutional shift in the
assignments of judges to particular divisions over time, apparently based, at least in part,
on judicial competence and experience. Indeed, at the time of writing, two African judges
were assigned to the Pre-Trial Division; one African judge was assigned to the Trial
division; and one African judge was assigned to the Appeals Division. This division of
African representation within Chambers further demonstrates African representation
throughout the Court’s institutional construction. In the same vein, the composition of the
Court is a reflection of broader institutional choices that are subject to evaluation.

91

Marc Perrin de Brichambaut and Gocha Lordkipanidze were the only judges elected from List B to be
assigned to another division at the time of writing (both were assigned to Appeals), which were new
assignments by the President in 2021. Judge Brichambaut was moved from the Pre-Trial division and Judge
Lordkipanidze was beginning his first term.
92
At the time of writing this included Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala (WEOS) and Judge Tomoko Akane
(Asia-Pacific).
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On this basis, the contemporary approach to appoint the overwhelming majority
of List B Judges to the Pre-Trial division could be subject to scrutiny when situated
within Article 39(1) of the Rome Statute, which says:
As soon as possible after the election of the judges, the Court shall organize itself
into the divisions specified in article 34, paragraph (b). The Appeals Division
shall be composed of the President and four other judges, the Trial Division of not
less than six judges and the Pre-Trial Division of not less than six judges. The
assignment of judges to divisions shall be based on the nature of the functions to
be performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges
elected to the Court, in such a way that each division shall contain an appropriate
combination of expertise in criminal law and procedure and in international law.
The Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall be composed predominantly of judges
with criminal trial experience.93
Considering the reality that two out of six judges appointed to the Pre-Trial Division at
the time of writing had criminal trial experience (List A)–this is a significant imbalance
in need of restructuring. When levied against the problematic decisions that the Pre-Trial
has made, most egregiously in unanimously deciding not to allow the Prosecutor to open
an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, it becomes presumptive that putting
politically minded individuals in the Pre-Trial Division yields politically reasoned
decisions. This is especially so because Pre-Trial Chamber II acknowledged that the
Prosecutor had fulfilled the procedural requirements to authorize an investigation, yet
unanimously denied her request because such an investigation was determined not to be
in the ‘interests of justice’ based purely on political (not legal) factors.94

10.8

The Situation in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the Pre-Trial Chamber Judges included Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe
Mindua (List B); Judge Tomoko Akane (List A); and Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala

93

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 39(1) [emphasis added].
Pre-Trial II, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (12 April 2019), ICC-02/17.
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(List A). Thus, both List A Judges appointed to the Pre-Trial Division were responsible
for this problematic and widely criticized decision.95 This is highlighted by the fact that
the Prosecutor was unanimously authorized to open an investigation in Afghanistan on
Appeal.96 All five judges appointed to the Appeals Division in this case were elected
from List A.97 On Appeal, it was determined that:
the Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in considering the
‘interests of justice factor’ when examining the Prosecutor’s request for
authorization to open an investigation. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the PreTrial Chamber should have addressed only whether there was a reasonable factual
basis for the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation, in the sense of whether
crimes have been committed, and whether the potential case(s) arising from such
investigation would appear to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. Noting that the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision contained all the necessary factual findings and had
confirmed that there is a reasonable basis to consider that crimes within the ICC
jurisdiction have been committed in Afghanistan, the Appeals Chamber decided
to authorize the opening of an investigation itself, rather than to send the matter
back to the Pre Trial Chamber for a new decision.98
On this basis, the Pre-Trial Chamber asked broader, political questions that they were not
tasked to consider in deciding to authorize the Prosecutor’s investigation or not. This
resulted in flawed decision-making and a problematic outcome that compromised the
legitimacy and credibility of the ICC as a whole. Taken in its entirety, the Pre-Trial
Chamber essentially concluded that the investigation in Afghanistan would be politically
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Christian de Vos, “No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big Implications,”
International Justice Monitor (15 April 2019) blogpost available at https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/noicc-investigation-in-afghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/; accessed 10 October 2020); Mark
Kersten, “The ICC was wrong to deny prosecution request for Afghan probe,” Aljazeera (12 April 2019)
available at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/12/the-icc-was-wrong-to-deny-prosecutionrequest-for-afghan-probe/; accessed 10 October 2020.
96
Judgment on the appeal against the decision on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-138 (5 March 2020), Appeals Chamber, available at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/17-138; accessed 21 October 2020.
97
This included Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa; Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza; Piotr Hofmanski; Howard
Morrison; and Chile Eboe-Osuji.
98
Afghanistan: ICC Appeals Chamber authorises the opening of an investigation, Press Release (5 March
2020), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1516; accessed 21 October 2020.
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difficult because of the alleged perpetrators involved–i.e. the United States military and
intelligence agencies, and should be avoided altogether. It was argued that “the
investigation in Afghanistan would inevitably require a significant amount of resources…
such a stillborn investigation will result in the Prosecutor having to reallocate its financial
and human resources, putting in jeopardy more realistic investigations and
prosecutions.”99
This is particularly problematic when viewed through the lens of Africans who
have been the subject of ICC intervention, even under contentious political
circumstances. For example, in the situation in Burundi, the Pre Trial Chamber
authorized the Prosecutor to open an investigation proprio motu even though “the
Government of Burundi has interfered with, intimidated, or harmed victims and
witnesses… the Government of Burundi is suspending international cooperation in
connection with the alleged crimes.”100 Note that in Burundi, the Pre-Trial Chamber was
composed of two judges from List B (Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua and Judge Raul
C. Pangalangan) and one judge from List A (Judge Chang-ho Chung). The comparatively
uneven application of the Rome Statute in the situations in Afghanistan and Burundi can
best be understood as politics disrupting law. The implicit notion that African situations
and cases are ‘more realistic’ is highly contentious and reiterates the manifestation of
realpolitik– even in the minds and decision-making processes of judges themselves.
It is also necessary to point out that the Pre-Trial Division had, at the time of
writing, authorized the Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation in every African
situation requested, including the situations in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya–neither of which
were particularly ‘politically stable’ environments, which directly impacted the
Prosecutor’s (in)ability to secure a conviction in both cases due to a lack of evidence and
widespread witness tampering. The decision not to authorize an investigation in the
situation in Afghanistan risked emphasizing the Court’s biased treatment of Africans and
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Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua,(31 May 2019), ICC-02/17, para.
32 [emphasis added] available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_03049.PDF ; accessed
12 January 2021.
100
Public Redacted Version of ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi,” ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp (25 October
2017), para. 13-14.
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African situations by denying justice elsewhere. In the same vein, victims in Afghanistan
could rightly question why the crimes committed against them were not worthy of ICC
intervention when crimes committed in Africa are.
The ICC’s commitment to justice cannot be understood as contingent on the
actors or states involved, even in the face of extreme political backlash.101 This uneven
application of international criminal justice fuels disdain and lack of trust at the state and
individual levels, generally, and specifically. It should not be up to ICC judges to weigh
the political consequences of upholding the Rome Statute, it simply must be upheld.
Importantly, while the current construct of the Pre-Trial Division lends itself to
synonymity with List B judges, it is important to note that in the Afghanistan decision,
two of the three judges were elected from List A and the decision was reached
unanimously. Such decisions reiterate that it is a judges’ character that is at the core of
his or her suitability and aptitude for the job, which is not contingent on whether or not
they have criminal law or international law experience per se. The ultimate point
demonstrated by this example is that List A judges are just as capable of making ‘bad’
decisions as those elected from List B. In reality, the Pre-Trial Chamber with a majority
of List B judges authorized the Prosecutor’s investigation in Burundi, regardless of the
difficult political circumstances surrounding such a decision.102 It is the responsibility of

101

Note, generally, that The United States authorized sanctions and travel restrictions against International
Criminal Court employees investigating the situation in Afghanistan, including Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda
and Phakiso Mochochoko (Head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division), and
others attempting to investigate alleged crimes committed by US citizens in Afghanistan since 2003, for
example.
102
It is important to note that African Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua (List B) was a member of PreTrial Chamber in both the Burundi and Afghanistan decisions. It is necessary to point out the relative
inconsistency in his reasoning. In his dissenting opinion in the situation in Afghanistan, Judge Antoine
Kesia-Mbe Mindua said at paragraph 25 “since the Prosecutor has not determined that initiating an
investigation in the Burundi situation ‘would not serve the interests of justice’ and, importantly, taking into
account the views of the victims which overwhelmingly spoke in favour of commencing an investigation,
the Chamber considered that there were indeed no substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would
not serve the interests of justice.” The same approach was taken by the Prosecutor in Afghanistan. Judge
Kesia-Mbe Mindua’s dissenting opinion at para. 27 says that “…the Prosecutor has identified no substantial
reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation into the situation would not serve the ‘interests of
justice.” Thus, the Pre-Trial Chamber took it upon itself to render an investigation into the situation in
Afghanistan to be not in the interests of justice for practical (political) reasons. It remains unclear why this
was not done in Burundi (or any other African situation) but was done in Afghanistan. This sort of uneven
application of the Rome Statute and hyper focus in African situations is thematic no matter whether
situations are referred by the United Nations Security Council (i.e. the referral of the situation in Darfur and
the denial of the referral of the situation in Syria) or when the Prosecutor seeks authorization from the Pre-
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the ICC to enforce the principles enumerated in the Rome Statute, not to cower to
powerful States that might interfere with its operational effectiveness. The ultimate blame
should always lie with those bearing the most responsibility for the perpetration of the
most serious international crimes–never with the institution designed to respond to them.
The only way that the ICC will continue to gain international respect and strength is to
consistently and credibly fulfill its mandate head on, rather than succumbing to political
pressure by a handful of powerful states. To this end, judges must be able to reasonably
divorce politics from law, even though the ICC is a practical function of both. The
political consequences of their decisions should be a distant or moot consideration in
their judicial reasoning, which requires a particular temperament based on principles of
objectivity, neutrality, and rationality above all else.

10.9

Conclusion

The substantive and widespread criticism of the ICC judiciary by scholars and observers
are well-founded and complex. These problems can be explained in structural terms–i.e.
by the design of the Rome Statute itself (specifically its provisions with respect to judges)

Trial Chamber to open an investigation proprio motu. This is problematic optically and practically. Further,
this sort of judicial inconsistency raises serious questions about the objectivity and neutrality of Judge
Kesia-Mbe Mindua and the rationality of Trial Chamber III as a whole in reaching its decision in the
situation in Afghanistan. Worth noting, Pre-Trial Chamber III noted in its Decision Pursuant to Article 15
of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation into the Situation in the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17 (12 April 2019) at para. 27 that “A high number of victims of
the situation have come forward to present their views on whether the Chamber should authorise the
commencement of the Prosecutor’s investigation into the situation. Overall, the Court has received a total
of 794 representations in Dari and Pashto, as well as Arabic, English and German of which 699 were
transmitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber on behalf of the following victims: 668 representations on behalf of
6,220 individuals; 17 representations on behalf of 1,690 families; 13 representations on behalf of several
millions of victims, including 26 villages; and 1 representation on behalf of an institution.” It is similarly
curious as to why the victims that spoke overwhelmingly in favour of opening an investigation in Burundi
were heard, but those in the situation in Afghanistan were not. This sort of piecemeal or fragmented judicial
reasoning is wholly problematic, particularly when viewed with the broader aim to establish coherent legal
standards and jurisprudence. Judge Kesia-Mbe Mindua’s dissenting opinion at paragraph 53 says that “The
Chamber, which is sensitive to the victims’ situation, has taken such a decision also in their interests, in
preserving the Court’s credibility. The Judges’ decision is a legal determination, even though they have
taken into account certain factors linked to the security on the ground and to the States cooperation or lack
of cooperation. It should be stressed that the ICC Judges are not politicians and they are guided only by law
even though the Court operates in a highly political environment. To sum up, this decision not to authorise
the investigation is a legal one and it is beneficial to international criminal justice.” This opinion is
flagrantly riddled with logical inconsistencies and ill-founded determinations that caused irreparable
credibility and reputational harms to the Court before this decision was unanimously reversed on Appeal.
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and, perhaps even more so in political terms–i.e. the way that states employ the Rome
Statute vis-à-vis the Assembly of States Parties to maximize particular interests,
particularly in the judicial nomination and election stages. Once elected, some judges
have acted inappropriately, and even more egregiously, the judges as a collective have
largely failed to arrive at cogent decisions in an efficient manner, best exemplified by
extraordinarily long detainment periods for suspects and the myriad of acquittals and
overturned decisions at various stages that have disproportionately affected Africans both
directly and indirectly.
Against this backdrop, Africans have been subject to the decisions of ICC judges,
yet have always had equitable representation on the ICC bench, at the time of writing.
African governments continue to engage in ICC judicial nominations and elections at an
extraordinarily high levels of engagement. This is reflected by high nomination numbers
across the region and the associated increase in representation of African judges on the
bench throughout the Court’s history. This activism and engagement on the part of
African states within the ICC functions as an effective counter to the power of developed
states within the institution. Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge ‘African’
inclusion in the ICC judiciary, including on the part of states and individuals. Such an
acknowledgement illuminates that the shortcomings observed with the bench are shared
and will require collective international commitment to remedy in the years ahead
through more robust and exhaustive national nomination procedures. What is perhaps
most important to highlight is that African states continue to engage within the
framework of the ICC by seeking representation on the judiciary, which reiterates that
there is indeed African ownership over the type of justice being dispensed by the Court.
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Chapter 11

11

Conclusion

This dissertation has answered four interrelated questions. The first asked what kind of
International Criminal Court African states wanted out of an International Criminal Court
(ICC or Court) before and during the Rome Statute negotiations in 1998. The second
inquiry interrogated why African states have ratified the Rome Statute more than states
from any other region even though they did not get the kind of Court that they wanted.
The third question asked about the origins of the criticisms levied by African states
against the ICC. Finally, the dissertation answered why African states have chosen to
commit and/or stay committed to the Court by signing, ratifying, and implementing the
Rome Statute despite the compromises reached in Rome and significant criticism levied
against the ICC since.
This dissertation has argued that African states were among the group of states
that viewed the ICC and the Rome Statute as a means to restructure the global order and
hierarchy of states but also those that viewed international criminal justice as an
important normative prerogative for the protection of international human rights and
security. This informed the idealized ‘African’ vision of the ICC pre-Rome and during
the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998. The compromises reached at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference were largely the result of concerns raised by the Permanent Five
members of the United Nations Security Council, particularly elements that threatened
the existing power structures and global hierarchy thereto. This was an unfortunate
political dilemma, since states such as China, Russia, and the United States never ratified
the Rome Statute, and have given no indication that they ever plan to, at least at the time
of writing. Therefore, for the states that have chosen to be bound by the Rome Statute
System, it is a system that reflects the status quo, especially the post-war power dynamics
that have permeated the global order in critical respects. In the context of the ICC, this
includes the ability of the Security Council to refer and defer cases at the ICC, as well as
the omission of nuclear weapons from the list of prohibited weapons used in war. In
seeking to better understand why African states would sign, ratify, and implement the
Rome Statute into domestic law despite these significant compromises in the Court’s
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architecture, the dissertation argued that African normative commitment, agency, and
activism in the Rome Statute negotiation processes, coupled with the comparatively high
regional experience with the sorts of crimes covered by the Rome Statute (especially the
Rwandan genocide) were catalysts for African ICC support. When addressing the
sustained commitment of African states to the ICC despite widespread criticism during
the Court’s operational years, the dissertation made two arguments: (1) For the most part,
African states have remained strongly committed to the international criminal justice
norm even when actively criticizing the ICC, or when attempting to regionalize
international criminal justice within the AU. And (2), the dissertation argued that the
ability of African leaders to manipulate the ICC to achieve domestic political ends is a
significant factor that has affected sustained institutional commitment in several African
contexts.
The overarching argument made throughout the dissertation is that African
involvement in the establishment of the ICC, its engagement with the resultant Court in
terms of high ratification rates, self-referral of cases, and the continent’s representation
within all major branches of the Court (including prominent positions within the judiciary
and the Office of the Prosecutor) supports the notion that the Court is as much ‘African’
as it is global. While Afro-centric concerns illuminate some serious institutional
weaknesses, attempts to regionalize international criminal justice offer an opportunity to
bolster the international criminal justice regime, strengthen the norms that undergird it,
and proliferate the intended aims of justice and accountability for atrocity crimes that are
most relevant to the continent as part of a robust system of international criminal justice.
The dissertation also argued that African criticisms of the ICC need to be taken
seriously because of the significant long-term regional involvement, engagement, and
commitment to the success of the project. There are normative reasons for doing so–that
is, to create a better and stronger ICC that reflects the policy preferences of its member
states. But there is also a more practical reason for doing so. The holism of the institution
depends on the support of states and the Court’s sustainability will be in jeopardy if it
fails to acquire the necessary political will and cooperation of its member states to be
effective. Despite claims that the ICC is an objective and neutral legal institution, in
reality it is not. Rather, it is deeply embedded in the complexities of the international
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political arena. Failure to acknowledge and adequately respond to the issues raised by the
states in which it operates (or seeks to operate), especially in historically disenfranchised
parts of the Global South (and Africa in particular), unnecessarily feeds a narrative of
paternalism and neocolonialism, which contributes to the manifestation of a serious
legitimacy crisis at the ICC.
The basis of the dissertation emanates from a conceptualization of an Afro-centric
vision of a prospective ICC. In doing so, the dissertation provided a novel analysis of
African positions on highly contested issues at the Rome Diplomatic Conference based
on the statements of delegates in the plenary meetings. These statements were situated
within the context of regional meetings conducted by the South African Development
Community in 1997, the African Regional Conference for the Establishment of an ICC in
Dakar, Senegal in 1998, and the participation of African diplomats in the Preparatory
Committee meetings at the United Nations leading up to the Rome Diplomatic
Conference. This content analysis provided a holistic account of an ‘African’ vision of an
ICC, which offered a theoretical basis to consider the significance of the compromises
that were ultimately integrated into the final package and text of the Rome Statute.
The remainder of the dissertation relies upon this conceptualization of an
‘African’ vision of an ideal ICC, since it uses the negotiated deficits as explanatory
factors to better understand and explain contemporary criticisms on the part of the AU
and some African states with the Court’s operationalization. Relying on the ICC’s
indictment of Omar Al Bashir, the dissertation examined how the United Nations
Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC triggered sensitivities and
reiterated the pervasive inequalities that dominate the international political order which
subjugate African states and Africans to the beneficial exclusion of others. This point of
view was (and has continued to be) compounded by two distinct factors: (1) the Security
Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC but has not done so in situations of
comparable gravity based solely on political factors and manifestations of realpolitik; and
(2) the indictment of a sitting head of state of a non-states party to the ICC deeply
infringed upon the principle of the sovereign equality of states. Both of these objective
realities are directly related to the concerns of politicization and revealed the seriousness
of imbedding hierarchical political inequalities into the architecture of the ICC, which
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African states cited before and during the Rome Statute negotiations as a high priority
issue with respect to the Court’s construction. The legitimate difficulties that the AU had
with ICC’s indictment of Al Bashir, and the lack of genuine discourse with respect to
those difficulties, contributed to the proliferation of anti-ICC rhetoric and policy,
including the more problematic objection and opposition to the indictment of leaders of
states parties (e.g. Kenya). This policy decision on the part of the AU rested on
normatively shaky ground and subjected the more legitimate arguments launched by the
AU to discreditation on the basis that it was attempting to protect African leaders at any
cost. Notwithstanding this, the dissertation placed an emphasis on the more substantive
concerns with the ICC’s behaviour in African situations and contexts, utilizing the
disparity between institutional expectations and reality as an explanatory and analytical
tool.
Similarly, the AU’s attempts to regionalize international criminal justice was
examined and considered not as a competitor institution promoting an opposing court, but
instead as a compatible one under the auspice of complementarity. The dissertation
focused on the overall value of including an afro-centric international criminal justice
mechanism within the international criminal justice system. It argued that ‘Africa’ values
international criminal justice and the norms that undergird the project. As such, the
African Court could offer an intermediary mechanism at a level that rests between the
state and the international sphere to address violations of international criminal law that
disproportionately affect the continent. Relying on ‘Africa’s’ longstanding commitment
to the ICC, the dissertation argued that the AU regional court is another manifestation of
normative commitment to the aims and values of international criminal law, and ought to
be adequately and fairly considered as an integrative response both to concerns raised
about the function of the ICC, but perhaps more importantly to its inherent deficiencies
and limitations, based on the scope of the Rome Statute itself. Indeed, the African Court
incorporates more crimes than the Rome Statute, and conceptualizes a form of
international criminal justice that encapsulates continentally relevant criminal activities
and behaviours. It is argued that immunity for sitting heads of state, as provided by the
Malabo Protocol, does not eliminate the ICC’s waiver of immunity and even if it did,
makes little material difference in the practical exercise of justice (at the time of writing).
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Thus, the ideation of an international criminal court on the part of African states is once
again re-imagined in the context of an African Court and provides important insight into
a regional conceptualization of the purpose and utility of international criminal courts.
Lastly, the dissertation argues that African states remain committed to the ICC
through high engagement within the Court’s structures, and the judiciary in particular. It
was argued that African states have been adequately represented on the ICC bench
throughout the Court’s history. The dissertation systematically demonstrated that African
states have exercised high levels of engagement by nominating the highest number of
judicial candidates for appointment out of any region. The overall point was to evidence
that African states and African individuals have continued to be involved in the highest
levels of the Court’s operationalization. As such, the ICC has woven African
representation into its institutional fabric at all stages of its evolution and development.
The utility of this argument is that it offers a formidable challenge to the assertion that the
Court is ‘European’ or neocolonial and instead recasts the narrative to both acknowledge
and appreciate the vitally important role of African governments and African individuals
in the Court’s day-to-day function. Consequently, Africans are equitably responsible for
the institutional shortcomings of the Court, which have become apparent throughout its
operationalization primarily in African contexts. Nevertheless, the fact that African
governments continue to seek representation on the ICC bench demonstrates a preference
for involvement within the ICC, as opposed to outright abandon or rejection of the
project altogether. This offers formidable support for the notion that African states
remain committed to the ICC and the norms that undergird the international criminal
justice project, whether for reasons of political self-interest or otherwise.

11.1

Understanding African Discontent

This dissertation argues that African states were deeply, authentically, and meaningfully
involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute and had a vision of an ideal international
criminal court heading into the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998. The compromises
reached in Rome were substantial in key areas and can be linked to the contemporary
discontent and criticism levied by some African states and the AU against the resultant
ICC. Normative commitment to international criminal justice stemming from the regional
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experience with widespread human rights violations and judicial responses to the same in
the context of Rwanda fostered broad support from African governments and individuals
for the establishment of a permanent court. This support was sustained even though the
weaknesses in the Court’s institutional design were well-known by African delegates.
This project argued that African states remain committed to ‘international
criminal justice’ broadly considered, including the ICC, even while actively criticizing it.
Since the ICC has operated disproportionately in African contexts, it is important to
meaningfully evaluate the concerns raised by those most affected by its activities, in the
interest of constructive reform. It is well acknowledged that the Rome Statute is an
imperfect treaty and the compromises reached in Rome were substantial. Therefore, the
dissertation argued that meaningful engagement and dialogue are required to bolster the
institutional strength of the Court, and to remedy the ostensive issues in its structure or
else application.
The strength of employing a content analysis combined with in-depth interviews
of those involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute allows for a conceptualization of the
kind of court that ‘Africa’ really wanted. This formulation allows not only for a measure
of the seriousness of the compromises reached in the final package presented in Rome,
but also offers a greater understanding of how African states imagined the ways in which
an ICC could fit within, or even shift, the global hierarchy and political landscape. The
disappointment that some African states and the AU have expressed towards the ICC can
be explicably traced back to the disparity between the ‘African’ conceptualization of an
ideal ICC and what was ultimately negotiated in Rome in key respects. At the same time,
the dissertation demonstrated that African governments were very much aware of the
limitations of the final package presented in Rome, but chose to commit to the Court
anyway.
While the dissertation acknowledges and evaluates the merits of the concerns
raised by some African states and the AU, it primarily focuses on explaining the root
causes of this discontent, which it argued, stem in large part from the deficiencies in the
Court’s institutional design as a reaction to the interests of the most powerful states.
Perhaps the greatest irony is that the powerful states that vehemently guided the
negotiations on key issues such as the powers of the United Nations Security Council to
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refer and defer cases, and the glaring omission of nuclear weapons from the prohibited
list, are not States Parties to the Rome Statute (and do not appear to plan to join) and are
largely insulated from its jurisdictional reach. Thus, states that choose to be members of
the ICC have committed to an institution designed and heavily influenced by the
constraints of realpolitik. In many respects, African states saw the ICC as an opportunity
to reorder international politics. Instead, the negotiated Rome Statute reflected a
reshuffling of the same stacked deck that privileges the most powerful states. This
narrative is supported by the fact that the United Nations Security Council has been
willing to refer African situations involving non-states parties to the Court, but not others,
including serious situations involving members of the Security Council where it could
reasonably be concluded that the types of crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute had
been committed. Even so, the choice to commit to the ICC by so many African states
suggests that beyond rationality or self-interest, norms also inform (and continue to
inform) policy preferences and guide behaviour domestically, regionally, and
internationally.
Yet, African commitment to the Rome Statute and cooperation with the ICC
provide different measures of normativity. Indeed, African states have been unwilling to
cooperate with the ICC when it has attempted to target leaders whether in a States Party
or otherwise, suggesting that an uneven application of the Rome Statute and/or
intervention into the affairs of sovereign states is generally not agreeable unless it
coalesces with domestic political interests. The dissertation highlighted the ability of
African governments to instrumentalize the ICC and emphasized the ways in which
African states have worked within the Rome Statute System to leverage various political
objectives, suggesting that it is not only traditionally powerful states that are able to
manipulate the Court’s overall ability to operate effectively. Thus, the ICC’s reliance on
the cooperation and political will of states to be effective is a limiting factor not only as it
relates to traditionally powerful states, but also the less powerful–including those in
Africa.

339

11.2

Avenues for Reform

This dissertation has implications in terms of policy and theory. Perhaps more
importantly, it also provides a new framework through which to view prospective
avenues for constructive reform at the ICC on the basis of African concerns and
criticisms stemming from the Court’s operationalization in its nascent years. While a
substantial amount of literature has evaluated various aspects of the ‘Africa-ICC crisis,’
few have considered the seriousness of ‘Africa’s’ historical involvement in the
development of the ICC project, or considered this involvement as an explanatory tool to
make better sense of the institutional weaknesses cited by some African states and the
AU from 2005 onwards. The point is not to accept the criticisms levied against the Court
by some African states and/or the AU wholesale. Rather, the dissertation simply provides
a means to recast and resituate the problems with the ICC in their relevant historical
context, which reveals the far more deep-seated and complex political dynamism at play.
Focusing on the genuine efforts of African governments and African individuals
to promote the international criminal justice project allows for a better understanding as
to why the AU has voiced opposition towards the Court and has attempted to regionalize
international criminal justice. The dissertation considered the ideological disparity
between what the ICC was hoped to be and what it actually is as fundamentally
explanatory of the pan-African response. Thus, efforts to regionalize international
criminal justice at the AU court are better understood as a secondary attempt to integrate
an African vision of an ICC into the international political landscape. While aspects of
this vision are open to skepticism, on the balance it offers particular insight into the most
pressing institutional issues with the ICC from an African perspective.
In the context of norm theory, African involvement with the ICC can be framed
both progressively and regressively. However, the dissertation focused on the ways in
which African commitment to the ICC, involvement within the ICC’s institutional
apparatuses, and criticism of the Court’s operationalization and behaviour can each be
framed separately and in tandem as generally advancing the international criminal justice
norm. While diffusion may happen in different ways across time and space, the
overwhelming evidence suggests that African states remain heavily committed to the
Court and the international criminal justice norm that undergirds it. Thus, the findings of
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the dissertation suggested that African states have provided incredibly useful insight into
the Court’s institutional shortcomings. If the problems illuminated by some African states
and the AU are responded to with meaningful and measured consideration, such insights
could reasonably contribute to the increased robustness and strength of the ICC
altogether. On this basis, there is a need to consider the utility of the criticisms levied
against the Court based on its behaviour and operationalization, if not to integrate
responses to those problems either in terms of treaty reform or within the general
procedural processes at the Court through its various organs and institutional channels.
Most of all, the dissertation demonstrated that many of the institutional weaknesses of the
ICC stem from the behaviour of states both inside and outside of Africa, and not
necessarily with the Court per se.

11.3

Future Research

The Africa-ICC relationship offers multiple pathways for a continued research agenda.
As the ICC moves past its hyper-focus on African situations and has recently opened
investigations into alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan, the State of Palestine,
Bangladesh/Myanmar, and Georgia, it faces another onslaught of opposition, criticism,
and challenges. It would appear in many respects that African concerns with the ICC
have been acknowledged and taken seriously, based on the decision of the Prosecutor to
pursue cases elsewhere, particularly in the incredibly difficult political contexts
referenced above. It is important for the Court’s holism to intervene whenever it is in the
interest of justice to do so, no matter the political circumstance. Yet, in the context of an
ongoing research agenda, it will be useful to consider whether or not the problems
identified by African states are shared by states in other regions. Comparative analyses in
this respect could offer further explanatory value and provide a means to consider areas
for institutional reform. The ability of the ICC to achieve its stated goals and to contribute
to the proliferation of justice in a global context can be better analyzed based on its
involvement in a truly ‘international’ sense. Further, whether or not the ICC is actually
able to do its job in contexts outside of Africa and outside of the context of self-referral,
especially of rebels or warlords, by states, will be a definitive marker of the state of the
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international criminal justice and accountability norm as well as the principle of the
sovereign equality of states, broadly understood.
Beyond these areas of research, whether or not the ICC has actually contributed to
localized deterrence, the bolstering of national justice mechanisms, or the achievement of
transitional justice and/or post-conflict reconstruction efforts can only be judged
retrospectively with the benefit of time. Thus, the effects of the ICC on the contexts in
which it has operated–only in Africa at the time of writing, can be better understood as
part of a holistic research agenda stemming from a place of institutional self-reflexivity
and honest evaluation about the Court’s success in terms of its ability to advance human
security, human rights, and justice at multiple levels of engagement. It will be important
to monitor whether African responses to the ICC, particularly in terms of the
establishment of a regional court to prosecute international crimes, becomes prioritized
by African governments in the future, and relatedly, to evaluate whether more local
responses better achieve the stated goals of international criminal justice mechanisms.
In terms of whether the compromises reached in Rome were too significant, it will
be necessary to evaluate whether or not the ICC is able to achieve its purpose without the
support of the most powerful states. The Rome Statute can be rightly framed as a civil
society and middle and weak power state achievement; how this can explain institutional
effectiveness will be a continuous task for future research. Moreover, whether or not the
negotiated Rome Statute fails to encapsulate all that it ought to either terms of the content
of the Statute itself or its jurisdictional reach, will be revealed by the need to establish
even more nested institutions, such as regional courts with a similar mandate to the ICC,
or a spurt of the establishment of ad hoc or hybrid tribunals as a response to gross and
widespread human rights violations (i.e. the United Nations’ establishment of the
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism in Syria–IIIM in 2016). Thus,
whether or not the ICC holds a necessary place in the international political and legal
landscape for the advancement of international criminal justice ought to be a part of a
continued research agenda.
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